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EVIDENCE FROM THE MACEDONIAN TOWN OF NAOUSSA

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ABSTRACT

Ottoman industrialisation in cotton spinning was led by the town of Naoussa in Macedonia. This paper shows that Naoussa capitalists grasped the opportunities created by trade liberalisation, accumulated capital in domestic manufacture of woollen cloth, and secured a regular supply of low-wage female labour and free hydraulic energy. It is further shown that they took advantage of local institutional and political mechanisms within the Christian community independent of the relatively remote Ottoman state. But there was no capitalist transformation of agriculture, even though Naoussa capitalists often owned large land estates. Lack of broader institutional and political influence and absence of capitalist transformation of agriculture hampered the transformation of Naoussa capitalists from a provincial social group into a broad-based capitalist class.

1. Introduction ¹

Spontaneous Ottoman industrialisation, undertaken by private capital, occurred mainly in mechanised cotton spinning (Quataert 1993a: ch. 2; Palairret 1997: ch. 11). Fairly rapid growth took place after the 1870s, primarily in southern Macedonia, which stretches from the major port city of Thessaloniki to the three provincial towns of Veroia, Naoussa and Edhessa. ² The economic history of this region has been little studied, while interest has focused almost exclusively on Thessaloniki. Yet, spontaneous industrialisation took place earlier and independently in the three provincial towns, and their industrial capacity exceeded that of Thessaloniki when Ottoman rule ended in 1912.

Among the three, Naoussa played the leading role, despite being the smallest in population. It provided the spark for broader industrialisation of Ottoman cotton spinning in 1875 and exported industrial capital to the rest of the region, even to Thessaloniki. In 1912, this little town controlled between a quarter and third of the entire mechanised cotton spinning capacity of the Empire. It also held much of the Empire's capacity in factory-produced woollen cloth. The economic, social and political forces underpinning spontaneous Ottoman industrialisation can be seen with clarity in Naoussa.

The topic should be of interest to others besides Ottoman or Greek historians. The social and institutional prerequisites of capitalist development have been increasingly discussed in recent years. The World Bank (2001), for instance, currently stresses the need for communal self-organisation, bridging and bonding practices among economic agents and an atmosphere of trust, if markets are to operate successfully. The Bank claims that poverty-reducing capitalist development depends not only on resources, skills and market-determined prices, but also on social contacts and reciprocal obligations, often with a communal dimension. With this in mind, it should be stressed that Ottoman industrialisation in the provincial towns of Macedonia was

¹ Thanks are due to Donald Quataert for comments and encouragement to write. Ben Fine also made useful comments on the manuscript. All errors are my own.

² Place names are a fraught issue in Macedonia. Here Greek names are used, sometimes with Turkish names in brackets. Original Slavic names are also given but in Hellenised form. Naoussa was also commonly called Niaousta, and its Slavic name is Negush.

largely an affair of the Christian community. Moreover, it took place in the context of market liberalisation adopted by the Empire in the 1830s. This article shows that the social, institutional and political structures of the Christian community of Naoussa were instrumental in taking advantage of the economic opportunities for industrialisation.

Naoussa and its region witnessed a profound social transformation during the final 90 years of Ottoman rule. When the Greek army arrived in 1912, the town was dominated by the *chorbaji*, a group of Christian landowners, industrialists and merchants. It is shown in sections 2, 3 and 4 that the dominant group controlled productive assets, while dominating trade in cotton yarn and woollen cloth. Their ability to obtain investment funds, technology and market information depended on family networks but also on regular contacts with the independent Kingdom of Greece to the south. The *chorbaji* also controlled political power in the town and used it to support industrialisation. Their power was primarily community-based and had a limited geographical area of influence. It was drawn mostly from the mechanisms of local autonomy for Christians and the web of social and institutional relations woven by the Orthodox Church. Thus, the *chorbaji* were able to confront economic and social problems posed by industrial transformation. The Ottoman state was not directly involved in these processes, though it did create a legal framework securing capitalist property.

The social and communal mechanisms that supported industrialisation in Naoussa did not preclude social conflict. On the contrary, economic, social and political decisions were contested within the dominant group. Section 5 shows that there was even stronger social and political conflict with the stratum of workers created by industrialisation. These conflicts were mostly resolved within the Christian community, rather than through the intermediation of Ottoman state authorities.

Lack of systematic access to the mechanisms of Ottoman power meant that Naoussa industrialists and merchants remained essentially a provincial group of Christian capitalists. They were not able to become a coherent capitalist class across the whole of Macedonia. To take such a leap, they needed to have confronted problems posed by frictions with Jewish capitalists in Thessaloniki, rising volumes of cheap imports,

unsteady supplies of cotton, and lack of advanced technology. These were broad tasks that required political and institutional influence across much of the Empire, or at least its European parts. The institutional and political resources of Naoussa capitalists were not adequate for this purpose as they were provincial and community-based.

Industrial capitalism in Naoussa emerged, moreover, against a background of landlord control of the nearby plain, where most of the fertile land lay and production aimed at the market. Landlords were typically Muslims but a significant minority were Naoussa Christians. The latter often had commercial and industrial interests, but lacked systematic mechanisms of social and political control over the plain, where Muslim landlords predominated. Sections 6 and 7 show that industrialisation in Naoussa was not accompanied by capitalist transformation of agrarian relations. The estates of Christian landlords did not become large agrarian capitalist concerns, indeed they were less productive than Muslim-owned estates. The failure of Naoussa landlords to bring about a capitalist transformation of agriculture probably helped to impede further industrial development in the region.

Finally, a word on the sources is necessary. Primary material on the economic history of Naoussa in the 19th century is extremely scarce. This is mostly due to destruction of local archives and burning of factories in January 1949 in the course of the Greek Civil War. Analysis in this article relies on data from the obscure, but reliable, sources of Stougiannakis (1911) and Dekazos (1913).

2.Natural environment and historical background

Naoussa lies on the eastern flank of Mount Vermion, at the edge of the southern Macedonian plain. It has a continental microclimate and is surrounded by deciduous forests. The river Arapitsa crosses the town offering opportunities for hydraulic energy. Access to Naoussa is gained via a turning off the main Veroia-Edhessa road on the plain, and even today the town feels slightly remote. But in the late Ottoman period, remoteness was very real. Prior to the arrival of the railway in 1892, the trip from Thessaloniki (a distance of about 80 kilometres) took fourteen hours (Stougiannakis, 1924: 25). Trains cut the time to two and a half hours, but it took a

further hour and half by oxcart from the station, since Macedonian railways were typically built away from towns (Gounaris, 1994).

Naoussa is not an old town, certainly not by the standards of Greece. There are legends connecting its foundation to Ghazi Evrenos Bey in the second half of the 14th century (Stougiannakis, 1924: 37-44). However, it is more likely that the town was founded in the 15th century by his grandson, Ahmed Bey Evrenosoglu, probably at the instigation of the influential dervish Sheikh Ilahi (Kiel, 1972). Its history until the early 18th century is little known, but the town probably had a strong Hellenic culture from early days. The first significant piece of information refers to a revolt in 1705, apparently against the practice of gathering Christian boys for Janissary service (*devshirme*) (Vasdravellis, 1967: 20-1). Nevertheless, it is certain that Naoussa was a town of Christians from the start, with rights of self-government and considerable tax privileges (Stougiannakis 1924: 48-9).

In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, self-government revolved around two institutions: local authority and the Orthodox Church, both of which played an important role in the subsequent process of industrialisation. Ottoman power was represented by the *kadi*, the Muslim religious judge dealing with criminal and civil cases, and the *voevoda*, charged with collecting land taxes. Christian power derived partly from the organisation of the community around parish churches and monasteries, controlled by the bishop of Veroia. Christian power also resided with the leader of the community, the *archon*, elected through limited popular vote (Cousinery, 1831: 72-73). The *archon*, supported by a council of powerful elders (*proestoi*), was in charge of Christian armed forces for the protection of the town (Pouqueville, 1826: vol. III, 94), and could arrest and imprison opponents.

Church and elders had judicial rights over Christian civil cases, including marriage, dowry, divorce and inheritance. Property and inheritance issues among Christians were also occasionally dealt by the *kadi*, typically after failure of the communal judicial mechanisms to reach and enforce decisions acceptable to the parties involved. Church and elders also had the right to collect taxes from the Christian population in order to finance schools and other communal activities. Parish committees brought

together church and lay constituents of Christian power and were instrumental in the self-government of the community.

Land ownership in the region was tightly bound with the clan of the Evrenosoglu, based in Giannitsa (Yeniye Vardar), from where the *vakif* (religious foundation) of Evrenos was overseen. The *vakif* possessed a vast area extending west of Thessaloniki all the way to the mouth of the river Aliakmon (Inje Karasu). It included lands in the vicinity of Naoussa, reaching into the town, and had the right to receive land taxes. In the 18th century the *vakif* started to give way to private estates (*chiftlik*) held by landlords that were often absentee and engaged in usury (Demetriades, 1981). The precise pattern of *chiftlik* ownership in the broader area of Naoussa at the end of the 18th century is unknown. However, information relating to the revolt of 1822, discussed below, shows that large Christian landownership was also present.

Domestic manufacturing existed in Naoussa at the turn of the 19th century, especially in linen towels, wool fulling, silk, jewellery and weapons (Pouqueville, 1826: vol. III, 95; Cousinery, 1831: 72; Leake, 1835: 287; Stougiannakis, 1924: 56-7). The town was on traditional caravan routes connecting southern Balkan fairs, and there were Naoussa merchants in central Europe (Stojanovich, 1960). It was also famed for its wine, as it still is (Pouqueville, 1826: vol. III, p. 95; Cousinery, 1831: 72). Its wealth attracted the attentions of Ali Pasha Tepelenli of Jannina, the effective ruler of south-western Balkans, who besieged it in 1795, 1798 and 1804. The events of the Greek revolution encouraged Naoussa to revolt against the Porte in 1822, but the insurrection was crushed and the town was sacked. Official Ottoman documents, published by Vasdravellis (1967: 282-95), give the names of 409 Naoussa inhabitants who were killed and their property confiscated. They also include the names of 198 who were pardoned and of 33 who left the town and had property confiscated. Church property was also confiscated.

The 640 were overwhelmingly men, a large part of the mature male population of the town. Between 50 and 60 are recorded with a single name - typically their first. There are roughly 100 surnames that are shared, but several are occupation-specific. The 640 men (including the *archon* and great landowner Zafirakis) owned 655 houses, while another 226 houses belonged to the church (Table 1). Finally, the women and

children sold to slavery were ‘more than 400 persons’ (Vasdravellis, 1967: 189). Details of property are as follows:

<Table 1>

Several conclusions follow. First, there were large Christian landowners in the area in 1822, and their estates were in villages on the plain (Golesiani and Diavornitsa). Second, average landholdings were small at 5.9, though that varied from 3.4 for those killed to 10.4 for those pardoned. The killed were considerably poorer than the pardoned, an unfortunate law of war. Third, the prevalence of vine and mulberry cultivation indicates that the smallholdings lay in the immediate vicinity of the town. Similar patterns of land division and cultivation reappear in the data for the end of Ottoman rule, discussed in section 6. Fourth, the church was a substantial landowner, and use of its land was similar to that in the large estates.

The recovery of the town was probably fairly rapid. The 198 pardoned families possessed, in addition to land, 17 workshops and 26 mills, as well as 4 wool-fulling outfits (Vasdravellis, 1967: 291). These assets represented a significant domestic manufacturing base, especially in woollen cloth. Christian immigration took place from the surrounding areas, and the authorities also invited Muslim immigrants, with the transparent aim of forestalling future rebellions. Almost a century later, in 1912, the population was reported at 12000 (Igglesis, 1910: 112; Dekazos, 1913: 23), of whom 1500 were Muslims, though Stougiannakis (1911: 145) gives 9000 in total.

Yet, the state of the town in 1822 gave few hints of the profound economic and social transformation that was to come. During the final 90 years of Ottoman rule, commercial and industrial capitalism emerged spontaneously in Naoussa. Land relations were also altered and large Christian estates appeared on the plain.

3.The extent of capitalist industrialisation in Naoussa

When Ottoman rule ended in 1912, Naoussa could be legitimately described as an industrial town. Textiles were the primary field of capitalist industrial activity, the extent of which is shown in table 2, using mostly Stougiannakis's (1911) data. Stougiannakis was the head of education in Naoussa and had thorough university training as well as an eye for detail.

<Table 2 here>

The figures are consistent with Palairet's (1997: 351) data for machine cotton spinning in the whole of Macedonia in 1912. Palairet records 10 factories with a total of 70000 spindles, of which 3 (with 22800 spindles) were in Thessaloniki and 7 (with 47200 spindles) in the 'provinces', i.e Naoussa, Edhessa and Veroia.³ Palairet's data almost certainly do not include factory (4), which commenced operations after World War I under the name of Tsitsis. However, its land and equipment had already been provided in 1911 by Kokkinos-Lapavitsas (Stougiannakis, 1911: 150), though family quarrels prevented the concern from starting. Even without (4), table 2 shows that there were 3 cotton-spinning factories with 14200 spindles in Naoussa in 1912.

The actual weight of Naoussa capital in Ottoman textile manufacture, however, was considerably greater. Of Palairet's remaining 4 'provincial' factories, 2 were located in Edhessa and 2 in Veroia. Both the Edhessa factories belonged to Naoussa capitalists, namely Lappas-Hajidimoulas (established in 1907), which had 6000 spindles in 1912, and Tsitsis (established in 1895), which had 16500 spindles in 1912. Moreover, of the 3 factories based in Thessaloniki, one belonged to a Naoussa industrialist, namely Tourpalis (established in 1910), which possessed 4000 spindles in 1912. The remaining two Thessaloniki factories belonged to Jews.⁴ Thus, Naoussa capitalists controlled 6 out of 10 cotton-spinning factories and 41500 out of 70000 spindles in Macedonia in 1912, without even counting factory (4). Macedonia,

³ Oikonomou (1999: 340) gives the number of spindles for Macedonia at 73100, perhaps because his figures are for 1914, but the two totals are very close. The spindles of Bilis-Tsitsis are given by Stougiannakis (1911: 149) as 4008. This is probably a printing mistake and has been rounded to 4000.

⁴ Quataert (1993a: 45) notes that of the 10 spinning factories of Macedonia, 8 belonged to Christian Greeks and 2 to Thessaloniki Jews. The evidence given here shows that Naoussa Christians owned 6 of the 8.

meanwhile, contained approximately half the mechanised cotton-spinning capacity of the Empire at the time.⁵ Machine cotton spinning in the late Ottoman Empire was pretty much the business of Naoussa.

The importance of Naoussa capital in Ottoman textile manufacturing becomes even more evident when the wool sector is considered. Bulgaria produced most machine-made woollen cloth in the Balkans in the late 19th century, but significant mechanisation took place in Macedonia in the 1900s, for reasons discussed in the next section. There were four wool-weaving factories in the European part of the Empire in 1912 (Oikonomou, 1999: 339), two of which were located in Naoussa (table 2) and two in Thessaloniki. One of the Thessaloniki factories also belonged to Naoussa capitalists, namely Tourpali-Kazazis, with 28 horsepower and 30 workers. In all, 80% of the horsepower and 90% of the employment in the mechanised woollen cloth sector in the European part of the Empire was controlled by Naoussa capitalists.⁶

Finally, significant domestic production of *shajak* (woollen cloth) continued in Naoussa, with annual output of 66640 metres and value of 3-4000 Turkish £ (Stougiannakis, 1911: 152). In 1912, the town also possessed three large water-mills (the largest operating separately within the factory of Longos-Kirtsis-Tourpali), two saw-mills, one electrically-powered saw-mill, as well as dozens of smaller water-mills, sesame presses, wool-fulling and silk-processing workshops. It is important to note, however, that this represented a very small industrial base in 1912, compared to European competitors. Bohemian mechanised cotton spinning and printing, for instance, employed 140000 workers c1850, and even backward Spain had 10000 workers in 91 cotton mills in 1805 (Quataert 1992: 28). Despite their considerable successes, Naoussa capitalists had not created deep foundations for the industrial transformation of Macedonia, far less the Empire as a whole. The economic, social and political aspects of these phenomena are analysed in the following section.

4. Familial and communal origins of industrial transformation

⁵ Issawi (1980a: 310) notes that in 1914, after the loss of Macedonia, there were 82000 spindles in the Empire, 68500 of which were active. Macedonia possessed approximately 28000 more spindles than Adana in Anatolia, the second largest area (Quataert 1993a: 44).

⁶ Oikonomou (1999) also gives 24 horsepower and 15 workers for Lanaras-Pehlivanos, instead of the higher figures of Stougiannakis. But this hardly matters for the conclusions drawn here.

Ownership and control of Naoussa enterprises rested with a few families that often pooled together the equity of each concern. Bonds between families were cemented through marriage. Without the networks of money capital and land assets - but also skills and information - created by family units, capitalist production would have been impossible in Naoussa. Table 3 lists the major shareholding families of Naoussa-owned factories during 1875-1912:

<Table 3 here>

Approximately twenty families supplied the bulk of industrial equity investment during the period, some providing land, others money capital and some both. Several families were involved in more than one concern, e.g. Kirtsis, Longos, Tsitsis, Tourpalis and Bilis. The overlap was often due to different branches of one family becoming involved in separate concerns by inheriting parts of the family fortune, marrying into another, or simply setting up on their own. The families in table 3 were at the core of the dominant social group of the town, the Christian *chorbaji*, who also included large landowners and possessors of urban real estate.

The rise of the *chorbaji* was facilitated by the transformation of Ottoman institutions during the *Tanzimat*, following the imperial proclamation of 1839. Christians and Jews acquired equal rights in court and there was a new spirit of equality in the face of the law and the state. Property rights became more secure and servile tenure of land gradually disappeared. In Naoussa, these legal changes facilitated rapid social transformation in the 1840s and 1850s. There is little overlap between the families in table 2 and the 198 families pardoned after the sack of the town in 1822. Thus, many of the *chorbaji* were immigrants who moved into the town after 1822 (Goutas 1997). Urban and agricultural land was going cheap after the confiscations of 1822 and the newcomers were able to acquire productive assets. They also proved adept at entering the nascent domestic manufacture of *shajak*. Several began to acquire land in the plains around the middle of the century, leading to emergence of large Christian landownership, discussed in sections 6 and 7.

The social power of the *chorbaji* is evident in the dominant role they played in the parish, education and charity committees, which allowed the community to restore a measure of self-organisation after 1822. *Chorbaji* and church ministers jointly dominated the town-wide committees that run Christian schools (Stoyoglou, 2000). Education was the leading communal activity of the Christians of Naoussa, improving the quality of the labour force and strengthening the bonds that kept the community together as well as separate from its Muslim neighbours. Education also forged national and cultural links with the Kingdom of Greece, which played a role in the process of industrialisation. Control of education and parish committees by the *chorbaji*, finally, provided access to communal funds, a ready source of working capital in a town sorely lacking in formal finance.⁷

A measure of autonomy and political power was also gradually restored to the Christian community after 1822. An *archon* was re-elected through limited popular vote in 1849, and the administrative affairs of the community acquired again a degree of independence from the representatives of the central Ottoman state in Veroia and Thessaloniki (Stoyoglou, 2000: 46). It is significant that the restoration of the Naoussa *archon* occurred after the intercession of the bishop of Veroia to the Ottoman authorities. The accrual of local political power to the Christians, however, became even more substantial after the imperial rescript of 1856 (*Hatt-i-Hümayun*), which made provision for formal Christian participation in local authority. The legislation was enforced in the 1860s, and the *archon* became the mayor of Naoussa, with formal power over communal affairs and entitled to an armed guard. Unlike the pre-1822 period, however, the mayor never had a significant armed force at his disposal.

The *chorbaji* of Naoussa controlled the office of the mayor from the first election in 1868 until the early 1900s. They also dominated an array of important communal mechanisms and institutions, including the electoral college, the council of elders, the education committees, the hospital committee, the committee for dowry contracts as well as parish and charity committees. Such control provided the *chorbaji* with power that could be deployed to influence economic affairs, for instance, access to the

⁷ There is little evidence of the role of organised finance (trade credit and banking) in the process of industrialisation of Naoussa.

waters of Arapitsa. The river was a vital economic resource and subject to a multitude of conflicting demands, as is discussed below. The availability of formal and informal power also probably played a role in the *chorbaji* acquiring communal land, especially close to the river and therefore suitable for industrial purposes (Goutas 1997).

5. Economic, social and political forces of capitalist transformation

The economic background of capitalist transformation, against which the Naoussa *chorbaji* acquired and wielded power, was determined in large measure by the Free Trade Treaties of the late 1830s between the Empire and the European powers. The Treaties helped to open Ottoman markets to imports bearing a low tax of 5% (raised to 8% in 1861). The implications for domestic textile manufacturing were complex (Quataert, 1992: 16-25; 1993a: ch.2; Palairat, 1997: ch. 2). Existing domestic cotton manufacturing shrunk rapidly in the face of English competition, especially the spinning of cotton yarn.⁸ But new commercial possibilities also emerged in textile products that often used imported yarn. In the Balkans, there was a market in cheaper cloths (woollen and cotton) for low-income urban families, the army and the peasantry. These cloths were domestically produced and of sufficiently good quality to resist imports. The segmentation of the textile market eventually created a field for capitalist industrialisation in Naoussa.

The broad economic forces at work were evident in the upland towns of Bulgaria, where domestic production of woollen cloth (*shajak* and *aba*) increased strongly around the middle of the 19th century. Bulgarian woollen cloth prevailed in the Ottoman markets from the 1860s onwards, especially after mechanisation of production in Gabrovo and Sliven following Bulgarian independence in 1878 (Palairat, 1997: ch. 9). A traveller's account gives the first indication of significant *shajak* production in Naoussa in the 1850s: 'There is here a factory producing thick woollen cloth, quite similar to felt, which is called Saïak' (Nicolaidy, 1859: vol.2,

⁸ Quataert (1993a: 40) judges the decline of homespun yarn far less dramatic than Pamuk (1986).

282, translated by the author). Unfortunately, we have no information on volumes of *shajak* production, except for Stougiannakis's 1911 figure, quoted in section 3.

Cheap woollen cloth, nevertheless, was unable to find a significant market among Macedonian or other peasants, who met their needs mostly by weaving their own wool at home, in traditional style. Their self-sufficiency in woollen cloth, however, created demand for coarse cotton yarn to combine with wool in domestic weaving. Moreover, handloom-produced cotton cloth resisted imports with considerable success after the 1880s, production approximately doubling between 1880 and 1914 (Pamuk, 1986). Such cloth was heavily produced in the region of Giannitsa and elsewhere in Macedonia (Palairat, 1997: 352). Similar sources of demand also existed in Albania, Bulgaria and other parts of the Balkans. Until the 1870s, this demand was met by homespun yarn (also commercially supplied) and coarse imported yarns.

In the 1870s it became profitable to mechanise the supply of coarse cotton yarn in Macedonia. The opportunity perhaps arose as falling international cotton prices made raw materials cheaper, while also lowering peasant incomes (Quataert, 1993a: 41). An attempt to mechanise cotton spinning was made in Thessaloniki in the 1860s by Allatini, a prominent Jewish family; two further efforts were also made, but without lasting results (Zografski, 1967: 481-2). In contrast, the Naoussa factory of Longos-Kirtsis-Tourpali, established in 1875, survived and proved a catalyst for further industrialisation.

In woollen cloth manufacturing, finally, Bulgarian producers began to lose command of the Ottoman market in the 1900s, since they had allowed quality to decline. The declining quality of Bulgarian cloth was especially problematic for the Ottoman army, and loss of the Ottoman market became catastrophic for Bulgarian producers after imposition of duties in 1910 (Palairat 1967: 257). The newly-established woollen cloth factories in Naoussa and Thessaloniki took advantage of these fresh openings. The large and advanced Hajilazaros factory, in particular, faced more army demand than it could meet (Stougiannakis, 1911: 151).

Naoussa capitalists were able to grasp the opportunities for industrialisation after the 1860s largely due to significant existing *shajak* production in the town. *Shajak*

manufacture provided the opportunity to accumulate capital. This is evidently true for the early cotton spinners, e.g. Kirtsis, Longos, Tourpalis, who were already heavily involved in the domestic manufacture of *shajak* (Goutas, 1997).⁹ *Shajak* manufacture and trading, moreover, created networks that supplied technology and information about textile markets. These networks also drew on cultural and national affinities, since the main export destination of Naoussa *shajak* was the Kingdom of Greece, where mechanisation of textile production had already begun in Athens-Piraeus in the early 1860s.

The leading exporters of *shajak* to Greece were Lapavitsas, Longos and Tsitsis from ‘the days of old’ (Stougiannakis, 1911: 147-8). There is a direct connection, therefore, with the owners of the first Naoussa spinning factory, Longos, Kirtsis and Tourpalis. The *shajak*-makers-become-cotton-spinners obtained the equipment of a failed Greek industrialist in Athens-Piraeus, shipped it to Thessaloniki by boat, and transported it to Naoussa by oxcart over appalling roads. A Greek engineer from Patra installed the spindles and built the wooden turbine setting them in motion (Hajiosif, 1993: 40). Greek engineers continued to repair the machinery and transfer technical know-how in years to come.

Naoussa capitalists were also able to take advantage of the technical knowledge available in the town. Apart from technical skills in domestic textile manufacture, the town also had skills in harnessing the waters of Arapitsa for hydraulic energy. The first two spinning factories were established on the sites of already existing water-mills. The family of Bilis, instrumental in starting the second factory, remained in possession of still other water-mills to the end of the Ottoman period. After its establishment, the factory of Longos-Kirtsis-Tourpalis provided further training ground for the skills and customs necessary for industrial capitalism.¹⁰

The supply of water to set the machines in motion was largely free, but the significance of this is more complex than it appears at first sight. Free water certainly offered a competitive advantage relative to the cotton spinners of Thessaloniki, who

⁹ Goutas (1997) records, if extremely sketchily, an interview with Hajimalousis, the first democratically elected mayor of Naoussa. The material is important, given that the private archive of Hajimalousis is currently out of reach.

¹⁰ Stougiannakis (1911: 149) calls it an ‘industrial Academy’.

used coal. However, obtaining a share of the flow of Arapitsa was far from straightforward, in view of the dozens of competing industrial, agricultural and urban uses. Water access was carefully regulated, entailing social conflict and the exercise of power.¹¹ It also put a premium on ownership of land, as factory sites had to be reasonably close to the course of the river. Reduced flow in the summer, moreover, forced factories to curtail production. Without the social and political power of the *chorbaji*, it would have been extremely difficult for the cotton spinners to obtain stable and free supplies of water. Taking advantage of the water, finally, required significant initial and maintenance investment (blocking and redirecting the river, channelling the water and creating a drop).¹²

The emergence of industrial capitalism further relied on the trading networks and commercial knowledge available to Naoussa. Wine, dairy products and preserved meats were traded with Thessaloniki, but also with Bosnia and Egypt. Trade with Egypt, initially in wine and foodstuffs, led to substantial emigration and setting up of trading offices in Cairo and Alexandria after the early 1860s (Goutas, 1999b). In 1911 the town possessed 12 ‘large’ (20000 Turkish £) and more than 20 ‘smaller trading houses’ (8000 Turkish £) (Stougiannakis, 1911: 148). A list of families with significant commercial capital in 1911 is as follows:

<Table 4 here>

It is notable that almost all trading families were also involved in cotton spinning and production of woollen cloth. The overlap is partly inevitable, since textile output had to be marketed. But it also suggests a degree of primitive accumulation of capital in commerce that was subsequently directed to industry. The family of Goutas provides an example, having originally engaged in trade in Egypt in the 1860s, subsequently to

¹¹ Evidence of the conflicts engendered by access to Arapitsa is indirectly given by Quataert (1993a: 169), who notes that the response of the authorities to the application to establish the first factory in 1875 stipulated that the supply of water to the fields should not be affected.

¹² Oikonomou (1994) gives a detailed description of the complex technical arrangements of Longos-Kirtsis-Tourpalis.

set up a spinning factory in Naoussa in 1903. Even Goutas, however, established the factory after contracting a marriage with Karatzias, who was a *shajak* trader.

The counterpart to the emergence of a group of industrial capitalists in Naoussa naturally was the creation of a sizeable working class. In 1912, there were probably 2000 wage labourers in a total population of around 10000, including 815 directly employed in the textile factories (table 2). However, wage labourers were often also engaged in cultivating their own smallholdings, as is discussed below. The process of creation of this urban class is obscure. It is certain, though, that in 1912 factory employees were mostly women: Kirtsis-Longos-Tourpalis employed 200 women out of a total of 270, while Bilis-Tsitsis ‘mostly’ 160 women, as did the other factories (Stougiannakis, 1911: 149-151). Children were also commonly employed (Zografski, 1967: 482). It is also clear that a significant proportion of workers came from villages around Naoussa even in 1912.

It can be fairly assumed, therefore, that most of the 80 workers initially employed by Longos-Kirtsis-Tourpalis were young girls recruited from surrounding villages. Factory employment was unsuitable for the married women of Naoussa who typically produced *shajak* domestically. Indeed, one of the official concerns of the Ottoman state regarding the establishment of the first factory regarded the implications for women’s domestic employment (Quataert, 1993a: 169).¹³ The first factory hands were probably young peasant girls from the surrounding villages, sent to work for a few years prior to marriage. Since factory operations slackened in the summer, as the flow of Arapitsa lessened, they could combine urban and rural work. In later years, barracks and other housing were constructed for workers in both Naoussa and Edhessa.

Very low wages offered a major competitive advantage to Naoussa industrialists. Quataert (1993b: 163) notes that wages in Thessaloniki might have been three times those of Naoussa in 1913. Working hours were long – from ‘dawn to dusk’ according

¹³ Stougiannakis (1911: 148) notes that Longos-Kirtsis-Tourpalis faced considerable ‘difficulties’ and ‘obstacles’ in establishing the first factory, associated with ‘prejudices and superstition’ against the ‘unprecedented and odd’ enterprise. His elliptical writing suggests that more than mere ‘superstition’ was involved. Social conflict regarding access to water and employment of women was also likely to be present.

to Quataert (1995: 70), exactly the same expression used in Goutas (1997). Worker organisation was also weak compared to Thessaloniki. Armed goons were typically employed by the companies to police clocking in times and intimidate workers (Goutas, 1997). Nevertheless, a grassroots movement gradually emerged in the 1890s, the “Poupoulo”, which had populist sympathies and a constitution that demanded better conditions for workers.

Intense political struggle took place between the Poupoulo and the *chorbaji* regarding control of the mayor’s office, with all that this implied for the economic and social life of the town. Payment of community taxes and charging for water appeared to have been focal points of conflict (Goutas, 1997). The finance and curriculum of schools was also a regular source of social conflict, even preceding the emergence of the Poupoulo. Divisions constantly emerged among the *chorbaji*, related to control over institutional and political mechanisms of the community, possibly exacerbated by the struggle with the Poupoulo. Gradually the Poupoulo prevailed and its leader, Hajimalousis, was the first mayor elected with full male suffrage.¹⁴ However, the *chorbaji* resisted surrendering control over the financial and political resources of the community. The church hierarchy was itself divided, some of it siding with the Poupoulo, which had strong religious leanings.

It is important to note that such conflicts were rarely resolved through the mediation of the Ottoman state. Thus, a bitter dispute in 1896 between the church and some powerful Naoussa *chorbaji* regarding teacher appointments left the Ottoman authorities of Thessaloniki entirely uninterested, and was eventually resolved by the bishop of Thessaloniki (Stoyoglou, 1999: 120-2). Similarly, the conflict between the Poupoulo and the *chorbaji* was partly fought out in the pages of Athens newspapers and involved the mediating services of the Greek consul in Thessaloniki. In short, toward the end of the 19th century, the Christians of Naoussa possessed mechanisms of political and social control that were practically independent of the Ottoman state. Local political and social control by the *chorbaji* smoothed the path of capitalist development in Naoussa. But lack of systematic access to the central state did not

¹⁴ Struggles over local government also took place in Bulgaria after the 1860s, involving the *chorbadziia* and the artisan/merchant social layer (Lampe and Jackson, 146-8).

augur well for their ability to become a broad-based capitalist class in Macedonia. This issue is considered in the next section.

6.Expansion in the 1900s and the limits of social and political power of Naoussa capitalists

A surge in industrial capacity took place in Naoussa in the 1900s. The spinning operations of Longos-Kirtsis-Tourpalis were fully renovated in 1902 and reached 7000 spindles by 1912. Cotton-weaving capacity had already been installed (40 looms) and an annex built in the second half of the 1890s. The new factory of Goutas (1903) had horsepower of 500, of which it used only 200. Obtaining a flow of water required difficult technical operations in rocky terrain. The investment made by Kokkinos-Lapavitsas in 1911 added further capacity, though it did not operate until after the First World War under the name of Tsitsis. By 1911, all factories produced a range of yarns from low to fairly high grade (4-24) (Stougiannakis, 1911: 149-150). None produced grades higher than 32, but the extent of technological progress can be glimpsed by noting that in 1875 Longos-Kirtsis-Tourpalis had 1500 spindles and produced only very coarse yarn (2) (Zografski, 1967: 482).¹⁵

Naoussa-owned spinning capacity was also created during the same period in Edhessa (Lappas-Hajidimoulas, established 1907) and even Thessaloniki (Tourpalis, established 1910). Most notably, the factory of Tsitsis in Edhessa grew into the largest spinning unit in the Empire in 1912 (16500 spindles), also possessing weaving capacity. Finally, industrial capacity was added in the technically more demanding field of woollen cloth manufacture, with three new Naoussa-owned factories (one in Thessaloniki). In particular, Hajilazaros was the largest wool-making factory in the Empire, and could wash, dye, spin, weave and finish wool. It had 300 horsepower produced by an Austrian-built turbine, while being electrically lit and maintained by Austrian technicians (Stougiannakis, 1911: 150-1).

¹⁵. Or even 1260 spindles (Oikonomou, 1999: 322).

The surge was partly due to lower costs compared to Thessaloniki. Worker organisation was more effective in Thessaloniki and the 1900s witnessed significant wage hikes (Issawi, 1980b; Palairat, 1997: 352-4).¹⁶ But lower wage costs cannot be a full explanation, since Tourpalis opened a new spinning factory in Thessaloniki in 1910. Deeper processes were at work. In 1911, Longos-Kirtsis-Tourpalis in Naoussa and Tsitsis in Edhessa merged and created the largest spinning concern in the Empire (Hajjiosif, 1993: 90-5). Cartelisation spread across the Christian-owned factories of the region (Quataert, 1993a: 46). It was probably spurred by the desire to improve access to cotton supplies, as production in the Serres region, the main source of cotton, shifted toward tobacco. Anatolian cotton was imported, and Naoussa industrialists took steps to secure their supply by acquiring steam-powered cotton ginning capacity in Kato Joumaia (for Serres cotton) and Thessaloniki (for Anatolian cotton) (Hajjiosif, 1993: 95).

Competition was also becoming fiercer as cheap imported yarns, mostly Italian, gained market share. Moreover, the Bulgarian export market shrunk after 1908, forcing Ottoman producers to concentrate on Macedonia and Albania (Quataert, 1993a: 45). This probably exacerbated the latent contest between Christian-owned factories in the provinces and Jewish-owned factories in Thessaloniki. A boost was given to Naoussa capitalists by the expansion of Ottoman railways in the 1890s that connected the hinterland to Thessaloniki.

A significant restructuring of Ottoman cotton spinning took place in the 1900s, but the process had barely been under way when imperial rule ended in 1912. Despite their successes, Naoussa capitalists remained in a highly precarious position, since they faced intensified European competition, narrowing markets, lack of advanced technology and uncertain cotton supplies. To make further progress, they needed access to greater financial, technological and political resources. They had to shake off their provincialism and become a fully-fledged capitalist class, with a direct presence in Thessaloniki. Thus, on the one hand, they cartelised and, on the other, some began to set up factories in Thessaloniki (Tourpalis). Still others acquired substantial commercial property in the city (Kirtsis). It was inevitable that friction

¹⁶ Though Quataert (1993c) has claimed that real wages in Thessaloniki did not rise.

would emerge with the better-connected Jewish industrialists of Thessaloniki. Naoussa capitalists had outgrown their small town, where command of social and political power had sustained their emergence. To confront the new and more complex problems, they needed access to broader mechanisms of political power. This could only mean the central Ottoman state, which was unlikely to provide it. But we shall never know for certain, as the First Balkan War destroyed Ottoman power in Macedonia.

7. Absence of capitalist transformation of agriculture

The difficulties faced by Naoussa capitalists in becoming a fully-fledged capitalist class can also be seen in relation to agriculture. This section considers the link between capitalist industrialisation and transformation of agrarian relations in the region of Naoussa. Information is scanty, but the data collected by Dekazos (1913) allow for some conclusions, especially when combined with Stougiannakis (1911). Dekazos was an agriculturist sent by the Greek state to survey the agrarian economy of the newly incorporated region. Inevitably, he thought of the old Ottoman regime as deleterious to agriculture. But his fieldwork produced valuable (though occasionally faulty) data, reconstructed in table 5 below.

There were two distinct agrarian sectors in the region of Naoussa in 1913. The first comprised the gently rising land in the immediate vicinity of the town, while the second the plain beyond. The distinction could also be found in 1822 and, much ameliorated, exists even today. In 1912, the total area of the former sector (8000-10000 stremmata) was parcelled out among town inhabitants, 'almost all' having some connection with agriculture (Dekazos, 1913: 23; Stougiannakis, 1911: 145-6). Naoussa inhabitants cultivated their smallholdings themselves, or rented them out, but rarely used hired labour. Muslims owned perhaps 1/7 of the land, also renting much of the rest, and were reputedly the best farmers (Stougiannakis, 1911: 146). Crops included mostly vines (4000-6000 stremmata) and mulberries (3000 stremmata), cultivated without fertilisers, though agricultural skills were reasonably high. In short, the sector close to the town comprised typical Balkan smallholding agriculture aimed at the market – grapes, wine, mulberry leaves for silkworm. The only direct result of

industrial capitalism was that agricultural income and urban wages frequently complemented each other.

The plain was a different world, far from the town and dominated by *chiftlik* estates. *Chiftlik* were formed across the European parts of the Empire in the 18th and early 19th century (Lampe and Jackson, 1982: 33-7). *Chiftlik* formation received a boost by rising grain prices in the 1840s and 1850s that made exports more attractive (Palairat, 1997: 43). Local Muslim notables (*ayan*) and their descendants held much of the *chiftlik* land, often brought under their control through tax farming and extra-economic power. It is shown below that almost half the Muslim *chiftlik* owners of the plain near Naoussa resided in Veroia, where *ayan* were extremely powerful already from the second half of the 18th century (Anastasopoulos, 1999). Veroia *ayan* probably took advantage of the collapse of the *vakif* of Evrenos in the plain that had commenced in the 18th century and continued unabated in the 19th. A higher proportion of *chiftlik* land emerged on Evrenos's *vakif* than elsewhere in Empire (Demetriades, 1981).

Table 5 reconstructs Dekazos's data for the 29 'villages' of the 'police district' of Naoussa in 1913. This is a large area, practically the entire western end of the Macedonian plain, bordering Vermion, the lake of Giannitsa, Veroia and Edhessa. Entries (20-29) were forest and grazing land, thinly populated and hilly or mountainous. Three entries were proper villages belonging to their inhabitants, though two had only recently been bought from landowners. A fourth comprised the estates of a local monastery. The remaining six were uninhabited *chiftlik* forests belonging to Muslims, except for Osliani, which belonged to an Istanbul Greek and was exploited by the British Miller Tracing Company for railway timber. The Osliani estate certainly represented advanced capitalist activity, but it affords too narrow a basis on which to draw conclusions about agrarian relations. For that we turn to entries (1-19), *chiftlik* villages that held almost all the cultivated land in the region.

<Table 5 here>

Several conclusions follow from table 5. First, the villages were large land units by Ottoman standards: the averages for available, arable and cultivated land per village come to, respectively, 8700, 5000 and 2700 stremmata (or 1390, 800 and 430 in hectares). However, villages typically had several *chiftlik* owners. Without double counting, there were at least 40 Muslim and 12 Christian *chiftlik* owners altogether. If the private holdings of villagers are disregarded, the averages for available, arable and cultivated land per privately owned *chiftlik* come to, respectively, 3200, 2300 and 1000 stremmata (or 510, 370 and 160 in hectares). These are not out of line with the rest of the Balkans, though toward the high end of the spectrum (Lampe and Jackson, 1982: 280-4). Absentee landlordship was not prevalent: of the Muslims, 17 came from Veroia, 15 from Edhessa and none from Naoussa; of the Christians, 8 came from Naoussa, 2 from Veroia and 2 from Edhessa.

Second, the agricultural population was relatively small. The villages had a total of 600 families, though these were sizeable groups of 3-4 and 5-7 mature men and women, respectively. Each family cultivated an average of 87 stremmata, varying from 125 in Yantsista to 41 in Tsarmorinovo, while the average for arable tended by each family stood at 158. Considering that the soil of the region is generally fertile, these were very high ratios.¹⁷ Clearly, there was labour shortage.

Third, land was abundant and not very intensively cultivated: 43% of the available land was not used for agriculture, while 46% of the arable lay fallow. Both unused and fallow produced an income through forestry, hay making, or by being rented to transhumant shepherds for grazing. Plentiful land and labour shortage made for low land prices on the plain: 1-2 Turkish £/stremma compared to 2-4 Turkish £/stremma in the vicinity of Naoussa (Dekazos, 1913: 17). Cultivated land was given overwhelmingly to grain: 77% to winter cereals and 18% to maize. The balance went to garden crops, and negligible proportions to cotton, rice, mulberries and tobacco. This mix of crops was typical for Ottoman *chiftlik* of the period (Issawi, 1980a: 199-200).

¹⁷ Certainly compared to Inalcik's (1984: 106) figures of 60-80 *dönüm* (920 sq. m.) of fertile arable land per peasant household.

Sharecropping prevailed, but immigrant hired labour was also brought in when the crop had to be gathered (Dekazos, 1913: 16-22). The landlord typically provided the land, the seed and housing, while the peasant supplied animals and labour. For winter cereals, the crop was divided in half, after subtracting the seed and the tithe. For maize, the landlord received a (quantity) rent per stremma agreed in advance and varying with the fertility of the soil. Peasants retained the remaining output, thus they had a strong incentive to raise production. The landlord and his estate manager displayed force, including violence, typically at the time of the division of the crop. But the peasant was protected by labour shortage and had considerable freedom in selecting the fields and types of cultivation.

Dekazos notes the absence of mechanisation and fertilisers, and bemoans the poor technique of the peasants. Fields belonging to different landlords lay indiscriminately next to each other, further reducing productivity. However, the yields were generally respectable: the seed yield stood at 1:8.5 for winter wheat, 1:11 for barley, 1:14 for oats, 1:17 for rye, 1:25 for maize, 1:17 for millet, 1:15 for moha and 1:15 for sesame; the land yield (oka/stremma) at 170 for winter wheat, 200 for barley, 250 for oats, 200 for rye, 250 for maize, 100 for millet, 80 for moha and 60 for sesame (Dekazos, 1913: 16-7). These were comparable to yields in the rest of the Empire (Issawi, 1980a: 214-5; Palairat, 1997: 343).

Despite producing for the market, the *chiftlik* sector as a whole showed few signs of capitalist transformation, including regular use of wage labour, improved rotation and seeds, mechanisation and chemical fertilisers. One factor contributing to lack of capitalist investment in agriculture was lack of security, associated with the fierce nationalist struggle for Macedonia. It is possible, however, that the absence of aggregate transformation concealed important underlying changes. To be specific, industrial capitalism in the region was a Christian affair led by Naoussa entrepreneurs. Naoussa Christians also had substantial *chiftlik* holdings. Perhaps they had started to transform their estates in a capitalist direction, in line with the industrial and commercial activities thriving in the town. If so, we would expect Christian-owned to have had higher productivity and greater value-added activities than Muslim-owned *chiftlik*. We turn to this issue in the next section.

8. Christian-owned versus Muslim-owned *chiftlik*

Acquisition of *chiftlik* by Naoussa Christians probably started on the wake of the Land Code of 1858, which had strengthened property rights in land in an effort to reorganise land taxation. To explore the issue of whether Christians induced capitalist agrarian transformation, it is necessary to estimate the extent of Christian landownership more precisely. Dekazos gives the area of *chiftlik* villages and the names of Christian landlords, but not the area they owned. However, Stougiannakis (1911: 146-7) lists Naoussa landlords and their estates by value (Turkish £). On this basis, and given the previously quoted average price of land on the plain at 1.5 £/stremma, it is possible to estimate Christian ownership in villages held jointly by Muslims and Christians.

<Table 6>

A remarkable aspect of table 6 is that half the Naoussa landlords, namely Kokkinos, Lapavitsas, Platsoukas and Pehlivanos, were also heavily involved in *shajak* manufacture and mechanised cotton spinning. It is clear that they had invested in land in the second half of the 19th century, after accumulating capital in *shajak* and other trading. After all, Macedonian *chiftlik* produced returns of 18-25% on capital around 1900 (Issawi, 1980a: 208). Profitability was probably boosted by tax-farming of the tithe, widely practiced among the *chorbaji* of Naoussa (Goutas 1997). Tables 6 and 5 together show that the bulk of agricultural land on the plain was firmly in Muslim hands in 1913. Christians possessed only 18% of the entire arable land, though they held a significant 42% of the arable in villages with mixed ownership, while Naoussa landlords owned nearly 3/4 of the Christian share.

The data does not allow for differentiation between purely Christian- and purely-Muslim *chiftlik* in terms of crops, labour and animals. However, since it was estimated that Christians held 42% of the arable land in villages with mixed ownership, it is reasonable to partition the sample into a group of purely Muslim-

owned villages (1-10) and a group of villages with mixed ownership (11-19). We could then treat mixed ownership villages as proxy for Christian-owned *chiftlik*.

The two groups were broadly similar in terms of land and labour. For (1-10), arable and cultivated land per village came to 5300 and 2900 stremmata, respectively; for (11-19), they came to 4700 and 2500, respectively. The average private *chiftlik* for the first group was 2000 arable and 1100 cultivated; the average for the second stood at 1400 arable and 760 cultivated. Thus, Muslims tended to have larger *chiftlik* than Christians, as is also clear from table 6. But labour was equally short: arable land per family was 156 stremmata for the first group and 157 for the second. Moreover, there does not appear to have been a systematic difference in the fertility of soil possessed by the two groups.

Under such conditions, draught animals were of critical importance for productivity. Draught animals represented by far the largest capital outlay and typically belonged to the peasant. Here the difference between the two groups was pronounced. For villages (1-10), the average for cattle stood at 739 and for horses/donkeys at 117 (individual animals). For villages (11-19), these averages were much lower, standing at 287 for cattle and 68 for horses/donkeys.¹⁸ Consequently, productivity was probably higher in purely Muslim-owned villages.

The large numbers of cattle and horses in purely Muslim-owned villages suggest that cattle ranching also took place (and possibly horse breeding), as was observed in *chiftlik* elsewhere and in past centuries (Inalcik, 1984: 111). The herds would have produced a marketable output of animal products and probably belonged to landlords. However, the possibility cannot be discounted that the peasants also shared in herd ownership. Purely Muslim-owned villages, after all, had far higher averages of sheep/goats and pigs (2035 and 167, respectively) than villages of mixed ownership (1000 and 79). These numbers do not indicate large commercial activity, but they are certainly sizeable and show wealth among peasants in purely Muslim-owned villages.

¹⁸ In Macedonia horses were not used for ploughing.

The patterns of cultivation were very similar between the groups, cereals taking up at least 95% of the land under the plough for both. There appeared to be a slight preference for maize in villages of mixed ownership - 21% of their cultivated land compared to 16% in Muslim-owned villages. This difference is not systematic, being entirely due to the statistical outlier of Golo Selo village. But another difference in the patterns of cultivation is undeniable and systematic: garden crops took up 4.8% of the cultivated land of the first group but only 1.4% of the second. These crops were marketed and represented far higher value-added than grains. On this score too, purely Muslim-owned villages generated more commercial opportunities and wealth for owners and peasants.

The conclusion is inescapable: purely Muslim-owned villages performed better than villages of mixed ownership, hence probably better than Christian-owned *chiftlik*. They also offered greater wealth opportunities to peasants. Thus, the hypothesis that Christian *chiftlik* owners transformed agrarian relations in a capitalist direction can be rejected. This conclusion is surprising but also significant. Capitalist agrarian transformation, as Byres (1996) has shown, is a widely varied historical process that could be classified into top-down and bottom-up. In southern Ottoman Macedonia, there was no top-down transformation, even when *chiftlik* owners were industrial and commercial capitalists from Naoussa. Christian landlords appear to have treated their estates as sources of surplus to be extracted in traditional ways, and perhaps invested in urban commerce and industry. It is probable that the lack of social and political power over the plain also prevented the *chorbaji* from transforming agrarian relations. Even if they had the desire to effect a capitalist transformation of the plain, they would not have been able to use social and political mechanisms, such as those they possessed in Naoussa. Instead, they would have had to rely on Ottoman state power, to which they had limited access.

There are some tantalising indications, however, that bottom-up processes might have been taking place in the 1900s. There was a wave of selling by Muslim landlords toward the end of Ottoman rule. Heavy speculation in *chiftlik* land took place, much of it undertaken by Jewish merchants from Thessaloniki (Demetriades, 1981). Nationalist unrest was the most probable cause of these developments, as frightened Muslims left for Anatolia. The buyers were often peasant collectives that proceeded to

re-divide the land. Peasants had monetary wealth, they were prepared to invest in land, and there probably was differentiation among them.

The selling trend was present in the Naoussa region and affected Christian landlords. Political instability and insecurity in the countryside were the probable causes. Thus, the villages of Arkoudhokhori and Khoropani were bought by their inhabitants - the former from a Muslim landlord, the latter from Naoussa landlord Hajidimitriou (Dekazos, 1913: 41-3). The forest at Osliani was sold by a Muslim landlord to an Istanbul Greek, who leased it to the British Miller Tracing Company. Land sales probably took place in Diavornitsa (by Bellas), Tsarmorinovo (by Hajidimitriou) and Arseni (by Lapavitsas). It is certain that peasants, both Muslim and Christian, held significant arable land in Episkopi, Arseni and Kato Kopanos. Agriculture was changing from below in the 1900s but, on current evidence, it is impossible to tell the direction it might have taken.

9. Conclusion

Spontaneous capitalist industrialisation in the Ottoman Empire was prominent in southern Macedonia and spearheaded by the little town of Naoussa. Trade liberalisation in the 1830s segmented the Ottoman textile market. In the 1870s a niche was eventually created for mechanised cotton spinning. The emergence of cotton spinning in Naoussa offers insights into capitalist development within trade liberalisation, albeit in the context of the late Ottoman Empire.

It was shown in this paper that the industrial success of Naoussa was partly due to economic factors. There was significant demand for coarse cotton yarn among peasants, in Macedonia and elsewhere in the Balkans. Capital and textile-producing skills had accumulated through the domestic manufacture of woollen cloth, *shajak*. The export of *shajak* to Greece created conditions amenable to importing second-hand cotton spinning equipment and technology. A supply of wage labourers became available as young women were mobilised from surrounding villages. Further economic advantages included very low wages and free water supply.

It was also shown that capitalist industrialisation relied on familial and communal networks among Greek Christians. The dominant social group of Naoussa, the *chorbaji*, together with the Orthodox Church, controlled the institutional and political mechanisms of the community. *Chorbaji* power smoothed the path of industrialisation by dealing with thorny economic and social issues, including access to water and conflict with the nascent working class. In contrast, the Ottoman state did not generally offer to Naoussa capitalists mechanisms capable of confronting the tensions of capitalist transformation.

At the end of Ottoman rule in 1912, the industrial base created by Macedonian Christians was very small and precariously placed relative to European competitors. The industrial capitalists of Naoussa remained a provincial group and did not become a broad-based capitalist class. This was partly because their institutional and political mechanisms were resolutely provincial, affording them negligible influence on Thessaloniki and the central Ottoman state. Lack of broader mechanisms of social power also probably contributed to the failure of Naoussa Christians to transform agrarian relations. It was shown that Christian landowners, despite often also being industrial and commercial capitalists, did not undertake significant capitalist investment in agriculture. Christian-owned performed worse than Muslim-owned landed estates. Failure to transform agriculture, in turn, limited the prospects of broader capitalist development in Macedonia.

The abrupt end of Ottoman rule in 1912 was followed by several cataclysms in Macedonia. The Balkan wars, the First World War and the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-22 led to population exchanges that completely altered the ethnic mix. In the 1920s and 1930s, landed estates were confiscated, the plain was drained and land was redistributed on a vast scale. The textile industry of Naoussa continued to be important, but its horizons were set within the Greek state.

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Table 1. SMALLHOLDER, LANDLORD AND CHURCH PROPERTY IN NAOUSSA, 1822

| | <i>Smallholderds</i> | | | <i>Church</i> | <i>Landlords</i> | |
|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| | <i>Killed</i> 408 | <i>Pardoned</i> 198 | <i>Departed</i> 33 | | <i>Zafirakis</i> <i>(Golesiani)</i> | <i>Tasios</i> <i>(Diavornitsa)</i> |
| <i>Fields</i> | 481.5 | 999.5 | 164.5 | 1679 | 1200 | 1928 |
| <i>Grazing Grounds</i> | 23.5 | 65.5 | 6.5 | 1 | 1 | |
| <i>Mulberry fields</i> | 225.5 | 243.5 | 16.5 | 23 | | |
| <i>Vineyards</i> | 644.5 | 798 | 113.5 | 94 | | 15 |
| <i>Total land</i> | 1375 | 2106.5 | 301 | 1797 | 1201 | 1943 |
| <i>Workshops</i> | 14 | 17 | 2 | 29 | | |
| <i>Water-mills</i> | 26 | 26 | 1 | 14 | 1 | |
| <i>Houses</i> | 419 | 193 | 36 | 226 | 7 | |

Source: Constructed from Vasdravellis (1967). Land in Turkish stremmata (1600 sq. m.). The landowner Tasios did not live in Naoussa.

Table 2. TEXTILE CAPACITY LOCATED IN NAOUSSA IN 1912

| <i>Cotton Spinning Factory</i> | <i>Year</i> | <i>Horsepower</i> | <i>Spindles</i> | <i>Output (packets)</i> | <i>Output (Turkish £)</i> | <i>Workers</i> |
|------------------------------------|-------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------|
| <i>1)Longos-Kirtsis-Tourpalis</i> | 1875 | 270 | 7000 | 95000 | 50000 | 270 |
| <i>2)Bilis-Tsitsis</i> | 1891 | 148 | 4000 | 65000 | 32500 | 160 |
| <i>3)Goutas-Karatzias</i> | 1903 | 200 | 3200 | 50000 | 25000 | 160 |
| <i>4)Tsitsis</i> | 1911 | 220 | | 200000 (oka) | | 130 |
| <i>Total (without 4)</i> | | 618 | 14200 | 210000 | 107500 | 590 |
| <i>Wool Weaving Factory</i> | <i>Year</i> | <i>Horsepower</i> | <i>Spindles</i> | <i>Output (metres)</i> | <i>Output (Turkish £)</i> | <i>Workers</i> |
| <i>1)Hajilazaros</i> | 1907 | 300 | 1080 | 100000 (1.4m width) | 40000 | 150 |
| <i>2)Lanaras-Pehlivanos</i> | 1910 | 75 | | 90000 (0.33m. width) | 8500 | 75 |
| <i>Total</i> | | 375 | 1080 | | 48500 | 225 |

Source: Constructed from Stougiannakis (1911) and Oikonomou (1999). An oka is nearly 1300 gr.

Table 3. SHAREHOLDING FAMILIES OF NAOUSSA-OWNED FACTORIES, 1875-1912

| <i>Factory</i> | <i>Shareholding Naoussa Families</i> |
|---|--|
| <i>1)Longos-Kirtsis-Tourpalis</i> | Longos, Kirtsis, Tourpalis |
| <i>2)Bilis-Tsitsis</i> | Bilis, Tsitsis, Kokkinos, Tourpalis, Sefertzis, Tsiomis, Boyatzis |
| <i>3)Goutas-Karatzias</i> | Goutas, Karatzias, Tourpalis |
| <i>4)Tsitsis</i> | Kokkinos, Lapavitsas, Bilis, Tsitsis, Sefertzis, Kirtsis, Longos |
| <i>5)Hajilazaros</i> | Hajilazaros, Angelakis, Lamnides |
| <i>6)Lanaras-Pehlivanos</i> | Lanaras, Pehlivanos, Kirtsis |
| <i>7)Lappas-Hajidimoulas (Edhessa)</i> | Lappas, Hajidimoulas |
| <i>8)Tsitsis (Edhessa)</i> | Tsitsis, Kokkinos, Kirtsis, Sefertzis, Longos, Platsoukas |
| <i>9)Tourpalis-Kazazis (Thessaloniki)</i> | Tourpalis |

Source: Constructed from Stougiannakis (1911) and Oikonomou (1999).

Table 4. COMMERCIAL CAPITAL OF NAOUSSA, 1911

| <i>Geographical Area of Trading</i> | <i>Family</i> |
|---|--|
| <i>Ottoman Empire</i> | Kirtsis, Longos, Tourpalis, Platsoukas, Pehlivanos, Angelakis, Lamnides, Lanaras, Petrides, Tsitsis |
| <i>Egypt</i> | Goutas, Lappas, Mathaiou, Kokkinos, Pehlivanos |
| <i>Bosnia</i> | Sefertzis, Gourgouliatos |
| <i>Greece</i> | Lapavitsas, Longos, Tsitsis |

Source: Igglesis (1910), Goutas (1999b), Stougiannakis (1911)

Table 5. *CHIFTLIK* ECONOMY IN THE REGION OF NAOUSSA, 1913

| VILLAGE | LANDLORDS | | LAND | | | LABOUR | CROPS | | | | | | | | ANIMALS | | |
|-----------------|-----------|------------------|-----------|--------|------------|------------|-------|-------|--------|------|--------|------|-------|--------|---------|-----------------|--------|
| | Muslim | Christian | Available | Arable | Cultivated | (families) | Wheat | Maize | Barley | Oats | Millet | Moha | Vetch | Sesame | Garden | Sheep/ Goats | Cattle |
| 1)Aghia Marina | 3 | | 9000 | 6000 | 2960 | 30 | 1500 | 500 | 400 | 200 | 100 | | 60 | 200 | | 1000 | 150 |
| 2)Lykovitsa | 3 | | 8000 | 5500 | 1170 | 23 | 500 | 350 | 200 | | 40 | | 30 | 50 | | 100 | 80 |
| 3)Yantsista | 5 | | 10500 | 9000 | 3760 | 30 | 2000 | 560 | 400 | 200 | 200 | | 200 | 200 | | 1700 | 320 |
| 4)Arseni | 3 + | villagers | 13000 | 7100 | 7100 | 60 | 3000 | 400 | 1500 | 500 | 500 | | 200 | 500 | 400 | 2000 | 1300 |
| 5)Kameniki | 3 | | 8000 | 5720 | 5720 | 50 | 3000 | 400 | 1500 | 100 | 150 | 150 | 100 | 200 | 80 | 2000 | 500 |
| 6)Zervokhori | 2 | | 8000 | 3000 | 1355 | 25 | 250 | 400 | 200 | 30 | 50 | 50 | 25 | | 350 | 700 | 1500 |
| 7)Vetista | 4 + | others | 13500 | 7500 | 2890 | 60 | 650 | 700 | 400 | 80 | 200 | 200 | 50 | 300 | 200 | 2000 | 1500 |
| 8)Palasnitsiovo | | | 10000 | 4000 | 2005 | 22 | 100 | 800 | 600 | 30 | 50 | 50 | 25 | | 350 | 10000 | 2000 |
| 9)Bania | 2 | | 3000 | 1000 | 530 | 6 | 200 | 150 | 80 | | 50 | 50 | | | | 55 | 35 |
| 10)Rizovo | 2 | | 8000 | 4000 | 1610 | 25 | 400 | 300 | 300 | 40 | 150 | 150 | 30 | 200 | 15 | 800 | |
| 11)Diavornitsa | 1 | 2 | 4500 | 4000 | 1870 | 25 | 1000 | 65 | 200 | 100 | | | 100 | 55 | | 1000 | 100 |
| 12)Kato Kopanos | 3 | 2 + villagers | 11000 | 10000 | 3300 | 30 | 1500 | 420 | 400 | 150 | 200 | | 200 | 350 | | 1000 | 200 |
| 13)Ano Kopanos | 1 | 1 | 6500 | 6500 | 2480 | 26 | 1000 | 350 | 500 | 150 | 200 | 150 | 100 | | | 1000 | 100 |
| 14)Monospita | 3 | 2 | 8000 | 6000 | 3275 | 30 | 1500 | 400 | 500 | 200 | 200 | | 200 | 250 | | 1500 | 150 |
| 15)Episkopi | 4 | 1 + villagers | 11000 | 5500 | 5000 | 35 | 2000 | 700 | 1000 | 300 | 400 | 200 | 100 | 300 | | 1000 | 400 |
| 16)Giannakovo | | 1 | 15000 | 1050 | 1050 | 18 | 300 | 300 | 150 | | 100 | 100 | | 100 | | 1100 | |
| 17)Tsarmorinovo | 3 | 1 | 8000 | 3000 | 1220 | 30 | 400 | 200 | 200 | 80 | 100 | 100 | | 100 | 30 | 1000 | 130 |
| 18)Golesiani | 1 | 1 | 5000 | 3000 | 1685 | 15 | 350 | 400 | 300 | 75 | 150 | 150 | 20 | 200 | | 1000 | |
| 19)Golo Selo | 1 | 2 | 5000 | 3000 | 2930 | 60 | 100 | 2000 | 500 | | | | 30 | | 300 | 400 | 1500 |
| 20)Osliani | | 1 | forest | | 200 | 17 | 80 | 100 | | | | | | | | 1250 | 45 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|-----------|-------------|------|-----|-----|----|--|------|----|
| <i>21)Marousa</i> | | forest | | | | | | | |
| <i>22)Seli</i> | | forest | | | | | | | |
| <i>23)Skotina</i> | | forest | | | | | | | |
| <i>24)Golema Reka</i> | | forest | | | | | | | |
| <i>25)Fetitsa</i> | | graz.(6500) | 500 | | | | | | |
| <i>26)Prodromos</i> | Church | | 3000 | 400 | 115 | | | 100 | 40 |
| <i>27)Arkoudokhori</i> | villagers | forest | | | | 80 | | 2000 | |
| <i>28)Tsornovo</i> | villagers | forest | 3000 | | | | | 2500 | |
| <i>29)Khoropani</i> | villagers | grazing | 1750 | | 135 | | | | |

Notes: Constructed from Dekazos (1913). Land in Turkish stremmata (1600 sq. m.)

Marginal crops were: Rye (100 in Diavornitsa), rice (250 in Diavornitsa, 40 in Golesiani), sycamores (80 in Kato Kopanos, 30 in Ano Kopamos, 25 in Monospita, 30 in Vetista, 10 in Rizovo),

cotton (10 in Tsarmorinovo, 100 in Arseni, 40 in Kameniki, 50 in Vetista, 15 in Rizovo), tobacco (30 in Vetista, 10 in Rizovo), beans (20 in Osliani), vines (1000 in Tsornovo),

hay (10000 bales in Zervokhori, 10000 bales in Palasnitsiovo). Garden crops include melon fields and vegetables. Cattle include oxen, buffaloes and cows. Silk cocoons are in boxes.

The owners of Palasnitsiovo are not given by Dekazos, but they were almost certainly Muslim. For Arseni, Kameniki and Giannakovo, Dekazos's figure for arable is actually less than the sum by type of c

The arable has been adjusted accordingly. Labour figures are suspiciously clustered around 30. Dekazos's labour figure for Kameniki (25) was improbably low, given the cultivated land, and has been adju

The labour figures for Yantsista and Rizovo are estimates on the basis of arable. Dekazos's figures for sheep/goats also look improbably clustered around 1000.

Table 6. CHRISTIAN LANDOWNERSHIP IN THE REGION OF NAOUSSA IN 1913

| <i>Village</i> | <i>Christian-owned Arable Land</i> | <i>Muslim-owned Arable Land</i> | <i>Christian Landowners</i> |
|-----------------------|--|-------------------------------------|--|
| <i>1)Diavornitsa</i> | 2000 | 2000 | Salfatas (Veroia), Hajigogos (Veroia) |
| <i>2)Kato Kopanos</i> | 3000 | 7000 | Kionses (Edhessa), Petsos (Edhessa) |
| <i>3)Ano Kopanos</i> | 3250 | 3250 | Pehlivanos (Naoussa) |
| <i>4)Monospita</i> | 2300 | 3700 | Kokkinos (Naoussa), Platsoukas (Naoussa) |
| <i>5)Episkopi</i> | 1100 | 4400 | Lapavitsas (Naoussa) |
| <i>6)Giannakovo</i> | 1050 | | Hadimitriou (Naoussa) |
| <i>7)Tsarmorinovo</i> | 1500 | 1500 | Hajidimitriou (Naoussa) |
| <i>8)Golesiani</i> | 1400 | 1600 | Hajinotas (Naoussa) |
| <i>9)Golo Selo</i> | 1900 | 1100 | Yamalis (Naoussa), Markobitsis (Naoussa) |
| Total | 17500 | 24550 | |

Source: Constructed from Dekazos (1913) and Stougiannakis (1911). Areas in Turkish stremmata (1600 sq. m.) and values in Turkish £. For Diavornitsa, Stougiannakis (1911, 147) mentions that 1/2 belonged to the sisters of Bellas from Naoussa. Bellas was a powerful *chorbaji*, with interests in silk and wool fulling. His sisters probably sold the estate to Salfatas and Hajigogos during 1911-3. For Kato Kopanos, the estimate is based on only 2 Christians out of 5 owners, Christians typically holding slightly less land than Muslims. For Ano Kopanos, Stougiannakis (1911, 146) mentions that 1/2 belonged to Pehlivanos. For Monospita, Stougiannakis (1911, 146) gives total value of Christian holdings at 3500. Making an allowance for non-arable, this gives 2300 stremmata of arable. For Episkopi, Stougiannakis (1911, 147) gives the value of Christian land at 2500, but also mentions that Lapavitsas's estate included part of Arseni, which is not in Dekazos (1913, 31). Lapavitsas's share of Arseni was probably sold during 1911-3. We will assume that it came to 1/3 of the estate. This leaves 1100 stremmata of arable for Episkopi, also allowing for non-arable. For Giannakovo, both Stougiannakis (1911, 146) and Dekazos (1913, 33) note that it belonged entirely to Hajidimitriou. For Tsarmorinovo, Dekazos (1913, 34) mentions that Hajidimitriou owned 1/2, though Stougiannakis (1911, 146) mentions 'the whole'. Hajidimitriou probably sold the other 1/2. This is in line with the 'recent' sale of the forest of Khoropani (Dekazos, 1913, 43), which also belonged to Hajidimitriou (Stougiannakis 1911, 146). For Golesiani, the estimate is based on only 1 Christian out of 3 owners. For Golo Selo, Stougiannakis (1911, 146) gives the value at 3000, which amounts to 1900 stremmata of arable, if allowance is made for non-arable. The allowances for non-arable were made on the basis of the chiftlik of Fetitsa, which comprised 6500 stremmata of mostly grazing land (Dekazos 1913, 40) and was valued at 1500 £ (Stougiannakis 1911, 147). All our estimates for arable land are evidently rough but they are adequate for our purposes.

