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Producing Political Landscape on the Korean Peninsula: Divided Visions, United Vista

Dr Robert Winstanley-Chesters & Ms Sherri L. Ter Molen

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Dr. Robert Winstanley-Chesters
Beyond the Korean War Project (University of Cambridge)
University of Leeds

Ms. Sherri L. Ter Molen
Wayne State University

Author Note
Dr. Robert Winstanley-Chesters is a Post-Doctoral Fellow of the Beyond the Korean War Project (University of Cambridge) and a Visiting Research Fellow at the School of Geography, University of Leeds.

Sherri L. Ter Molen, A.B.D., is currently a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Communication, Wayne State University.

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Correspondence this article should be addressed to Dr. Robert Winstanley-Chesters at r.winstanley-chesters@leeds.ac.uk.
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Abstract

Myths of national construction and accompanying visual representations are often deeply connected to political narrative. The Korean peninsula may be unlike other political space due to the ruptured relations and sovereignty on its territory since World War II: North and South Korea. Nevertheless, both nations construct inverse ideologies with the common tools of the pen and lens and both produce highly coded, politically-charged national, visual and narrative mythologies rooted in their physical landscape.

Following Geographers Denis Cosgrove and Noel Castree in recognising landscape and the natural environment’s vital contribution to the construction of symbolic national/political space(s) and adopting rhetorical and methodological strategies derived from communication studies’ approach to visual culture, this paper focuses on the “Saemaul” movement, a political project of the 1970s focused on upgrading rural infrastructure and landscape in South Korea, which was both enacted by and connected to President Park Chung-hee. At the same time, Kim Il Sung and North Korea, manifested a charismatic political urgency on its own landscape through the “Ch’ollima” movement.

Comparing and connecting both of these acutely political projects and the political landscapes of which they were a product, this paper seeks to examine the relationships between the visual productions and reproductions of the Saemaul and Ch’ollima campaigns, and those literary, rhetorical and narrative strategies embedded within these visual outputs. Critically and particularly this paper considers these strategies and representations of afforestation and forestry management either side of the DMZ, juxtaposing these representations within the opposed states and revealing processes through which physical landscapes and their representation function to both divide and unite the Korean peninsula.
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The denudation of the hills in the neighbourhood of Seoul, the coasts, the treaty ports, and the main roads, is impressive, and helps to give a very unfavourable idea of the country (Bird, 1905, p.8).

While Isabella Bishop-Bird, late Victorian British female adventurer and one of the last foreigners not in the pay of governmental or diplomatic authorities to visit Yi dynasty Korea before it finally fell under the colonising rule of the Japanese Empire, may have encountered a Korea of distinct denudation and forest over-exploitation, any contemporary visitor to South Korea will note the verdant abundance of forest resource. The Korean peninsula has been subjected to many political forms and approaches in the recent past, and its landscape and topography certainly bears the scars. Korea is a place of radically different landscapes as much as it is also a terrain of radically different politics. Political circumstances have produced these spaces such as the environmental contradiction of the Demilitarised Zone’s attendant military infrastructure in a setting of pristine eco-system, accidentally created by war and rupture. Equally, the extreme denudation and degradation of some of North Korea’s hills and mountains as well as the neo-liberal urban monolith and megalith rich landscapes of localities such as Seoul, Incheon and Songdo are unexpected products of its recent history (Gelezeau, 2014). The facts and reality of the national polities on the Korean Peninsula and the apparently radically different contemporary approaches to political form and function are often both popular and academic points of interest and analysis though often these analyses of alienation and rupture are undertaken with a distinct lack of imagination so far as comparison is concerned. It is this paper’s assertion that comparison and connection between both Koreas are both possible and useful. The key is to find points of connection and similarity, lines of
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flight in the Deleuzean\textsuperscript{1} sense across the institutional divide which remind, suggest and allow remembrance that both Koreas were, not so different in the 1970s and 1908s when the photographs examined in this study were produced since the two countries had not been separate entities for a considerable period of time. In fact, these analyses will suggest that the Koreas, though they did not share similar outlooks, shared much in common in approach.

Accordingly, this paper holds that the production, generation and consumption of landscape and the representation of these processes, as well as the produced landscape itself, constitute an element of these potential ruptures. Naturally, therefore, this paper seeks to investigate the empirical potential of these ruptures, exploring the processes through which they are generated or sustained. Specifically, it will examine the visual rhetoric of afforestation and forestry management in both North and South Korea in the 1970s and early 1980s during the period known in South Korea as the ‘Yushin period’.

This paper first explains what is meant essentially by the production of landscape, political landscape as a concept. Following, this the paper reviews the impact of such landscape production in the context of a wider East Asia, specifically focused upon forestry management and timber resource, before considering the processes of the production of political charisma in the twentieth century on the Korean Peninsula. It then reviews the narratives of developmental process undertaken by both Koreas during this time before considering the importance and utility of its visual manifestation. Having done so, this paper introduces key methodological structures and analytical tools through which these

\textsuperscript{1} Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri coined the conception of “lines of flight” in the first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, known as A Thousand Plateaus essentially to describe the processes of interaction in a post-structuralist philosophy. They described them in the following terms “…Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities. The plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities. The line of flight marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions that the multiplicity effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary dimension, unless the multiplicity is transformed by the line of flight; the possibility and necessity of flattening all of the multiplicities on a single plane of consistency or exteriority, regardless of their number of dimensions…” (Deleuze and Guatarri, 1988, pp.9-10)
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developmental processes and practical manifestations might be analysed. In particular, the authors outline the utility and function of tools of visual rhetoric, specifically ideological analysis. Finally, before coming to a conclusion, this paper deploys these methodological strategies on a select, representative sample of imagery collection by its authors during an exercise in field work amongst the archives of the Republic of Korea.

Literature Review

Constructing Landscape: From Terrain to Vista

Following our introduction, the first task of this paper, in terms of outlining the literature that informs it and which underpins its conceptual framework, is to explain essentially what is meant by producing or constructing nature or landscape in such a way that it might be political landscape or political nature. Key to this explanation will be a reflection upon literatures addressing the meaning of the term ‘nature’ and thus the conceptual ground upon which categoric interaction takes place.

In his book, Social Nature: Theory, Practice and Politics, Castree (2001) deploys a helpful tripartite set of definitions focused on contemporary conceptions of nature. Firstly, he notes that “The familiar distinction between society and nature indicates a long-standing assumption that nature is external and different to society” (p. 6). Such thinking is representative of much of the Platonic root of ‘Western’ or ‘modern’ political or social theorisation, in that universalised concepts must inherently be rendered into dualistic modalities of being or not being. Thus, the social, political and human world is essentially and radically different from the world of the natural and the environmental. Castree also notes that since the European Enlightenment, which embedded Platonic dualism within the roots of philosophic and social ordering, there have been other cases of such a process including “other dualisms organizing our thought, such as rural-urban, country-city and wilderness-civilisation” (p.6). Secondly, nature can be understood as ‘intrinsic’, in the sense
that there is something innate, ineffable and finite about natural or environmental spaces, different from human or social existence though they appear to be in a state of constant flux. Castree, however, reminds us that the “pessimist among the ‘humans and environment’ tradition of geography take the Malthusian line that natural resources are fixed in quantity, such that population levels will outstrip them with disastrous consequences” (p. 7). Finally, Castree identifies that nature is also understood as ‘universal’. This universalism allows for the conception that events or situations in nature will always follow a similar pattern. It thus follows that “a hydrologist studying how pesticides leak from fields of a certain soil type into rivers might use a general theory of soil water movement” (p. 7), but nature may also be considered universal in a ‘Gaian’ sense in that current human interaction with the natural runs counter to world order and that such action will be subject to a necessary and inevitable correction at which point the world will revert to a universal mean.

Following the lead of Castree and other ‘critical geographies’, it thus appears that multiple conceptions of nature and the natural, their interaction with political form and governmental narratives, might be possible. Aside from Castree’s framing of different approaches to nature and the natural, Cosgrove’s (1984) analysis of the concept of ‘landscape’ could also play a key role in these interactions. Cosgrove separates land from landscape in a way that echoes the ‘Platonistic’ dualism of disconnection between nature itself and social or political conceptions of the natural. Placing the concept of landscape well within the field of social/political construction, he asserts that “the landscape idea represents a way of seeing – a way in which some Europeans have represented themselves and to others the world about them and their relationships with it, and through which they have commented on social relations” (p. 1). Cosgrove’s ‘way of seeing’ embeds the natural and the world of social

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2 The authors refer here to the ‘Gaian’ conception or theory, derived from James Lovelock’s 1989 work “The Gaia Hypothesis”. Lovelock essentially asserts that the world, its biological and physical processes as well as all its inhabitants, sentient or non-sentient co-exist and co-operate, sometimes unwittingly as a single cohesive organism (Lovelock, 1989).
relations well within these representations and within those forms of being, relating and producing which they represent. Thus, nature and the natural are captured within the realm of economic relations and modes of production. Indeed, Cosgrove employs the Marxian designation of capitalism’s mode as being rooted in the disconnection between producer and the ‘natural’ ownership/control of his production, recognising that at the time of Marx’s writing the latter primarily related to control of the land and/or resources is derived from the land itself. It follows, therefore, at times of modal shifts that “the land, both objectively and subjectively is implicated, and we should therefore expect it to undergo radical change during the period of the capitalist transition” (p. 61).

Cosgrove identifies a number of examples of both narratives and representation of land and nature within the output of cultural production at times of modal shift, and the more practical, actualised affect upon natural landscapes at times of either colonial or capitalistic exploration. For Cosgrove, the transference of the natural in urban spaces and around the home is central to the process of relational formation during the development of capitalism as a mode of production. He focuses particularly on the application of theory to practice in Italy, identifying the social and political movement from feudalism to proto-capitalism, and its subsequent arrest in an underdeveloped state as a useful exemplar through which to analyse this process. Leaving behind the commitment demanded by cyclical seasons of agriculture and rurality, co-opters and controllers of newly generated capitalistically-derived wealth and status aimed to construct Palladian architectural pieces within new planned urban environments, which had as their mirrors carefully planned gardens and country-scapes. Cosgrove quotes Turner on this matter; “Renaissance landscape … exists to serve mankind. Its fields and groves are carefully groomed and only rarely give way to wild ravines, spectacular vistas or deserted places” (Turner, 1963, as quoted in Cosgrove, 1984, p. 100).
These new Italian capitalistic landscapes of constructed and mediated rurality or wildness represent one form of the symbolic conquering of nature. Castree goes on to analyse the more esoteric, forthright and adventuring examples in the formative years of the United States. The transformation of the natural and landscape in America, although in one sense an expression of the same capitalistic impulse responsible for re-ordering social relations and conceptions with the wild in Europe, appears a great deal more abrupt and less considered than that encountered in Italy. The European prospectors and pioneers of the 17th and 18th centuries who settled North America encountered what they understood as an unmediated, unreconstructed wild. Cosgrove thus argues that “the actions of settlers down the length of the seaboard had little if anything to do with Golden Age fantasies…Those who cleared the forests, removed stones from the fields, ploughed up virgin earth…adopted practical attitudes and quickly learned the most efficient techniques for disposing of a wilderness” (Cosgrove, 1984, p. 170).

Charismatic Vistas

Cosgrove’s analysis, focused on the development of Palladian architecture and landscape3, dovetails very nicely with this paper’s focus on vision and vista on the Korean peninsula. In the North Korean case, a ‘Haussmannian’ or ‘Boulevardian’4 conception of Pyongyang as constructed landscape has been best articulated by Joinau (2012) in his work “The Sun and the Arrow: A Topo-Myth Analysis of Pyongyang”. Joinau envisages the landscape of

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3 The authors and Castree here refer to the work of Antonio Palladio (1508-1580), a Venetian architect whose work echoing the symmetry and perspective of Classical Greek architectural style. While Palladianism became popular in the United Kingdom and Europe in the seventeenth century, it is its popularity in the original thirteen states of the United States of America and its influence upon the monolithic and classical styles of many of the public buildings of these states to which Castree primarily refers.

4 Here the authors refer to the architectural policy and approach of Georges Eugene Haussmann, sometimes known as Baron Haussmann (1809-1891). Sometime Prefect of the Seine Department in France, Haussmann is famed for his planning and reconstruction of the urban infrastructure of Paris and Greater Paris between 1853 and 1870. Haussmann controlled and managed a process of reconfiguration within the city through which its older, medieval street plan was reworked utilising a series of grand, extensive, Boulevards and Places. This is the Paris street plan distinctly recognisable in our current age and which has greater influenced the urban architecture of Europe in the intervening century.
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Pyongyang under construction, the cities axis being reoriented “…in order to correspond to the new ideological agenda. This axis rotates slowly during the 1970s and 80s…becoming eventually a new ‘destiny axis’…to the glory of Kim Il Sung’s personal myth…” (p. 66). The conceptions advanced by Cosgrove and others of nature, landscape and their narrative make possible and explicit later potential connections to the political realm.

Following the publication of Kwon and Chung’s (2012) landmark work, *Beyond Charismatic Politics*, much has been written on the theatricality of contemporary politics the hinterland of its supportive mythos. The first author on this project has utilised Kwon and Chung’s thesis along with Cosgrovian or Castree inspired analyses to develop a general assertion that, not only in North Korea is there a charismatic politics, but that this political form perhaps begets a charismatic landscape. Further, he has sought to examine how these constructions in the case of North Korea might impact and transform its landscape.

In *Beyond Charismatic Politics*, Kwon and Chung establish a framework for understanding and analysing North Korea’s political space from the perspective of a politics of ‘theatrics’. This conception of theatrical politics expands the realm of political and ideological practice into the commemorative and demonstrative spaces of politics, into gymnastics and ‘mass’ displays and into the monuments and monoliths that once supported the personality cult of Kim Il Sung and that work to support Kim Jong Un’s reign. Such theatrics and theatricality demands that these spaces, places and concepts share, at some level a degree of charisma deriving in political science from ‘Weberian’ conceptions of political governance (Weber, 1947). Kwon asserts that a theatric form of politics has been evidenced and analysed by the

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5 Max Weber (1864-1920), the German sociologist and political theorist is renowned for having extensively theorised on the function and structures of power and ideology within the processes of political governance and interaction. In particular, Kwon and Chung (2012), build upon Weber’s conception of the ‘routinization of charisma’ within political action and performance. Primarily we look to Talcott Parsons translation of *Economy of Society* from 1947 known as *The Theory of Economic and Social Organisation* (Weber, 1947).
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Dutch anthropologist Clifford Geertz in his studies of the pre-colonial, 19th century Negara-era state of Bali and its repertoire of complex, performative rituals of state and power.

Kwon and Chung utilise this analytic lens to consider North Korea’s voluminous cultural output including operas such as Sea of Blood and films such as The Flower Girl, but they also apply this lens to manifestations of an institutional culture of revolutionary commemoration as seen in the Revolutionary Martyrs Cemetery in Pyongyang and the national repertoires of gift giving and exchange with the key example being the International Friendship Museum at Manpok Valley. Combined, these varied forms of political practice form a praxis of theatrical or charismatic politics.

This charismatic form of politics, according to these authors, seeps out and is embedded in landscapes and landscape narratives. The term ‘landscape’ comes to us somewhat denuded of both politics and content, a denudation that makes its connection to such a rich and content filled conception as charisma and the charismatic difficult to say the least. Landscape is not currently, therefore, an ideal word or conception to twin with charisma in any realm of “thick” politics, let alone in the context of North Korea. We, instead, intend to use (or misuse), a more ancient piece of terminology, the German word ‘Landschaft’.

Cosgrove (2004) engaged with the conception of “Landschaft”, its utility and function lying in its original usage to define spatial organisation in political or social terms: “Custom and culture defined a Land, not physical geographical characteristics – it was a social entity that found physical expression in the area under its law…” (p. 60). These authors would claim that North Korea can be seen as this type of a social or political entity, a space in which particular customs, culture and political manifestations interact with physical or

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6 The authors derived the notion of a “Thick” (or by definition of a “Thin”), politics or political form from the analysis of Clifford Geertz. Geertz understands both context and behaviour as being useful or explanatory to the anthropologist or the outsider. In this sense, we consider the utility and function of charisma within politics and political form in a similarly extensive manner, not just simply concerned with theory, but also with context and behaviour as well as any other relevant and useful factors (Geertz, 1973, pp. 3-30).
topographical features within the remit and function of its sovereignty and legal framework.

Cosgrove determines that Landschaft “….points to a particular spatiality in which a geographical area and its material appearance are constituted through social practice…” (p. 5)

In North Korea’s case we would claim that its Landschaft is, instead, constituted through the political practice and mode that has been characterised as charismatic by Kwon and Chung.

**Forest Narratives and Charismas**

Politics on the Korean peninsula has thrown up of course, many different developmental possibilities in which politics and its attendant charismatic content might act in order to form new landscapes or ‘Landschafts’. While landscapes and their respective categories of developmental approach and accompanying visual and textual narratives, of course, could be the focus of this paper, its authors have settled upon rural and forest development and narrative production, in particular, as the target of our analysis. Forestry appears vital to both North and South Korean developmental approaches as well as charismatic and theatric narratives in the 1970s and early 1980s, and we shall outline some of these developments later in the paper. However, before that outline and before the paper’s core analysis, we will review the literature, which addresses previous historic manifestations with East Asian forest narrative and practice.

Crossing the East Sea to Korea’s once colonial master and traditional enemy, we find, even in our contemporary era, though massively industrialised and densely populated, the archipelago of Japan still very well-endowed with forests. According to Totman (1989), however, to presume that these forests are ancient or historic would be wrong. Totman asserts that its forest resources have been as exploited and overused as those elsewhere in the world. Around the third century BCE, arable agricultural practice in the guise of rice cultivation drove the eradication, appropriation and adaptation of forests and woods. Totman named this initial phase of forest management “The Ancient Predation.” As religious and political
institutional development gathered pace, so an inclination towards the construction of monumental wooden architecture arose, as Buddhist and Shinto places of worship and reverence used enormous quantities of wood in the Kinai basin. Another such demand, closely connected to the needs of institutional or political charisma, was the tradition of rebuilding the headquarters of tribal or family polities every couple of decades.

A transfer of political authority to centralised institutions during the process of state formation might have limited over-exploitation of forest resources, and during the Heian era (794-1185 CE), an attempt was made to manage and coordinate resources. However, central authority, and therefore organised national or supra-regional control, over forest resources collapsed into the hands of local and regional authorities during the Kamakura (1185-1333 CE) and Murumachi periods (1336-1573 CE), and these sub-national authorities lacked both the inclination and power to exercise control over the forestry development. Consequently, a return was made to the exploitative pattern of earlier periods.

Central institutional authority did, in fact, not develop in Japan until the fall of the Ashikaga Shogunate and the end of what has become known as the ‘Warring States’ or Sengoku Period (1467-1603 CE). However, when Ashikaga fell to Oda Nobunaga in 1573, the development of victorious institutions proved even more destructive than the non-centralised governance of previous centuries. Hideyoshi’s expansionist military campaigns demanded enormous amounts of forest resources in the building of ships and equipment to service them. Such exploitation resulted, ultimately, in a collapse of the availability of timber in spite of developments in transportation and survey quality.

If Japanese development had continued along these lines, its developmental history would be as famous as much for its denudation as for its current verdancy. Ultimately, this was not the direction taken by its institutions and political form. This over-exploitation had begun to hamper the continuation of social and political development as well as damaging the
economic potential of all forms of institutional authority (Morris-Suzuki, 2007). Accordingly, an intellectual approach to the position of forests and their utilisation began to develop. This supported a change from a paradigm of careless exploitation to one of regenerative management.

The seedling culture and plantation based forestry that developed into a regenerative approach during the Edo era and into the modern era ultimately saved Japanese woodlands from complete denudation. However, that fact that Japan was covered by regenerated woodland monocultures does not assume a reverence for forests or the natural and cannot be attributed to a Shinto philosophical inclination. Rather, this suggests that forests exist within the Japanese institutional and developmental mind sets as a resource requiring management and that the justification of this approach lies in their potential usefulness to human society, development and political charisma. (Totman, 1989; Morris-Suzuki, 2007)

Elvin (2004), in his work “The Retreat of the Elephants: An Environmental History of China,” assesses the impact of state formation in China on environment and landscape. Until relatively recently, institutions and populations within the forming Chinese polity encountered the inhabitants of the non-human world in hostile circumstances. The development of human populations, and the institutions and infrastructures that governed and supported them, seemed to regularly clash due to rapidly diminishing space as a result of rapid development. Elvin describes a historical narrative of the Chinese polity, which he names “The Great Deforestation.” It consists of three phases.

The first phase was during the Zhou, Qin and Han dynasties. At this time, institutions of the developing state had already begun to take customary lands and rights throughout its realm. This took the guise of imposing institutional monopolies on timber resources in the face of already determined overuse.
A second phase was centred in the era of the Song dynasty during the European medieval period. The invention of blast furnaces for the smelting of iron ore into steel and other technological inventions created something of an industrial revolution during this period. This revolution not only led to massive increases in population but also to accompanying resource demands. Much timber was needed in order to supply such demands and allow for the construction of new centres of population as well as military infrastructure. The use of more and more iron ore for the production of steel drove the revolution and also put pressure on forests by the need for wood to create fuel for the furnaces. The obtaining of iron ore by rather aggressive mining techniques eradicated large areas of forest. All these factors led to the development of heavily denuded areas and severe localised restrictions of timber availability and supply.

The third and final phase in Elvin’s analysis covers the more recent period between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. During this later period, population growth expanded to such an extent that industrial usage of timber combined with the impact of domestic exploitation led to a national shortage of timber and wide scale denudation of forests. This led to what Elvin terms “…a general forest crisis…” (p. 85). Unlike in Japan, there was to be no redemptive second act in the development of institutional functionality. Instead, politics and political charisma bequeathed China a relationship with natural and environmental terrains both toxic in its nature and radically different to that of Japan. Landscapes built by culture and politics in China were to be free from darker, uncontrolled spaces, free of forests.

Akin to most comparative examples of Korea’s development, when it comes to forest matters, sits somewhere twixt the experience of Japan and China. While, as we will see in this paper from the later practical example of the Saemaul movement, afforestation in the Korean context was certainly important and necessary following over exploitation under the Japanese Empire and during the institutionally weak final decades of the Yi dynasty, Korea
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continued to hold a very positive appreciation of wilderness spaces and forest terrains. This conception has held true either side of the current border since 1945, regardless of the political form or institutional approach. We now turn to the literatures and background of the politics and institutional structures in which this previous forest history would be enacted in the modern age.

South Korean Charismatics

The reader hopefully will remember the work of Kwon and Chung and their investigation of North Korea’s political terrain and the interaction of that politics within those landscapes under Pyongyang’s sovereignty. The authors’ now equally move to suggest that this framework might common to developmental structures in nations of the modern age, have some utility in the south, especially given its early political outlook and structures. To justify this claim, we now turn to an examination of literatures and narratives addressing South Korea’s political and infrastructural development.

While South Korea as a sovereign, national polity was officially founded on August 15, 1948, its political form and the individuals around which institutional and charismatic authority would come to coagulate and eventually evolve stretches back in time. While we do not determine to give an extensive or systematic historical overview here, a brief recounting of the historical process supporting that evolution will be important.

Pre-colonial Korea, under the Yi dynasty, was often historically characterised as backward in developmental, economic, social and political terms. The reticence towards external or international engagement that developed following the Japanese Hideyoshi invasions of the 16th century had endured hundreds of years while the Yi government refused to engage in trade or exchange with foreigners or neighbouring polities, especially Japan, other than on the most mediated, controlled and restrictive terms until forced to do so through the 1875 Treaty of Ganghwa. Modern conceptions and foreign ideas had been spreading for some time from
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China through the work of Catholic missionaries, but the Yi Dynasty’s increased engagement with the rapidly modernizing forces of Japan degraded and fragmented social and cultural life quickly as factional movements such as Sohak (Western Learning), Sirhak (Practical Learning) and Tonghak (Heavenly Way) (Baker, 1999), grew at the same time the Yangban system of social stratification, ordering and bureaucratic privileges slowly collapsed (Lee, 1988).

Members of the intellectual and bureaucratic elite had begun pressuring the Yi Dynasty for change before the Treaty, but the impetus for political, institutional, technical and scientific development grew after its ratification as Japan’s external and internal influence, which had displaced China’s previous status as the Peninsula’s long term cultural and political ally, became evident. In the waning years of Yi rule, King Kojong and other rulers would court and be courted by these individuals. Occasionally members would be sent overseas to gain experience of the institutional, bureaucratic and developmental processes of the wider world. As Japan exercised ever-greater control, movements such as the Independence Club and the Siminhoe (New Korea Movement) attempted to resist its impositions and incursions. While these movements, for the most part, were ultimately unsuccessful with their members exiled or imprisoned, it is actually this process of resistance and exile from which South Korea’s early political elite emerged. Syngman Rhee, who would go on to become the first president of South Korea, was a member of the Independence Club and was, in fact, imprisoned for his

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7 These various factions manifested during a time of great transformation and pressure on traditional Korean, Yi dynasty society. Sirhak (or Silhak) sought to reform the structures and conceptions of Confucian practice at the time that had been heavily influenced by a Neo-Confucian school of thought and practice, and thus is referred to as the School of ‘Practical Learning’. Sohak (or Seohak) was a diffuse school of thought, that sought to connect Confucian principles and structures with the rapid development and interactions of Catholic theology during this time and thus is referred to as the school of ‘Western Learning’ (Catholic theology mainly arriving from the influence of missionaries in China, to the West of Korea). Tonghak (or Donghak) conversely in philosophical terms was the more reactionary movement amongst Neo-Confucian influenced scholars and supporters, to maintain the status quo during the period and so is referred to as the school of ‘Eastern Learning’. Tonghak also gives its name to a series of peasant rebellions between 1892-1898 on the Korean Peninsula that sought to resist the influence of foreign powers and influence and maintain the position of the peasantry (Baker, 1999, p. 199-230)
part in a 1899 coup attempt against King Kojong who the movement believed was ineffectual and liable to Japanese influence. During the chaotic period of the Russo-Japanese War, Rhee was released at the behest of powerful pro-reform members of the elite, after which he fled to the United States where he pursued an education, earning a doctorate from Princeton University and lobbied several U.S. presidents including Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson for Korean Independence since his homeland had been officially annexed by the Japanese in 1910. He also advocated for Korea at 1919’s Paris Peace Conference and 1920’s Washington Naval Conference, and he was appointed to senior positions in a number of different versions of a Korean Provisional Government in exile (Cumings, 1981). Rhee’s extensive experience, charismatic personality, personal connections, virulent anti-communism and hatred of the Japanese eventually made him extremely useful to the United States, which was fighting a difficult Pacific War while also employing its Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to find ways to destabilise Japan and prepare for its potential collapse. In the urgency following the surrender of the Japanese Empire on September 2, 1945, Rhee’s influence with the U.S. military and Washington bureaucrats became clear since these entities were tasked with filling the power void in the south of the peninsula given the disappearance of the former occupying colonial power. Col Cecil Nist, head of military intelligence for the US XXIV Corp, is reported by Cumings (2010) to have found “…several hundred conservatives who might make good leaders of post-war Korea. Most of them had collaborated with Japanese Imperialism, he wrote, but he expected that taint to soon wash away…” (p. 106). Rhee’s tenure living under the American brand of democracy had not made him a liberal politician, but the U.S. found him palatable nonetheless and backed him as the leader for the southern half of Korea.

Following Rhee’s election as president on July 20, 1948, he continued his efforts to eradicate leftists and the People’s Committees that had formed in the south, suppressing the
Jeju Uprising and passing the National Traitors Act through the National Assembly in 1948. Political authority and its attendant charisma very much accumulated around Rhee, especially following the Korean War (1950-1953), demonstrated through his altering of the young constitution to allow himself to run for re-election an unlimited number of times. However, in developmental terms, Rhee’s period as president certainly lacked charisma. In spite of enormous levels of support and aid from the United States, South Korean economic and infrastructural development proved disastrous during his reign. Combined with his brutal suppression of protests and his government’s almost candid corruption, Rhee’s charisma was unable to withstand public scrutiny, which eventually to his resignation (Cumings, 2010).

Political charisma would soon pool around a new figure, one that would end the brief life of the Second Korean Republic. On May 16, 1961, Lieutenant General Park Chung-hee led a military coup and then a military junta, which assumed power and again sought to crush left leaning politics and dissent. The Third Republic of Korea founded on the December 17, 1963. However unlike his predecessors, Park would both harness the power of political charisma and utilise it within the developmental field.

Park Chung-hee developed a personality cult of a type very similar to that present in the north, with his image on posters and paintings that were displayed dynamically at marches and stadium gatherings. However, Park Chung-hee, supported by American technocrats and consultants, is equally famous for reorganising South Korea’s economic and developmental infrastructure, harnessing the productive power of companies later known as Chaebol’s to develop a functional corporatist state.

Park’s developmental focus was legendary, from his intense focus on export productivity and his dedication to the modernisation or urban housing in Seoul to his five-year planning periods that were rich with projects such as the Gyeongbu Expressway project, the Third Republic and the later Yushin Republic (or Fourth Republic) radically readjusted South
Korean developmental possibilities and potential, essentially laying much of the groundwork for South Korea’s current economic success. Park Chung-hee was intricately and personally connected to these developments, in visual, cultural, productive, institutional and narrative terms. The harnessing of political power, in this way, surely can be said to create the political space for what is known in the North as charismatic politics with just as much potentiality and utility as those north of the DMZ. The incorporation of this charisma into the realm of rural spaces that may have otherwise been overlooked as South Korea charged toward the horizon of development and modernization and the production of visual and textual narratives that informed this charisma is at the core of this paper’s ambition.

**North Korean developmental histories**

Moving to the north, while we have encountered Kwon and Chung’s analysis in general within this literature and narrative review and considered their justification for their conceptual framework of a theatric or charismatic politics in the North Korea of the present, to come to a holistic understanding of this framework’s historical functionality, the authors wish to return to its developmental past, that which eventually birthed the visual subject which they will later analyse in detail.

In-spite of having been ruled by one family and one political party since its founding, Pyongyang, under Kim Il-sung’s leadership, during the period of 1950-1980, was also subject to different developmental periods and impetuses. In spite of the authoritative charisma and institutional theatrics that developed around the person of the Great Leader and that we have outline previously, its government and political structures were also subject to external impacts and influences, which directed both its charismatic productions and their accompanying narratives (Kwon & Chung, 2012). In the post-Korean War era, Pyongyang’s institutions were bequeathed with what Cuming’s (1981) described as a ‘scorched earth’. Within Pyongyang, some 93% of all buildings had been destroyed, and there had been an
enormous amount of done to the environment of North Korea. Much of the industrial and agricultural infrastructure that had been put in place by the Government General of Chosen under Japanese colonialism had been destroyed, and North Korea found itself with almost a blank slate, needing to rebuild much of its agricultural and industrial base and desperate to rehabilitate much of its once natural environment. This infant North Korea did so, engaging much technical expertise from both the USSR and the PRC, and incorporating much of the intellectual/ideological influence of Stalinist era central planning. Once the war was over, North Korea’s institutions spent a short period reorganising and assessing the damage done during hostilities. By September 1953, North Korea had formulated a “Three Year Plan” for the reconstruction of the country, and it entered into negotiations with the USSR for an extension of its credit lines (Kuark, 1963). This was a distinctly impositional period in developmental and environmental terms. North Korea’s Department of Agriculture, for example, described its policy outlook as having only two primary goals: “the swift reconstruction and rehabilitation of the war-shattered factories making agricultural implements, and of farms and irrigation systems so as to increase grain production and meet the pent-up demand for food” and secondly “the rapid socialisation of agriculture by means of collectivisation” (Kim, 1957, p. 83).

Although very little consideration was given to the impact on natural terrains or environments during this period, development seemed to focus more on consolidation rather than radical change as well as technical improvements in already industrialised agricultural land. When it comes to developmental narratives, a distinctly North Korean or ‘Juche orientated’ approach is hard to discern from Kim Il Sung’s 1956 statement, “Rice is immediately socialism. We cannot build socialism without rice” (Kim, 1956, p. 25), a statement that shared a great deal in common with Lenin’s “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.”
Narrative production as well as the developmental approach would soon change, however. Upon Stalin’s death and the solidification of the power of Nikita Khrushchev as Soviet premier, a process of radical and abrupt political reorientation began that would have a direct impact upon both Soviet and North Korean environmental strategies. Khrushchev’s (1956) “Secret Speech” denouncing Stalin as well as the document in April of that year entitled “On the Personality Cult in North Korea,” which heavily critiqued the political strategy of Kim Il Sung, forced a shift in the positioning of the parties involved within the Warsaw Pact, a breakdown in relations between the USSR and China known as the Sino-Soviet split and rapid political and diplomatic movement away from the USSR on the part of North Korea.

This tumultuous period for North Korea also created the political and ideological space for a revision of its developmental approach that would both create a new paradigm of practice, and the narrative theme that would first connect development with political charisma. During this era of distantness from the Soviet Union, Chairman Mao directed Chinese industrial, agricultural and environmental policy away from the path of technocratic Soviet style central planning, instigating what has become known as the “Great Leap Forward”. During this period, Chinese environmental and developmental policy was ingrained with an existential urgency. This sense of almost impossible pace served to break natural and historical connections that citizens may have had with local natural environments along with the religious and spiritual traditions connected with them, to disorientate and to militarise and it is this disorientated head-long rush into change that enabled many of the projects attempted and achieved within the Great Leap Forward to take place (Kuark, 1963; Winstanley-Chesters, 2015).

**South Korean Forestry Developments**

Moving to the political and sovereign entity south of the demilitarized zone, South Korea too exhibits an interesting early developmental history. Just as the author’s do with regards to
North Korea, this paper addresses ideological representations present within the visual output of Seoul’s development in the 1970s. During this period of course, the government in Seoul was led by Park Chung-hee. One-time coup leader, dictator and many times elected president of the South Korean Third and Fourth Republics, Park Chung-hee developed an interest in forestry and forest resources that was apparently spurred by his travels. His 1965 trip to the United States to meet President Johnson and to offer South Korean troops for the Vietnam War involved a visit to the verdant, well forested campus of West Point Military academy. Similarly, the year before, on a visit to West Germany⁸, to negotiate a loan and to meet President Lubke, Park was mightily impressed by the rehabilitation of West Germany’s forest resources. (Lee, 2013)

Almost diametrically oppositional in experience to these was Park’s return to Korea. In 1964, direct flights from South Korea to Europe could not be routed northwards nor westwards due to air space restrictions imposed by the USSR and PRC as well as the length of Gimpo airport’s runway, instead having to be routed via Japan. President Park, therefore, returned from Germany via Tokyo’s Haneda Airport. Having flown over the heavily forested western slopes of the Japanese Alps, President Park’s first glimpse of Korea was of the deforested, barren slopes of Yeongil district, which apparently greatly disturbed him and led him to assert that “It is out of the question to hoist a flag for modernizing the country over such a desolated land…” (p. 52).

Spurred on by his disappointment at South Korea’s developmental inefficiencies, Park sought solutions. In an apparent connectivity with more recent developments in North Korea and with historic China as described earlier in this paper by Elvin (2004), it appeared that one of the major drivers for forest depletion was extraction by local populations of fuel wood and institutional inefficiency or corruption so far as the control of that extraction was concerned.

⁸ South Korea engaged in a period of labour diplomacy with the Federal Republic, supplying it with nurses and miners to fulfil labour shortages of the time (Regulska & Smith, 2012).
Park’s government, therefore, instituted both a practical plan for the creation of new forest and timber stocks. To this end, the Park administration created the Korean Institute of Science and Technology, which was charged with the task of developing a research base and long-term strategies to support both natural forests and new fuel wood forests where they experimented with breed types and husbandry methodologies in an effort to slow the depletion of more ancient or valuable stock (Lee, 2013).

By 1967, these early plans had solidified around a new central government institution known as the Forest Service that launched the 1968-1971 Five Year Fuel Wood Plan. However, greater research focus naturally revealed further timber problems such as the impact of erosion that was caused by both natural and agricultural practices such as terracing. Great emphasis, from this point, was, therefore, put on erosion control with the investment of some 36.8 million dollars from the Watershed Forest Reclamation Plan of 1967-1976. What marks all these projects out though is the essential bureaucratic and technocratic focus and embedding of their praxis. This institutional approach would be contested by President Park’s next developmental project whose visual and narrative output is, of course, the ultimate focus of this project.

Park’s conception of forest management and resource availability and the issues of its depletion or inefficacy, as one can see from the prominence of the Fuel Wood plan, was that the problem of forest degradation was connected very much to modes of being in rural life and rural modes of production. More ancient forms of agricultural practice and living demanded high levels of timber use simply to maintain lifestyle elements such as heating and cooking. Timber and fuel wood was also a key instrument of value within less advanced agricultural economies. In the field of urban development, Park had placed a great deal of focus on modernisation, income development and productivity issues, and it seemed perhaps that solutions lay in the translation of that approach to the rural field. Thus, on March 7, 1972
the Saemaul Undong Movement (New Village Movement) began. Saemaul essentially focuses on three core developmental principles, diligence, self-help and cooperation. Through this framework of practice, Park’s conception of a modernisation of rural life, practice and social ordering could be undertaken, and many of the inefficiencies and issues, which had prevented modernisation of South Korea’s rural spaces during his first decade in power and had generated a massive disparity in development between the urban terrains of Seoul and the agricultural areas to the south, could be diminished. Saemaul would have answers and strategies for many aspects of modern agricultural life and would undertake these through a difficult balancing of community engagement and empowerment, research-driven empiricism and institutional charismatic authority.

While Saemaul did (and does) engage in development in many fields, much of the impetus for its praxis focused originally on those issues, which Park found so distressing in terms of forest degradation. Its modernisation of rural life would negate the impetus behind many of the drivers of deforestation such as the focus on providing coal briquettes for fuel instead of wood at the same time as creating a useful, committed and well organised pool of labour to undertake tasks such as erosion control, land reclamation and, most importantly for this paper, tree and sapling planting.

While, of course, the communitarian and social aspect of forest management and tree planting is very important to the wider themes of developmental practice undertaken during and within the Saemaul Movement, its connections with political charisma to both drive home its importance and the impetus generated by the affiliations to President Park are heavily used. In a sense, this is something born in common with North Korea’s Ch’ollima movement. Ch’ollima, originally an element of post-Great Leap Forward revolutionary developmental strategy with thematic commitments to revolutionary urgency and the radical transformation of landscape, had, by the 1970s, transformed into one part of a wider
repertoire of developmental action. North Korea’s institutions used Ch’ollima as an impetus to the speed of developments, though not quite to the extent of revolutionary urgency. It was also used as a signifier in the name of a group of technocratic consultants who could be emplaced within developmental, community or local projects to spur on or explain party or governmental policy. It, too, had become deeply connected with the personal charisma of President and Great Leader Kim Il-sung, especially when it came to developmental agendas focused on forestry and reforestation. Both nations have manifested these connections, agendas and narratives within this field in a particular form and temporally located it around specific days of commemoration (Winstanley-Chesters, 2012).

METHODS

Visualising Developmental Landscapes

While developmental production and institutional or governmental changes to support it are, in some ways, abstract and bureaucratic and thus targeted at a bureaucratic community in tune with that production, the productive process generates narratives and visual representations designed for consumption by non-members of that community and the general public. Indeed, in many ways, that is the point of this production: to address and build political or institutional authority and charisma through developmental or structural processes. To do so, however, means that a generally untrained or uninformed public often engages with text-based narratives but that they also, as in the case of Korean forest development, engage with its visual productions. Extracting the narrative content and empirical value from these media and outputs requires a visual rhetorical perspective.

The public, the recipients of governmental or institutional narrative and output, are conceptualised as an imaginary community of people engaging in conversation, much of which is mediated and asynchronous. Photos, often circulated by media outlets and governments, are one type of public address within this sphere (Harriman & Lucaites, 2007),
PRODUCING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

and their purpose is to function rhetorically as tools of persuasion (Olsen et al., 2008). Visual rhetoric is both a term used for images themselves and the research perspective that analyses these depictions (Foss, 2005). Rhetorical critics identify and then decipher the ways symbols work, ultimately trying to discover how they impact individuals and society (Foss, 2004). Accordingly, images must be examined within the larger contexts where they are produced, displayed and encountered by the public (Olsen et al., 2008) since they do not simply represent so-called reality but are the settings where perceptions of reality are (re)constructed (Deluca and Demo, 2000).

Not all images function as vehicles of persuasion, however. For an image to qualify as artifact of visual rhetoric it must exhibit “symbolic action.” In other words, its signs and symbols must represent greater meaning. It must also be the product of “human intervention” in that it has been intentionally crafted my individuals or institutions that have paid attention to elements such as color and size with the intent to communicate, and therefore, it must have “presence of an audience,” people with whom the image presents its interlaced nuances who then take on the task of interpretation (Foss, 2005, pp. 144-145).

Deluca and Demo (2000), in an American example, examine the affects of Carleton Watkins’ pristine Civil War Era photographs of the Yosemite Valley. They convincingly argue that Watkins’ photographs were the inspiration behind the bill that Abraham Lincoln signed into law in 1864, deeding the Yosemite Valley and Mariposa Big Tree Grove to the state of California, preserving the world’s first public wilderness area and shaping the future of American environmental politics. Watkins’ photographs had become iconic in the public sphere, representing more than the landscapes themselves by reinforcing a nationalistic narrative and reassuring Americans that they still had God’s favor even while their country
was bitterly divided and engaged in a brutal and bloody war. Indeed, landscapes function rhetorically in that they allow those gazing at their visual representations to imagine alternate identities (Halloran & Clark, 2006). For this reason, in the wake of the Civil War, the U.S. congress quickly established Yellowstone National Park and Grand Canyon National Park as spaces where Americans could perform their renewed notions of national cohesion.

On the Korean peninsula during the 1970s and early 1980s, images of Park Chung-hee and Kim Il Sung planting trees, leading or observing reforestation efforts, and viewing forested landscapes were similarly circulated by each country’s media and governmental institutions. Similar to the Civil War Era in the United States where the camera was used to “naturalize reality” (Deluca and Demo, 2000, p. 244), each Korean nation disseminated images that also sought to erase the history and memory of their mutual war. While the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) was still omnipresent as Park Chung-hee and Kim Il Sung were shown digging their tools directly into the soil of the Korean peninsula as if boring the ideological divide themselves, the scarred terrain, scorched by the fire and brimstone of battle, seemed to be rhetorically healed with each depiction of newly planted trees.

**Ideological Analysis**

Ideological criticism is a rhetorical method that aids researchers in unlocking the beliefs and values embedded in cultural texts (Foss, 2004). Eagleton (2007) acknowledges that scholars and practitioners have not agreed upon a single definition of ideology since there are a number of useful definitions that are appropriate in an array of contexts, but he also pinpoints two salient uses of the term. For this study, we have adopted this dual perspective, allowing us to understand ideology as the use of signs and symbols to (re)produce meanings and reinforce dominant social power at the same time the term can also refer to significant

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9 DeLuca and Demo (2000) also heavily discuss the Yosemite images in terms of the sublime. Citing Edmund Burke, they define the sublime as “an intense passion rooted in horror, fear, or terror in the face of objects that suggest vastness, infinity, power, massiveness, mystery, and death” (p. 246).
points at which discourse and political interests intersect. Ideologies are sometimes evident, but there are often additional latent ideologies that must be made visible by the ideological critics (Foss, 2004). These subtleties come to light though careful analyses.

The first step of an ideological criticism is to identify the nature of the ideology/ideologies. Researchers consider “membership,” thinking about the individuals and institutions that created the images by asking questions such as *Who are they, and where are they from?* Researchers also address “activities,” what the creators do and why they exist and “goals,” what the creators want audiences to realize, in addition to “values/norms.” Further, ideological critics consider “position and group-relations” in addition to “resources,” the essential social capital that the creators need and desire (p. 244).

The next step is to ascertain the strategies that support the ideology/ideologies, but since there are an infinite number of possible tactics, researchers need to consider various possible dimensions. For example, the nature of the ideology should indicate the group that possesses the power and usually points to widely held beliefs that are supported by, at least, some of the population and accepted, even if passively, by other parts of the politic. The communication genre also needs to be contemplated since there are some media that are especially effective in delivering persuasive strategies and since context also affects an image’s impact. Concurrently, the size of the audience is important, so it is imperative to consider the intended audience and the artifact’s possible reach, and it is necessary to narrow an analysis to certain aspects of visual rhetoric since it would be impossible for ideological critics to discuss every detail of what they know. Style such as graphics and interactional strategies, including ways in which others can respond directly to artifacts in certain settings, need to be examined as well (pp. 245-248).

Thus, when looking at the photographs produced during what was referred to as the Yushin period in South Korea along with photographs from the same time period produced on the
other side of the DMZ, it is useful to ask the question DeLuca and Demo (2000) posed when considering Watkins' works: “What vision of nature do the photographs authorize, warrant, and legitimate?” (p. 244) Of course, where two distinct polities meet head-to-head, the answers to this question almost certainly lies in the ideologies that are either manifest or muted within the artifacts (Foss, 2004). It is when the symbols embedded in the images are decoded that we, as outsiders from the West, will begin to understand the images within the contexts of what we think we think we know about forestation, reforestation, and the political situation on the Korean Peninsula during the Yushin epoch. To these ends, we consider the following research questions. Firstly, what are the ideologies embedded in the images of Park Chung-hee and Kim Il Sung as they engaged in forestation activities in 1972? Secondly, what are the similarities and differences between the strategies used to support these ideologies on each side of the DMZ?

An archival research trip to South Korea revealed an extensive repository of photographic and textual material directly addressing forestry, afforestation, and sapling husbandry. These materials were unearthed from the Saemaul Undong Headquarters, the Presidential Archives at the National Archives of Korea, and the Information Center on North Korea at the National Library of Korea. As we demonstrate through ideological analyses of examples of visual rhetoric, a narrative stream deeply focused on the practice and praxis of the Saemaul and Ch’ollima movements are embedded within the developmental traditions of Korea and wider East Asia.

ANALYSIS

Linfield (2010) recalls that representative art forms such as painting and storytelling developed from “innocent, primitive” human existence over thousands of years but that “compromised, modern man” invented photography, making it an ideal vehicle for conveying notions of “techno-utopianism and technophobia” (p. 16). Photographs of Park Chung-hee
and Kim Il Sung planting trees within the Saemaul and Ch’ollima movements reflect both of this developmental binary. On the one hand, they encapsulate the convictions of visionary men seeking to overpower nature with tool and machine, forcing landscapes to meet their own ideals of beauty and functionality. On the other, these images serve to illustrate that both of these leaders believe that returning scorched and over-harvested earth to lush, pristine states was in the interests of their respective countries’ development.

Each image we collected during our archival research trip to South Korea in the summer of 2014 yields its own story, but for this analytical exercise, we focus on two specific images depicting the leaders of the Korean nations sowing small trees in 1972. One is a black and white photograph of Park Chung-hee, shovel in hand, bent over at a ninety-degree angle to the right of a rather slight-looking tree, which is just left of centre in the frame. Park and another man shovel dirt onto its roots while it is held upright by yet another crouched man. The photograph’s background is filled with older trees with established roots and sprouted leaves on a gently sloping terrain. The second black and white image features Kim Il Sung, who is also bent over, shovel in hand, flanked by two other men who, together, are shovelling dirt around a newly planted tree. Kim is in the centre of the frame, with the freshly planted tree just to his right. Behind him is a thin line of conifers, so young that they are unable to block the view of a large nearby hill. The two images we collected during our archival research trip to South Korea in the summer of 2014 yields its own story, but for this analytical exercise, we focus on two specific images depicting the leaders of the Korean nations sowing small trees in 1972. One is a black and white photograph of Park Chung-hee, shovel in hand, bent over at a ninety-degree angle to the right of a rather slight-looking tree, which is just left of centre in the frame. Park and another man shovel dirt onto its roots while it is held upright by yet another crouched man. The photograph’s background is filled with older trees with established roots and sprouted leaves on a gently sloping terrain. The second black and white image features Kim Il Sung, who is also bent over, shovel in hand, flanked by two other men who, together, are shovelling dirt around a newly planted tree. Kim is in the centre of the frame, with the freshly planted tree just to his right. Behind him is a thin line of conifers, so young that they are unable to block the view of a large nearby hill. The two

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10 At this time, we do not have the permissions to publish these images. However, we have included outlines of the images so that the placements of each element can be viewed.
11 Source: Presidential Archives at the National Archives of Korea; Control Number: CET0027323_박정희대통령식목일청와대기념식수 (1972)
12 Source: Information Center on North Korea at The National Library of Korea; 김일성동지의 위대한 주체사상 가치에 따라 (1972)
photographs are not mirror images of each other, but like the entities that produced them, they share commonalities.13

In the centuries preceding the Japanese Colonial Period, the Korean ‘yangban,’ or elite, aristocratic class, “did not even live side by side with those who were not yangban” (Lee, 1984, p. 174). The yangban literati held prestigious public posts, and manual labor such as the cultivation of the land was left to landholding peasants and tenant farmers (Lee, 1984).

Following the annexation of the Korean peninsula to the Japanese empire and the abolition of traditional structures of power and class, the Government General of Chosen’s annual reports made much of the interactions with the governing classes of the new political entity with the ground and landscapes of their development. In particular, the most senior political figure in the colonial regime, the Governor General is pictured and reported many times planting trees on Arbor Day and visiting land reclamation projects, getting his hands metaphorically and literally dirty in a way unthinkable to the political elite of the previous era (Government General of Chosen, 1908, 1909 & 1911).

When considering the nature of the ideologies both latent and manifest in the images examined here, we can surmise that preferred readings might include those hailing Park Chung-hee and Kim Il Sung as epitomes of post-war South and North Korean elite classes. Park and Kim representative of a blending of authority derived both previous yangban superiority and current proletariat equality since both leaders demonstrate both their citizenship and authority by performative acts of interaction with the landscape.

The land, of course, by this point is not a single territory. By 1972, a single nation has not occupied the entire Korean Peninsula for almost three decades. In its place is a pair of independent Korean states. Anderson (2006) describes nations as imagined since most subjects often do not know each other personally though they share “a deep, horizontal

13 We do not have permission currently to publish these images in print or online, but to give readers an idea of their layouts, we have included image outlines below (Figure 1).
In order to inspire the masses to feel this kind of connection, leaders must generate the sense that there is a mission to be accomplished and must foster trust and optimism in order to motivate the public to take part in such a mission. Hence, leaders must ensure that there is adequate social architecture that allows for participation and leadership development (Bennis, 2007). These images of Park Chung-hee and Kim Il Sung convey newly constructed notions of nationhood and work to build national cohesions through the Saemaul and Ch’ollima projects.

Park Chung-hee and Kim Il Sung demonstrate their memberships in the two separate polities by performing civic arboreal activities, literally building their nations on each side of the DMZ with their own hands. These photographs present leaders who are free from the pristine monarchy of the past since they are not afraid to get a little dust on their shoes. Thus, membership in either realm, regardless of social, political or cultural positionality, comes with the responsibility of active involvement in the rebirth of the landscapes, responsibilities conceived and derived from their conflicting quests for the achievement of acceptable national prosperity.

Modernism may have emerged after the rise of capitalism in the late sixteenth century, but modernity is experienced in various ways economically, politically, and socially across societies (Appadurai, 1996), its impact, equally now conceived of as being in the geographer Neil Smith’s word ‘uneven’ (Smith, 1999). It is conceivable that such differences ‘unevenness’ and notions of South Korea’s capitalist modernity as well as North Korea’s socialist modernity are communicated and represented through these photographs. Park Chung-hee recognized that wealthy nations tend to boast abundant forests, and this is why afforestation and reforestation were incorporated in the Saemaul Undong (Lee, 2013). Likewise, Kim Il Sung sought to overcome colonial impacts and the imposition of Japanese models of development, making tree planting a national initiative and determining its
importance for the vitality of North Korea (Winstanley-Chesters, 2015). These woodland-focused goals and conceptions are communicated through these photographs, and viewers might understand their presentation of forests as critical resources, directly tied to welfare and each country’s brand of modernity.

Accordingly, the ideologies embedded in the images of Park Chung-hee and Kim Il Sung as they engaged in forestation activities in 1972 centre on presentations of diminishing demarcations between economic and social classes for the purpose of collectivistic nation-building goals. South and North Korea may have had divergent ideologies and planning philosophies governing the management of those resources accumulated through the Saemaul and Ch’ollima campaigns, but their strategies for amassing national support through the representations of those ideologies and philosophies are strikingly similar.

Because we collected these images from archives rather than drawing them from the media at the time they were circulated, it is difficult to determine how they were originally used or to estimate the size of their intended audiences. The image of Park Chung-hee was listed in the database at the Presidential Archives independent of a source, but the image of Kim Il Sung was derived from a publication available at the Information Center on North Korea within the National Library of Korea. It is quite likely that both black and white images were used in print materials intended for domestic audiences. This means that the analyzable elements in regards to the second research question, which addresses the strategies used to support the ideologies embedded in the artifacts, are rather limited to the content and the interactional strategies of the images themselves. Perhaps we should also consider in the future the difficulties presented by Park Chung-hee’s legacy in the current political discourse of the Republic of Korea. Following his fall from power, President Park’s reign in office and the governmental bureaucracies and structures created by him have been challenged by many aspects of South Korean society, sometimes in moments of real, violent combat. Thus images
which seek to establish a positive conception of him and his rule sit uncomfortably with much of southern society. While the Saemaul movement still undoubtedly exists (which the authors having visited its headquarters and encountered its visual presence on the streets of Seoul can certainly attest to), this collection of images are not widely disseminated in the current era, perhaps because of these difficulties, no matter how positively Saemaul is remembered by those who experienced it.

Rhetorician’s have to make content choices because they cannot focus on everything. They choose what content to show the public in the frame and choose what to exclude. Neither of these images show Park Chung-hee or Kim Il Sung driving powerful earth movers and planting large trees about to enter the prime of their lifecycles. Instead, the images and many others like them in the collection the authors gathered, show these leaders using simple tools that almost anyone could wield and planting manageable infant trees. Thereby, an interactional strategy utilized in both photographs is to encourage subjects to imagine emulating the same obtainable civic duties as those of their leaders. In other words, one need not be a yangban literati to serve public or community. In the modern nations of South and North Korea, toiling the land is instead presented as a noble enactment of citizenry, an acceptably practical way of making once imagined communities and sovereignties decidedly real.

**Divided Visions, Shared Vista?**

While, of course, our examination of these visual, textual and rhetorical narratives generated by the Saemaul Movement is still very much in its infancy, and essentially represented here by two comparative images our preliminary rhetorical and ideological analyses and considerations lead to thoughts and future directions which very much could be of use in deeper investigation.
Firstly, in investigating the South Korean collections from which the image presented within the analysis section is derived, the authors were greatly surprised by the visual narratives of Park Chung-hee’s Charismatic participation. This theme appears to directly connect to the deep strands of Korean environmental engagement enacted by its bureaucracy and governmental elite. South Korea very much celebrates what is known as Arbor Day (or Sikmogil) on April 5th (Park, 2008). Overwhelmingly, South Korean popular narratives assert that Arbor Day, a national tree planting day, is a product of post-Korean War South Korea, so it might not be surprising to find images of Syngman Rhee engaging in forestry practice at Arbor Day events. What certainly is surprising is to find deeper visual narratives going back beyond the foundation of South Korea itself to Syngman Rhee’s time as an exile in the United States. Even more surprising, shocking in fact, was finding on examination of the Chosen Government General Annual Report series, the annual reports published by the government of colonial Korea while under Japanese occupation reports of Arbor Day activities as far back as 1908 (Government General of Chosen, 1908, 1909 & 1911). Perhaps a further research strand would investigate the pre-history of this forestry practice, whether it extends in the Japanese context before the opening up of Japan in 1854 and whether there was any traditional spring tree blessing ceremony during the Yi dynasty or further back in Korean history.

This historical narrative of forestry and afforestation pre-dating the Korean division, for this paper’s current purposes, is revealing and fascinating. Could it be that the routes of South Korean forestry practice and rhetorical, charismatic narrative production reside in the colonial era? When examining forestry and afforestation development connected to North Korea’s Ch’ollima movement, visual narratives are less clear and more difficult to access when it comes to imagery of groups of individual or independent workers. This is not a surprise. In North Korea’s case, imagery of groups of workers undertaking particular projects, which are
not simply propagandist paintings or staged performances, are quite rare in this era. More recently, they have become very frequently used to bolster political charisma and can be seen particularly when connected to institutional elements such as ‘Shock Brigades’ (Winstanley-Chesters, 2015). In the 1970s and early 1980s, ‘Ch’ollima Riders’ (Winstanley-Chesters, 2014), the ideologically committed and well-trained developmental technicians, were a great deal less visible in the North’s visual and narrative production. Primarily, visual and textual narratives feature and focus upon the person of Kim Il Sung and his connections to forest development. Kim Il Sung’s series of speeches and pamphlet publications collected in the 47 volume Works series gives extensive account of his focus on forestry matters, and the lead author of this paper, particularly in his early work, has addressed Kim Il Sung’s assertions and considerations on forestry matters in Chagang Province in 1968. In visual terms, Kim Il Sung is seen much as his son Kim Jong Il and his grandson Kim Jong Un have been/are in more recent years, planting trees or preparing the ground for their planting on a particular day or during a particular period (Winstanley-Chesters, 2012; Winstanley-Chesters, 2015).

Similar to Arbor Day in the South, spring tree planting and Spring Tree Planting Day are presented as vital to North Korea’s narrative production. While the impetus for the birth of Arbor Day in the South is unclear, North Korea’s Spring Tree Planting Day commemorates historical events in the early years of Kim Il Sung’s rule, it currently marks the 2nd March 1946 climbing of Mount Moran on the outskirts of Pyongyang by Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Suk and the infant, Kim Jong Il, who made the trek to plant trees. Thus, tree planting is directly connected to the charismatic power of dynastic ‘Kimist’ authority. The imagery of the day, as can be seen from the visual narrative, is repetitive and fulfils a particular repertoire of necessary actions. To all intents and purposes, the North Korean imagery presents a moment of political ritual (Kwon & Chung, 2012).
While Arbor Day and North Korea’s Spring Tree Planting events may be connected by some undeterminable colonial or pre-colonial event, it is apparent that the rhetorical and charismatic potential offered by both visual narratives, represented by those images we have chosen to examine and analyse within the ideological analysis section and by the process of political landscape production demonstrated by those narratives, are important to both nations and to the political forms of both nations in the 1970s. Both North and South Korea had, at this moment in their developmental history, resoundingly dictatorial leaderships, for whom charismatic political authority was vital in order to maintain governmental and institutional authority and cohesion. In this sense the visual, textual and developmental narratives presented by this material do demonstrate in at least some way a unity in approach and outlook between these two apparently estranged nations. In spite of their radical estrangement, utterly opposed geo-political positioning and ideological form, governmentality and political authority shares something of a common visual or political syntax. However, to conclude, perhaps this is not surprising. Most political forms, even those differing categorically such as ‘laissez faire’ Liberal social democratic politics and determinist ultra-autocracies, share the political and rhetorical language of authority and charisma, whether or not they are theatric in performance terms.

Finally, however, is the difference in tone between the two visual narrative repertoires deployed in our sample material, which is surprising and will certainly require greater analysis in the future. It is intriguing to note the almost chaotic staging of the imagery featuring Park Chung-hee and his daughter, which is, at times, almost comic in presentation. Equally, the images portraying President Park include a great many more participants than those deriving from northern narratives, as if, while charismatic and authoritative, Park is one among many engaging in this developmental project, a many represented extensively.
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elsewhere in the Saemaul record and perhaps the core of this political form and developmental practice.
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References


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