Strategic Concept for Removal of Arms and Proliferation
The Strategic Concept for Removal of Arms and Proliferation (SCRAP) offers a draft negotiating text of ‘basic elements’ for General and Complete Disarmament with a ten year implementation period (See Page 9). SCRAP is a comprehensive approach to realising global disarmament, building upon best practice. It can be implemented incrementally and supplement existing initiatives. It offers a rapid countdown to global zero nuclear weapons and can build on humanitarian disarmament initiatives to encompass conventional weapons stocks.

The basic elements of the proposal are extended from those proposed by a number of states in November 2007 for globalization of the 1987 US-Soviet Intermediate Forces Treaty (INF) which scrapped an entire class of missile. SCRAP includes the internationalization of European treaties governing armoured vehicles, artillery, helicopters and war planes as well as the technical aspects of the UN mandated inspection process for Iraq’s WMD and the US-Russian strategic nuclear agreements (START).

Explanatory Memorandum concerning SCRAP

Introduction
SCRAP suggests using proven agreements as a basis for General and Complete Disarmament: (GACD) a priority for the international community reiterated recently by the UN Secretary-General. This commitment is an obligation under Article VI of the NPT and has been the subject of UN policy since the early days of the UN. There is an unrealised commitment to hold a 4th Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament.

Present humanitarian initiatives are regarded by many states as part of a process for GACD, for example, for example proposals for halting the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects are often made in this context. GACD has long been a goal of the developing world to restrict and prevent humanitarian disasters and as a potential boost to sustainable development through the concept of disarmament and development.

SCRAP’s focus on a rapid and holistic approach is designed to demonstrate the practicality of this unified approach, so helping change the paradigm of present activity from a fragmentary and step-by-step approach to one which offers a highly challenging and yet demonstrably practical message to vested interests. SCRAP can be adopted incrementally and supplement existing campaigns with a potential of synergy.

For example, at present no treaties outside the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe area provide for the control of tanks, artillery, warplanes and missiles or provide
military Confidence and Security Building Measures. But these conventional weapons are killing people daily around the world, and enable major powers to threaten and invade others with dire humanitarian consequences as is the case in Iraq.

A premise of the successive and successful campaigns from landmines, through small arms to cluster munitions and on to the ATT has been that major interstate warfare was, with the end of the Cold War, no longer a concern. And yet in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Africa major conventional weapons have contributed to and often been decisive in conflicts often with a transnational dimension. For example in Libya and Syria imbalances in these weapons in internal conflicts has been an argument for outside powers to use theirs. At present there is the prospect of a huge use of conventional weapons by the US on Iran, and regional and sub-regional arms races underway in Asia.

The European security treaties from around 1990 enabled a ‘peace dividend’ for European tax payers over the last decades but neither states nor NGOs have sought to export or extend these models. Though recently, both Turkey and the US have been looking at these possibilities. The only external impact of these treaties was the transfer of the weapons banned in Europe to states to the South. For example, transfer of the East German navy to Indonesia.

The SCRAP approach moves the application of humanitarian concern from the trade in weapons to their deployment, possession and production. An initiative on conventional weapons and CSBMs can also help bypass real and diplomatic obstacles to nuclear disarmament. Most countries that seek or possess nuclear weapons have regional security concerns around conventional weapons threats: Israel, Pakistan, China and Russia for example. Ignoring this dimension damages the credibility of nuclear only disarmament campaigns. Diplomatically, the argument over linkage between the nuclear and general disarmament clauses of NPT Article VI can be overcome once it is realised that conventional disarmament is practical and introducing it into the debate is not just another roadblock to nuclear disarmament.

With respect to nuclear and related ‘WMD’, the necessity for prevention of humanitarian catastrophe is clear. SCRAP takes the world’s most effective, proven and comprehensive mechanism for WMD disarmament, the UN authorised regime imposed on Iraq, and suggests that the International Community impose it on itself. Not withstanding the highly politically controversial nature of the inspection regime and the war, the inspection system itself worked and this can be used as a foundation for global application.
Recent initiatives on nuclear disarmament including the new START Treaty, WMD, cluster munitions and the Arms Trade Treaty show a significant commitment across the spectrum of the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. It has been noted before\(^1\) that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin. Similarly, while there is and should be no linkage between conventional and WMD control and elimination strategies there is much to be gained by developing them in a mutually reinforcing manner.

There are now latent and converging interests in addressing major conventional weapons holdings and proliferation as well as WMD. Globally, the core constituency actively pursuing nuclear and WMD non-proliferation and disarmament can usefully combine with the broader coalitions interested in controls on conventional armaments in the context of weak states and poor levels of development. Zero WMD in the world will be accomplished in a climate of confidence and controls on conventional armaments and new technologies.

The Nuclear Weapons States have taken to talking of the need to create the conditions for zero nuclear weapons but have no concrete plan to that end. SCRAP presents them with one.

**Developing a strategy on conventional arms**

There are a number of convergent global issues and interests that favour the development of a global approach to the removal and proliferation of major conventional weapons. These include: (1) Efforts to achieve zero nuclear weapons will be made much easier where attention has been given to conventional forces and confidence building measures regionally and to those capable of strategic intervention across regions; (2) holdings and production of conventional arms in general are emerging as an issue (if only rhetorically) in debates on the Arms Trade Treaty and on weapons systems or categories under small arms and light weapons (SALW) and Cluster Munitions; (3) some states see progress on ‘General and Complete Disarmament’ as linked to nuclear disarmament in Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – and globalisation of some provisions of the CFE/CSBMs and Open Skies offer a means of realising this NPT provision rather than regarding it as an obstacle to progress on nuclear disarmament; (4) recession driven defence cuts in the shorter term will provide strains on US international commitments and other nation’s budgets that regional arms control agreements may soothe; (5) a major expansion of effective arms control is an effective preventive measure to the well-known conflict pressures arising from international economic dislocation; (6) the European agreements on Conventional Armed

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\(^1\)https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Interview/2006/061111-Namensartikel-D-NOR.html
Forces in Europe (CFE) and the associated Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) and Open Skies regime provide a strong and unprecedented institutional platform for expansion that should not be allowed to collapse through NATO-Russia disputes.

From START to SCRAP

Despite the progress in agreeing a final document and action plan at the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), there is much that needs to be done. The international community's earlier breakthroughs are again an inspiration here: for the long-standing legal commitment (embodied in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty [1970]) to 'general disarmament' of all weapons, save those needed for internal policing, is actually in sight. Just as the acronym START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) denotes the nuclear-arms talks leading to the treaties of 1991 and 1993, and New START in 2010, today's equivalent could be SCRAP - a Strategic Concept for Removal of Arms and Proliferation.

In 1989, NATO and the Warsaw Pact began talks on arms reductions: by 1991 they had signed a treaty that saw 52,000 of their tanks, warplanes, artillery guns and helicopters destroyed. Ronald Reagan reached agreements with Mikhail Gorbachev that led to many thousands of nuclear missiles going the same way. More than 20,000 nuclear warheads have been dismantled, leaving some 30,000 intact. In this same period, near-universal agreements banned chemical weapons and the test-firing of nuclear weapons; as a result, global test-firings since 1996 have been reduced almost to zero (previously the US and the Soviet Union had been firing off hundreds a year).

The continuation of the Nunn-Lugar programme and recent initiatives to revive the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) talks are positive signs. Useful innovations in practical – including non-violent – methods of controlling dangerous commodities including nuclear materials, for example in transport and logistics, have come gradually as the disarmament and arms control mainstream has both dwindled and split. The novel legislative approach embodied in UNSCR 1540 is certainly a step in the right direction in the battle on illicit WMD transfers but it has suffered through problems of implementation at the state level. Efforts to create new initiatives for example on the “illicit trade” in small arms and light weapons are floundering on narrow conceptions of security sector reform (SSR) and the international rule of law.

2 http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-summits/nuclear_2563.jsp
5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/14/newsid_3771000/3771065.stm
6 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reagan/peopleevents/pande01.html
With respect to conventional arms, the overwhelming vote in the General Assembly for a coordinated UN process to consider the feasibility, scope and parameters of a global Arms Trade Treaty reflects an increased international concern in arms control debates with humanitarian, human rights and development standards and impacts. However, to achieve these ends, this concern needs to also be directed at initiatives to reduce holdings of major weapons systems, ordnance stocks and production, and not only to the control of the conventional weapons trade. Moreover, the parallel surge of interest by the international donor community, reflected in the OECD Development Assistance Committee, in using such standards to measure the success of security sector reform requires the development of an integrated, risk-based approach to equipment and weaponry, and hence to disarmament, in the re-shaping of military, security and policing institutions – one without the other will not deliver sustained security.

What is needed is not to set aside the useful aspects of the new, piecemeal approach towards proliferation but to reunite them with a renewed ‘classical’ process based on strategies towards disarmament and the use of treaty and rule of law methods – with the associated principles of equity, objectivity, universality and transparency. This new combination could achieve a more rational division of labour and subsidiarity. Such an approach should fill dangerous gaps in the pattern of coverage and effort, and minimise the double-think and double standards that are rife in current policies and practices.

**A realistic prospect**

Much can be done to advance a Strategic Concept for Removal of Arms and Proliferation – including setting deadlines to conclude negotiations and implement agreements. It took just eighteen months to overcome the ideological and technological issues governing the cold-war armies. Today, with this precedent as a guide and no ideological barrier comparable to the confrontation with communism, a ‘general disarmament agreement’ could be scheduled within two years of the talks starting. The basis for a global-disarmament compact is provided by current agreements. There have been arguments for and against timetables. One notable success was the 1996 CTBT, agreed by a date set at the 1995 NPT meeting. For public opinion used to target dates for climate change and the Millennium Development Goals – disarmament targets are an obvious next step.

A way ahead is to adapt procedures that have worked in the past rather than engage in developing a new set. The ‘best practice’ here lies in the UNMOVIC work in Iraq and in the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). UN inspectors should have access

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8 [http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/about/index.cfm](http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/about/index.cfm)
to the permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) as well as to the ‘smaller’ nuclear powers (India, Pakistan and Israel). These procedures will also be effective in restricting terrorist access to nuclear technology; and they can be adapted to work with biological and chemical weapons.

In practice, the START and intermediate nuclear force (INF)\textsuperscript{9} agreements of the Reagan-Gorbachev era\textsuperscript{10} should be extended to all states, and include missile defence and Star Wars systems. New START includes an important innovation by establishing a total number of missile launchers regardless of whether they are carrying nuclear or conventional weapons. The practice developed in UNMOVIC also provides a template for intrusive and effective WMD verification. The European agreements reducing and regulating tanks, artillery, helicopters and war planes should also be globalised and include naval vessels. Most of the technical work has already been done for all these agreements; implementation could be as swift as in the most effective existing agreements. The extension of these agreements to naval system can be achieved technically by using similar categories of weapons to those on shore as the types are very similar. Encompassing space weapons can be achieved by launcher inspection and data exchange on previously located assets.

The implementation process might build on that in the CFER Treaty. 75% of all stocks would be verifiably "Scrap'd" in two years; the remaining quarter would be cut again by 75% in the next two years; until, after a decade at this rate, they are all gone, or a lower limit is agreed.

A policy research agenda needs to be developed for SCRAP. This needs to include the definition of what states are entitled to retain for internal reasons pursuant to the duty of the state to retain a monopoly on the use of force, holdings by private contractors, the interface between small arms and light weapons categories and the lower sizes of weapons under the existing CFE arrangements and lessons learned to be shared between the experiences of European arms control and humanitarian disarmament processes.

An international coalition could build upon the important precedents set by the Australia-Japan Commission and the earlier Canberra Commission, the Blix Commission, governmental initiatives by Norway, Germany and the UK, and non-governmental reports from BASIC to Amnesty across the spectrum of human security and development. The bonus for citizens in every country, taxpayers, the poor and the global economy as a whole would be immense.

\textsuperscript{9} http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/inf/index.html
\textsuperscript{10} http://www.ronaldreaganweb.com/ronaldreaganweb/ReaganGorbachevSummitMeetings.htm
Draft Text

“Basic elements of an international legally-binding arrangement on General and Complete Disarmament encompassing the elimination of strategic, intermediate-range, shorter-range and short range missiles; verification of the elimination of nuclear weapon manufacturing and stockpiles; verification of biological disarmament and verification of conventional armed forces, disarmament, holdings and manufacture, and for global and regional confidence and security building measures including military exercises and operations; open for broad international accession”\textsuperscript{11}

Preamble

The States Parties to this Arrangement, \textit{Guided} by the objective of strengthening strategic stability both globally and regionally, \textit{Convinced that} the measures set forth in this Arrangement will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, \textit{Determined to act} with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict international control, \textit{Emphasizing} the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes between States laid out in \textit{Article 33 of the UN Charter}, \textit{Recognizing} the right of States to self-defence under \textit{Article 51 of the UN Charter}, \textit{Desiring} to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, have agreed as follows:

\textbf{Article I General Obligations}

1. Each State Party to this Arrangement upon entry into force of this Arrangement and thereafter shall not produce or flight-test any strategic, intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall eliminate all its strategic-range, intermediate-range and shorter-range and short-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, as well as all support structures and equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, being in its possession or ownership, or being located in any site or on any vessel under its jurisdiction or control, under categories subject to an agreement, so that no later than the agreed date after entry into force of this Arrangement and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support structures and equipment shall be possessed by each State Party. The forgoing to include ground-to-air, air-to-air, space

\textsuperscript{11} Chemical Weapons verified elimination is encompassed in the Chemical Weapons Convention
launched and anti-missile-missiles. Where states designate missiles as solely for the purpose of launching payloads into space these are included in these aforementioned categories for inspection purposes to ensure the prevention of space-based weapons whether using kinetic or other energy.

3. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall permit inspections on its territory consistent with the relevant provisions developed by UNMOVIC / IAEA with respect to nuclear and biological weapons and their production facilities to carry out the verified elimination of such weapons and supporting technologies and infrastructure according to a timetable agreed; and in conjunction with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

4. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall not produce or test any weapon system of category types described in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty regardless of whether they are fitted to land, air or sea systems save where it is subject to prior notification and verification.

5. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall provide data to other States Parties to this Arrangement concerning weapon systems of all category types within the CFE Treaty whether operated from land or at sea.

6. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall adhere to the Open Skies Treaty.

7. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall adhere to the Vienna Confidence and Security Building Measures developed by the OSCE.

8. Each State Party to this agreement shall adhere to the Arms Trade Treaty.
   a. Each State Party to this agreement shall apply the provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty to all conventional arms, munitions and ammunition, as well as to equipment used for military, police or national security purposes.

   Each State Party to this agreement shall adhere to the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

9. All States party to this agreement shall adhere to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and to its protocols.

Article II Rules of Accounting and Definitions of Types of Weapons systems
Provisions for Rules of Accounting and Definitions of Types weapons and supporting technologies are subject to an agreement pursuant to the adapted provisions of START, INF, UNMOVIC / IAEA, CFE.
Article III  Limitations on numbers of weapons and supporting technologies are subject to an agreement

Article IV  Exchange of Information Related to the Obligations
Provisions for exchange of an information under categories of data, related to the obligations provided for by this Arrangement, are subject to an agreement pursuant to the provisions of START, INF, UNMOVIC, CFE, CSBMs and drawing on the timetables therein.

Article V  Elimination Procedures
Each State Party to this Arrangement shall eliminate all its strategic, intermediate range, shorter-range, and short range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures which are subject to an agreement and weapons within the CFE categories based upon the elimination procedures of UNMOVIC, START and INF and CFE. Each State Party to this Arrangement shall reduce the other categories of weapon systems and supporting equipment and manufacturing capability subject to agreement.

Article VI  Rules of Compliance Verification
Rules of compliance verification are subject to an agreement.

Article VII  Definitions shall draw on the relevant paragraphs of the treaties listed herein

Article VIII  The Organization for Implementation of the Arrangement
The States Parties to this Arrangement shall come to an agreement about mechanism of implementation of the subject and the objective of this Arrangement. A framework for discussion will be the timeframes for implementation of UNMOVIC, START, INF and CFE Treaties with a view to completion within a ten year timeframe.

Article IX  Duration of the Arrangement
This Arrangement shall be of unlimited duration.

Article X  Amendments, Signature, Accession, Ratification, Entry into Force, Reservations, Depositary, Authentic Texts
Amendments, signature, accession, ratification, entry into force, reservations, depositary, authentic texts are subject to an agreement.
Treaty Links

i. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
   http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml

ii. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

iii. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)
    http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/cfe.pdf

iv. Treaty on Open Skies
    http://www.osce.org/library/14127

v. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)
    http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/140035.pdf

vi. New START (START II)
    http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/start1.html

vii. Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
    http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/inf2.html

viii. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
     http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/16411.htm

SCRAP is part of the Disarmament and Globalisation research programme at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at SOAS, University of London. For more information about SCRAP and the Centre please visit our website at: www.cisd.soas.ac.uk

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