SOAS Undergraduate Research Journal

Foreword

This is the first edition of the SOAS Undergraduate Research Journal and I am delighted to see it in print. The Journal was conceived in response to several clear needs. As an academic at SOAS, it is common to see undergraduate work that makes a stunning contribution to the disciplines from which it comes. In many ways, this is should come as no surprise – our student body is usually highly engaged, and personally committed. The work produced at the undergraduate level can have a depth and resonance at SOAS that may not occur elsewhere, as our adherence to interdisciplinarity and critical evaluation are often fertile ground for new and exciting perspectives.

This Journal provides a vehicle for such work to be read more widely and to have more academic impact. Importantly it encourages a breadth of topic and methodology, making it a vital contribution to the world of academic publishing that is often founded on the privileging of certain approaches and topics over others. As such, it speaks to the SOAS mission to use our research, scholarship and teaching to make an impact in the communities with which we engage in the UK and around the world. A cornerstone of this is that our research and teaching consciously produces challenging perspectives that help to build bridges in a complex world and apply a global lens to the critical issues of our time.

As well as providing a place where exciting and thought-provoking academic contributions can be published, the Journal also equips our students with essential skills. Many undergraduate students want an insight into the skills of writing for journals and the experience of academic publishing. At SOAS we aim to produces graduates and researchers who can influence and make an impact throughout their careers. I look forward to the lasting impact this journal will have on those who participate either as authors or as members of the editorial board.

If the Journal was born from need, then its creation has been a work of belief and partnership. It has been wonderful to see the team-work between students, academics and professional services staff. Elsewhere in the journal the Editorial team are commended, and it is fitting that I do so again here. I particularly want to thank Ben Mason for his unflagging stewardship of this project. Finally, there have been a group of academics who have been committed to supporting the project and the editorial team. Thank you all for belief that the excellent research output of our students should be matched by an excellent home for publication.

Prof Deborah Johnston

SOAS Pro-Director (Learning & Teaching)

SOAS Undergraduate Research Journal

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Editorial

The SOAS Undergraduate Research Journal was founded in 2019 with the intention of introducing undergraduate students to the world of academic publishing and providing a platform to showcase the work of both current and former undergraduate students at SOAS. The journal reflects the great diversity that is present at SOAS and is open to all the regions and disciplines that the undergraduate students are engaged with. The editorial board of the journal also consists of SOAS undergraduate students, although, for this inaugural issue, the editorial board has received great support, guidance, and help from the staff in the advisory board. The SOAS Undergraduate Research Journal provides a great opportunity for students at SOAS to be involved with an academic journal early on in their academic careers, either through having their work published or through participation in the editorial process.

Our task as the co-editors of this inaugural issue of the journal has been challenging at times, but incredibly rewarding. We would like to extend our gratitude to the journal's editorial board of fellow undergraduate students - Timothy Lim, Tamara Harvey, Marie Kwon, Dita Said Hashi Warsame, Madhur Wale, and Seren Thomas, who have been active in all parts of this process- from designing the logo to establishing the submission criteria and carefully reviewing papers.

We would also like to mention the invaluable guidance of the advisory board, and especially the Learning and Teaching Project Manager, Mr. Ben Mason who has invested great thought into this project. We are beyond excited to showcase the academic work being produced at an undergraduate level at SOAS, in this first publication of the SOAS Undergraduate Research Journal. In this inaugural issue we present eight papers written by students at various points in their undergraduate degree, with various themes, and from various disciplines.

First, George Smith, studying for a BA in Social Anthropology, offers a study of Britain's 'Travellers' and 'Ex-Travellers'. Through his ethnographic work, Smith explores the reasons why some choose to 'stay on the road' while others choose to leave this way of life. His paper contributes with great insight into the culture of the so-called 'New Age Travellers' and asks the question of how their 'creationist culture' is sustained?

Through a case study of the Värtsilä community located at the Finnish-Russian border, recent BA Development Studies graduate Grace Elizabeth Richardson, presents an interesting rethinking of borders. Her paper offers an insightful discussion of the relationship between the theory and the reality of borders.

Agnes Schim van der Loeff, who also recently graduated with a BA in Arabic & Development Studies, discusses the challenges that arises when framing climate change as an issue of national security. With this, the paper offers a critical assessment of using national security as the main framework of international politics.

Chinese & Economics student, Camilla Munkedal, writes an interesting paper on China's economic development experience. With a particular focus on the institutional barriers to labour migration, Munkedal offers a discussion of the 'Lewis Model' as a framework for development economics of China.

BA International Relations student Arzu Abbasova's paper pays close attention to the generative and transformative aspect of the Sri Lankan War on a societal and global level. Tracing the creation of Sinhalese and Tamil identity to the violent process of state-building, Abbasova offers a critical approach to the study of 'ethnic' conflicts.

In a thought-provoking paper on militarism in a post-trauma Myanmar Theint Theint Thu, who studies for an LLB Law degree, points out how human rights discourse fails to account for the deeply ingrained injustices of an authoritarian society.

Based on her own ethnographic fieldwork in a Christian Science Church in London, Greta von Albertini, who recently graduated from a BA in Social Anthropology, presents an anthropological study of how suffering and healing are conceptualised within this new religious movement.

Finally, Julia Frances Alice Everett, studying for a BA in International Relations & Development Studies, seeks out the root causes of the very real London housing crisis by placing it in the context of government policies that are increasingly informed by neoliberal ideology. This paper contributes to the strand of scholars that seek to bring attention to the importance of everyday life in the study of international political economy.

Hilde Rønnaug Kitterød

Ada Özenci

SOAS Undergraduate Research Journal Co-editors

Contents

The Change and Continuities of British New Travellers

George Smith

Abstract

During Thatcher's Britain (1979-1990), the inner-city squatting movement and the hippy convoy movements of the 1970s formed a new lifestyle culture, termed 'New Age Travellers' by the contemporary media. It was a reaction to the injustices of early neoliberalism and a romantic desire to salvage what was left of the natural world before every facet of life became 'up for sale'. Over three decades since the birth of this movement, I explore the life-worlds of those who remain on the road today and those who retreated into more conventional forms of living. The piece asks what sustains a 'creationist culture' such as this, in contrast to other travelling cultures who are sustained through family heritage and tradition. I address some of the familiar misconceptions and stereotypes of a culture which has all too often been spoken for, concluding that the lifestyle is sustained by a commitment to craftsmanship and an integral appreciation (and tolerance) for nature.

Keywords: 'New Age Travellers', Wales, Nomadic life, Techne, Ethnographic research

It had been six days since the whole thing started; music was blaring out of the numerous sound systems. The park-up of trucks, buses, caravans and cars created a makeshift village separated by a maze of passageways. The old and the young alike, people from all walks of life, could be seen dancing next to the speakers or 'lunching out' in other people's buses. It was 1992. It was Castlemorton Common Free Festival. A mass congregation of Travellers and sound systems attracting an estimated 20,000 – 40,000 people from across the UK for a week-long party. Sophisticatedly orchestrated before the use of mobile phones or the internet, Castlemorton relied solely on word of mouth. News helicopters could be seen circling the site. In amongst the ravers, Travellers, students and locals, news reporters could be seen roaming the crowds to document this never-seen-before event. The whole nation was watching. There was a sense that something had begun. For some, their lives would never be the same again.

It was a cloudy December morning. An old postal truck, a renovated horse box and a caravan sat in a muddy field with a backdrop of giant solar panels and wind turbines against the serene countryside. A trail of pallets led from the corner of the field to the door of the horse box. It was 2017. I was at a semi-sustainable farm in Mid-Wales. Power came from the panels and the turbines and drinking water was sourced directly from filtered rainfall. The air was still and blissfully quiet; a far cry from the propagated image of a noisy, disruptive free party terrorising the British countryside or the unwelcome 'intruders' living with the impending threat of eviction. These Travellers had a good relationship with the farmer and like many others today, choose to live where

the seasonal work is found - orchards and farms rather than the suburban Traveller site. For these Travellers, the stereotype propagated by the media is far from their reality.

 This paper explores the diverse experiences of British New Travellers, sometimes referred to as 'New Age' Travellers. It draws on my time spent conducting ethnographic research at two field sites in Mid-Wales. First Amy[1], an ex-Traveller, discusses how her experiences at Castlemorton (as described above) drew her into the Travelling Scene in the 1990s. Amy's story is contrasted with Rosie and Eric, whose family have been on the road since the 1980s and are active Travellers to this day (also described above). I will use the knowledge learnt from these two field sites to contrast and compare, ultimately asking why some stay on the road and why some retreat into conventional forms of living. While this paper draws primarily on my experiences in the field, I justify my research methodology and line of questioning through epistemological theories, the available anthropological literature on 'New Age' travellers (of which there is little), and Traveller's own autobiographical/ auto-ethnographic texts such as *A Time to Travel?* (1994) and *Travellers: Voices of the New Age Nomads* (1993). Throughout, I will juxtapose my field research primarily with Greg Martin's postulations in *New Age Travellers: Uproarious or Uprooted?*.

A Brief History

The comprehensive history of New Travellers is both fascinating and long. Therefore, a very brief history of the group and some basic terminology is as follows. For the purpose of this paper, I refer to this group as 'Travellers', though they are known most widely as 'New Age Travellers'. While some Travellers and ex-Travellers identify with this term, many reject it on the basis that they are not aligned with 'New Age' spiritual philosophy, a characteristic ascribed to them by the media. Some prefer New Travellers, Newer Travellers, Contemporary Travellers, among others. All these terms refer to a collective which can be defined as a British nomadic subculture. They are distinct from traditional Roma Gypsy[2] and Irish or Scottish travellers[3] in that they do not come from a travelling heritage but have either actively rejected the culture in which they were raised and took it upon themselves to live nomadically or entered the culture out of the force of marginalisation and homelessness caused by the rising house prices of the 1980s. In this way, the origins of the culture can be traced to a convergence in the 1970s of both the inner-city squatting movement and the free festival movement (Earl *et al.* 1994).

 Quintessential to Travellers are their creative methods of living. Travellers are known to occupy renovated vehicles such as horse trucks, postal trucks, trailers, old busses equipped with wood burners and gas stoves. Others occupy tents such as benders, tepees, tarps, yurts and some use traditional horse-drawn wagons. Once the Traveller 'culture' formed, its population gradually inflated. The free parties and festivals gained attention from national newspapers which conceptualised the Travellers in the minds of the wider population. It's difficult to know the population of Travellers throughout this brief history; as many lived off the grid, any official assumptions tend to underestimate their numbers. However, the population is known to have peaked in the early 1990s, marking what is known to many as the beginning of the end. The

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[1] All names are pseudonyms
[2] Stewart, M. (2013). 'Roma and Gypsy "Ethnicity" as a Subject of Anthropological Inquiry'. *Annual Review of Anthropology.* 42: 415- 432.
[3] Acton, T. & Mundy, G. (1999). *Romani Culture and Gypsy Identity.* Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press.

perceived demise of the New Traveller culture is often credited to the draconian eviction laws echoed from the reign of Margaret Thatcher, namely the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Some, however, have found ways to remain 'on the road'.

Off the Road

For my initial research I came to a historic market town in Mid-Wales[4] to meet Amy, an ex-Traveller who now permanently lives here. I wanted to find out about her years as a Traveller in the 1990s; why she chose to take to the road and why she decided to retreat back to a house some years later. I was lucky to have known Amy prior to research and she was happy to help with the project, access was therefore straight forward. Amy now owns a shop in the town's market hall, so we decided to meet here. For this field site, I decided to use a semi-structured interview formula as I had specific points I wanted to address but also wanted to encourage Amy to take the conversation in any direction she saw fit. I hypothesised this would award a more emic, sensitive kind of data. I likened this technique to that of Sherry Ortner's style in *Ethnography among the Newark* (1993). Ortner delineates in this piece how she will research among a segment of American culture; namely her fellow high school students (class of 58'), while addressing and responding to the stylistic and theoretical problems associated with the crisis of representation in ethnographic work. In this study of social class she adopts an approach which she terms 'documentary ethnography'. This form is characterised by entering relatively small life-worlds and examining the way in which large social forces work themselves out in everyday life.

Amy was first introduced to the Traveller Scene when she started going to festivals such as Glastonbury as a teenager. However, the "defining moment", as she describes it, was Castlemorton. "That's where it all changed for me. Castlemorton was the moment," she explains. Amy describes her experience at the illegal free festival as a kind of enlightenment. "There was just such a strong sense of community. The sense of freedom was very exciting. "We were one big family". What was meant to be a two-day party lead to a week-long gathering. She was even interviewed by one of the many news reporters on the site and made it into the newspaper. When she went back to work in Bristol the following week her boss had seen her picture in the paper and thought she'd never come back. "I didn't feel like I was the same person when I came back," she recalls. "Going back to living in a house, it just felt different". She cites many elements that attracted her to the scene, "The party scene was so strong. The whole thing: the partying, the drugs, the people, the way of life, it was definitely a strong part of it".

A couple of years after the iconic Castlemorton Festival, Amy was on the road. I wanted to find out what made her decide to be a Traveller. She acknowledged that she didn't make the decision to be a Traveller but was led to the scene by a series of events. "I was already going to festivals and things like that and had already taken a year out travelling abroad. But then my personal life took a bit of a turn. Getting into the Traveller Scene was born out of a violent relationship. My daughter's father was really violent. I went through the courts, but nothing worked so I packed my bags one day, left everything behind. Left my home behind. And just got in the car. I had some friends in Tepee Valley and I just packed as much as I could for me and my baby and went to the Valley and set up a kind of refuge." From there she was able to find Brechfa, a Traveller site nearby and met her partner, Jay, to whom she later married on the site in a Pagan wedding ceremony. Jay

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[4] Exact locations will remain anonymous to protect my interlocutor's privacy

was a horse-drawn Traveller and already owned a horse and cart, for their wedding present they were given an old wagon and continued to travel by horse throughout Wales and South West England.

Amy and her family would utilise road protest camps that were prevalent at the time as a place to park up and meet like-minded people. These camps were part of an altruistic movement in Britain which reacted to Margaret Thatcher's 'Roads for Prosperity' white paper detailing plans for the largest road building programme for the UK since the Romans (Sadler 2006). These protests involved activists camping out in forests and building treehouses in places where development plans were being outlined. Amy recalls, "At the time it was quite a big thing, the road protests. The camps became quite big, people were setting up almost permanent homes. That's where my son was born, on a road protest camp. Proper Traveller styley, in a bender with no gas n' air or anything like that". This demonstrates the 'back-to-nature' aspect of being a Traveller which all of my interlocutors discussed in the interviews. Amy discussed the attraction of living a simple life, "appreciating simple things like warmth and sunlight. Trying to find grazing, finding wood and water. You have to kind of rely on the universe to give you what you need when you need it. It's very grounding and quite spiritual, especially with a horse and cart you're very much out there. You spend most of your time outside, outdoors in the elements and you're very in tune with the horse." Amy's fondest memory of being a Traveller was the connection she shared with their horse, Willow. "It's amazing how in tune you can get with a horse when you're with them all the time. It's almost like they can read your mind. I went through my whole pregnancy with Willow. I rode him every day until I gave birth. Towards the end of my labour I went in to a kind of twilight zone where I was oblivious to everyone else around me right before I gave birth, right at that point. And I kind of wailed out and I heard willow neigh back at me. I'll never forget that. The next morning, I took my new-born baby to willow and willow was sniffing him, and he just knew. It was magical." This details a Rousseauian conception of nature, a reclaiming of the connection to the land which many Travellers value.

However, while Amy detailed the remarkable connection she felt towards the horse, especially during her second pregnancy, it was their connection towards nature that ultimately brought their travelling days to an end. Amy expressed that it was a hard and sad decision to make, but it became apparent that they could no longer live with the elements while caring for two children. It's difficult to say whether the path that lead Amy to the Traveller Scene is a common one, but it does challenge the public perceptions of Travellers as 'sponges' and 'scroungers' that were common at the time (Lowe & Shaw 1993: xi). In *New Age Travellers: Uproarious or Uprooted?* Greg Martin (2002) discusses the different ways in which people come to be Travellers. He takes a sympathetic approach to how many turn to the Traveller Scene out of force rather than choice, for instance, due to homelessness or domestic violence. However, it might be argued that Martin's tone is somewhat patronising. In a reaction to Hetherington (2000), Martin argues that his representation of Travellers favours the view that they live on the road by choice, implying that they aren't true nomads who live on the road by force but rather middle class drop-outs who are too lazy to 'get a real job'. I agree here with Martin's concern that this idea can lead to the 'official' line taken by the media that Travellers are middle class dropouts. However, in taking this position Martin also affirms a hierarchical dichotomy of force over choice. He claims that overestimating the level of choice Travellers have, risks "contrasting their lifestyle to that of true nomads who are on the road 'for legitimate reasons and not out of choice'" (Martin 2002: 724).

Ultimately, Martin's claim is flawed because it fails to acknowledge that choice is an ambiguous concept rather than something that can be measured. In the case of Amy, she was drawn to the Traveller scene because she had to flee an abusive relationship in the city. However, there are many places she could have gone, a legitimate women's refuge for instance, but instead she chose to seek protection from the Travellers. Arguably, joining the Traveller scene was both an act of free will and coercion, and evaluating whether this is a culture born out of choice or force is arbitrary. Furthermore, Martin's hierarchy of force over choice is imagined. He argues choice is not a legitimate reason to be a Traveller. I would dispute this assumption. The concept of choice in our society is surely what determines the intrinsic value we assign to personal sovereignty. To dismiss choice in the way Martin does is unfounded and lacks the accreditation individuals deserve for the agency of crafting their own culture.

On the Road

The crux of my ethnographic methodology is participant observation, or as Peter Wogan describes it, "deep hanging out" (2004: 129). In my primary field site where the Traveller's 'park-up' on the farm, I grappled with some of the epistemological issues of participant observation. The practice has, in recent years, been unpacked for its philosophical shortcomings in the wake of postmodernist scrutiny (Swartz & Jacobs 1979; Clifford & Marcus 1986; Taussig 1987; Duranti & Goodwin 1992). A valid critique of the practice is that one cannot both participate and observe simultaneously, rendering the term 'participant observation' a debilitating oxymoron. Schwartz & Jacobs argue involvement and detachment cannot be achieved because they are "competitive in principle" (1979: 49). Duranti also maintains that the more the ethnographer "acquires a way of behaving and interpreting reality similar to those of the subjects he is studying, the more their behaviour and relative vision of the world seems natural to him and therefore difficult for him to grasp" (1992: 20).

With this is mind I was able to separate the involvement and detachment with the Travellers in two separate visits. The first was in the summer of 2016 at a cherry orchard in Kent where I first gained access to the group. Working here for just over a month during the cherry-picking season, I learned about the culture through lived experience; the daily beat of waking up with the sun, working in the trees until 5pm, eating dinner together, playing endless games of hide and seek with Batstar (their youngest daughter), collecting wood and talking around the fire in the evening. In this visit I learned through participation or involvement. I used this experience to gain what Geertz (1977) describes as "thick description". In contrast, during our second meeting (under research circumstances) at my primary field site in the winter of 2017, I took an observational or detached perspective when conducting interviews and gathering qualitative data. In this way, I feel I overcame the dilemma of the participant-observation paradox by applying both an involved and detached approach to my fieldwork. This dual approach allowed me to see the contrast of living seasonally and how winter affects a nomadic lifestyle in comparison to summer.

In a conversation we once had around the fire at the cherry orchard, I initiated a discussion on what it would be like to be 'studied' by an anthropologist, to which they jokingly responded that it would feel quite weird. I must admit that I agreed with them. While access was easy because of my positionality, fluctuating between the role of friend and researcher came with its own 'weirdness'. To break the ice, I used the ethical guidelines of fieldwork as a fun activity by having everyone pick their own pseudonym. Rosie's 5-year-old daughter took this activity very seriously and spent a long five minutes pondering in silence before finally declaring her name was to be

'Batstar'. To give a brief outline of the family: Rosie took to the road when she was 19 years old in 1990 and met her ex-partner with whom she had two children, Polly and Rainbow. After parting ways, Rosie met Eric, who lived in a bender at the time, and they began travelling together. They later had two further children, Bran and Batstar. Polly and Rainbow have both moved away from home and are no longer travelling, leaving Rosie, Eric, Bran and Batstar as the remaining contemporary Travellers in the family.

Throughout the interviews conducted with Rosie and Eric's family they provided me with a comprehensive history, a wealth of anecdotes, and endless stories of being a Traveller. They detailed the various subcultures which existed within the community; groups such as the "Crusties" known for their rude attitude, dirty clothes, and habitual Special Brew consumption (a strong, cheap brand of beer). And of course, their own motto: "in crust we trust". The stories of eviction, changes in legislation, and the dynamic between traditional Gypsies and New Travellers were fascinating. Initially I was curious about whether, although those labelled as Travellers often have vastly different attitudes and motivations, they feel as though they're still part of a homogenous culture; alluding to whether Victor Turner's concept of 'Communitas' (1969: 132) plays a role in sustaining the lifestyle. Eric answered, "No". He maintained that "as far as I'm concerned we're a family, we're all one. And the fact that I'm in a vehicle is neither here nor there, because there's people like me in houses, there's people like me on the street, there's people in tents. I don't distinguish between who's part of my family or who's not". I understood what he meant, as Martin argued: "By treating Travellers as Other, or as blank figures (…) one perpetuates their popular image as strangers and all of the negative connotations that go along with this" (2002: 730).

Rosie, on the other hand, argued that all Travellers do share fundamental commonalities: being connected by fire (all Travellers need to make fire), a need to collect wood and water, and lifestyles and livelihoods dictated by the seasons. "All these things bring us closer to nature and the elements, that's what we all share," said Rosie. She also cited the ritualistic use of cannabis which is common among all Travellers. "In the late 80s and 90s you used to just step in a vehicle and everyone would be smoking dope. It was part of the ritual. It's still the same now but it's changed slightly due to the introduction of the stronger skunk varieties. Back then it wasn't as strong, and everyone was smoking spliffs or pipes. That was seen as a massive part of this culture, and having dreadlocks alongside it was also very symbolic."

According to Rosie, however, other forms of drug use lead some to 'pack up' and move in to houses, abandoning the Traveller scene altogether. "Of course, some people get lost and lose the lifestyle completely, and end up in a council house because they've done too many drugs or whatever. Most people do [travelling] for five years, get burnt out, then decide they want their kids to go to school or whatever. Some people keep going, but it's very rare to find people that have been doing it for 30 years." I asked Rosie what has made her such a successful Traveller had kept her on the road for so long. "From my perspective I've made it all this time by avoiding taking all the drugs and not becoming obsessed with partying and burning the candle at both ends. And by finding a way of surviving, a practical way of living that will sustain the lifestyle. You need to be really organised." Rosie's daughter Rainbow agreed, "You have to maintain all the vehicles, you need to know how to be a mechanic. You need to be able to work with wood. You need to have practical skills". She claimed that these practical skills are the reason they are so successful at remaining on the road. Rosie and Rainbow's comments suggest that Travellers may be considered a creationist culture -crafting their culture out of the ashes of post-Thatcher Britain (in contrast to

those who inherited a travelling culture) while maintaining the physical craftsmanship the lifestyle demands.

 However, for those ex-Travellers such as Rosie's ex-partner (Rainbow and Polly's dad) who are no longer on the road, much of the community atmosphere of the 80s and 90s is alive and kicking on the internet. Through online forums and Facebook groups such as the 'Crusty Traveller' group, 'Site Life'[5], and squatters Facebook groups, many Travellers and ex-Travellers alike stay in touch, share information about technology and reminisce about old times. For those who are no longer on the road it allows them to remain part of the community, and for those remaining Travellers such as Rosie and Eric it allows them to feel the community that was once present on the Traveller sites they frequented. "Of course, now it's different again because of the technology. When Polly and Rainbow were growing up all we had was candles, we were lucky if we got a radio signal. Now we have LED lights, phones, laptops. There's a bit of a cyber element to the culture now," Rosie observed. If I could add a commonality among Travellers to Rosie's list (above) I would add techne – the gift of creation and craftsmanship. It is a culture created (rather than inherited), maintained by craftsmanship, and remembered on the internet through technology. Travellers share a culture of techne.

 Overall, much of the conversations I had with Rosie and Eric echoed the question I had grappled with in regard to Martin's earlier essay: whether people take up travelling through choice or force and how that affects their success of staying on the road. Martin argues, "While I do not dispute that some have quite deliberately chosen to move onto the road, a vast proportion of them have, in fact, been forced to do so" (2002: 733). The concept of choice is again ambiguous here. As Eric said, he was presented with a society in which he was expected to be something he didn't want to be. "Everything just seemed wrong. The education system seemed wrong, what they wanted us to be seemed wrong. It just all seemed wrong. So, it's like, I just want to find what's right for myself. And that's what people did, for myself it was my own personal dream". From this perspective the concept of choice becomes arbitrary. For Eric, looking for an alternative is just something that needed to happen. By rejecting the conditions imposed upon them by the state, Rosie and Eric and others like them created their own culture and continue to live on their own terms. This demonstrates the agency involved in becoming a Traveller, an agency which Martin (2002) doesn't accredit in his paper.

Conclusion

This paper has analysed fieldwork among two parties: Travellers and ex-Travellers. I conducted interviews to gain insight into why some people stay 'on the road' and why some return to mainstream society. With reference to my findings, it appears a desire to stay on the road is related to a passion (and also a tolerance) for nature. The knowledge required to adapt to a nomadic life is very much real and learned only from raw experience which makes Traveller culture particularly hard to maintain. It became clear from the offset that an entire volume could be written on this amazingly unique way of life; at once a display of the most fundamental of our rights – to opt out of convention and stay true to the natural environment, and yet perhaps the most misunderstood, misrepresented, and precarious of lifestyles in Britain today. As my research has only scratched

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[5] These have not been referenced to protect the right of anonymity.

the surface of this lifestyle, given the opportunity to revisit New Travellers the study would benefit from a deeper exploration of the culture of techne. It seems that this is a creationist culture. Born out of craftsmanship, maintained by craftsmanship, and even remembered through craftsmanship in the cyber world. An exploration of the culture of techne as Tom Boellstorff conceptualises in *Coming of Age in Second Life* would award a rich and interesting take on the New Traveller scene. To reflect on the completion of my first ethnographic research project, the element which proved to be the most challenging was converting my raw data into readable material. That being said, I hope my research made for an interesting read and a balanced window into the New Travellers' world, if only a drop in the ocean of the possibilities of research of this kind.

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Towards an Anthropology Theory of Borders: The Case of Finnish-Russian Border Community, Värtsilä

Grace Elizabeth Richardson

Abstract

Borders are commonly considered by political agents to be physical entities determining states' territorial parameters. This positivist perspective differs significantly from the anthropology theory of borders, which maintains that borders are complex social processes. These constitute dynamic sites of interactions whereby local border practices create bodies of knowledge, producing localized forms of power. This paper adopts Foucault's concept of power: Rather than power being perceived as a 'thing' which can be gained and lost through both national and international macro-political positioning, it is intricately woven through the tapestry of society and manifests through micro-social dynamics and daily social practices. The paper examines the Finnish-Russian border commune Värtsilä. This provides an excellent site of investigation because as the analysis demonstrates, local border practices significantly influenced Russia and Finland's shifting national historical geo-political and ideological border processes. This reflects how borders are heterogeneous complex social realities and as such, need to be considered within their respective evolving geo-political contexts.

Border Theories: Arbitrary lines imposed from above

Personal histories and experiences continually re-produced a cross- border web of exchanges through which individuals navigated shifting territorial dynamics and socio-political interests (Paasi, 1997: 254). Thus, borders are critical sites of social change and therefore, this paper adopts the above anthropogenic definition to allow for a multi-dimensional critical analysis. This paper argues that the claim drawing borders is 'easy', while their construction is 'not the same', cannot be universally applied across multiple border processes (St. Johns, 2011). Furthermore, this perspective is theoretically founded in a single-dimensional, state-centred view of top-down capitalist power processes, from which borders derive their legitimacy (Anderson, 1996). Instead, this paper contends that power transcends these macro-political dynamics and plays out across more nuanced micro-social dynamics in local border practices. Each border has complex historical socio-economic, cultural, geo- political, and power dynamics, which in turn, produce heterogeneous outcomes for both their conceptualization and physical formation (Popescu, 2012). These realities are reflected in the Russian-Finnish border commune Värtsilä: The drawing of the border itself was heavily contested and fluctuated throughout history as both countries responded to their respective shifting positions in the international political arena (as evident in post-WWII).

Further, St. Johns' (Popescu, 2012) proposition that borders are simply conceptualized while their construction differs, emerged from a macro-historical analysis of how and why the US-Mexico border materialized[6]. According to St. Johns (ibid: 13-14), the concept of the US- Mexico border emerged from a common western political vision of how the US could acquire and maintain hegemonic power: 'With a stroke of a pen [treaty negotiators] began to transform [borders] into sites of national significance and contested power […] shaped by forces of capitalism and state power […] what began as a line on a map became a space of evolving and multiple meanings and forms'. In other words, the US-Mexican border is the product of the ideological historical development of the capitalist state which in turn, produced multiple complex fields of interaction between individuals, institutions, and corporations (Hilgers and Mangezs, 2015).

However, this paper argues that this top-down theory of borders presents multiple issues. Firstly, St. Johns (ibid: 13-14) fails to de-construct what the 'forces of capitalism and state power' entail, and how they shape border processes. Instead, state power and capitalism are presented as homogenous entities from which borders automatically derive their conceptual and material legitimacy. Thus, because St. Johns (ibid) aggregates capitalist power bordering processes, no attempt is made to decimate the conceptualization and socially-constructed entity of the nation-state system. This is a significant analytical shortcoming because St. Johns is thus unable to critically examine how divergent micro-dynamics of state-power imposed arbitrary ethnic, and geo-political categories in which individuals were subordinated under and navigated across heterogeneous border processes (Alvarez Jr, 1995). Secondly, St. Johns (2011: 14) fails to critically analyse how and why border processes transitioned from a 'line on a map' to a 'space of evolving and multiple meanings and forms'. Further, the line itself is accepted as an entity with no attempt made to consider the intricate composites of family dynamics, daily social practices, and expressions which constitute threads woven into border conceptualization and construction (Alvarez Jr, 1995: 463). Additionally, the diverse spatial meanings produced by the line and how they evolve are not considered beyond the capitalist state vs population dichotomy[7]. This presents a considerable analytical problem as diverse border activities transcend the capitalist vs worker dichotomy, which is evident in the social practices and daily interactions between individuals (for example, through family and personal relationships). Crucially, these micro- dynamics of cross-border relations produce divergent hierarchies within relationships which is fundamentally, where micro-dynamics of power play across divergent border processes (ibid: 462). This paper proposes an alternative micro-social theory of borders, which is introduced below.

In contrast to St Johns' (2011) macro-historical theory of the US-Mexican border, Alvarez Jr (1995: 450) argues that because traditional studies of the US-Mexican border focus on homogenous political and historical constructs, this overlooks social practices of people at the border. Crucially, this top-down approach to borders fails to analytically capture how individuals continually re-negotiate multiple identities through manoeuvring across shifting micro-power dynamics (ibid). Thus, this paper contends that Alvarez Jr's anthropology theory of borders is best placed within the following analysis of the Russian-Finnish border. This is because by challenging socially-constructed categories of race, gender, ethnicity and class, which produce the nation-state

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[6] Perrier-Bruslé (2007) and Wilson (2015) share a similar perspective of borders in their respective analyses of colonial borders in Latin American and Central Asia.

[7] The capitalist state refers to a state which functions primarily through socio-economic and political institutions encouraging multiple market exchanges and the private consumption of goods and services.

as a unit of analysis, enables a critical inquiry into how the complexities and variations of life at both sides of a border are expressed through daily behavioural practices and micro-power dynamics within the global political economy. Thus, the object of study is how these diverse micro-social dynamics of power are continually expressed, distributed, and re-imagined across deconstructed patterns of human behaviour. Furthermore, these shifting social realities are evident in the following analysis of the Russian-Finnish border town Värtsilä, whose history is introduced below.

The Russian-Finnish Border: Värtsilä's History

Before WWII, Värtsilä was a key industrial community fuelling Finland's capitalist development. Moreover, over 1,000 of the 6,000 inhabitants sustained livelihoods from Finland's largest industrial site: Wärtsilä (Paasi, 1997: 226). Thus, industry became the centre of socio-economic life in Värtsilä. However, as an outcome of WWII, the industrial border community was split in two, leaving Finland with a mere third of the community's previous territory, while Russia kept the iron industry (as displayed in figure 1 below) (ibid). Crucially, this paper argues that contrary to St. Johns' (2011) theory, the re-drawing of the Russian-Finnish border in the Värtsilä community was not 'easy' but significantly complex and highly contested by both Russian and Finnish agents. Further, this reality is evident in the micro-dynamics of social practices and power employed by people as the border was physically produced. This critical analysis is conducted below.


Figure 1: The Post-WWII Värtsilä border (Paasi, 1997)

Värtsilä: Micro-Social Border Power and Practices

At the heart of the intricate social texture of the industrial border community Värtsilä, lay the factory (Paasi, 1997: 227). Furthermore, the factory itself was composed of a jungle of social exchanges including: daily physical rituals carried out by workers (using machinery and equipment), social exchanges between factory workers, spatial acts of work (varying stages of production in different parts of the factory), time-specific social activities (lunch breaks), and economic exchanges enabling family members to meet their basic material needs for survival (factory wages spent on food). Thus, the border community was not produced by the factory which then created macro-power and political cross-border relations; rather, the factory itself was a complex field of multi-diverse interactions within which each individual was uniquely positioned. More crucially, this paper contends that these daily social interactions constitute micro-power dynamics within which border-community members created socio-spatial identities specific to their respective personal experiences and histories. Further, these micro-power dynamics constituting the factory, created shifting tensions among Finnish and Soviet Union individuals regarding the conceptualization and creation of the border. The micro-power and social dynamics constituting the heavily contested re-drawing of the post-WWII Finnish-Russian border are best illustrated by the activities of Finnish director of Wärtsilä: Wilhelm Wahlfors (ibid: 231). Crucially, Wahlfors was a local figure who in addition to directing the factory, represented and negotiated local Finnish interests during the 1947 Paris peace negotiations (ibid: 233). Furthermore, Wahlfors attempted to influence the location of the local border line to include the factory within Finnish territory.

However, although Wahlfors' efforts failed as the border was redrawn to include the factory within Soviet Union territory, the strategic socio-economic and political significance encompassing the contestation of the border, demonstrates two critical micro-dynamics of borders' re-drawing and building. Firstly, the localized border negotiation practices between Wahlfors and Soviet Union representatives, reflects how power is diffused throughout micro-social interactions which created contested re-conceptualizations of the border. Further, these nuanced manifestations of power spread throughout the rest of the community, as former Finnish employees were made redundant, lost their livelihoods, and thus had to resort to agricultural subsistence to ensure their survival. This led towards a de-industrialization of the split Finnish community which in turn, ignited the wrath of national Finnish politicians. Thus, the drawing of the border was not easy, but produced the above adverse outcomes for many members of the former Finnish community, as individuals attempted to navigate shifting socio-economic and spatial realities. Secondly, because the new border was drawn and built through Soviet Union and Finnish negotiations, it presents a physical manifestation of complex social processes within which individuals construct a territorial-spatial narrative, thus producing national identities. This is evident in interviews conducted by Paasi (1997), in which he exposes how the WWII generation community members still feel resentful and hostile towards the former Soviet Union (present day Russia), due to the 1947 border cutting off Finnish access to factory employment, essential goods and services, and railway links. Thus, this created a nationalist narrative of 'us' and 'them' whereby symbolic and physical divisions were continually produced, re-produced, and dispersed as the Soviet Union was

characterised as the 'eastern threat' to 'western Finland'[8]. More fundamentally, this nationalist narrative persisted into the Cold War as Finland remained the only western country to border a socialist country, which became known as the iron curtain (Medvedev, 1999).

Conclusion

This paper has argued that contrary to St. Johns' (2011) claim that drawing borders is 'easy' while their construction is 'not the same' cannot be applied across multiple border processes. This is evident in a survey of the theoretical roots of St. Johns' (ibid) proposition, which fails to deconstruct capitalist power processes, and analyse how divergent social and power dynamics enable borders to transform from a line drawn, to physical entities. In light of these analytical shortcomings, this paper adopted Alvarez Jr's (1995) anthropology theory, which places borders within their respective micro-social and power dynamic positions. This theory was then applied to the Russian-Finnish industrial border commune Värtsilä, which revolved around intricate social-relations of the factory. Additionally, the micro-social dynamics evident in post-WII border negotiations, reflected how both the conceptualisation and construction of borders can be contested. Crucially, this reality re-emphasises how borders are heterogeneous and complex social realities, composed of divergent micro-social realities and imagined power dynamics. Thus, this paper calls for each border process to be placed within their respective realities, only then can their respective historical and evolving geo-political and economic positions be understood.

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[8] This perspective of nationalism as socially-constructed through complex multidimensional processes of othering, is also shared by Anderson (2015) which she applies to current European perspectives of migration.

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Climate Change and National Security: Contradictions Challenging the Status Quo

Agnes Schim van der Loeff

Abstract

Presenting climate change as a national security issue provides an appropriate sense of urgency needed for serious climate action. However, there are several contradictions between the national security framework and climate change, four of which are explored in this paper. First, a focus on national borders inadequately deals with the problem's global nature and allows for climate injustice. Second, long-term impacts are not captured by the short-term focus of national security's main agents such as policy makers. Third, seeing the military as the traditional provider of national security does not address the root causes of climate change but leads to its inappropriate militarisation. Finally, national security is primarily concerned with protecting the status quo, which is itself the cause of the threat. Climate change thus exposes the flaws of national security as the dominant framework of international politics, being inherently antithetical to properly understanding and addressing this major threat.

Keywords: Climate change, Climate injustice, National security, Borders, Militarisation

The United Nations have called climate change "the defining issue of our time", and while it has become clear that it will have severe impacts "global in scope and unprecedented in scale", international action to mitigate its effects remains limited (UN website 2019). Meanwhile, there is a growing trend to present climate change as a national security issue, which provides it a sense of urgency demanding a serious response. The national security discourse focuses on the security of the state and its institutions. It assumes that the state shares interests with its population and considers the military the main protector against external threats. The interaction between climate change and national security thus contains several contradictions, four of which are explored in this paper. Firstly this paper explores how climate change's global nature is understood within a framework based on national borders, and whether the problem is adequately addressed; secondly it considers how the long-term effects of climate change contradict the short-term focus of policy makers on 'traditional' security threats; thirdly it analyses how the military as the primary provider of national security addresses the non-military threat of climate change, particularly through its militarization; and finally it considers how national security's primary aim of preserving the status quo renders it inherently antithetical to comprehensive climate action, protecting state institutions rather than vulnerable populations. If the status quo is based on fossil capitalism and therefore itself is the cause of climate change, systemic transformation is the only viable solution. Overall this paper questions whether reframing climate change as a national security issue is constructive in countering its impacts.

Global problem versus national borders

The first contradiction in the interaction between climate change and national security is that while the latter's scope is limited to the borders of a state, the former is a fundamentally global issue, both in its cause, its impact, and the response required. By approaching climate change merely "in terms of its implications of nation-states", the problem itself "is not addressed at all, only its manifestations" (Lacy, 2005: 162). A national security approach focuses on climate change as a threat to "the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation-state", with national governments and security institutions as the main agents to provide security (McDonald, 2018: 160). This assumed dichotomy between inside and outside the nation-state leads to a focus on external threats which can be kept from harming the state. However, focusing on the nation-state as the entity to be protected provides too limited a scope to properly address an issue as broad as climate change. Neither emissions nor global warming are bound by national borders, and in fact oppose such a separation between states. Since a comprehensive response to climate change requires international cooperation, "invoking national security may actually be counterproductive" (Dalby, 2009: 50). Moreover, a nationalistic discourse framed in military terms emphasizes the antagonism of external threats rather than a globally shared threat (ibid). This results in the latter not being properly addressed, while the supposed 'threat' from international migration is given priority.

An international approach is even more crucial because of the profound injustice that "[t]hose most affected by climate change are those least likely to have caused it" while "[t]hose most likely to have caused it are those most likely to avoid its negative effects" (Voskoboynik, 2018: 19). This is because while high income countries (HICs) in the Global North are responsible for the majority of emissions, low income countries (LICs) in the Global South who did not benefit as much from fossil fuel use still suffer from the consequences (Diffenbaugh and Burke, 2018). In fact, many LICs are geographically more vulnerable to climate change because they are small island states or located in tropical regions, and therefore set to experience worse impacts than HICs (King and Harrington, 2018). This differentiated impact is exacerbated by LICs' relative lack of resources to adapt to climate change. These climate inequalities do not only occur between countries but also within them, as marginalised groups are more vulnerable to climatic changes and disproportionately affected (Islam and Winkel, 2017). If national security remains the dominant paradigm of international relations, those countries most responsible for climate change are in practice allowed to continue their high consumption without being held accountable for the insecurities this causes in the Global South. Meanwhile, countries with low historical emissions and low consumption levels but more vulnerable to climatic changes are left to face major challenges on their own, since it is then considered a national issue only. This essentially allows Northern governments to "shift the burden of environmental adjustment" on Southern governments (Renner 2004: 316).

This lack of accountability and responsibility explains why national security discourses usually focus on adaptation while human security, taking as its referent object all people including the most vulnerable, prioritises mitigation (McDonald, 2018: 161-162). The poor and marginalized of the Global South only enter the security of the North when they migrate and are "portrayed as a threat to Northern societies "requiring" security measures to prevent their immigration" (Dalby, 2009: 2-3). This indicates the bias in national security discourses to prioritise the security of states in the Global North, with climate change "shifting sensibilities from matters of protecting borders to thinking about global interconnections and the fact that affluence is making the poor and

marginal insecure" (ibid: 12). This connection is crucial in understanding how the global economy creates both security and insecurity as an inherent part of 'modernization' and 'state-making', since "impacts of consumption in one place are frequently displaced into other states and regions" (ibid: 45,75).

Long-wave event versus short-term thinking

A second contradiction in the interaction between climate change and national security is that the latter's focus on short-term policy making and on maintaining legitimacy does not prioritise long-term issues until it is too late. Tony Barnett's analysis of such 'long-wave events' helps to explain why so little is done against climate change despite its evident urgency. He describes such events as having long-term implications but no clear starting point, resulting in its nature and impact often being understood only when it is already underway and difficult to slow down or stop (Barnett, 2006: 302). Moreover, their long timespan demands long-term thinking, which people in power do not usually prioritise since the effects "fall outside the normal time horizons of politicians and business strategists" (ibid). Not only do such events require a broader scope in planning, it is also unclear whether there is even the political and administrative capacity to deal with such events at all, as they require completely new policies, being unlike any previous experiences (ibid: 303).

 This explanation of the lack of climate action is complemented by Mark Lacy's analysis of how Realism - the school of thought at the heart of national security - constructs anthropogenic climate change as a "Second-Order problem" (Lacy, 2005). In the traditional hierarchy of security, first-order problems are granted priority, and constitute more 'traditional' threats such as war and terrorism. Second-order problems are often "non-traditional threats": they do not fit the objective realist understanding of threats, because they are uncertain and complex (ibid). In contrast, the human security approach focuses on "amorphous threats that are unintentional and global", or "threats without enemies" (Dalby, 2009: 35). The dominance of realism in international politics means traditional threats are taken more seriously than non-traditional threats. Climate change is considered a non-traditional threat because it is uncertain, distant in time and space, and cannot be dealt with through traditional means since there is no clear enemy (Lacy, 2005:18). Meanwhile, the 'techno-optimistic' belief that human ingenuity and technological innovation will provide solutions reinforces the notion that it is an illegitimate threat (ibid:104). Consequently, policy makers are encouraged to focus on adaptation rather than mitigation, fixing problems when necessary without having to address the root causes which would extend beyond the timespan of their career. This reflects Barnett's finding that once long-wave events are 'discovered' they are dealt with as emergencies through short-term solutions that can actually exacerbate the issue in the long term (Barnett, 2006: 303). At an international level this is illustrated in the World Bank increase of its 'adaptation funds' from $2.3 billion to $4.6 billion in 2012 while only increasing mitigation funds by $100,000 (Marzec, 2015: 9). 'Techno-optimists' even warn against expensive measures to address long-term dangers that are uncertain, since "they may actually harm the capitalist culture that can create solutions to problems" (Lacy, 2005: 51). This overwhelming focus on climate change adaptation as opposed to mitigation is not merely a result of naïve and short-sighted thinking. It is actively promoted by those who profit from the current political and economic system. Lacy calls this the "network of Realism", a network of power and influence that has strong motives to construct climate change as a secondary issue (ibid: 21). This involves the downplaying of mitigation in order to maintain the traditional hierarchy of threats in which for example the War on Terror is the "First-Order problem" (ibid: 22). This is equally reflected in the

fact that the global economy does not naturally have to be based on fossil fuels because they are cheaper or better than renewable energy sources, but that the link to fossil fuels is actively reinforced with global fossil fuel subsidies in 2015 being estimated at $5.3 trillion (Coady et al., 2017: 21).

Militarising a non-military threat

National security's traditional focus on threats of a military nature limits its understanding of non-military threats such as climate change, where militarization might bring it higher on the policy agenda but compromises the chance of an effective solution. Taking states as the referent object of security generally assumes threats will come in the form of external military attacks or "internal subversion of the political order" (Dalby, 2009: 2). Consequently, the military and related security institutions are considered the main actors in providing this security. As mentioned above, climate change being a non-traditional, non-military threat for a long time kept it off the policy agenda. Thus, the military addressing climate change is a positive development in that its securitisation makes it "an urgent, existential threat which demands immediate action" (Trombetta, 2018: 595). Particularly since the 2007 UN report on climate change there has been an "extension of the military and the national security state into the arena of environmentalism" (Marzec, 2015: 1). However, serious questions must be asked as to whether the military is in fact an appropriate actor to address the issue of climate change, especially considering it is "one of the most polluting of human institutions" (Dalby, 2009: 4). While military threats usually involve intentional attacks by states or terrorist organisations, threats related to climate change are "diffuse, indirect, and international, originating both inside and outside the state concerned" (ibid: 50). Additionally, while the former tends to be occasional and rare, "environmental degradation is a long-term process usually derived accidentally from routine economic activities," and therefore not easily 'fixed' by the military (ibid).

 Although the profound differences between 'new' environmental threats and 'traditional' military threats requires a non-traditional approach to security, this is not yet the case in the militarisation of climate change. Military reports addressing climate change as a national security threat exclude the possibility of transformative policies that could mitigate its effects, considering it unavoidable and attempts at mitigation useless (Marzec, 2015: 2). The result is the militarisation of the environment with a singular focus on adaptation as a crucial element in "the "exceptional" war on global warming" (ibid: 4). This is exemplified in the 2007 US military report National Security and the Threat of Climate Change which concludes that "the U.S. war machine must expand its power globally to avoid significant disruptions to international stability" (ibid: 7). Furthermore, climate change is presented as a "threat multiplier" exacerbating conflicts and existing vulnerabilities in alarmist discourses that direct policies to limit migration rather than solve the root causes of poverty and environmental change (Dalby, 2009: 50). This is partly because in the militarisation of climate change the ideological basis is left unacknowledged, an ideology that "disadvantages the potential for alternatives and can result in the reduction of the state to an aggressive ecological policing agent" while still prioritizing "market forces over the needs of the planet's dispossessed and their environments" (Marzec, 2015: 26). Ignoring this is dangerous, considering that the relative affluence in the Global North combined with higher vulnerability to climate change in the Global South could lead Northern security institutions to impose a "defence-oriented solution that seeks to remap the earth along the lines of a gated community" (ibid: 27).

Thus, climate change itself remains unaddressed, and its victims are turned into a threat that is more readily understood in the realist framework of national security.

The status quo: threatened or threatening?

The most fundamental contradiction in adopting a national security approach to climate change is that while the former aims to preserve the status quo, this is exactly what is driving the latter. The painful "irony of climate change is that the threat is self-imposed", at least for those in affluent consumer societies (Dalby, 2009: 2). Therefore, any adequate response to this threat requires transformation of the current political system of nation-states and the economic system of carboniferous capitalism. In this way anthropogenic climate change questions the legitimacy of the dominant conceptualisations of modernity and development, since the security this has given the Global North is based on fossil fuels that are now creating insecurity (ibid: 3). However, as pointed out by Lacy, there are "networks of power that have an interest in protecting a limited vision of security", which is reflected in the strategies employed by national security agents in relation to climate change (Lacy, 2005: 6). These strategies focus primarily on "securing and protecting a particular mode of existence" and the people who benefit from that, as opposed to "disrupting the strategies of powerful actors in the fossil fuel economy" (ibid: 105-106). For example, the European Union was advised to take responsibility for 'managing climate security risks' through "more proactive […] interventions in crisis regions" (Fetzek and van Schaik, 2018). Meanwhile, fossil fuel subsidies were recently estimated at €55 billion per year in the EU (Coleman and Dietz, 2019). Other scholars have noted that the dominant way of conceptualising environmental change implies that climate change can only be addressed by "remaining within the existing [neoliberal] frame of our politico-environmental relations" and following the realist conclusion of the inevitability of adaptation (Marzec, 2015: 26).

 The preservation of the status quo is based on the assumption that states share the interests of their population, meaning that insecurity experienced by humans may be neglected as long as state institutions survive. Thus, adaptation is considered the best strategy to preserve state sovereignty, while mitigation might be considered a threat to "core national values of political communities" such as high living standards and economic growth (McDonald, 2018: 162). This is in stark contrast with a human security approach which considers mitigation necessary for the protection and welfare of vulnerable communities (ibid). National security's assumption of shared interests ignores how states can actually cause insecurity, which is convenient for countries with high consumption patterns. These countries constitute what Lacy calls the 'tame zone', where security discourse is more concerned with containing the 'wild zone', for example by restricting migration, rather than mitigating climate change which creates vulnerabilities that might actually prompt migration (Lacy, 2005: 107). Narratives of national security thus allow countries in the tame zone to turn the primary victims of climate change into threats, without actually addressing the problem that they themselves have caused. Rather than climate change threatening national security, it is action against climate change that poses "a threat to the conceptual hegemony of state centred national security discourses and institutions" (Deudney, 1999 cited in Dalby, 2009 :51).

Conclusion

This paper has shown that climate change cannot be fully comprehended or adequately addressed by a national security approach. It thus exposes the flaws of national security as the dominant framework of international politics, since it fails to provide solutions to what is arguably the most

serious security issue of our time. First of all, a fundamentally global issue cannot be addressed in national terms, because its causes and effects are not bound by national borders. A national security approach thus allows for climate injustice instead of promoting a solution based on international cooperation. Secondly, short-term thinking in state and security institutions fails to provide solutions that mitigate the long-term impacts of climate change, emphasizing instead short-term technological solutions. Thirdly, the military as the traditional provider of national security is equally ineffective in addressing the problem because of its focus on adaptation rather than mitigation and by framing migration as the more pressing security issue. Finally, climate change exposes the fundamental unsustainability of the current political and economic systems that national security aims to preserve, which specifically challenges the foundations of the Global North's wealth and security. The shortcomings of the national security approach in these four aspects means that the security of those most vulnerable to climate change is neglected in favour of those profiting from the status quo. Although climate change has been gaining increasing attention in international politics, comprehensive action to combat it is still disappointingly limited. Moving away from a national security approach is necessary to create space for transformational policies that do mitigate climate change and ensure climate justice and security for all people, now and in the future.

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Institutional Barriers to Labour Migration: Does China's Economic Development Vindicate the Lewis Model?

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Abstract

The Lewis Model is a seminal framework in development economics due to its analysis of the importance of migration for economic growth. This paper builds on the scholarship that has analysed the Lewis Model in relation to the Chinese development experience and focuses in particular on the institutional barriers to migration in the form of China's hukou system. It is shown that the Chinese development experience of increasing wages in the face of persisting rural labour surplus does not adhere to the Lewis Model. Moreover, it is argued that wage and social discrimination in China's urban labour market serve as significant barriers for rural-urban migration. This paper concludes that the Lewis Model provides a useful but inadequate framework for understanding China's internal migration challenges, and that more research should focus on the welfare implications of migration patterns in China.

In 1954, as Dr. Arthur Lewis was finishing off what was to become a seminal paper in development economics, a huge wave of migration swept over China's cities, with 20 million people migrating to the cities in the period 1949-1956 (Cheng & Selden, 1994: 653). Policies to control the flow of migrants proved inefficient and bemoaning the number of urban dwellers who were to be provided free housing, health care, and food subsidies, the government implemented the hukou system in 1955. By requiring all migrants to obtain a migration certificate to gain eligibility for employment, shelter, and social services in their destination, this system effectively bound rural citizens to their villages for most of the Maoist period (Cheng & Selden, 1994).

The easing of the hukou system in 1984, in granting migrants temporary resident permits in cities while keeping the institutional barriers in place by barring access to social services, unleashed another wave of migration, with 60 million migrants coming to Chinese cities in the following 10 years (Melander & Pelikanova, 2013: 2). This level of migration has continued, growing by an estimated 14% annually from 1995 to 2006 (Knight et al., 2011: 6-7). Do such high figures vindicate the Lewis Model in a Chinese context? The answer to this question may have implications for how development paths are understood more generally, particularly in the Global South, where the economic dualism of the Lewis Model is still seen as a powerful explanatory factor in cross-country inequality (Ranis, 2004: 719).

In this paper, it is argued that in order to evaluate the Lewis Model's application to China, particular attention should be given to the institutional barriers to migration in China. The paper first provides a detailed account of the original closed economy Lewis Model as well as the 1961

Ranis-Fei interpretation and its application. The extent to which China's economic development fits into the Ranis-Fei interpretation of the Lewis Model phases is then discussed, providing the argument that urban labour market segmentation and the hukou system serve as strong barriers for migration.

The Lewis Model

Lewis' 1954 paper

In his 1954 paper *Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour*, Lewis sets out a dualistic model of a capitalist sector, generally understood as the industrial sector, and a subsistence sector, generally understood as the agricultural sector. The model is based on the assumption of an unlimited supply of labour in the subsistence sector, which manifests itself in a marginal product of labour that equals zero ($MPL^A = 0$). As the wage naturally cannot be zero, it is set above the MPL^A at the point where the average product of labour provides sufficiently for the farmer and their dependents (Lewis, 1954: 409). In contrast, wages in the capitalist sector (W^I) are set at a premium over those in the subsistence sector (W^A), generally around 30% more (ibid: 410). As a result of this premium, workers in the subsistence sector will migrate to urban areas to seek work in the capitalist sector. Lewis then reasons that if there is a constant urban real wage and a share of profits is reinvested in capital, profits will grow, thus increasing the demand for labour (ibid: 418). This process will continue until there is no longer surplus labour in the subsistence sector or real wages in this sector become so high that there is less of an incentive to migrate (ibid: 1931). This has become known as the Lewis Turning Point (LTP).

Ranis-Fei Interpretation

Arguing that Lewis "failed to present a satisfactory analysis of the subsistence or agricultural sector," Gustav Ranis and John Fei (1961: 534) presented an interpretation of Lewis' paper that focused mainly on the economic effect of rural-urban migration on the subsistence sector. Their addition of different phases is displayed in Figure 1. As illustrated, the first phase of the Ranis-Fei interpretation of the Lewis Model is that in which the subsistence sector features $MPL^A = 0$. In this phase, both subsistence and capitalist wages are constant. As labour starts migrating from the subsistence to the capitalist sector, the unlimited supply of labour in the former comes to an end, and MPL^A will start increasing, marking the beginning of phase 2, denoted by Ranis and Fei as the 'shortage point' (ibid: 540). When $MPL^A > 0$ less workers will migrate to the cities. This leads to an increase in W^I, thus maintaining the incentive for rural-urban migration. This process continues until the rising MPL^A causes a rise in the W^A marking the beginning of phase 3, which is denoted by Ranis and Fei and the 'commercialization point'; as it marks the advent of "a fully commercialized agricultural sector" (ibid: 537).

Figure 1: The Ranis-Fei interpretation of the Lewis Model (Ranis and Fei, 1961: 535)

The Lewis turning point

Much debate has been centred around whether or not China has reached the Lewis Turning Point (Islam & Yokota, 2008; Cai, 2010; and, Knight, 2011). In this context, it is important to point out that different definitions are used for the Lewis Turning Point (LTP). In their paper, Ranis & Fei (1961: 240) state that the LTP coincides with the 'shortage point', that is, the point at which a rise in MPL^A causes an increase in W^I, signalling the end of surplus labour in the subsistence sector. In contrast, Nazrul Islam & Kazuhiko Yokota (2008: 360-61) define the LTP using Ryoshin Minami's criterion-I, which states that the LTP occurs when $MPL^A = W^A$, that is, at the 'commercialization point'. Cai Fang (2010: 114) describes China's state of economic development state as indicating on the one hand, labour shortage, and on the other hand, an increase in the wages of migrant workers. Fang asserts these as the defining characteristics of the LTP. This statement is clearly contradictory; while the former characteristic refers to the 'shortage point', the latter refers to the 'commercialization point' where W^A start increasing. From these few examples, it becomes evident that given the discrepancy in definitions of the LTP, the debate on whether or not China has reached the LTP is not well-informed. Hence, this paper will not seek to evaluate whether or not China has reached the LTP, but rather the extent to which the Lewis Model phases, as set out in the Ranis-Fei interpretation, correspond to the economic development of China in recent decades. This implies an analysis of urban, rural, and migrant wages, as well as the extent to which China is experiencing a labour shortage.

Applying the Lewis Model to China

Rising urban wages with rural labour surplus

The Ranis-Fei interpretation is widely accepted as an extension of the original Lewis Model, and Gary Fields & Yang Song (2013) have argued that the recent decades of economic development in China do not correspond with either phase one or phase two of the Lewis Model. That is, China

has neither seen a period wherein urban wages remain constant while rural wages are rising, nor has it seen a period in which rural and urban wages are rising at the same rate. In contrast, both urban and rural wages have been increasing, though urban wages have grown much faster than rural wages (Fields & Song, 2013: 5), as seen in Figure 2.

Source: Author's calculation using data from NBS (2006).
Note: Real income is in 2003 yuan, deflated by national urban and rural consumer price indices. Because of the lack of a rural CPI through 1985, the rural CPI is assumed to be equal to the urban CPI from 1977 to 1985.

Figure 2: Real urban and rural per capita income (PCI), 1978-2005 (Park, 2008: 42)

As seen in Figure 2, there is a significant and rising premium of income in the urban parts of China, and rural income has simultaneously increased. It shows that between 1985-89, when there was a constant urban wage, the rural wage did not rise, and since 1989 the urban wage has been increasing at a much faster rate than rural wages. This would confirm the analysis of Fields and Song; that the Lewis Model is not capable of describing China's economic development. Moreover, it would indicate that China has already seen an end to rural surplus labour, which is not the case, as demonstrated by Jane Golley and Xin Meng (2011: 564) who show that 50% of the rural workforce is underemployed. This persistent surplus of labour in the agricultural sector is inconsistent with the rise in wages as shown in Figure 2. What then accounts for these trends in wages?

The urban labour market

Although urban areas have in general seen a significant rise in real wages in past decades, wage growth has been highly unequal between urban residents and migrants. While qualitative information might have shown this for decades, quantitative information has been scarce, as official Chinese data does not include information about migrant wages. Using data from the Rural–Urban Migration in China and Indonesia (RUMiCI) project, Golley and Meng (2011: 559) show that while over the past 10 years aggregated nominal urban wages have increased by 93%, migrant nominal wages have only increased by 30%. Controlling for the rise in living costs in urban areas, migrant urban wages may not have increased at all in the ten years preceding 2011 (ibid: 561). Knight et.al (2011: 11-12) further show that wages of migrants in comparison to the wages of urban residents fell significantly from 2001 to 2005. According to the Lewis Model which hypothesizes about wage earnings for migrants, though lacking a theory for wage differentials between migrants and residents, this trend in urban parts of China would indicate that it has not yet reached the LTP.

Several scholars have analysed the paradox of rising urban wages and surplus rural labour, and unanimously conclude that labour market segmentation is the key deterrent (Knight et al, 2011.; Golley and Meng, 2011; Fields and Song, 2013). The Chinese urban labour market is segmented into two employment sectors, (i) the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector and (ii) the private sector. While there is no observed discrimination in the private sector, in the SOE sector workers with urban hukou are 35% more likely to be hired than those with rural sector, and the former group earn approximately 50% more than the latter (Fields and Song, 2013: 9). Such employment and wage discrimination clearly serve as strong explanatory factors for why migrant workers earn significantly less than urban workers, and why there is not quite as strong an incentive for migrants to move to cities (as Figure 2 suggests). However, in 2009 migrant workers still earned about 35% more than farm workers indicating that the urban wage should still provide a strong incentive for the rural workers to migrate, and hence, that the rural labour surplus is determined by other factors.

Barriers to migration

Importantly, higher costs of living in the urban sector may deter rural workers from migrating to urban parts of the country as it requires rural workers to have a greater amount of savings relative to income in order to sustain themselves in the cities, than for urban residents. Moreover, the hukou system which grants migrant workers temporary rather than permanent working visas in cities, bars them from access to the same social services as urban hukou holders. As this prevents them from accessing benefits such as health facilities, pension provision, and free schooling for their children, the system not only requires them to have enough savings to sustain themselves but also their dependents. The 2010 census showed that around 36 million migrant children lived in cities (Xu et al., 2018: 693), and reducing the family-related variable in their analysis increases the likelihood of migrating by 45% (Golley and Meng, 2011: 566). This illustrates that while many migrants wish to bring their families with them when migrating, and millions have already done so, the conditions that family members will live under in their destination is a strong determinant of migration. This is confirmed by Golley and Meng (2011: 567), who show that when removing the effect of institutional barriers, the probability of rural workers migrating increases from 20% to 36%, indicating that there is still a large population of rural workers that are willing to migrate.

It becomes clear that wage disparities aside, there are also many social disadvantages of migrating to the city due to the hukou system. This has led many scholars to argue that the Chinese government should in coming years reform the hukou system to increase the benefits of migration (Cai, 2010; Melander and Pelikanova, 2013). However, whilst recognizing the clear benefits of migration to economic growth, it poses a more fundamental question of whether migration is a preferred development path. Fields and Song (2013) reject the idea that migration is necessarily desirable because "there is no economic or moral reason to simply judge whether migration is good or not for people's economic well-being in a country" (Fields and Song, 2013: 7). Analysing the welfare benefits in China of reducing living costs in cities, easing hukou conversion, and driving rural development, they find that using two different social welfare criteria, rural development is the only policy that has unambiguously positive welfare benefits. Lewis' own paper, titled *Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour* (1954) does not provide any discussion of the social aspects of migration and development, thus implicitly endorsing the classical notion that economic growth equals development. It becomes clear, that while the Lewis Model serves as a useful tool for analysing growth in China, it may stand in contrast to other important developmental aspects such as social welfare.

Conclusion

As in the 1950s, the prospect of urban industrial work opportunities motivated millions of Chinese rural workers to migrate to cities after the easing of the hukou system in 1984. While high levels of migration have continued over the past decades, China is still experiencing a substantial population of surplus rural labour, despite the wage premium of the migrants over farm workers. A significant deterrent is the hukou system, which bars migrants from accessing social services; in this context, it becomes important to note that the Lewis Model focuses on economic growth, not development overall.

It may be concluded that the persistence of rural surplus labour accompanied by high rates of migration in the recent decades of China's economic development do in part vindicate Lewis. However, the institutional barriers posed by the hukou system, most likely exacerbated by urban labour market discrimination, still serve as a significant deterrent for migration, and this cannot be explained by the original Lewis Model. While such obstacles to migration may prove to be limiting factors of future economic growth in China, that is less likely to be the case for development overall, as migration itself is not necessarily welfare-improving for migrants. Future research should focus on how the hukou system could serve as an institutional framework for reducing urban-rural inequalities and shift focus away from migration-easing reforms, as they may not have the same overall developmental benefits.

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The Productive Capacity of the Sri Lanka War

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Abstract

Traditional understandings of war overlook its productive capacity. To remedy this neglect this paper focuses on the case of the Sri Lanka war and critically engages with the war's generative and transformative power. After theoretical explanation of how war has productive capacities, the article develops a historical, societal and global analysis of the Sri Lanka war in order to trace back the creation of ethnic tension, to show how war is embedded in the societies and to demonstrate the war's global effects. It argues that the war in Sri Lanka produced both Sinhalese and Tamil identity as well as the latter's gendered character and spatial distribution. This exploration of identity creation as a by-product of war, will contribute to the critical war studies literature.

Keywords: Ethnic conflict, Sri Lanka war, Tamil women, Diaspora, War and Society

Conventional understanding of war mainly focuses on its destructiveness. However, such a conception of war undermines its complexity and overlooks its ability to produce and connect in consequential ways. Through critical analysis of the Sri Lanka war, this paper argues that besides destroying, the war progressively produced both Sinhalese and Tamil identity as well as the latter's gendered character and spatial distribution. Moreover, to make the analysis more systematic the paper takes a historical, societal and global perspective. Starting with the brief theoretical debate on the ways war can produce, the paper will firstly trace back the process of creation and polarisation of ethnic identities. Secondly, and relatedly, it will explore the changing role of women in the military to demonstrate identity formation of women. Lastly it will locate the Sri Lanka war in a global context, demonstrating the production of a Tamil diaspora. This paper aims to contribute to the literature by primarily challenging the conventional understanding of war and showing how new identities can be outcomes of war.

War produces and connects

Besides being destructive war is also generative, transformative and interactive. However, these characteristics of war are overlooked, as critical theory of war has relegated its effects on culture, society and politics into only a few lines. Redressing the ontology of war, Barkawi (2004) argues that there is a reciprocal relationship between war and society, as wars are formed by the societies in which they occur and that societies, in turn, are shaped by the wars. In other words, the character of war takes its shape due to the larger social context, thus accordingly the conducted war "reacts back on its social context" (ibid: 162). Moreover, Nordin and Öberg (2015) agree that understanding war as a reciprocal phenomenon enables to track the ways in which it produces identities, spaces, discourses and exchanges among them.

Historical perspective

To trace how war, state and society in Sri Lanka were mutually constitutive, taking a historical approach is necessary. Even though the actual war in Sri Lanka started after 1983, the conflict retrojects to British colonisation. This was followed by the political and economic favouritism of Sinhalese after independence and essentialization of ethnicities which produced antithetical Tamil and Sinhalese identity. Bose (1994) and Herring (2001) agree that the conflict between Sinhalese and Tamil is not primordial as their ethnic identities were shaped and produced through a process of identity construction dating back to the colonial period where colonisers united the three regional sovereignties on the island under single administration. Such administrative union led to an unequal development of the capital city, Colombo, as well as a reorganisation of power in the government based on ethnic lines (ibid). However, due to the making of a post-independence unified administration in 1948, a territorialized logic emerged, in which Sinhala-Buddhist were regarded as majorities and thus the other ethnicities as minorities (Nadarajah 2018). Essentially, this led to the rise of a Sinhalese majoritarian nationalism. Yet, at the same time, it also fuelled the Tamil demands for federalism and autonomy which manifested itself through massive protests (ibid).

 The economic and political pressure on the Tamils imposed through the state-led reforms resulted in dogmatisation of identity and produced a "territorialized and equally modern rationality of Tamil resistance" (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2017: 455). Indeed, the 1948 Ceylon Citizenship Act and Indo Ceylon Agreement of 1964 disenfranchised Indian Tamils from political life (World Bank, 2003); the adoption of 1956 "Sinhalese Only Bill" rejected the parity of Tamil language; standardisation policies of 1971 further limited the education opportunities of Tamil groups, and lastly the 1972 constitution advocating Sinhalese language and Buddhist religion resulted in overt Tamil claims of an independent state (Bose, 1994). Moreover, the Mahaweli project, non-utilisation of foreign aid in the Jaffna region and imposed limitations in public sector admission of Tamils, created economic insecurity and inequality in the system, necessitating the Tamils to secure their identity (Herring, 2001).

 Subsequently, the essentialisation of ethnic identity, such as seeing "Tamil as a whole and Sinhalese as a whole" ascribed collective characteristics to individuals and heated the ethnic tensions, which was manifested by revolts in 1956, 1958, 1961 and 1977 (Herring, 2001: 161). Indeed, the ethno-political identities were sharpened even more when the state adopted the 1979 Prevention of Terrorism Act, attaching an idea of 'terrorism' to the perception of the Tamils (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005). This vital change manifested itself in youth radicalisation, and after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) assassination of 14 Sinhalese in 1983 and anti-Tamil pogrom, the context of the Tamil Sinhalese conflict shifted from "cold war to a civil war" (Nithiyandam, 2000: 303). Consequently, the identities were polarised to such an extent that by the time of the outbreak of war, the army consisted of 300,000 Sinhalese soliders and the institutional organisation of the military was formed on the basis of a Buddhist 'just war' ideology (Rampton and Nadarajah, 2017: 458). In essence, the historical context of the Sri Lanka war reinstates Barkawi's (2004) war and society approach: the conflict, and later the war, in Sri Lanka took its shape due to the alienating hierarchical order in society, which was imposed by the state mainly through economic and political pressures. Thus, the war in turn produced and sharpened the conscious Tamil and Sinhalese identities.

Societal perspective

War can never be "fully exterior to an order war itself creates" (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 135). Hence, to thoroughly understand the productive and connective effect of the war, there is a need to shift the debate from the conceptual notion of 'war and society' to 'war in society' (ibid: 139). Indeed, with regards to the case of Sri Lanka, one can argue that through the active military engagement of women in LTTE, the war in the Tamil society produced a new ideas of gender roles among the Tamils. Thus, as war produces new power-geometries in societies, different social categories may be challenged or strengthened (Brun, 2005).

While the women's role in the traditional Tamil society (before the armed conflict) was restricted to the cultural norms of "addaccam" (meaning modesty and silence) and "odducam" (meaning poise and restraint) (Alexander 2014: 10), the role of women changed as an effect of the war. As Tamil women started having income-generating jobs and participating in the military force during the war, the position of women was transformed in social, gender, class and cast relations (Brun 2005). Thus, from 1980s LTTE started enlisting women in its units, which, due to the mass female mobilisation, accounting for more than 30% of LTTE's force, led to the creation of its women branch in 1983 (Alison, 2003). Therefore, while the Women's Front of LTTE initially trained females for battle, it later started fighting against all forms of discrimination, such as the dowry and caste system, in order to guarantee the political, social and economic equality of Tamil women and propagate the female emancipation as part of the Tamil struggle towards an autonomous state (Alison, 2011; Alexander, 2014). Indeed, questioning whether or not female empowerment was an ambition of LTTE, the movement received several criticisms from Sixta (2008) and human rights advocate, Radhika Coomaraswamy, (cited in Alison, 2003: 46) who saw the women of LTTE as victims of a nationalist patriarchal plan and "cogs in the wheel" who are implementers but not decision makers. However, the fact that in the early 2000s, five of the twelve members of LTTE's central committee were women. The movement's Women's Wing took part in ceasefire negotiations held in Geneva in 2002 and was chosen as a prominent member of the Sub-Committee for Gender Issues. These examples demonstrate that whether voluntarily or not, LTTE challenged the traditional gendered relations in the society (Dissanayake, 2017). Moreover, the election of a female Sri Lanka Tamil MP, Vijayakala Maheswaran, in the 2010 parliamentary elections, further strengthens this point (Alison, 2011). To sum up, analysing the Sri Lanka war through a 'war in society' concept challenges two overlooked issues. Firstly, it understands that militaries are not outside the society but are embedded in it, thus, the forms of organisation in militaries both reflect and shape the social relations around them. Secondly, it demonstrates that the Sri Lankan war did not only transform the society, but that it also produced a place for women in the public arena.

Global perspective

While analysing the war from a societal and historical perspective opens its interior dynamics, ignoring the role of international actors in Sri Lanka and relegating the war into an internal conflict could result in a limited analysis and overlook its wider effects. Thus, by taking a global perspective and locating the Sri Lanka war in a transnational security debate, one can argue that this local/global war produced a Tamil diaspora as a social and political formation. Today Tamil diaspora accounts for over one million people living mainly in North America, Europe, and India (Sriskandarajah, 2005). However, according to Fuglerud (2001), Tamil migration dates back to the pre-colonial era. Nevertheless, it particularly increased after the breakout of the war. Following

India's refusal to accept refugees in the 1990s the migrants consequently settled in mainly European countries, forming a diaspora network.

However, being in a triadic relationship between host state, the home state and among themselves, diasporas in this local/global war became the targets, channels, and centres for various security procedures (Sriskandarajah, 2005). Although the diaspora members mainly constitute a "diaspora nationalism" (ibid: 495), as pointed out by Laffey and Nadarajah (2012: 404): their power can put them in the position of either "warmongers" or "peacebuilders". Thus, while such a dualism shapes diaspora as hybrid trans-local subjects, it also defines the paradoxical international reaction to it: disciplining through policing, proscriptions and immigration when they are warmongers, but empowering and supporting when they are peacebuilders (ibid). For example, during the Norwegian-led mutual peace processes the Western stance towards the LTTE and the Tamil diaspora was more or less neutral. However, with the failure of the peace talks, LTTE was included in proscribed terrorist organisation lists in the EU, UN, UK, and Canada, subsequently turning the diaspora into warmongers in the eyes of the West (ibid).

According to Vimalarajah and Cheran (2010) being a 'stateless diaspora' and supporting illiberal LTTE, Tamil mobilization was regarded as bringing home conflicts to the host states which threatened their security. As a result, systematic legal restrictions such as limitations on Tamil broadcast, venue arrangements, and social events were enforced. However, such attacks politically and socially mobilised the global Tamils diaspora, and simultaneous Tamil protests took place in different European cities (Laffey and Nadarajah, 2012). Indeed, the 72 day long occupation of Parliament Square in the UK (ibid), the 'Say No to Sri Lanka' and 'No Blood for Panties' campaigns, organisation of hunger strikes, as well as the use of violence, forms demonstrate the organisation and spatial social construction of Tamil identity (International Crisis Group, 2010: 16).

On the other hand, the political formation of a Tamil diaspora emerged when Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam, "a non-violent democratic political organization with an aim to be parallel to a government", was founded in 2009 and 2010, with 99% cast votes in a referendum held in Germany, France, Canada and Switzerland favouring the establishment of Tamil Eelam state (ibid: 9). Interestingly, the expansion and formation of diaspora resulted in its cooperation with Western governments on human rights issues subsequently shifting its position from 'warmongers' to 'peacebuilders' after 2010 (Nadarajah, 2018). In essence, the continuity of Tamil diaspora to fight for the Tamil Eelam state, even after the defeat of LTTE demonstrates that the local/global war of Sri Lanka could produce the Tamil identity spatially and form a political and social organisation of the Tamil diaspora.

Conclusion: From war to identity creation

Beyond its destructive power, the Sri Lanka war did at the same time produce and connect. This paper analysed the case of Sri Lanka from three different perspectives- historical, societal and global. Starting from the period of British colonisation, the paper demonstrated how administrative, economic and social policies implemented by the state were isolating Tamils and resulted in the creation of their ethnic consciousness. As a result, through the conflict and war, both the Sinhala Buddhist and Tamil identities got sharpened, this reflected back on the society and further triggered the actual war. Applying the 'war in society' approach to the LTTE military, it becomes evident that the war also produced a new gendered aspect of the Tamil identity and

opened up spaces for women in the society. In fact, through active military engagement of women in LTTE, the war produced new power dynamics in the society. On the other hand, in a global/local war context, the Sri Lanka war also produced the spatial distribution of Tamil identity, namely through the Tamil diaspora as a political and social formation. Lastly, in the current phase of ongoing conflicts, this paper suggests that identity creation as a product of war should be further researched.

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How Human Rights Law and Rhetoric Shielded the Military Junta in Myanmar

Theint Theint Thu

Abstract

This paper argues how human rights norms, practices, and language have clouded the real solutions to injustices in Myanmar by protecting the military junta from pressure. It will explore how the international human rights discourse has set out to merely deal with the symptoms of the problems rather than the root cause itself, providing negligible change in the long run. The paper explains how the current solutions for Myanmar ignore the institutional roots of the injustices (such as the constitution) as well as structural and societal causes. In addition, it explores how in recent years, the military has been able to hide its rights violations behind superficial developments as well as the regime change. Overall, the human rights discourse has provided a naive narrative for despotism in Myanmar by undermining the entrenched authoritarian rule in both government and society, even in the post-trauma era. In doing so, the discourse has unknowingly shielded the military junta and has dangerously looked over the true causes of rampant rights violations.

Keywords: Myanmar, Human Rights, Discourse, Democracy

The case study of Myanmar demonstrates how human rights, particularly as a legally centred objective, have masked and distracted prevalent injustices. The language of human rights in the international sphere have only hid and exacerbated the problem by providing unsustainable and insignificant change. With international eyes being placed on the expansion, mechanism, and awareness of human rights in Myanmar, many fail to unravel the true foundation of the violations in the country. Human rights violations in Myanmar exists as a symptom of a lack of true democracy, faulty constitutionalism, and the role of a despotic regime who has hid behind their opposing democratic party. Myanmar, still under the large influence of the military, has suffered from political instruments like the 2008 constitution, the superficial development of human rights, and from the structural oppression that goes behind the scope of human rights advocacy. This paper will argue how the current human rights language, rhetoric, and practices have clouded the true solutions to injustices in Myanmar, undermining its own ability to resolve the very issues it had set out to overcome.

The Problem with the Human Rights Language

In Myanmar, and in the wider world, the language of human rights has ironically been used as a weapon against those said rights. Unfortunately, as Baxi points out, the gaining popularity of the word 'human rights' mean that most arguments are framed to suit its language - even when the issue is not necessarily one of rights (Baxi, 2007: 2). The language of human rights gives the

impression that it is something governments can do to enact change by granting rights through legislation or allocation of resources (Carozza, 2018). However, in a system of faulty constitutionalism and lack of democratic accountability, the implementation of rights cannot be carried out as simply. The declaration of human rights and the founding of international human rights law essentially created a checklist for development for many NGOs and government officials by providing basic standards (Robinson, 2005: 35). However, the reality is that despite advances in the expansion of human rights, poverty and oppression will still override the effectiveness of rights. In Myanmar, the language of human rights has eclipsed the true issues, thus clouding the awareness of what is really at stake.

An Overview of Human Rights Violations and Developments in Myanmar

Under the military rule, initially brought in through a coup d'etat by General Ne Win's party, the Burma Socialist Programme Party, the rights of both citizens and non-citizens of the country have been infamously violated against. From qualifying the right to expression to the lack of minority rights and religious freedom, the party committed human rights violations that continue to remain even in the current quasi-democratic regime. One of the greatest political shifts in contemporary Myanmarese history is marked by the 8888 Revolution. The 8888 Revolution, a series of protests led by students and monks, was the first stand towards democracy, and against the socialist regime. For the Myanmarese, the notion of democracy encapsulates all forms of civil and political rights (Muang, 1999). Despite certain international media coverage, in Myanmar, the 8888 revolution is best understood not as a fight for the better establishment of human rights but as a protest to attain liberty from an oppressive government (ibid: 253). Even in the decades following the 8888 revolution, international media continues to utilize the language of human rights to frame the political and social situation in Myanmar, but it is interesting to note that it is not the dominant language used in the local political sphere (ibid). Despite the supposed victory of the National League of Democracy (NLD) in the 2015 elections, Myanmar citizens are still campaigning for greater democracy and liberty today. They believe that human rights cannot exist as a separate entity but can only granted once true democracy is achieved (ibid).

The violations of human rights in the country has led states to sanction Myanmar in the past - believing that applying pressure to the military junta as per international human rights customs will pave way for the better establishment of human rights (Xuechang, 2010: 7). However, as countries like the United States view their sanctions as a righteous and a helpful stance on human rights, they are masking the vast problems that the sanctioning has caused. For civilians, the sanctioning of Myanmar led to economic devastations affecting businesses and job availability, limited access to the wider world, and exploitation for natural resources (Pederson, 2008: 229). Thant Myint-U remarks that the "current sanctions on the government are hurting ordinary Myanmar people more than the junta generals" (Xuechang, 2010). The sanctions left Myanmar in a dire state of socio-economic development, and left the people of Myanmar exposed to greater violations of human rights (Johnston 2009). Instead of being the premise of democratic change, the sanctions, in the name of human rights, hindered the democratic process by paving the way for a greater control on civil and political rights with less resources for political engagement.

The recent human rights violation that the current Myanmar's government is responsible for is the ongoing crisis of the Rohingya genocide. The language of human rights has made Aung San Suu Kyi at the centre of media attention, due to her previously seen role as a protector of the people and as a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. However, while the lady has not been wholly innocent,

she also cannot be held directly accountable for the crimes against the Rohingya that are occurring today (Barany, 2018). In shifting the spotlight towards Aung San Suu Kyi, international media had unknowingly masked the true culprits of the situation - the tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) and its commander in chief, General Min Aung Hlaing (Ibrahim, 2016). Today, the common person would speak about Aung San Suu Kyi, as the nobel laureate who has failed to intervene in an infamous mass genocide. However, they would be unsure about the role of the tatmadaw or of General Min Aung Hlaing (Barany, 2018: 13). The scrutiny of Aung San Suu Kyi in the international media gave the tatmadaw the opportunity to conceal behind their opposition, clouding accountability, and thriving without international pressure (ibid).

The Problem of Constitutionalism in Myanmar

The one-dimensional view on human rights, that the rule of law is essential in upholding human rights law (Robinson, 2005), is conflicted in the case of Myanmar, where the constitution is a perpetuator, not protector of rights (Renshaw, 2017: 221). By diverting the attention onto human rights laws in Myanmar, many are failing to recognize the underlying difficulty of enforcing these rights under an established legal institution. The rooted authoritarianism means that the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has guaranteed its power through all aspects of the legal and political sphere, especially in what can be seen in the international legal sphere as a righteous concept of a constitution (Cheesman, 2016: 67). The interchangeability of the words of constitution, rule of law and human rights in the Western political sphere has given the false impression that the establishment of one guarantees the establishment of the other (James, 2006). It is a catch-22 situation, unveiling the irony of holding human rights accountable under the rule of law, under the 2008 constitution.

On the surface, the constitution marked a milestone towards the recognition of human rights and its enforcement in Myanmar. Chapter 8 of the constitution lays out the "Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Citizen", which recognizes the rights set forth by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - including equal recognition under the law (Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2008: Art 347). However, further inspection of the constitution unravels a deceitful hierarchy that undermines true equality under the law. Article 445 of the same constitution provides legal immunity for members of the USDP in relation to any act done in the execution of duty (ibid: Art 445). Though it is unclear whether it would apply to genocide or crimes against humanity, the legality of their pardoning illustrates the difficulty in holding the political party accountable for violations of human rights.

Even if advocates work for better human rights accountability under a legal framework, effective enforcement under the law remains a challenge. The lack of accessible legal aid and "prevalence of corruption deters the majority of the population from accessing the judicial system" (Renshaw, 2017: 221). Even if the elitist nature of law is overcome through access to courts, competing principles and the dominance of military objectives in the constitution, make it difficult to access remedies and redress (ibid). While most thought that the development of the constitution marks an advancement towards better human rights, the overlooked problem is that the constitution still guarantees military power. While one could argue that the creation of the constitution marked the adoption of human rights into domestic law, the reality is that its undemocratic and unaccountable nature still does not signify a victory for the modern human rights regime.

Superficial Developments in Human Rights

While it is true that human rights law has been able to hold states accountable to particular violations, it has also provided false hope and blurred the lines of accountability. In Myanmar, the language of human rights has shielded the military party from the pressures of demilitarizing the government. While the previous military president, Thein Sein, received praise in the international community for his reformist laws, the reality is that his laws were still not an exceptional advancement for human rights (United Nations. General Assembly & Quintana, T.O. 2014). The recent developments of human rights in Myanmar has made people think that the quality of life has improved under the new regime, when in fact, there is no significant difference. The distinction between the superficial achievements of human rights and the actual oppression that takes place in Myanmar paved the way for the military to hide behind arbitrary notions of human rights.

 Under the USDP president, Thein Sein, the party has expanded civil and political rights to allow for the establishment of a domestic human rights accountability body (Burma Partnership 2012), the release of political prisoners (Hlaing 2012), allowing parliament to address the issue of the military in land grabbing (Zaw, 2013), legalizing trade unions (BBC News, 2011), and allowing for more public political gatherings. However, the expansion of human rights in recent Myanmar has undermined the grave influence of the military under the rule. It is one thing to say that people now have a greater right to the freedom of speech - that people can now speak up more about politics in public areas than they were ever to in the past (Renshaw, 2017: 216), but it does not increase the fundamental purpose of the right-- the ability to be politically engaged. While people can now slightly raise their voice about change, it is false optimism to say that they can bring about substantial, meaningful change whilst doing so (Lakhdhir 2016). Today, access to politics still remains as qualified as it was under Ne Win's government; it is just now masked behind the expansion of other civil and political rights.

 The establishment of the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission, at first glance marked a triumph of human rights. Established in 2011, by President Thein Sein, the commission was created to further align Myanmar with the Paris Principles, endorsed by the UN General Assembly (Renshaw, 2017: 217). However, the creation of the commission and its execution has lacked in transparency. Although the chairman of the commission, Win Mra, stated that the commission would not be influenced by the government (Htun, 2011), civil society groups have doubts as to its true independence and its willingness to scrutinize the government (Burma Partnership, 2012). Unfortunately, their scepticism was met with some truth. In 2015, the commission urged for the release of student demonstrators who were involved in the Letpadan protests by releasing a statement declaring that excessive force was used against the demonstrators - undermining their right to protest (Lone, 2015). However, after publishing the report, the students were subjugated to further abuse and more students were imprisoned. Despite the aggravated situation, hunger strikes, and allegations of torture in the prisons, the commission declared that they would not pursue the situation further (Min & Kuan, 2016). The commission is a critical example of how Myanmar uses human rights bodies to create an illusion of enforceability, concealing the greater issues of oppression and demonstrating how a state can hide behind the popular language of human rights.

The Structural Issues in Present Day Myanmar

The human rights rhetoric and international human rights standards overlook the underlying social and cultural difficulty of the pursuant of such rights. As Renshaw states, "many are traumatized by the decades of subjugation to articulate their values on how society should pursue" (2017: 234). Renshaw highlights the difficulty in establishing a simplistic human rights order in the post-trauma era. It is not merely the government's reluctance to change, but the hesitation and fear of Myanmar's citizens to accept and embrace their slowly expanding rights. While organizations attempt to increase a knowledge of human rights in the country, they will find that the knowledge of human rights is not an issue. While most may not have formally heard of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they still understand the gross injustice that they have be subjected to (National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma. Human Rights Documentation Unit 1999). In Myanmar, even despite the lack of formal education in the social sciences, the population remains politically active and aware (Crouch, 2017: 157).

The greater problem is that decades of military rule and brutal enforcement measures have created a structural problem within society that goes beyond the scope of the state's ability to recognize human rights (Pederson, 2008: 180). The trauma endured by generations under the military party will not only need the opportunity to heal but requires the activism to reshape it (ibid: 191). If Myanmar were to move forward, it would not only need to increase civilian and technocratic makeup at all levels of government, but to increase the population's trust in the legal system and actors of the law (ibid). Myanmar would need to combat the corruption, move towards national reconciliation, and rearrange its entrenched authoritarian control. Even if Myanmar were to develop an effective human rights mechanism, it would not be enough to combat the deeply-rooted oppression and abuse of people by the state (ibid: 181).

Conclusion

The reliance of human rights on democracy has led to confusion with regards to the current situation in Myanmar. The problem is not the lack of human rights, but rather the rooted political mechanisms in which the violations of these rights are a symptom of. Creating more rights, expanding the scope of rights, or increasing awareness of human rights will not alleviate the situation if the problem is one of systematic oppression and an undemocratic constitution. However, due to the popular development of the language of human rights, the true solutions are being masked behind false developments of said rights. The lack of accountability brought by the language of human rights blurred the lines of scrutiny.

Believing that a democratic party in power entails a better human rights regime is merely incorrect. Not only are there power interests at conflict, but the mechanisms of upholding rights, like the constitution itself, is being used as a weapon to justify human rights atrocities. Adding to the complexity, the citizens themselves are living in the post-trauma era where the acceptance and personal adoption of human rights is met with hesitation and fear. In addition, the simplistic language of human rights does not account for the tension between human rights and the rule of law. The expansion of human rights does not mean the dissolution of an oppressive regime, nor does it mean that citizens are generally more content and freer. In fact, the expansion of human rights in Myanmar has only succeeded in diverting the attention away from the existing mechanisms of despotism. As Baxi (2007: 6) writes, "the notion that human rights regimes may, or ought to, contribute to the 'pursuit of happiness' remains the privilege of a minuscule of

humanity". As in the case of Myanmar, human rights have mistakenly been seen a cure for the vast injustices in the country today.

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How are Healing and Suffering Conceptualized within Christian Science?

Greta von Albertini

Abstract

This paper investigates and explores the understanding of suffering and healing within the new religious movement (NRM) of Christian Science (SC). Through a medical anthropological lens, concepts such as the mind/body dualism and the 'placebo effect' will be discussed, alongside analyses of qualitative research data gathered at my local CS church in central London through participant observation and semi-structured interviews. With a focus on the movement's construction of healing, that perceives suffering as 'unreal', I argue that CS's conceptualisation of healing and suffering is inherently contradictory and dichotomous. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the rather scarce literature on CS through a transdisciplinary approach incorporating religious studies, medical anthropology, and sociology.

Keywords: New Religious Movement, Christian Science, London, Suffering, Healing

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"Matter and disease cannot destroy life"

— *Mary Baker Eddy (1875: 292)*

She had purple eyes, a voice like an opera singer, and her prayer practice at the church would put her into such a deep trance-like state that other members struggled to get her 'back' to reality. I never met her, but as a child, this was the description I was given about my great-grandmother. She joined Christian Science (CS) sometime in the late 1890s, which gave her something to hold on to when facing poverty and social exclusion as an immigrant. Apparently, the prayer and healing practices provided her with the missing stability. My grandmother and her sister both followed their mother's path of faith and were members of Christian Science all their lives. The tradition broke, however, with the following generation. Although my aunt went through a phase as a 'religious shopper' (Janson, 2016: 661) when facing a health-crisis in her early 30s, she tried out different esoteric and spiritual practices[9] and eventually became a member of CS for about three years.

Intrigued by what seemed to be a contradiction in itself, a faith that sees illness as an illusion while promising to heal the sick, I chose to focus my fieldwork project on the conceptualization of healing and sickness within this new religious movement (NRM). This paper will introduce the origins of CS and discuss, through the writings of Arweck and Barker, why it is considered an NRM. The main focus, however, will be on the movement's emphasis on and understanding of healing and suffering from a medical anthropological perspective. In line with that, and by drawing

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[9] Such as yoga and the writings of Eckhart Tolle.

on Hackett, the notion of 'science' in relation to healing practices will be elaborated on, followed by a discussion of the mind/body dualism by medical anthropologists, Lock and Scheper-Hughes. Furthermore, through the writings of medical anthropologists and psychiatrists, Kleinman and Hahn, the notion of the 'placebo effect' will be explored in relation to CS' emphasis on positive thinking. Throughout the more theoretical analyses, I will weave in ethnographic examples from my observations and interviews gathered during fieldwork and draw on the sociologist of religion, Rodney Stark's account of CS.

Methodology

My fieldwork was conducted at the CS church, Eleventh Church, near King's Cross in London. Upon my first encounter, I was warmly welcomed by the members of the church, who showed great interest in my project. One of my interlocutors, Richard, told me that perhaps a handful of the 'thousands' of people who will read my paper may convert, possibly myself included someday. Thus, my interest in and work on the church was interpreted as a catalyst for conversion. Due to my family history, my positionality within the field could be defined as one of a 'native anthropologist' but, although my grandmother was a Christian Scientist, I was not raised as one – in fact, CS was, rather, a taboo topic[10]. I was a 'native anthropologist' in Narayan's more fluid sense: my sense of belonging was in constant flux as I negotiated my positionality as both insider and outsider (1993: 671). Richard's remark also made me realize that ethnographic research is not a one-way relationship. An anthropologist always must consider the impact they have on the field as their relationships with their interlocutors is always reciprocal. With that in mind, I agreed to share my final paper with my interlocutors.

 In addition to attending a Sunday Service and a Wednesday Testimony, I conducted three semi-structured interviews with a practitioner (Lawrence), a long-time member (Henry), and another member who is working on becoming a full-time practitioner (Richard).[11] Furthermore, I had a few conversations with my aunt around her experience with CS. However, due to the restricted scope of this paper I have decided to focus on my participant observation and interviews conducted at the church in London.

What is Christian Science?

Christian Science (CS) is a new religious movement (NRM), a term used to replace the terms 'cult' or 'sect' by Western scholars in the 1960s (Barker, 2001: 10631). According to Arweck (2002), NRMs arose from the post-WWII period onwards, predominantly resulting from the 1960s counter-culture movement (Arweck, 2002: 269). However, due to the vast variety of NRMs, there is not "one accepted definition" (ibid. 283), and there are many indicators other than that of temporality for CS to be a NRM. Most markedly, it is based on Christianity (ibid. 295), charismatic leadership (ibid. 270), an alternative reading of the Bible (ibid. 271), a dichotomous worldview (Barker, 2001: 10634), and specific practices (ibid: 10633) or techniques to achieve good health.

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[10] Due to my family's distrust of CS and the more general negative connotations attached to NRMs. See Clarke (2006: 44) on hostility towards NRMs.

[11] For ethical reasons I am using pseudonyms for the three interviews.

In 1866, Mary Baker Eddy (MBE) discovered CS and defined it as the "absolute divine Principle of scientific mental healing" (1875: 107). She had a difficult life, plagued by hardship[12] and physical ailments. Following an accident, MBE was told by her physician that her paralysis was incurable. She tried everything, from conventional medicine to homeopathy, but nothing could heal her. One day, however, when she was lying in bed, she read in the Bible about Jesus' healing practices and the impossible happened: she was able to stand up and walk again. This was when she discovered CS. During my fieldwork at the church I heard this story repeatedly, and there were posters in the hallways with short biographical paragraphs about her and quotes from her translation of the Bible: Science and Health: With Key to the Scriptures (SH). This emphasizes MBE's "charismatic authority" (Barker 2001: 10634), which is still important to the members of CS today. Stark states that MBE "[presented] herself as infused with divinity and to be the co-equal of Jesus" (1998: 199).

MBE provided an alternative reading of the Bible and, when referring to the Bible, stated that "the translators of this record entertained a false sense of Being. They believed in the existence of matter.'" (SH: 525 in McKim, 2014: 406). MBE created what Stark calls, a "radical doctrine of mind power" (1998: 196) that negates the realness of illness and physical symptoms of any kind, and even death is perceived as an illusion.[13] With a female founder, women are central to CS. The so-called Mother Church in Boston is considered the main church or 'headquarters of CS. At one of the Sunday Services I noticed that one of the readers[14] closed the sermon with: "Holy Father-Mother." The notion of God as "genderless"[15] illustrates one of its revolutionary concepts.

"Prayer is practical and effective"

——*Christian Science (2018)*

After a successful career as a scientist and businessman, Lawrence decided to retire a few years early in order to become a full-time CS practitioner. He explained to me that a full-time practitioner is not allowed to have any other source of income than that accumulated through one's healing practices. Practitioners are paid for their services and usually ask for the same amount as a medical doctor, which, according to Lawrence, is around £40 an hour. Hence, although physicians are not tolerated in CS, the general framework of the healing procedure is reminiscent of the former, as it involves a consultation billed according to the local medical standard.

So-called 'spiritual science movements' are NRMs that provide a specific practice or technology to achieve spirituality in order to "manipulate the empirical course of existence" (Hackett, 1986: 8). When asked why CS is a 'science', Lawrence stated that the definition of science is based on theory and practice. If the theory is correct, you can prove it in practice and because the healing practices of CS are demonstrated to be successful, CS is a science. This seems like a contradiction in itself; while the material world is dismissed as an illusion, the CS healing practice is legitimated

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[12] According to Henry, MBE's son was taken away from her at a young age as her family thought her incapable of taking care of him due to her poor health.

[13] "Life is perpetual and never changes into death" (Eddy, 1875: 292).

[14] There are always two readers present at the Sunday Service, one reading psalms from the Bible and the other reading correlating passages from *Science and Health*.

[15] Definition according to one of my interlocutors.

through physical proof. All three of my interviewees decided to join the church after experiencing a form of personal healing through CS.

"There is no matter; matter is nothing but a mortal illusion."

— Science and Health: With Key to the Scriptures[16]

Through the usual London drizzle, I slowly cycled into St. Chad's Street on my bike, feeling relieved to have survived the traffic chaos around King's Cross. Outside the church, a member greeted me and kindly suggested I leave my bike in the hallway entrance of the church. The newly renovated[17] church (not recognizable from the outside as a church in the traditional sense) has a calming and clean atmosphere inside, designed in a modern minimalistic style with a lot of light-coloured wood and white walls. Someone was playing the piano, and as I sat down I could feel myself starting to relax as the noise of the city faded away. I was there for the Wednesday Testimony, a weekly gathering open to all, where people are invited to share their healing experiences. It began with the reader reading from both the Bible and SH (Science and Health: With Key to the Scriptures), interspersed with communal singing. About half-way through, the reader encouraged people to share their healing experiences, adding, however, that they were not allowed to mention any symptoms, name any diseases, or be explicit about their illness in any way. The sociologist of religion, Rodney Stark, argues that, according to MBE, positive thoughts are the most powerful tools given to us: "The world of our senses is but an illusion of our minds. If the material world causes us pain, grief, danger and even death, that can be changed by changing our thoughts" (1998: 195). CS emphasizes healing and refusing to name the nature of symptoms and suffering negates their reality.

When I asked the practitioner, Lawrence, about CS' take on the mind/body dualism, he stated that in CS there is no such thing as their viewpoint is based on unity and 'wholeness'. Since God is omnipresent, there is no space for the opposite of God. He elaborated on this thought by pointing out that only the spirit Mind[18] is real and the mortal mind (body) is an illusion and that therefore the Cartesian split of mind/body does not apply in CS. However, this proves to be a contradiction in itself because if only one (spirit Mind) is true, and the other (body) is unreal, a dichotomous thinking is observable. The anthropologist Margery Fox made a similar observation, noting that CS' doctrine of "opposing the divine Mind (capital M) to the mortal mind (small m)" perpetuates the dualism (1984: 292). Lock and Scheper-Hughes argue that, when discussing the "Cartesian Legacy" (1987: 8), biomedicine is based on overruling oppositions: "spirit and matter, mind and body, and (underlying this) real and unreal" (ibid.). Within this tradition of thought, what is real is perceived as an underlying biomedical causation of illness, rather than psychological or social effects on the body (ibid.). Thus, when comparing the predominantly materialist approach of Western medicine to that of CS, they are strikingly similar, only reversed. It has been observed that often when a dissolution of the mind/body dichotomy is attempted, it is in reality being reinforced (ibid: 10).

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[16] SH, ed. of 1893: 525 in McKim, 1914: 406.

[17] In 2016.

[18] The capital 'M' in spirit Mind was repeatedly emphasized during my fieldwork, reflecting its superiority over matter.

"Belief kills; belief heals."

— *Hahn & Klienman (1983: 3)*

According to Lawrence, a CS practitioner should never use medicine to treat a patient because medicine is material and therefore not real (Hahn & Klienman 1983: 3). He continued, a medicine's effect is ultimately determined by a patient's faith in it, by what a doctor would call the 'placebo effect'. In their article, Kleinman and Hahn investigate the notion of placebo,[19] aiming "to elucidate the pervasive power of belief" (1983: 16). They criticize the dominant approach based on the Cartesian ontology and offer an alternative viewpoint, arguing that mind and body affect each other perpetually, as they are intermeshed: "The mind is embodied, the body is mindful" (italics in original; ibid: 18), emphasizing the realness and efficacy of placebo as a treatment method for a "great variety of pathological conditions" (ibid: 17). Accordingly, a sick mind creates a sick body, and vice versa. For CS, on the other hand, it is a one-way street: a healthy mind creates a healthy body, because only the mind is real and physical symptoms are merely a creation of the mind. After the first interview, Lawrence sent me a document via email with the most important quotes "illustrating some of the areas in which Mary Baker Eddy was a pioneer for reform" (email: 3rd December 2018). One of them was about the use of medicine and the placebo effect: "Unsupported by the faith reposed in it, the inanimate drug becomes powerless" (Eddy, 1875: 160).

"Welcome: Our healing ministry"

— *Eleventh Church of Christ, Scientist, London (2018)*

Richard told me his first healing experience was when he accidentally cut his finger, leaving a very deep cut that would not stop bleeding. He remembered the CS teachings that physical perception and pain are illusions and ignored the bleeding finger and the pain. Soon after it had stopped bleeding and he realized that his pain was in fact an illusion. In contrast to Kleinman and Hahn's notion of an embodied mind, or mindful body, I argue that CS' approach to healing and suffering is one of disembodiment. The notion of physical symptoms as being an illusion that can be controlled through the subject's thoughts calls for the mind to transcend the body, as Richard did by ignoring his pain, creating a split between mind and body.

When conducting the first interview with Lawrence, a practioner, I was suffering from a recurring intense stomach pain and asked him what healing procedure he would offer me if I was his patient. He summed up an individualized protocol[20] for me that started with the notion of overcoming fear, as this emotion underlies all illness. Healing is conceptualized and to be achieved through an emphasis on positive thoughts and emotions (loss of fear, strengthening feelings of love and gratitude). This is reminiscent of Hahn and Kleinman's claim that "there is a physiology of expectation: of hope, of fear, and of their variants" (1983: 18). They highlight the importance of considering the cultural and social context of when a placebo phenomenon occurs because a patient's belief affects their healing outcome (Lock and Scheper-Hughes, 1987: 30).

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[19] Hahn & Klienman also published a chapter on *nocebo,* the notion that negative thoughts may cause illness.

[20] Which he later said was very standard. The protocol can be found in the Appendix.

According to Richard, who will soon be a full-time practitioner, it is through the acceptance that illness and pain are not real but constructions of the mortal mind that the patient will be healed. When I asked him about how the practitioner helps the patient to achieve this view point, he explained it to me with an example: if someone has breast cancer, the first thing that he, the practitioner, does is make sure that he himself is healed from the 'wrong' perception, which is to perceive the tumour as real and feel sorry for the person. This, he said, is dis-empowering and leads to a downward spiral, only making the patient sicker. Hence, the practitioner has to 'cleanse' (Richard) himself first of such thoughts and will only then be able to heal the other person. The next steps of the advice for the patient are always spontaneous, sent to the practitioner from God in the moment.

Concluding reflections

Anthropological work on CS is rather scarce. This is surprising, considering that, especially within the field of medical anthropology, CS offers much to explore. Insights into the economic and entrepreneurial sides of the CS healing practice, the liminal phase (Turner, 1967) a practitioner has to endure during the so-called 'class instruction' (training), and the similarities with psychodynamic therapy (which is also based on empathy, confidentiality, and the fact that a practitioner is not allowed in any way to transfer their issues onto anyone else) would all make fascinating anthropological studies. In this paper, however, I have had to limit my focus to examining the complexities of CS' conceptualization of healing and suffering. Specifically, I have focused on why healing is such a central aspect of CS, discussing the meanings attached to 'science' and the perpetuation of the mind/body dualism. I argued that CS' social construction of healing, which condemns suffering as unreal, is built on contradictions and dichotomies.

The day after my interview with Lawrence, my stomach pain decreased and, had I been a CS myself, I would have taken this as empirical evidence for the prayer's efficacy. Yet as an agnostic, I do not recognise the correlation between prayer and pain relief or perceive it as scientific proof. More importantly, however, as an anthropologist I acknowledge how belief shapes one's conceptions of healing and suffering.

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Appendix

All interviews were conducted at the 'Eleventh Church of Christ, Scientist' (11 St. Chad's Street, WC1H 8BG London).

<u>Lawrence</u>

Interviews:

- November 2018, duration ca. 1 hour (not recorded)
- December 2018, duration 27:30:00.

Lawrence's healing protocol for me (interview 1):

a) Handle the fear, because fear underlies all illness. Love rules over fear. God's love is like mother love, the most powerful, pure and universal love.
b) Recognizing that *God is all in all* excludes the possibility of a belief in pain. The mind you have is the mind of God, which cannot hold pain.
c) Gratitude: we need to be grateful before the healing happens.

<u>Henry</u>

Interview:

- November 2018, duration 1:01:12.

<u>Richard</u>

Interview

- December 2018, duration 53:49:00.

Drivers of the London Housing Crisis: The Neoliberal Nexus of Ideology, Policy, and Capital

Julia Frances Alice Everett

Abstract

For the average Londoner, the subject of housing is a bleak one. House prices in the capital continue to rise while homelessness, displacement, and poor-quality accommodation become increasingly pervasive and damaging, with seemingly no end in sight. This paper is situated within a budding literature surrounding the international political economy of housing and property and seeks to trace the root drivers of the London housing crisis. It argues that although crises in housing are not necessarily new phenomena, this current period of crisis is intensified by neoliberal ideology which has justified and driven government policies which have in turn facilitated the financialization of the London housing market. These developments have occurred counter to the interests of ordinary Londoners through the reconceptualization housing as an asset, as opposed to a right. The paper will examine how ideology intersects with capital and UK government policy, in effect perpetuating the London housing crisis.

Keywords: Housing crisis, London, Neoliberalism, Political Economy, Homelessness

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The question of housing is one of primary importance in the study of global political economy due to its fundamentality in our daily lives. It is difficult to deny that the effects of the housing crisis are felt by all Londoners, be it through profit or loss. The housing crisis takes numerous forms, such as a lack in socially provisioned housing for the neediest in society as well as shortages of affordable housing in London (Watt & Minton, 2016: 204). As homelessness figures in the capital continue to rise (Fitzpatrick, et al., 2018: 48-9), it is urgent that we trace the root causes of the dearth of available, affordable housing in London so that we may find the solutions. This paper will argue that the crisis in housing has been intensified by neoliberal ideology which informs government policies and in turn facilitates global investment in the London housing market at the expense of the interests of regular Londoners. 'Neoliberalism' is a loaded and contested topic, but it generally signifies a certain set of political and economic practices and policies such as privatisation, deregulation, and financialization (Edwards, 2016: 224) which facilitates the reconstruction of power dynamics in favour of international capital (Eagleton-Pierce, 2018). This issue is one which is filled with complexity and numerous interlinking factors, not all of which can be adequately discussed here. This paper will begin by asking whether this issue can genuinely be considered a crisis as opposed to simply a continuing and intensifying trend. It will then turn to the root ideology which underpins government policy and the UK economy; that of neoliberalism. Then it will explore how this ideology has impacted government policy and how it has in turn exacerbated the crisis. Finally, it will examine the role of international finance capital and its contribution to the crisis.

Housing Crisis or Business as Usual?

Land and property have a unique role in the economy and have led to consistent conflict throughout the history of capitalism (Clarke & Ginsburg, 1975: 1), which begs the question as to whether the current period can even be considered a crisis at all. Housing is unique and politically important as it represents not simply a single transaction but a contractual relationship with the state, landlords, or financiers. Therefore, the dialectically opposed classes of worker and capitalist are brought closer together in an ongoing and antagonistic relationship (ibid: 1). As a result, housing struggles and crises have proven to be an enduring feature of late-capitalist society (Gallent, et al., 2017: 2205). Paul Watt and Anna Minton (2016: 204) argue that the current era of conflict can be traced back to the 1980s, which coincides with the rise of neoliberal ideology, and Margaret Thatcher's 1979 election as Prime Minister. Ben Fine and Alfredo Saad-Filho (2017) contend that the neoliberal era can be considered a qualitative development in the capitalist system, and as such could possibly mark a new stage in the housing struggle. As will be argued throughout this paper, neoliberal policy plays a role in reinforcing the conditions which facilitate the housing crisis. Simon Jenkins (2015, cited in Watt & Minton, 2016: 205) asks whether there is any 'crisis' in housing at all, arguing that neoliberal politics and finance have normalised crisis-like conditions in the housing market as well as actively encouraging them which is an argument to be explored throughout this paper. This suggests that under the rubric of neoliberalism, the housing crisis we see today is nothing more than business as usual.

But for many Londoners affected by the current situation in the housing market, it is a crisis which is seriously affecting livelihoods around the capital. The contradictions surrounding housing and property which arise under the capitalist mode of production can be argued to be intensifying. There has been a seven percent decline in home ownership since 2003 despite government focus on encouraging a 'property owning democracy' (Gallent, et al., 2017: 2206), which suggests that getting on to the 'housing ladder' is no longer tenable for many in the capital. Further evidence of intensified contradictions in housing can be seen in activist groups which are currently being formed and gaining traction. An example of these groups is Focus E15 which was arose when young homeless people including mothers and children were evicted from the Focus E15 hostel after funding was cut by Newham Council. The solution provided by the council was private housing outside of the capital as far as Manchester, uprooting young vulnerable people from any existing support networks (Focus E15 Campaign, 2019). This squeezing out of lower income people from the capital has been referred to by groups such as Focus E15 as a form of social cleansing (Watt & Minton, 2016: 211), suggesting that London is gradually becoming a space reserved for the wealthy. Therefore, it can be argued that although this may not be a crisis for the wealthy who are simply carrying on with 'business as usual', for those on low incomes in London this is an intensifying crisis which is threatening livelihoods. Therefore, we must ask ourselves the question: Why is there a housing crisis in London?

The Ideological Roots of the Crisis

Neoliberalism has been the underpinning ideology of UK governments since the 1980s, which has been reflected in concrete policy actions as well as in terms of the popular political psyche of the UK. As previously referred to, there is the argument that the neoliberal 'era' marks a fundamental change in the development of capitalism. Multiple dimensions are involved in the phenomenon of neoliberalisation as it transforms social, economic, and political spheres and as such reproduces itself through these channels. It has been argued that this process is underpinned by

financialization, (Fine & Saad-Filho, 2017: 686) the meaning and significance of which will be explored below. Ideologically and socially, neoliberalism has penetrated popular discourse and conceptions about housing and its provision because it redefines the relationship between the individual, society, and the state (Fine & Saad-Filho, 2017). This phenomenon can be understood through the lens of Gramsci's concept of hegemony which argues that hegemony is established by social leadership but is then projected outwards and takes on its own momentum (Bieler & Morton, 2004: 87). Thus, political ideas are perpetuated throughout social life and as a result become self-reproducing. Nick Gallent, Dan Durrant & Neil May, argue that ideology shapes the housing system (2017: 2208), which is arguably dominated by neoliberal hegemony.

 We can see that neoliberal hegemonic ideology has had an impact on the housing system. After the Second World War there was an ideological and political move towards the welfare state and the idea that housing is a social good which should be available to all through state provision (Minton, et al., 2016: 257). This implies the idea of collectivism in which the interests of society are elevated above those of the individual. Neoliberalisation swept away these ideas and replaced them with individualism. In terms of housing, individualism is a factor in the public perception of property simply being an asset for the purpose of capital accumulation (Edwards, 2016: 223). This is the case historically under capitalism as housing is a commodity (Clarke & Ginsburg, 1975: 1), but the idea of housing being a social good which should be provisioned by the state for the neediest in society has to some extent evaporated. This is an example of how the relationship between state and society have been transformed by neoliberal hegemony. Neoliberalism has impacted popular attitudes towards housing, as it is now seen as a privilege which is worked for as opposed to a right. Thus, the idea arises that people who cannot afford to live in London are in such a situation as a result of their own individual failings instead of the failings of collective society to provide for them, and as such they are left to deal with the consequences alone. These conceptions in turn facilitate such policies which, as I argue, lead to a dialectical and mutually reinforcing relationship between government policies and public perceptions of the housing system.

Post-Thatcher Government Housing Policy

It has already been argued that the new stage in the capitalist economy of neoliberalism has social, economic, and political dimensions; thus, neoliberal ideology is reflected in policy towards housing provision and regulation. Historically speaking, the state has intervened in the provision of housing under capitalism because as a system it fails to provide housing for the working classes of a basic standard. The state intervenes in housing to maintain and reproduce the working class which the capitalist system is dependent upon, so that it does not compromise its own existence (Clarke & Ginsburg, 1975: 6). Housing policy has changed in line with neoliberal ideology since the 1980s. Along with the ideological shift of the post-war consensus came a boost in the provision of working-class housing as that provided by local councils became a high priority although council housebuilding never reached the government's aims and was then slashed after the devaluation crisis of 1947 (ibid: 9). However, Thatcher's election radically altered the direction of governmental housing policy, tearing down a core pillar of the post-war welfare state (Minton, et al., 2016: 257). To understand how neoliberal housing policy has contributed to a housing crisis in London as well as around the UK, the rest of this section will examine certain aspects of post-Thatcher governmental housing policy and its consequences for the London housing market.

Figure 1- UK annual completions of dwellings by developer type 1946–2012 (Edwards, 2016, p. 226)

One of the most prominent features of neoliberalism is the importance of privatisation and reconfiguring the role of the state away from the provision of social goods (Edwards, 2016: 224). Housing has been no exception to this under neoliberal governmental policy since Thatcher, which has seen much continuity in its direction. House building has been placed in private hands and housing provision is no longer the responsibility of the local council as this task has now been given to housing associations. Figure 1 supports this notion and demonstrates the scale of the transformation into the neoliberal era which has brought privatisation, as housebuilding responsibilities for local authorities have been reduced to almost nothing in recent years. Housing associations are non-profit organisations which provide social housing in lieu of the state. Publicly owned land is therefore seen through a neoliberal lens as a group of assets which should be managed through financial principles rather than as a public service (Edwards, 2016: 223). The growth of housing associations has been a result of the limitation of local councils in the provision of social housing such as the Housing Act 1988 which reduced the council's powers and responsibilities in housing (Watt & Minton, 2016: 207). However, housing associations have not been able to fill the vacuum left by local councils and there has been a contraction in social housing going on since 1981 (Watt & Minton, 2016: 209-210). Figure 1 supports this argument as we can see that far fewer homes are being built since the mid-1970s by housing associations than were being built by local councils. Therefore, because of neoliberal privatisation in terms of social housing provision we can see that fewer social homes are being provided which is a major contributing factor to London's housing crisis.

Resulting in this shift from the public to the private spheres there is an increasing trend of gentrification in London as there is no buffer of social housing to protect against it (Watt & Minton, 2016: 210). Gentrification is the process of 'regeneration' which is going on throughout London's boroughs which involves reconfiguring an area to suit middle class tastes whilst squeezing out the working class further into the peripheries of the city. This process is facilitated again by neoliberal hegemony as council estates which house the most deprived in society, are stigmatised and dubbed

'sink estates' by the media (ibid: 209). These conceptions are further perpetuated by Newman's idea that tower blocks produce crime and should be replaced by low rise housing which has more clearly defined private boundaries of ownership (Minton, et al., 2016: 257-258). This thinking reflects neoliberal individualism and these conceptions have served to facilitate the process of gentrification. Newman's ideas have contributed to 'regeneration' of certain council estates in London. In 2015 a Conservative housing minister stated that council estates needed to be regenerated, while equating them to disused 'brownfield' sites (Glucksberg, 2016: 238-239). This demolition and regeneration of housing estates can be interpreted as state-led gentrification (Watt & Minton, 2016: 210-211) which breaks apart communities. To illustrate, the Heygate estate was demolished in 2014 and was replaced by mostly luxury apartments which were overpriced and therefore pushed out old tenants from the immediate area (Watt & Minton, 2016: 212). This is the process of state-led gentrification or 'social cleansing' in action and is not a unique case. Fine and Saad-Filho (2017) argue that a key feature of neoliberalism is that it is a class offensive against workers in favour of global capital through its collaboration with the state. Gentrification can be seen as an aspect of this because it benefits the upper classes at the expense of the working class. Thus, gentrification and 'regeneration' which reflect neoliberal ideas have been a key factor in contributing to the housing crisis.

Financialization

As has been previously argued, neoliberalism as a phenomenon can be understood as a reconfiguration of the relationships between the individual, society, and the state in favour of the interests of global capital (Fine & Saad-Filho, 2017). Financialization can be interpreted as being a part of this neoliberalisation process as it is argued to be a fundamental change in recent capitalist history which has not only led to a stark growth in the financial sector but has also impacted how non-financial firms and individuals think and behave (Edwards, 2016: 223). It has already been said that housing is a fixed asset which has historically been used for wealth creation (Gallent, et al., 2017: 2206). But in the past decades this has intensified as the real estate market has become a way for global capital to find risk free investments which give back high returns. Watt and Minton (2016: 206) argue succinctly that the London housing market has been used as a "speculative rent-seeking investment vehicle" for global capital. London is at the centre of this because of its status as a global city resulting in unwillingness by the state to regulate these speculative investments for fear that it will impede investment in the country more generally; this is an aspect of the neoliberal phenomenon of deregulation (Edwards, 2016: 224).

However, it should be noted here that other cities such as Zurich and Hong Kong do have strategies to protect from overuse of speculation and foreign investment despite continuing to hold their 'global city' statuses (Glucksberg, 2016: 245). Luna Glucksberg (2016) argues that to understand the causes of the London housing crisis we need to look at the people at the top of the housing market, who they are and the consequences of their involvement. Glucksberg outlines a typology of these investors. The most relevant of those include those who buy to invest, who are often based in the Far East and finance new build properties which are then rented out but are often priced far above affordable levels and are usually not social housing. Furthermore, those who buy for their children are those wealthy central London homeowners who sell up and buy smaller properties for their children. These people are being priced out of the most elite postcodes so are moving further out which leads to gentrification and price increases. Moreover, others buy to leave their properties, using London real estate to protect their capital similarly to a bank. This leaves

many properties in central London empty with no obvious owner, meaning that it is often hard to discern who is liable for council tax. This trend also causes price inflation as well as underuse of desperately needed housing. Therefore, financialization and the movements of the wealthy elite are clearly a factor in the housing crisis as prices are being pushed up, leading to gentrification and displacement. This is because there is a mismatch in the interests of the working classes and those of the elite in the super-prime market, the latter being favoured by neoliberal policy decisions such as deregulation of financial markets. Thus, financialization can be viewed as a key cause of the housing crisis.

Conclusion

In sum, the housing crisis can be interpreted as an intensification of contradictions in the housing system which are encouraged by neoliberal policies of UK governments since around the 1980s. Neoliberal discourses have broken down the post-war welfare state consensus and ushered in an era of individualism and self-help. Neoliberal policies and the resulting crisis in housing are normalised and brushed under the rug as the state pursues policies which aid global capital at the expense of the working class. This is carried out through privatisation and reworking the role of the state in housing provision, leading to a dearth of social and affordable housing in London. This issue is intensified by 'regeneration' projects which gentrify, displace vulnerable communities and disrupt social cohesion. Furthermore, the state has facilitated the increased financialization of the housing market through deregulation which contributes to rising prices in the centre of the city, gentrification and disused housing which is so desperately needed. Therefore, London has a housing crisis because of the sway of neoliberalism which has impacted government policy which puts global capital ahead of working-class interests, allowing the housing market to be a tool of accumulation rather than a social good.

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