THIS ISSUE: NORTH AFRICA

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- An Algerian flag in Exmouth Market
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PLUS
Reviews and events in London
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25 EVENTS IN LONDON
This issue of The Middle East in London deals with North Africa, the region where the dramatic events of the Arab Spring began just over four years ago. It is also a region with surprisingly close ties to London, despite the fact that the major powers with interests in the area in the past have been France, Spain and Italy. London contains substantial Moroccan and Algerian communities, in North Kensington and Finsbury Park respectively. It housed Tunisia’s major moderate Islamic movement, An-Nahda, during its twenty-year-long exile until the Ben Ali regime was overthrown in 2011. The movement’s leaders still remember with affection their observations of politics-in-action in Britain, an experience they put to good use after they returned to Tunisia. For much longer, London was also the home to a significant portion of Libya’s exile community, many of whom still retain close links with the city.

The issue opens with a review of the outcomes of the recent upheavals throughout North Africa. It then turns to a study, by Karima Laachir, of the role played by civil society in Morocco in sensitising public opinion towards criticism of autocratic government behaviour: a precursor to the popular demonstrations that ushered in the Arab Spring. This is followed by an analysis of the ways in which the media have exploited their newfound freedoms in Tunisia and Morocco, as compared with Turkey and Jordan, and of the pressures they still face. The author, Roxane Farmanfarmaian, is undertaking a major study of the regional media at the University of Cambridge. This article is then followed by a study of the Amazigh communities in France and Britain by Jonathan Harris. A piece by Barnaby Rogerson looks at Exmouth Market’s links with Algiers and provides an account of the personal experiences of Algerian migrants there. Igor Cherstich follows this with a discussion of the persecution of Libya’s Sufis in the aftermath of the revolution there.

John Hamilton then analyses the crisis facing North Africa’s energy producers, at a time when they could be exploiting Europe’s anxieties about its dependence on energy supplies from Russia. He concludes that the failure is due, not to a lack of resources, but to political, managerial and technical deficiencies in the wake of the Arab Spring. It is a view strongly supported by Amel Chetibi, a visiting scholar at the London Middle East Institute, in her study of the Algerian economy. The issue concludes with a detailed look by Sahar T. Rad at what has happened to the Libyan economy after the revolution and what this might imply for rebuilding the Libyan state, together with a review of the latest book on the Libyan revolution. We hope you find it all of interest.

Dear Reader

George Joffé, MEL Editorial Board
Since the start of 2011, much of North Africa, like large parts of the Middle East, has been in a state of unprecedented upheaval and change. Two regimes have been swept away, another has seen significant constitutional change and the fourth teeters on the edge of a constitutional crisis. European states have been disconcerted by their failure to anticipate what has happened as they are threatened by a new flood of migrants, both from the North African region and from further afield, who are profiting from the security vacuum that has emerged in Libya, the Sahara and the Sahel. European policy towards North Africa is in disarray, its normative values flouted by increasing and overt dependence on national self-interest in stemming these massive migrant flows.

In retrospect, it is striking that the 2011 crisis was not anticipated, either in its timing or its scope. Both European states and the region’s regimes seem to have complacently believed that stability was certain and that evolutionary change at a pace they would determine would cope with whatever popular discontent might emerge. Yet the signs were there. There was the financial crisis in Europe, reducing employment opportunities, repressing migrant remittances and depressing regional economic performance. At the same time, food and energy prices spiralled, models of economic development failed to raise average income but stimulated increasingly unequal income distribution, and kleptocratic regimes in Tunisia and Libya became ever more blatant in their depredations. Yet it is a feature of comment on international affairs that crises are rarely correctly anticipated for we use our experience of the past to make linear predictions about unpredictable and complex futures, so it is hardly surprising that we fail to detect the signs of paradigmatic shifts in the fortunes of states and societies.

North Africa’s paradigm shift

One reason for the European failure to anticipate what happened in 2011 was that the Arab Spring began in Tunisia, widely touted at the time as an economic success story in North Africa. France, in particular, was caught out by the way in which riots
The pattern was to be repeated, first in Egypt and then in Morocco and Libya, albeit with different outcomes in each case because of widely differing political environments.

...over food and energy prices escalated into political demonstrations demanding dignity and freedom as a result of Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation. Nor did European states appreciate the depth of frustration and anger over the poverty and inequalities that neo-liberal economic development theories, faithfully carried out by the Ben Ali regime and supplemented by its nepotistic kleptomania, had visited upon the country. Nor, indeed, had they ever appreciated the degree to which civil society, particularly lawyers, journalists and trade unionists could escape from state control to mobilise the revolution.

It was a pattern that was to be repeated, first in Egypt and then in Morocco and Libya, albeit with different outcomes in each case because of the widely differing political environments in which events occurred. One of the striking features about these revolutionary events was the way in which the social movements that initiated them, unlike the situation in Tunisia, were never able to consolidate their initial achievements. The result was either that other movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or the militias in Libya, took them over or the state, as in Morocco and Algeria, reasserted itself.

Outcomes

In Algeria, the regime also capitalised on popular memory of the horrific war in the 1990s, with up to 200,000 deaths, to remind the population of what revolution could mean. It combined this with judicious bribery, through consumer subsidy paid for by its abundant oil revenues, and police repression of attempts by the political parties to sustain popular contestation of the regime. The result has been that popular aspirations for political change have been submerged under a torpor of despair at the immobility of the regime, itself trapped by a worsening constitutional crisis under a disabled president and a lack of consensus as to how the crisis can be resolved.

In Morocco, the Royal Palace adroitly captured control of the potential revolution by initiating widespread consultation, then enacting consequent constitutional change and new legislative elections which brought Morocco’s Islamist party, the Parti de Justice et du Développement, into a coalition government as the dominant partner. The Palace itself, however, made sure that it retained ultimate control of the political process – a tactical success, no doubt, but one, like the situation in Algeria, that merely postpones inevitable real change to accommodate popular aspirations.

Egypt has proved to be a sobering lesson in the reality of power for the Brotherhood which completely misinterpreted its electoral mandate and woefully underestimated the entrenched power of the military. It first outraged public opinion by assuming that it enjoyed hegemony over the political process, thus provoking the Tamarrod movement and then alarmed the military leadership over its economic interests and role as guarantor of the state. Within a year it had provoked a counter-coup that forced it from power and into the margins of Egyptian society, from which it can return only by accepting the outcome of the July 2013 coup – a very bitter pill indeed!

In many respects, however, it has been Libya that has proved to be the most sobering lesson of the difficulty of revolutionary change. In retrospect, the greatest disservice done by the Qaddafi regime was to ensure that Libya never acquired an effective bureaucracy outside the administrative structure that serviced the intensely personalised policies endorsed by its leader. The result was that, in the wake of the revolution, constructing a new state has been virtually impossible because the basic administrative infrastructure to do this never existed. Outside powers, favouring their own preferred movements, have made the situation even worse and the combination of uncontrolled militias, a lack of centralised coercive power for the state, security chaos in Libya’s desert hinterland, increasingly extremist movements now including the Islamic State, separatist demands and governance split between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica have created a situation that seems insoluble despite the valiant efforts of the United Nations.

Is the Arab Spring, therefore, a failure? Perhaps the only answer, recalling Cho En Lai supposedly commenting on the French revolution, is that it is too early to tell. Revolutionary transformation is an arduous and slow process and, in North Africa, it has only just begun.

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Algeria experiences issues with voter registration prior to a legislative poll, March 2012

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There has been much discussion on the role of civil society in promoting democracy in the Arabic speaking region, especially with the growing maturity of social groups in defending human rights and women’s rights, holding the government accountable, calling for economic transparency and raising environmental concerns. Recent innovative research on civil society activism in the region rejects the normative Western understanding of civil society as a parameter of democratic change; it also attempts to locate civil society activism under authoritarian constraints. ‘Liberal’ authoritarian states such as Morocco create state-sponsored forms of civil activism which make it difficult to distinguish genuine activism from other forms used to promote a liberal image of the state. In this case, the regime actively co-opts leaders of professional associations and organisations so that the state’s authority is not challenged. The authoritarian state also imposes restrictive legal procedures and infiltrates civil society groups to keep abreast of their activities. However, this does not mean that there are no autonomous civil society groups that can resist the state’s co-optation. Moreover, in the region there are various types of secular and religious-based civil society groups. The normative division that perceives religious-based activism as ‘undemocratic’ and secular activism as democratic is problematic as it demonises the Islamists and denies their active and complex participation in society as well as their large popular support base.

One can partly agree that the recent Arab uprisings were not the outcome of civil society activism but more a result of mass dissatisfaction and ‘mass revolutionary fervour’ as well as ‘loose horizontal networks’ (Cavatorta, *Civil Society Activism* 2012). The Moroccan state uses divide-and-rule policies to weaken civil society activism.
Individuals have invented new forms of activism by creating blogs and virtual discussion forums. Without formal association, dissenters connect over the Internet and individual initiatives give way to widespread activism that is not traditionally confined to associative life.

The 'Daniel Gate' scandal in Morocco in August 2013 is an example of this kind of activism. This refers to King Mohamed VI's pardon (on the occasion of the Throne Day) of 1,000 prisoners, including a Spanish paedophile serving 30 years of imprisonment for sexually abusing several Moroccan children. The royal pardon caused a massive outrage across social media. Individual online activists created a Facebook page to denounce the King's decision. This was followed by demonstrations across Moroccan cities, some of which were violently suppressed by the police. Moroccans from across the social and political spectrum were united in their outrage, forcing the Royal Palace to issue a statement reversing the pardon of the paedophile (who had already fled abroad). In a country where criticism of the King is prohibited, open criticism of his decision in cyber space and street protests were unprecedented. Individual activism from below via social media outlets creates new forms of opposition that are difficult to control, giving people with ideological differences the opportunity to rally together to achieve common goals.

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The media post-Arab uprisings in the MENA

The changes in political fortunes in the Middle East and North Africa since the uprisings of 2011 have nowhere been more perfectly reflected than in the region’s media – not just in their pages and on their screens, but in the nature of their own fortunes as well. As political barriers crumbled and democratic practices took hold in 2011, the media were the face of those changes, translating the air of freedom into an outpouring of new radio, television, online and press products, along with programming and exposition that no longer suffered the crimping of censorship, self-censorship and information blackouts. Yet, as the barriers began to rise again in the political arena, the media too began to find its range restricted.

The transformation in the role of the media, though it has in many cases paralleled political change, has followed its own path, going through three general periods: liberation, retrenchment and re-emergence. In the process, it has become clear that re-blinkering the media to fit the restrictions on political freedom is problematic, as new technologies and broadened popular awareness reveal that the culture of savvy media use has changed the playing field. What is more, the regional media such as Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiya – variously credited (or blamed) as the instigators, facilitators and instruments of the rolling upheavals – have remained conveyors of cross-border information. Today they are watched and accessed by populations now more pragmatic in regards to satellite or internet-projected ideological framing and government agendas. Perhaps most tantalising, the tools of social media are illustrating themselves to be suited to sensationalism and the framing of social conscience in ways that are highly disruptive to centralised authoritarian control.

Liberation

The unleashing of politics were heady days for liberated media in Tunisia and Egypt, but likewise in Morocco and Jordan, and indeed Turkey, the non-Arab state that had already been experimenting with the combination of pluralism, Islamic practice, press freedom and private enterprise. Populations in these states began watching evening news programmes on television, finding them genuinely interesting because the current events they portrayed were no longer pre-scripted by the government into unwatchable pabulum, but were real stories that focused on the citizen, not the autocrat. The ideological filter was gone or significantly tempered. Journalism became credible, if not yet completely professional – a far cry from the manufactured presentations of the past. In Tunisia, for example, viewership of the national television 8 o’clock news jumped from under 25 per cent prior to the revolution to 82 per cent by October 2013. Today Wataniyya’s share has fallen not because the news is no longer legitimate or relevant, but because private channels such as Nessma TV and Ettounisia TV have improved their audience ratings.

The tools of social media are illustrating themselves to be suited to sensationalism and the framing of social conscience in ways that are highly disruptive to centralised authoritarian control.

‘Free...but for how long?’ The slogan of the Reporters Without Borders media campaign to support freedom of the press in Tunisia, 2011

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Roxane Farmanfarmaian analyses the evolving role of the media since the uprisings of 2011
Social media and the Internet began, in the fall of 2014, to take on a new role – that of the public whistle-blower

for catharsis. Journalists, politicians and others used media spaces to air personal as well as social and religious grievances, criticise institutions and individuals without evidence, and engage in political diatribes. This so polarised the public sphere that in Tunisia the practice was labelled ‘le Discours de Haine’ – the Discourse of Hate. Professional, investigative journalism made little headway while the red lines previously set out by President Ben Ali’s regime (which included not criticising the presidential family, or indeed, the weather, in the event it was ill-suited to healthy agricultural output), were replaced by a more amorphous, if equally dangerous set of red lines defined by popular sentiment and largely based on religious and moral sensitivities. Newspapers and television stations in Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan were mobbed by angry protestors when their announcers or writers were deemed as having exercised undue license by stepping too boldly over the lines of propriety. In Tunisia, for example, a glossy magazine featuring a revealing picture on its front page of the model-girlfriend of an important political boss was not distributed to the news kiosks on that basis.

Retrenchment

In Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, the political environment changed within two years as centralisation of the government trumped the demands for political pluralism. As political hands shifted, and the institutionalisation of the state returned power to governments similar to those which had pertained prior to the uprisings, the media again became a target of co-optation.

In Egypt, the national media revived its old role as instrument of the prevailing army/government discourse, while well-placed elites launched private television channels that mimicked the official line. In Jordan and Morocco, widespread shutdowns of hundreds of online websites reflected the view that the public sphere was exceeding official levels of tolerance. In Turkey, in the wake of the Gezi Park uprisings and subsequent corruption scandals, the Erdogan government began widespread firing of journalists and editors, the number of those imprisoned mounting to become at one point the highest in the world. Only in Tunisia, where the political process of pluralism and constitutionalism continued, could the media sector flourish; even though restraints on certain subjects – such as terrorism – were reinstated by the Ministry of Interior, and police violence against journalists remained high. Likewise, regulations restraining media companies from partisanship failed to take hold. Overall, the political shakeout across the region had the effect of reinstating the practice of self-censorship to avoid government bullying.

Re-emergence

This has not meant a return to pre-2011. Instead, social media and the Internet began, in the fall of 2014, to take on a new role – that of the public whistle-blower – as mysterious wielders of Twitter and the Internet leaked damning government documents in Morocco, Turkey and Egypt. The headlines in local and regional media such as al-Arabiya, al-Monitor, al Arabiya al-Jadid and al-Akhbar, reflect this re-emergence of a ‘media of conscience’: “Moroccan Wikileaks” Rattles Rabat’, ‘Leaked recordings embarrass Egypt’s military rulers’ and ‘Anonymous Twitter Account Rocks Turkish Money Market’. Fuat Avni, the alias of the Turkish Tweter, is thought to be a high-placed government insider who tweets information about raids on journalists and police hours before they occur. The Moroccan, using the alias Chris Coleman, has revealed diplomatic cables that not only suggest he is a Sahrawi independence sympathiser, but point to unscrupulous decision-making at the top of the Moroccan government. The Egyptian leaks, released on the Internet and by Islamist newspapers, have reproduced documents that reveal strong-arming and judicial interference by Sisi’s inner circle to ensure the Muslim Brotherhood remains compromised. Though the governments have denied the allegations and denounced the documents as forgeries, the leaks have elicited a raucous debate in the press and television as well as online, instigating a level of public engagement that belies the constraints on freedom of expression. For political leaders and the population at large, they are vivid reminders that the Fourth Estate remains flexible and a force to be reckoned with. The legacy of the Wikileaks revelations in Tunisia – a key component of the tipping point into revolution – has become generalised and is defining a new public sphere.

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Workers from the 2M network hold a rally in Casablanca, Morocco calling for an end to censorship, 2011
The Imazighen – North Africa’s ‘Berbers’ – claim to be the region’s indigenous people, rather than being ‘Arab’ as they are often – but incorrectly – described. Labour migration throughout the 20th century to Europe and later to North America has meant that large numbers of Imazighen now reside in the diaspora. In particular, France is estimated to be home to nearly two million people of ethnic ‘Amazigh’ descent. As a result, the diaspora now serves as a meeting point and base of operations for a wide variety of Amazigh activists from across North Africa. In so doing, they actively participate in the transformation and assemblage of an entirely new creation: the idea of a contiguous Amazigh nation in North Africa and in the diaspora. This intangible geopolitical project has very real effects on the socio-political integration of emigrant Imazighen.

Diaspora geopolitics
The political involvement and influence of diaspora communities in their respective ‘homelands’ has been a major force in geopolitical contestations and independence struggles globally over the last century. Examples range from the powerful Irish-American associations of the late 19th century to today’s instances of Kurdish diaspora organisation. In each of these examples the ability of diaspora groups to organise – in this case around the issue of homeland geopolitics – has also facilitated their socio-political integration into the host society within which they live. It is important to stress that these diaspora groups and the political identities they articulate are not naturally occurring entities existing merely by virtue of migration, but particular assemblages created through the work of multiple actors at various levels – from nation-states and international NGOs to artists and local community leaders. ‘Integration’ however remains an elusive spectre, as the very concept contains within it a recognition of difference that can never be fully denied.

The activities of the diasporic Amazigh movement fall within this cultural/geopolitical field. Starting with the creation in Paris of the Académie Berbère in 1966, and spreading from the universities into the public sphere with the legalisation of ethnic minority cultural associations in France under Francois Mitterrand in 1981,
numerous Amazigh cultural associations have been created across the diaspora with the 'promotion and defence of Amazigh culture' as their primary goal. In practice, this means the celebration of key events of the Amazigh calendar such as Yennayer (New Year) and Tafsut (the 'Berber Spring') and ‘Tamazight’ language classes. The Amazigh diaspora is thus embodied in a loosely affiliated network of cultural associations spread across the places where significant populations of Imazighen have become organised. Whilst it does not have a clear and unified set of motivations and purposes, it serves as a platform for the exchange and production of militant ideas about Amazigh identity and geopolitics in what we might call the diasporic Amazigh movement. Overtly political organisations such as the Congrès Mondial Amazigh (CMA) and its splinter-rival the Assemblée Mondiale Amazighe are examples of activist Amazigh organisations that are based in France and draw primarily on the resources of the Amazigh diaspora, but in name at least seek to represent Imazighen at ‘home’. A unified sense of Amazigh identity and place is articulated, ironically drawing on the earlier French colonial racial imagination, which presents the Imazighen as the ideal candidates for ‘assimilation’ by virtue of their secularism, their democracy and their comparative ethnic ‘whiteness’. By engaging in a homeland geopolitics that highlights the originality of Amazigh culture and language and its links to territory, the Amazigh diaspora is able to leverage unique ‘cultural capital’ in seeking to integrate in their host society.

‘Nek d Charlie’

The weekend following the Paris attacks in early January this year saw the largest marches in France since the Liberation in 1944 but also coincided with the Amazigh New Year, Yennayer. The celebrations at the Association Culturelle Berbère (ACB), Paris’s oldest and probably largest Amazigh association, took place a stone’s throw from the march of over three million people in central Paris and were uncharacteristically sombre. Turnout was low, as many had chosen to join the march. They started with a formal declaration by the director of the ACB, who condemned the attacks against Charlie Hebdo. He also made two observations: first that the attacks would reinforce the far right’s hostility towards ‘French people of immigrant origin’, and second that ‘Radical Islamism’ had been prospering within the North African emigrant community despite the best efforts of the ACB and others. At the march itself, in imitation of the various world leaders who had flown in to participate, was the President of the ‘Provisional Government of Kabylia’, Ferhat Mehenni, surrounded by Amazigh activists flying the Berber flag and widely publicising the fact that a Franco-Kabyle – the Charlie Hebdo proof-reader, Mustapha Ourrad – had been amongst the victims. The tension between assimilation and homeland geopolitics was observable here, as a sense of French identity rooted in the values of civic liberty perceived as needing defence is maintained alongside an ethnic distinction that ascribes a measure of responsibility to the Amazigh diaspora. ‘Nek d Charlie’, said the posters – the Amazigh would participate in French society but would ‘be Charlie’ in their own way.

Imazighen in Britain

The diaspora in France has achieved a degree of organisation and group cohesion that is simply not found in the UK. This is understandable, given the size and the age of the diaspora, through its colonial-era relationship to France. Algerians and Moroccans here are far more likely to be recognised as such, rather than as ‘Berbers’, let alone as ‘Imazighen’. In fact, it is the Libyan Imazighen who seem to have achieved a measure of UK diaspora organisation on the basis of Amazigh identity. Based in London, the Libyan Tamazight Congress was founded in 2000. Members of the UK diaspora were active in the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime and in the promotion of Amazigh culture in post-Qaddafi Libya. In comparison with the associational life of the Amazigh diaspora in France, however, levels of organisation amongst Imazighen here remain comparatively low, as does pressure for North African immigrants to culturally ‘integrate’.

Amazigh diaspora organisation is likely to continue to focus on the seemingly paradoxical identity politics of homeland geopolitics and host country integration. As North African states officially recognise Amazigh culture and language we may see a greater degree of interaction between the diaspora and home states.

Jonathan Harris is studying for a PhD in the Department of Geography in the University of Cambridge. His chosen topic of research is the organisation of diasporic Amazigh communities in France

Demonstrators fly the Berber flag at a rally against the attack of Charlie Hebdo newspaper, 11 January 2015
I had been caught in a 24-hour-long traffic jam in the centre of Algiers, as the capital city celebrated the national squad beating Egypt in a football match. It was before the Arab Spring and national rivalry had been built up to an unnecessary level of tension by the spin-masters of the Mubarak regime. So the Algerians were especially triumphant and in between the fireworks (released by the Admiral of Algiers) and the blare of 10,000 car horns, I got to see a fair acreage of the tricolour drapeau of the Algerian Republic. The flag hung from every balcony and window, was used as a cape, a T-shirt and painted on the faces of young girls.

So I immediately recognised the flag when I saw it suspended across the breadth of my local street in London – Exmouth Market – which has a curious connection with Algiers. Once a slum, the street was rebranded in 1816 and named after one of Britain’s naval heroes (Edward Pellew, Lord Exmouth) who bombarded Algiers in August 1816, destroying the pirate fleet that lay within its fortified harbour and ‘abolished Christian slavery throughout North Africa’. Our pub is also called the Exmouth Arms and carries a signboard bearing the arms of Lord Exmouth, complete with a battleship, a castle, the motto ‘Algiers’ and a white slave breaking free of his chains.

Which is ironic, since the British had for centuries been supplying arms to the Barbary corsairs of North Africa, principally to use against their mutual enemy Spain, and a number of these Barbary pirates were in fact English privateers, such as Henry Mainwaring and John Ward. Lord Exmouth’s cruise down the coast of North Africa in the spring of 1816 was a signal that this old game was now ‘up’. To give him his due, the admiral was aware of the flimsy pretext for the attack and was personally determined not to be the one to fire the first shot. But that did not make Lord Exmouth’s bombardment of Algiers any less dramatic a battle when it did erupt. Wound for wound it was more bloody for the British than the Battle of Trafalgar, which had a 9 per cent casualty rate to Algiers’ 16 per cent.

So when I first saw the flag flying in Exmouth Market, I looked around half expecting that some friend (knowing my enthusiasm for North African history) was playing an elaborate hoax. Eventually

**History is punctuated by revolutions, elections, states of emergency and policy options.**

**Humans live by a different measure.**
I asked Jimmy, a tall East-Ender who runs a kiosk in the street and who seems to know everything. Jimmy is very British, outspokenly patriotic, proud of his parish and not very keen on Europe.

So it was odd to discover that Jimmy had put the Algerian flag up. Not as my fancy had it, on behalf of the poor bombarded city of Algiers in 1816, but in honour of two young men who work in the local café. England had just been knocked out of the World Cup and Jimmy thought the neighbourly thing to do was to support Algeria. I have been travelling throughout North Africa for 35 years and had been buying coffee off them for years without realising they were Algerian. It felt good to be put in my place by Jimmy who had never set foot in their country.

So I started collecting their stories, a slice of living Algerian reality to counterbalance all my historical book-knowledge. History is punctuated by revolutions, elections, states of emergency and policy options. Humans live by a different measure: of weddings, births, funerals and memorable football games.

Neither man had left his homeland to find political, spiritual or artistic freedom in the west. They both came from large, prosperous, hard-working families that were used to running their own affairs. The decision to come to London was part of their tradition, extending many generations back, that men left the mountains to work elsewhere. To which they had added the desire to be part of a diverse, tolerant culture, which was not France where there was too much history and too many relations.

The first taste of living in London came from a fortnight-long holiday, a reward for having passed their university exams in business and law. Then a year later, a more methodical return to London, based around a three-month language course supported by working hours in a café-chain, such as the Café Rouge. Then using natural contacts, distant cousins or the friends of neighbours they shifted to a better, more responsible job in a family-owned café.

They are both proud of being Berber and of belonging to the Kabylia Mountains, which gives them the warm glow of being part of an extended family. They agree that this feeling of kinship does not extend to the Shawi Berbers (of south-eastern Algeria) or the western Algerians of Oran and Tlemcen, but apart from their support of JSK (Jeunesse Sportif Kabyle), the local football team, they are not militant in their identity, just pragmatic about who they are: men from the Berber heartland of Kabylia. They have no problem using Arabic or French if it allows them to communicate better, especially in the small knot of Algerian cafés and a mosque that have emerged along the Old Kent Road.

In three years they have risen to be assistant managers and are always the last to leave their place of work, though this is but a stage towards setting up their own business. They openly admire the lack of corruption, the good organisation and the entrepreneurial freedom of England. They feel welcome in pubs even though they do not themselves drink and find the English funny and relaxed in these places whilst admitting that they drank far too much. They find that their Italian and Spanish co-workers instinctively understand their attitudes to work and family.

I tried not to look shocked, for in my own British family it is a matter of pride to show your complete independence as early as possible. I can remember my father and grandfather (both naval officers) heartily approving of Edward Pellew running away from home aged fourteen. Indeed they had both been packed off to the Navy aged ten. So once again I found myself wondering if the key difference between the Middle East and London is not, in fact, about faith but about family. We may be proud of our institutions, but they put their faith in their family.

Barnaby Rogerson has written North Africa – A History, The Prophet Muhammad – a biography, The Last Crusaders, The Heirs of the Prophet Muhammad and guidebooks to Tunisia and Morocco. He is a member of the Editorial Board and his day job is Publisher at Eland (www.travelbooks.co.uk)

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In many ways, Libya is a Sufi country. During the first half of the 19th century a powerful Sufi order, the Sanusiya, guided the anti-colonial revolt against Italian invaders and established a kingdom that lasted until 1969, the year of Qaddafi's coup. Islamic mysticism has left a recognisable mark on Libyan traditions, on folk-poetry and proverbs, and on Libya's most celebrated musical tradition, the Mal'uf. Once, even the Libyan landscape resembled a constellation of shrines to local Sufi saints, and until recently every Libyan city had at least one Sufi gathering place. Post-Qaddafi Libya, however, is proving to be a difficult place for mystics.

Following the collapse of the Qaddafi regime it has become a political mosaic, with a government in Tobruk that enjoys international recognition, another in Tripoli with strong economic means and theocratic tendencies, an independent General, Khalifa Haftar, running a major military campaign against jihadi cells, extra-national powers that fuel local jihadism with economic aid and weapons, and numerous militias, some having pledged alliance to ISIS and to Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. In this scenario, marked by the proliferation of extremely literal interpretations of Islam, Sufi brotherhoods and sympathisers suffer heavy persecution.

In Zlitan the sanctuary of Sidi Abd As-Salam Al-Asmar, Libya's most renowned Sufi saint, has been demolished. In Tripoli the traditional celebration of the Birthday of the Prophet, with its beautiful Sufi processions, performances and songs, has been forcefully stopped. Even though many Sufis fought against Qaddafi in the revolution of 2011, today Sufism is seen as an agent of corruption. Many Libyans, both militiamen and civilians, consider Libyan mysticism a relic of the past with no place in the country's future. But what are the roots of this growing anti-Sufi sentiment?

When Qaddafi took power in 1969, he overthrew the Sanusi king and dismantled his Sufi kingdom. During the first two decades of the regime, Qaddafi identified Sufism as anti-revolutionary and ordered the destruction of a number of Sufi shrines and gathering places – actions that resemble what jihadis are doing today. The Qaddafi regime effectively fuelled anti-Sufi sentiment in the country for many years, publicly portraying Sufism as heretical Islam, and three generations of Libyans have grown up thinking just that. This attitude permeated Libyan society, even before 2011.

Interestingly, during the last two decades of the regime, Qaddafi publicly rehabilitated Sufism as a counter-balance to jihadism, Salafism and political Islam. Qaddafi perceived political Islam to be a local extension of the Saudi government (one of his old enemies), and he decided that Sufism was, in a sense, the lesser evil. Sufism was used as a propaganda tool. Beginning in the late 1990s, Qaddafi began to praise Sufis in public, presenting them as a valid alternative to Salafi approaches to Islam. This change of attitude by the regime created a false association between Qaddafi and Sufism in the minds of many Libyans and paved the way for anti-Sufi violence in post-Qaddafi Libya.

Contrary to what is suggested by the media, there is a substantial difference between the anti-Sufi criticism of jihadi militias and many Libyan Salafis. Doubtless, local Salafi cells have always been critical of Sufism, but today they are also critical of the actions of the militias. Many Salafis have advocated the creation of a state where Libyans can follow different approaches to Islam, clarifying that they only want to be free to practice their own interpretation of religion. In Eastern Libya many Salafi leaders have sought an alliance with General Haftar, joining his campaign against the militias. Nevertheless, if the persecution of Sufis continues Libya will lose one of its oldest and most fascinating traditions.

Igor Cherstich is an Anthropologist who has done extensive research in Libya. He is currently based at UCL as a core member of the team for the ERC project CARP – Comparative Anthropologies of Revolutionary Politics.

Even though many Sufis fought against Qaddafi in the revolution of 2011, today Sufism is seen as an agent of corruption.
North Africa’s failing energy promise

That it is now reasonable to ask whether North Africa can rely on domestic production for its energy needs in the foreseeable future shows the extent to which old certainties have crumbled. Less than a decade ago, the answer would have been unquestionably yes. International oil companies, global markets and European policy strategists all agreed that North Africa was both a vital and a reliable source of energy for the long term. The focus was entirely on export potential – doubts over meeting internal demand did not arise in Egypt, Libya or Algeria.

Egypt, despite its vast and energy hungry population – larger than that of the rest of the Maghreb put together – was so confident about volumes of domestic gas production that its international partners started exporting Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) from two massive terminals in the Nile Delta in 2005. Algeria was similarly confident. In the early 2000s, as the country emerged from its violent civil war, the authorities launched a series of licensing rounds which were expected to add to already mighty gas resources, as well as boosting oil production. At the same time the national oil and gas company, Sonatrach, massively invested in new LNG export terminals, two of which started operations early in 2014. Even before this, Algeria was already an established gas exporter. It exported the first LNG shipment in history from a terminal in Skikda to the UK in 1964. Large capacity undersea gas pipelines also link it directly with Italy and Spain.

A decade ago, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya was also re-engaging after many years of political sanctions. A series of exploration licensing rounds, each one more over-subscribed and competitive than its predecessor, took place at approximate yearly intervals from 2004 to 2007. More than 30 international oil companies started work. Only Tunisia and Morocco were not part of this trend. They have always been net energy importers for the simple reason that they do not possess the large easily accessible reserves of their neighbours.

Unfortunately, Egypt, Algeria and most of all Libya now face current or long-term challenges to their abilities to meet domestic demand. North Africa has missed the opportunity to increase its share in the energy industry. John Hamilton explains:

Egypt, Algeria and most of all Libya now face current or long-term challenges to their abilities to meet domestic demand.
The pre-2011 governments of Libya and Algeria succumbed to the temptations of resource nationalist policy-making

This year a floating regasification terminal in the Gulf of Suez will start operation and Egypt will start importing LNG. Algeria, while still a massive exporter, has also experienced a decline in production over the past two years. The total collapse of Libya's oil production is well known.

How did we get to this point? The problem is not the geology. While the era of massive field discoveries may be over, most geologists and reservoir engineers agree that quantities of unexploited reserves still remain. Much of the blame can be placed on both bad policy and the aftermath of the 2011 ‘Arab Spring’. Far from providing the necessary fiscal incentives and cooperative working environment necessary for their international partners to prevail, the pre-2011 governments of Libya and Algeria succumbed to the temptations of resource nationalist policy-making, assuming that enthusiasm for their national resources was a permanent, rather than a conditional, phenomenon. When exploration efforts over the period resulted in only a handful of potential developments, companies identified more profitable opportunities elsewhere in the world and left.

The other policy mistake made by all three countries was not to restrain the subsidy of fuel and electricity. As well as encouraging a massive and inefficient surge in demand, this also undermined commercial incentives to invest in production. In Egypt's case, when money was tight the government built up large arrears with international oil and gas producers, who were in any case paid below international market rates for domestic supplies. This left little reason for them to invest more in production.

The devastating collapse of the Libyan state in the years following the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime highlights a further threat, which potentially also has implications for its neighbours. In the immediate post-revolution period, Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) restored production to a level just below the historic 1.6 million barrels per day maximum. But from mid-2013, a federalist militia in the eastern province of Cyrenaica blockaded the main terminals for political ends. This coincided with an ever more rapacious and corrupt abuse of resources and government revenues at all levels.

These developments rapidly crystallised into the current battle between the rival governments in Tobruk and Tripoli for control of both NOC and the Central Bank of Libya (CBL), being the only two state institutions that survived the revolution more or less able to function. Already debilitated by this conflict, Libya was further destabilised by the violent murders carried out in the name of the Islamic State in recent weeks. In mid-February NOC warned that unless the safety of its workers could be guaranteed, it would be obliged to cease all operations. While the impact on exports would be negligible, the loss of crude oil feedstock for the single major refinery still operating at Az-Zawiya, plus that of gas supplies for power generation would be a hammer blow to what remains of the country’s social fabric. With sources at the CBL warning that it may be close to exhausting the liquid and accessible portion of its foreign reserves, the threat could hardly be more severe.

It is natural to question whether Algeria might follow its neighbours down the perilous route of revolution, particularly if its military ‘deep state’ mishandles the presidential succession. There is no obvious candidate to replace President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who was re-elected in 2014 despite having suffered a stroke a year earlier rendering him almost unable to speak or move. However, there is no need for a violent insurrection to create difficulties. Supporters point to the country’s vast financial reserves and Sonatrach’s own massive plans for investment in upstream exploration and development, arguing that the government can both buy social peace and restore its place as a major hydrocarbons exporter. More cautious voices argue that austerity is already necessary as the financial reserves are more limited than they appear. Those familiar with the inner workings of Sonatrach believe it may be too inefficient and corrupt and lacking in technical skill to achieve its ambitious objectives. Politically unacceptable measures to liberalise hydrocarbons legislation may be the only route to a true revitalisation of production.

So as Europe’s relations with Russia fail over Ukraine, there has never been a more strategically important time for North Africa’s main energy producers to claim additional market share and show themselves to be reliable long-term partners. But due to their incapacity, this opportunity will be missed.

John Hamilton is a director of Cross-border Information, the publishers of African Energy

(Opposite) Offices of the Central Bank of Libya in Tripoli, 2010
(Right) Map of gas pipelines across the Mediterranean and the Sahara. The Trans-Saharan pipeline is planned but not yet built

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Algerians are currently obsessed with fluctuations in the price of oil, regarding them not simply as a challenge for policy-makers and politicians but also as a huge setback for the nation as a whole. Algerian policy-makers, economists and politicians have been openly debating today’s collapse in oil prices on television – the price of crude oil has decreased from an average of $110 per barrel in the first half of 2014 to less than $50 in January 2015 – thereby spreading alarm among wide sections of the society. Admittedly price volatility is not uncommon in oil and primary commodities markets; the recent fluctuations may last for weeks or even months. Oil prices in international markets have now reached a five-year low, tumbling to levels not seen since January 2009. The collapse is the result of a surplus in the global market: 1.5-2 million barrels per day are expected in the first half of this year, 600,000 of which will be produced by OPEC countries. In addition to overproduction the market has been further destabilised by Western sanctions against Iran and Russia and military conflict in Syria and Ukraine.

In theory Algeria has great economic potential. It is the largest country in Africa by area, it has diverse geographical regions and a large population that is predominantly young and active, but its economy is unbalanced. It is hugely dependent on the production of oil and gas. According to the latest African Economic Outlook for North Africa, the Algerian hydrocarbon sector constitutes 97 per cent of the country’s total exports, overwhelmingly dominated by the state-owned company Sonatrach. Consequently, Algeria’s economy is highly bound to the global oil and gas market and prices.

Popular discontent in Algeria is not only fuelled by economic anxiety. Rampant government corruption, poor living standards and flaws in the provision of public services, especially healthcare, are constant sources of resentment among Algerians. The country has not, however, witnessed the popular revolts and uprisings that swept through the Arab region during the so-called Arab Spring. Algeria’s economy is very different compared to most of the other countries – Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Yemen – which witnessed these revolutionary waves of demonstrations, protests, riots and civil unrest. However, as the recipient of oil rent, it has similarities with two other countries that have seen uprisings: Libya and Bahrain. The oil boom has brought some undoubted economic benefits: Algeria has experienced increasing GDP growth of 3 per cent on average during the past 15 years which has enabled the regime to respond to many demands, especially those of poorer segments of the society. For example, it has legislated an increase in base salaries and also supported the construction of social housing programmes.

Algeria’s youth has, in turn, been silenced by the programmes adopted by ANSEJ (Agence Nationale de Soutien à l’Emploi des Jeunes), the government agency responsible for the management of credit funds for business development which influences

The Algerian hydrocarbon sector constitutes 97 per cent of the country’s total exports.
public-service employment by providing loans for young people between the ages of 19 and 40 who generate their own micro enterprise projects. This programme has not, however, been effective in creating jobs or in realising added value. The unemployment rate among young people still exceeds 24 per cent – one of the highest in the MENA region.

In the past, Algerian economic strategy has largely bypassed the productive sector, which is essential for creating a diversified economy, and instead continued to rely on the hydrocarbon sector. The deficiencies of this approach can be readily observed in the country’s persistently high levels of poverty, poor living standards and high levels of unemployment especially among the youth. In addition, bureaucracy and corruption have combined to prevent the completion of planned reforms. According to Transparency International, the global movement against corruption based in Berlin, Algeria was ranked 100 out of 175 (with 1 being the least corrupt) among the most highly corrupt nations using the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for the year 2014.

Despite reassurances from the governor of the Algerian Central Bank at the end of 2014 that the currency reserves are enough to cover three years of imports, concerns still remain. According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, Algeria’s sovereign wealth fund is $77.2 billion. Known as Fond de Regulation des Recettes (FRR), it was set up in 2000 in order to protect the Algerian economy from fluctuations in oil and gas prices. The reserve is drawn from annual surpluses of oil revenues. Despite its size, the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute is apprehensive about the FRR: it ranks Algeria in the last position according to the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index because it complies with a minimum of one out of ten principles deemed essential for sovereign wealth to be transparent to the public. The non-transparency of the Algerian authorities is also a source of anxiety for many Algerians who expect a level of living standards over $13,000 GDP ppp (at purchasing power parity) per capita according to the IMF (World Economic Outlook database) and the World Bank (World Development Indicators database).

Algeria has other unexploited potentials. This is especially the case for solar power, particularly in the Sahara desert, as a sustainable means of producing energy which remains largely undeveloped. Ambitious projects such as Desertec, which was initiated in Germany with the aim of generating sufficient solar energy in the Sahara sun to power Europe, have come to nothing. In November 2012 doubts about the future of solar energy were expressed by the vice-president of Conseil National Economique et Social (CNES), a state-sponsored institution, when asked whether the European electricity price was capable of giving Algeria a return on its investment.

Speaking on behalf of the Algerian government, the Algerian Prime Minister reaffirmed, in late January of this year, the position of the government in working towards diversification of the economy as the only way to ensure sustainable development and the creation of jobs. The government has recently taken a series of measures aimed at diversification by promoting the public sector and facilitating joint private and public investment programmes. Plans have been set in motion to activate different sectors of the economy: manufacturing, petrochemical industries, agriculture, tourism and information technology and telecommunication.

For all that, it is now essential for all oil-exporting countries – but particularly those like Algeria whose economies critically depend on oil exports – to consider seriously how they can diversify their sources of income to achieve sustainability. The current oil ‘obsession’ might just offer a silver lining for the concern of this and the next generation.

Amel Chetibi, a graduate of the universities of Constantine 2 and SOAS, is Assistant Professor of Economics at University Constantine 2 in Algeria and is currently a Visiting Scholar at the London Middle East Institute.
Though endowed with one of the world’s largest oil and cash reserves, today’s Libya is often associated with instability, insecurity and disintegration. The gradual chaos that the country has descended into has dramatically overturned the immediate post-revolution hopes of a smooth economic and political transition. Already highly undiversified and institutionally weak at the time of the 2011 revolution, the Libyan economy has taken major blows thanks to its rich resource base and failing governance structures.

During the 42 years of Qaddafi’s rule, the economy was constructed in parallel with the political and social remoulding of the country’s institutions. Until the late 1970s, private enterprises played an important role in the economy except in the fields of oil, banking, and insurance. However, the second volume of Qaddafi’s ‘Green Book’, published in 1975, considered private retail trade, rent and wages as forms of ‘exploitation’ that had to be abolished. By 1981 the state had also restricted access to individual bank accounts to draw upon privately held funds for government projects. The development of the non-oil private sector was continuously hampered by an underdeveloped financial system, inefficient public administration and lack of an educated workforce. The regime’s highly centralised governance structure, which had restricted the role and activities of individual ministries, together with its increasing political suppression, gradually began to build up discontent among the disenchanted and unemployed masses. Although oil revenues allowed for substantial welfare improvements compared to the regional standards, by 1982 around 50,000 to 100,000 Libyans had emigrated abroad due to a lack of viable economic and sustainable employment opportunities. This, combined with the increasing concentration of the country’s investment resources in the western region around Tripoli (where Qaddafi’s tribe originated from), resulted in a groundswell of socio-economic discontent that formed the basis for the 2011 revolution.

With the largest oil reserves in Africa, and among the ten largest globally, hydrocarbons account for over 50 per cent of Libya’s GDP and 96 per cent of government revenues. The remaining portion of the GDP is also financed by hydrocarbon revenues. Oil and natural gas production and exports suffered a near-total collapse in the wake of the 2011 revolution. Following the gradual consolidation of control over most parts of the country by the National Transitional Council and the instalment of a new government, oil production experienced a rapid recovery in 2011, almost reaching its pre-conflict average of 1.6 million barrels per day by October 2011. However, the unfortunate combination of Libya’s already weak institutional structure, the tense tribal and ethnic politics, the rise of Islamic extremism across the region and the country’s sheer oil wealth soon undermined the early post-
With neither the militias nor the government having a monopoly of power, a security vacuum and a state of administrative suspense have emerged on a path of diversification and inclusive development it needs to overcome two key challenges. First and foremost, containment of the economic and political power of regional and tribal militias and their challenge to central state authority and service delivery capacity. This requires, however unlikely it may seem at the moment, a process of inclusive national dialogue initiated by key national and international actors. The vast and unsecured weapons stockpiles, which are used as militias’ ‘insurance policy’ amidst the reigning anarchy, are fuelling instability also across the Maghreb–Sahel region.

Once the security situation is resolved, the second major challenge would be the sheer lack of institutional capacity for economic planning, institutional coordination and service delivery at the state level. The institutional vacuum created over the last four decades implies that almost all key public and private sector institutions suffer from weak strategic and policy-making capacities, lack strategic and inter-organisational coordination frameworks and suffer from a shortage of technical expertise. Essential reforms are required in these areas to enable a future Libyan government to begin formulating the country’s post-revolution economic strategy. However, once the security situation stabilises, Libya will have two opportunities at its disposal that could ensure a fast recovery and rapid and sustainable economic growth. First, its immense hydrocarbon base provides ample financial resources that, if utilised efficiently, could spark off a process of economic diversification and employment generation, efficient public service delivery and an enhanced national investment strategy. Second, Libya’s strategic presence in Africa, a continent with some of the world’s fastest growing income and economic growth rates, provides it with an unrivalled regional investment opportunity. With an already-existent portfolio of investments across the continent, through SWFs such as the Libya African Investment Portfolio, the country is in prime position to reform and expand its investments across the growing and emerging economies of Africa. Though it is hard to see beyond today’s gloomy landscape, Libya does have access to massive untapped natural resources and regional markets that could, once an internal negotiated political solution is reached, make Libya one of the fastest growing economies in the region.

Sahar Taghdisi Rad was the Senior Country Economist for Libya at the African Development Bank, 2012-14. She is currently a Senior Teaching Fellow in economics at SOAS and a Visiting Lecturer in development economics at the University of Westminster

Opposite) Post-2011 graffiti on the walls of the old town (madina) of Tripoli

(Below) The road sign for the Tripoli airport, the battleground for the militias in summer 2014, and closed down ever since due to severe destruction
The revolution and civil war in Libya in 2011 has produced chaos and crisis in its wake in the aftermath of international engagement that played so significant a role in the destruction of the Qaddafi regime. Publications are now beginning to emerge which seek to explain what happened, both during the civil war and as a result of its aftermath. This book is by far the best to emerge to date; it has the advantage that most of its thirteen contributors were actually involved in the Libyan crisis, many of them on behalf of the United Nations.

The first five chapters deal with issues connected with the civil war in the six months between February and October 2011. They discuss the actual course of the revolution, the spontaneous emergence of a guiding body that acquired international recognition (the National Transitional Council), the revolutionary capture of Tripoli, the NATO intervention in support of the ‘responsibility to protect’, the role of the United Nations and transitional justice in the immediate aftermath of the war. One aspect that is not discussed in detail is the issue of the interventions by the US, France, Britain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to achieve ‘regime change’.

The second half of the book consists of detailed studies of the main players in the difficult and, as yet unsuccessful, process of reconstructing the Libyan state. They range from the Islamist movements – an excellent study of moderates and extremists – to the federalist movement in Cyrenaica, as well as covering the emergence of Misurata, Zintan and the Jabal Nafusa as the major centres of the complex militia movement, which is the main challenge to government and the state in Libya. The book concludes with analyses of Qaddafi loyalists in Bani Walid and of Libya’s major groups with roots in the Sahara and the Sahel, the Tuareg and the Tibu.

In one sense, any book of this kind, which deals with evolving contemporary political situations, is condemned to be out-of-date as soon as it is published. The editors of this volume have addressed this issue wisely by not trying to provide a continuous history of Libya since the revolution began in February 2011. Instead, they have focussed on the main players and events that have defined the crisis that Libya faces today. Given the contributors’ practical experience of the issues they address, this provides the reader with the information needed to facilitate an understanding of the political chaos created today by two parliaments and two governments, each supported by its own powerful militia coalition.

The text is accompanied by copious notes and references, although these are, rather annoyingly, separated from the actual chapters to which they refer, a feature which makes it more difficult than need be to make use of them. There are also no maps, an omission that will hinder the non-specialist reader from fully appreciating the often-complicated spatial interactions and interrelationships that have affected the evolution of events there. Yet, apart from these minor irritations, this is a very satisfying set of studies by practitioners and policy analysts that is illuminating to both specialists and non-specialists of the Libyan scene.

As such, this book provides much of the detail that has been missing from the literature on contemporary Libya. It explains, for instance, the significance of Misurata, the causes of eastern federalism, the complex societies of the Jabal Nafusa, the reasons for the substantial residue of loyalty to the former regime and the way in which the Libyan crisis is related to instability and insecurity in the Sahel.

It is, in short, a valuable addition to our understanding of the complexity of modern Libya and the reasons why its revolution seems to have disintegrated within what could soon become a failed state on the periphery of Europe.

George Joffé is a member of the Editorial Board and teaches the international relations of the Middle East and North Africa at the University of Cambridge. Previously he taught in the Geography Department in SOAS and was Deputy-Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
**Tehran Noir**

Edited by Salar Abdoh

This anthology contains pieces by a collection of Iranian writers: Gina B. Nahai, Salar Abdoh, Lily Farhadpour, Azardokht Bahrami, Yourik Karim-Mashi, Vali Khalili, Farhaad Heidari Gooran, Aida Moradi Ahani, Mahsa Mohebali, Majed Neisi, Danial Haghighi, Javad Afhami, Sima Saeedi, Mahak Taheri and Hossein Abkenar. Most of them live and publish novels in Iran and their narratives – set in the capital city, Tehran – address social, economic and cultural issues. The women's tales have noticeable anti-poverty, anti-racist and feminist messages; they challenge censorship and capital punishment in Iran. Similar to other Noir literature, these fictions slip in and out of reality: the central characters are victims, perpetrators and sometimes both. The adoption of violence and pornography in some of the stories simultaneously highlights the degeneration of society and a way to struggle against injustices.


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**Manufactured Crisis: The Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare**

By Gareth Porter

For years now Israel, US officials and much of the mainstream media have maintained a steady drumbeat of allegations that the government of Iran has been pursuing a secret, “military” adjunct to its civilian nuclear program. Numerous western officials and commentators have warned that there will be a time coming very soon, beyond which this alleged military nuclear program will be unstoppable. But where is the evidence that this program even exists? In this book, investigative journalist Gareth Porter shows how Israel and the George W. Bush administration portrayed the actions taken by western nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as responses to a long history of Iranian covert work on militarisation of its nuclear program. In reality, however, the United States had intervened aggressively as early as 1983 to prevent Iran from pursuing its legitimate right to peaceful nuclear power.

February 2014, Just World Books, £17.00

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**Palestine Speaks: Narratives of Life Under Occupation**

Edited by Mateo Hoke and Cate Malek

For more than six decades, Israel and Palestine have been at the centre of one of the world’s most widely reported yet least understood human rights crises. In *Palestine Speaks* men and women from the West Bank and Gaza describe in their own words how their lives have been shaped by the conflict. This includes eyewitness accounts of the most recent attacks on Gaza in 2014. The collection includes the stories of Ebtihaj, whose son, born during the first Intifada, was killed by Israeli soldiers during a night raid almost 20 years later, and Nader, a professional marathon runner from the Gaza Strip who is determined to pursue his dream of competing in international races despite countless challenges.

January 2015, Verso Books, £14.99
Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation

By Theodor Hanf

For 15 years, Lebanon’s disparate confessional groups waged a protracted civil war. Today, power-sharing between Sunni, Shi’i, Christian and Druze groups is a precarious balance, greatly affected by and in turn affecting events across the Middle East. But even during times of conflict, Lebanon’s communities have managed a modicum of coexistence. Tracing the origins of the civil war, Theodor Hanf shows that it was primarily a surrogate war over Palestine, which escalated into a conflict between the diverse Lebanese communities. Hanf’s central theme is the problem of conflict and conflict regulation between these groups. This book delves into vital issues – such as how conflicts were peacefully regulated before the war and how the country came to be a battlefield for proxy wars – and analyses the prospects for permanent coexistence.

December 2014, IB Tauris, £25.00

The Kurds of Iraq: Nationalism and Identity in Iraqi Kurdistan

By Mahir A. Aziz

Over 90 years since their absorption into the modern Iraqi state, the Kurdish people of Iraq still remain an apparent anomaly in the modern world – a nation without a state. In The Kurds of Iraq, Mahir Aziz explores this incongruity and asks who are the Kurds today? What is their relationship to the Iraqi state? How do they perceive themselves and their prospective political future? And in what way are they crucial for the stability of the Iraqi state? The book examines the creation, evolution and development of Kurdish nationalism despite the suppression of its political and cultural manifestations, analysing wider issues of the intersection and interdependency of national, regional, ethnic, tribal and local identities.

October 2014, IB Tauris, £14.99

The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and Sectarianism

By Toby Matthiesen

Toby Matthiesen traces the politics of the Shi’a in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia from the 19th century until the present day. This book outlines the experiences of being Shi’a in a Wahhabi state and casts new light on how the Shi’a have mobilised politically to change their position. Shi’a petitioned the rulers, joined secular opposition parties and founded Islamist movements. Most Saudi Shi’a opposition activists profited from an amnesty in 1993 and subsequently found a place in civil society and the public sphere. However, since 2011 a new Shi’a protest movement has again challenged the state. The Other Saudis shows how exclusionary state practices created an internal Other and how sectarian discrimination has strengthened Shi’a communal identities.

Events in London

THE EVENTS and organisations listed below are not necessarily endorsed or supported by The Middle East in London. The accompanying texts and images are based primarily on information provided by the organisers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the compilers or publishers. While every possible effort is made to ascertain the accuracy of these listings, readers are advised to seek confirmation of all events using the contact details provided for each event.

Submitting entries and updates: please send all updates and submissions for entries related to future events via e-mail to mepub@soas.ac.uk

BM – British Museum, Great Russell Street, London WC1B 3DG
SOAS – SOAS, University of London, Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG
LSE – London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2 2AE

APRIL EVENTS

Wednesday 1 April


6:30 pm | Gardens of Medieval Persia: From Patronage to Evolution (Lecture) Mohammad Gharipour, Morgan State University, Baltimore. Organised by: Iran Heritage Foundation. Historical accounts and chronicles as well as the Europeans’ travelogues, written between the 11th and 15th Centuries, indicate that Persian gardens played a crucial role as the main context for social and political events. In his lecture Gharipour addresses the patronage behind gardens of medieval Persia as well as their dynamic functionality as sites for pilgrimage, encampment, and administrative affairs. Tickets: £10. Asia House, 63 New Cavendish Street, London W1G 7LP. T 02036512121 E astrid@iranheritage.org W wwwiranheritage.org

7:00 pm | My House in Damascus (Discussion) Organised by: The Mosaic Rooms. Join author, Guardian contributor and authority on Syria, Diana Darke, in conversation with Zahed Taj-Eddin, to celebrate the launch of My House in Damascus: An Inside View of the Syrian Revolution (new edition), and to discuss the war’s threat to and destruction of Syria’s historic monuments and sites.

Monday 13 April
9:00 am | The Second Annual Conference of the British Association for Islamic Studies (Three-Day Conference: Monday 13 - Wednesday 15 April) Organised by: British Association for Islamic Studies (BRAIS) in collaboration with the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and Human Rights Consortium, School of Advanced Study, University of London. Tickets: Various. Senate House, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU. T 0131 650 4165 E bras@ed.ac.uk W www.brais.ac.uk/2015

Tuesday 14 April
9:00 am | The Second Annual Conference of the British Association for Islamic Studies (Three-Day Conference: Monday 13 - Wednesday 15 April) See event listing on Monday 13 April.

Wednesday 15 April
9:00 am | The Second Annual Conference of the British Association for Islamic Studies (Three-Day Conference: Monday 13 - Wednesday 15 April) See event listing on Monday 13 April.

6:30 pm | (Panel Discussion) Iranian architects and designers Mehran Gharleghi and Amin Sadeghy will be joined by musician and filmmaker Roxana Vilk, author, journalist and broadcaster Kamin Mohammadi and The Courtauld Institute of Art's Susan Babaie in a panel discussion on the evolution of architecture in Iran to mark the opening of the exhibition Evolution: Art, Design & Architecture (see Exhibitions listings). Admission free. Asia House, 63 New Cavendish Street, London W1G 7LP. T 020 7307 5454 E enquiries@asiahouse.co.uk W http://asiahouse.org

Thursday 16 April
6:30 pm | BIAA Oliver Gurney Memorial Lecture: Exploring the early history of British archaeology in Turkey and Syria (Lecture) Nicolò Marchetti, University of Bologna. Organised by: British Institute at Ankara (BIAA). Archaeologist Nicolò Marchetti showcases new evidence from British archaeologists between 1876 and 1920 from the excavation site at Karkemish between Turkey and Syria. Tickets: BIAA members free/£10 non-BIAA Members. British Academy,
Friday 17 April

10:00 am | Shell Gold (Two-Day Workshop: Friday 17 – Saturday 18 April) ’Shell gold’ is the term given to finely powdered gold with a gum Arabic binder, learn how to make and use fine gold pigment which is used as a water-based paint for a variety of effects in manuscript painting and illumination. Tickets: £220.00 plus £20 to cover the cost of gold and containers. Studio 3, First Floor Offices, 1-7 Woburn Walk, London WC1H 0JJ. T 020 3556 7075 E anitachowdry@talktalk.net W https://anitachowdry.wordpress.com/homepage/

Saturday 18 April

10:00 am | Shell Gold (Two-Day Workshop: Friday 17 – Saturday 18 April) See event listing on Friday 17 April.

Monday 20 April

6:00 pm | Revealing ‘Invisible’ Greek Magical Texts from the Levant (Lecture) Kathryn Piquette, Cologne Center for eHumanities, Universität zu Köln. Organised by: Anglo Israel Archaeological Society and the Institute of Archaeology, UCL. Admission free. Lecture Theatre G6, Ground Floor, Institute of Archaeology, UCL, 31-34 Gordon Square, London WC1H 0PY. T 020 8349 5754 W www.aias.org.uk

7:00 pm | Sir John Malcolm (Lecture) Organised by: The Iran Society. John Malcolm, who has recently published a biography of his namesake and kinsman, Sir John Malcolm (1769-1833), Malcolm – Soldier, Diplomat, Ideologue of British India, will be discussing Sir John’s role as envoy to Persia and writer of the History of Persia. Admission free for Society members and one guest. Pall Mall Room, The Army & Navy Club, 36-39 Pall Mall, London SW1Y 5JN (Dress code calls for gentlemen to wear jacket and tie). T 020 7235 5122 E info@iransociety.org W www.iransociety.org / www.therag.co.uk

Tuesday 21 April

10.00 am | Islamic Art Auction Organised by: Roseberys London. Roseberys Auctioneers in London will be holding their first in a series of Islamic Art auctions. The sale will include paintings, sculpture, artefacts and works of art, and is open to the public with viewing of all items permissible at the London saleroom prior to the auction. Admission free. Roseberys London, 74/76 Knights Hill, London SE27 0JD. T 020 8761 2522 E auctions@roseberys.co.uk W www.roseberys.co.uk

10:30 am | Oriental Rugs and Carpets (Auction) Admission free. Christie’s, King Street, 8 King Street, St James’s, London SW1Y 6QT. T 020 7839 9060 W www.christies.com

Wednesday 22 April

7:00 pm | The muqarnas Wooden Ceiling in the Palatine Chapel of Palermo (Lecture) Fabrizio Agnelli, University of Palermo, Sicily. Organised by: Islamic Art Circle at SOAS. Part of the Islamic Art Circle at SOAS Lecture Programme. Admission free. Khalili Lecture Theatre, SOAS, SOAS. T 0771 408 7480 E rosalindhaddon@gmail.com W www.soas.ac.uk/art/islac/
Friday 24 April

9:30 am | History in the Making: Arab Media and Processes of Remembering (Conference) Organised by: Arab Media Centre, CAMRI, University of Westminster. 10th Annual Arab Media Centre Conference. A one-day conference which will seek to address issues raised by the place of media in history, the function of media artefacts as historical sources, and the processes involved in documenting and storing media images and accounts that will make the past accessible to future generations. It will include a keynote address by Kay Dickinson, Montreal, plenary sessions, parallel workshops and a book launch. Tickets: £110/£59 students. Pre-registration advised. University of Westminster, 309 Regent Street, London W1B 2UW. E lh2@soas.ac.uk W www.soas.ac.uk/lmei/events/

Monday 27 April

7:00 pm | Saudi Arabia: A Kingdom in Peril? (Panel Discussion) Organised by: Frontline Club. The new leader of Saudi Arabia, King Salman, pledged continuity after his accession to the throne following the death of his half-brother, King Abdullah. A panel of experts will be looking at the situation within Saudi Arabia and the changes we might see under the new king, as well as discussing its influence and actions in the region and relations with the West. Tickets: £12.50/£10 students & 65+. Frontline Club, 13 Norfolk Place, London W2 1QI. T 020 7479 8940 E events@frontlineclub.com W www.frontlineclub.com

Wednesday 29 April

TBC | A Concert of Muwashshah Songs from Medieval Andalus Organised by: Maqam Society @ SOAS. Concert, to take place in Whitechapel, in the East End of London, a neighbourhood with a long Jewish history which today has a predominantly Muslim community, which celebrates the rich tradition of Arabic and Jewish dance song known as muwashshah and zajal – a tradition which began with the Arab and Jewish poets of medieval al-Andalus, and continues up to the present day. Tickets and venue TBC. E ed emery@soas.ac.uk

Thursday 30 April

TBC | Social Change in Turkey since the Year 2000 (Two-Day Conference: Thursday 30 April – Friday 1 May) Organised by: Contemporary Turkish Studies, LSE. Tickets TBC. LSE. T 020 7935 6067 E euroinst.turkish.studies@lse.ac.uk W www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/ContemporaryTurkishStudies/Home.aspx

Wednesday 29 April

7:30 pm | Haunted (Maskoon) (Film) Organised by: The Mosaic Rooms. First feature documentary by Syrian director Liwaa Yazji which explores what it means to flee war and the Syrian people’s relationship with their homes during the war. What is a home – in a physical and metaphorical sense? And how do people feel when they are forced to leave? 112 min. In Arabic with English subtitles. Tickets: £6.50 online (no booking fee)/£7.50 on the door. The Mosaic Rooms, A.M. Qattan Foundation, Tower House, 226 Cromwell Road, London SW5 0SW. T 020 7370 9990 E info@mosaicrooms.org W www.mosaicrooms.org

Thursday 23 April

10:30 am | Art of the Islamic and Indian Worlds (Auction) Admission free. Christie’s, King Street, 8 King Street, St James’s, London SW1Y 6QT. T 020 7839 9060 W www.christies.com

7:00 pm | Land of the Turquoise Mountains: Journeys Across Iran (Talk) Organised by: British Council, I.B. Tauris and the Centre for Iranian Studies, LMEI, SOAS and the SOAS Iranian Society. Talk by Cyrus Massoudi about his travels in Iran and his book Land of the Turquoise Mountains: Journeys Across Iran (I.B. Tauris, 2014). Wanting to make sense of his roots and piece together the divided, divisive and deeply contradictory puzzle that is contemporary Iran, Massoudi, a British-born Iranian, spent three years travelling across the country, encountering the Iran behind the headlines. Admission free. DLT, SOAS. T 020 7898 4330/4490 E vp6@soas.ac.uk / lh2@soas.ac.uk W www.soas.ac.uk/lmei-cis/events/

Untitled, 2014. Mixed media and collage on paper, 50 x 70cm. Image courtesy of the the artist and Kashya Hildebrand, London. Memory of a City (See Exhibitions, p.34)
April – May 2015 The Middle East in London 29

6:00 pm | The Path of Justice: Rašnu and the Cosmography of the Rašn Yašt (Lecture) Leon Goldman, SOAS. Organised by: Department for the Study of Religions, SOAS in association with The World Zoroastrian Organisation. Eighteenth Dastur Dr Sohrab Hormasji Kutar Memorial Lecture. In the Zoroastrian tradition, the concept of ‘justice’ is represented by the divine judge, or Rašnu. Goldman charts Rašnu’s path across the universe and argues that the Avestan hymn known as the Rašn Yəšt, which depicts Rašnu’s sphere of judicial activity, reveals a complex set of numerical and spatial patterns. Admission free. Khalili Lecture Theatre, SOAS.

6:00 pm | The Water Crisis in Yemen (Lecture) Christopher Ward, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter. Organised by: The British-Yemeni Society (BYS) in association with the London Middle East Institute, SOAS (LMEI). Tickets: £10/£5 BYS members. Pre-booking advised. MBI Al Jaber Conference Room, London Middle East Institute, SOAS (LMEI), University of London, MBI Al Jaber Building, 21 Russell Square, London WC1B 5EA. T 020 7731 3260 E allfreea@gmail.com W www.soas.ac.uk/ lmei/events/;

EVENTS OUTSIDE LONDON

Wednesday 8 April

TBC | Symposia Iranica (Two-Day Conference: Wednesday 8 - Thursday 9 April) Biennial international graduate conference on Iranian studies featuring over 30 panels and more than 100 presenters. Tickets: Visit website below for ticket information. Downing College, Cambridge CB2 1DQ. W http://symposiairanica.com/

Thursday 9 April

TBC | Symposia Iranica (Two-Day Conference: Wednesday 8 - Thursday 9 April) See event listing on Thursday 9 April.

Thursday 23 April


Saturday 25 April

10:00 am | BATAS 26th Spring Symposium Organised by: British Association for Turkish Area Studies (BATAS). Tickets: Various. Pre-registration required by 20 April for lunch to be included. Nissan Lecture Theatre, St Antony’s College, 62 Woodstock Road, Oxford OX2 6JF. E rezan.muir@gmail.com W http://batas.org.uk

MAY EVENTS

Friday 1 May

TBC | Social Change in Turkey since the Year 2000 (Two-Day Conference: Thursday 30 April – Friday 1 May) See event listing on Thursday 30 April.

Until 24 June | Iranian Cinema After the Revolution (Film) Organised by: British Council and the Wales One World Film Festival. A season of film screenings focussing on a generation of internationally acclaimed Iranian filmmakers who have opened a window on contemporary Iran during a time of great social change. Tickets: Various. Cinemas across Wales and the the UK. E ukiranseason@britishcouncil.org W www.wowfilmfestival.com / www.britishcouncil.ir/underline/

Sunday 3 May

TBC | Muwashshah and Zajal Conference (Two-Day Conference Sunday 3 - Monday 4 May) Fifth in a series of conferences (Exeter, Madrid, SOAS) devoted to the topic spanning the whole historical range of Arabic and Hebrew tawshih poetry from the beginnings in the tenth century to the present day, in all geographical regions. Tickets: Various. SOAS. E ed.emery@soas.ac.uk

8:30 pm | Arabic Music Session @ The Cockpit: The Muwashshah Dance Songs of Al-Andalus and Elsewhere Musical session with the SOAS Arabic Band and friends associated with the weekend conference on muwashshah and zajal which is being organised at SOAS on Sunday 3 – Monday 4 May 2015, see above event listing. Tickets: Various. Cockpit Theatre, Gateforth Street, London NW8 8EH. E ed.emery@soas.ac.uk W www.facebook.com/arabicmusicsoas

Front Line, 2007. Courtesy of the artist and Kalfayan Galleries, Greece. Imagined Futures (See Exhibitions, p.34)
SOAS, University of London, is pleased to announce the availability of several scholarships in its Centre for Iranian Studies (CIS).

The Centre, established in 2010, draws upon the range of academic research and teaching across the disciplines of SOAS, including Languages and Literature, the Study of Religions, History, Economics, Politics, International Relations, Music, Art and Media and Film Studies. It aims to build close relations with likeminded institutions and to showcase and foster the best of contemporary Iranian talent in art and culture.

**MA in Iranian Studies**

In 2012/13 CIS members successfully launched an interdisciplinary MA in Iranian Studies, the first of its kind, which will be offered again in 2015/16.

Thanks to the generosity of the Fereydoun Djam Charitable Trust, a number of Kamran Djam scholarships are available for BA, MA and MPhil/PhD studies.

**For further details, please contact:**

**Scholarships Officer**
E: scholarships@soas.ac.uk
T: +44 (0)20 7074 5091/5094
W: www.soas.ac.uk/scholarships

**Centre for Iranian Studies**
Dr Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (Chair)
E: aa106@soas.ac.uk
T: +44 (0)20 7898 4747
W: www.soas.ac.uk/lmei-cis

**MA in Iranian Studies**
Dr Nima Mina (Department of the Languages and Culture of the Middle East)
E: nm46@soas.ac.uk
T: +44 (0)20 7898 4315
W: www.soas.ac.uk/nme/programmes/ma-in-iranian-studies

**Student Recruitment**
T: +44(0)20 7898 4034
E: study@soas.ac.uk
Monday 4 May

TBC | Muwashshah and Zajal Conference (Two-Day Conference Sunday 3 - Monday 4 May) See event listing on Sunday 3 May.

Wednesday 6 May

6:30 pm | I/Eye in Conflict: Silvered Water, Syria Self Portrait + Screen Talk with Ossama Mohammed (Film) Part of I/Eye in Conflict: Personal stories from the Middle East. Dirs Ossama Mohammed & Wiam Simav Bedirxan (2014), Syria/France, 90 min. Exiled in Paris since 2011, filmmaker Ossama Mohammed tries to make sense of what is happening in his homeland, Syria through a collection of footage from thousands of online videos that document the everyday atrocities in Syria, combined with footage by Wiam Simav Bedirxan a young Kurdish woman in Homs. Tickets: Various. Cinema 2, Barbican Centre, Silk Street, London EC2Y 8DS. T 020 7638 8891 W www.barbican.org.uk

Thursday 7 May

4:00 pm | Iain Browning Memorial Lecture: Jerusalem’s First Mosque and the Entrance to Bayt al-Maqdis in the 7th Century (Lecture) Beatrice St Laurent, Bridgewater State University. Organised by: Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF). Part of the PEF Free Anniversary Lecture Series. Admission free. Pre-registration required T 020 7323 8181 W www.britishmuseum.org BP Lecture Theatre, Clore Education Centre, BM. T 020 7935 5379 E ExecSec@pef.org.uk W www.pef.org.uk

Saturday 9 May

TBC | The Camel Conference at SOAS (Two-Day Conference: Saturday 9 - Sunday 10 May) The third in the biennial series of conferences on camels and camel cultures worldwide. Admission free. DLT, SOAS. E ed.emery@soas.ac.uk W www.soas.ac.uk/history/

Sunday 10 May

TBC | The Camel Conference at SOAS (Tow-Day Conference: Saturday 9 - Sunday 10 May) See event listing on Saturday 9 May.

Monday 11 May

TBC | Encountering the Past in Turkey (Three-Day Conference: Monday 11 - Wednesday 13 May) Organised by: Contemporary Turkish Studies, LSE. Tickets TBC. LSE. T 020 7955 6067 E euroinst.turkish.studies@lse.ac.uk W www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/ContemporaryTurkishStudies/Home.aspx


Tuesday 12 May

TBC | Encountering the Past in Turkey (Three-Day Conference: Monday 11 - Wednesday 13 May) See event listing on Monday 11 May.

Wednesday 13 May

TBC | Encountering the Past in Turkey (Three-Day Conference: Monday 11 - Wednesday 13 May) See event listing on Monday 11 May.

6:30 pm | I/Eye in Conflict: My Love Awaits me by the Sea (PG*) + Screen Talk with Mais Darwazah via Skype (Film) Part of I/Eye in Conflict: Personal stories from the Middle East. Dir Mais Darwazah (2013), 79 min. Director Darwazah (Take Me Home, The Dinner) leaves a secluded life in Amman, journeying to Palestine to seek out a lover she's never met – the late Palestinian artist Hasan Hourani. In Arabic with English subtitles. Followed by a screen talk with director. Tickets: Various. Cinema 2, Barbican Centre, Silk Street, London EC2Y 8DS. T 020 7638 8891 W www.barbican.org.uk

7:00 pm | The ‘Cairo Street’ at the World’s Columbian Exposition of 1893 in Chicago (Lecture) István Ormos, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. Organised by: Islamic Art Circle at SOAS. Part of the Islamic Art Circle at SOAS Lecture Programme. Admission free. Room B104, Brunei Gallery, SOAS. T 0771 408 7480 E rosalindhaddon@gmail.com W www.soas.ac.uk/art/islac/

Saturday 16 May

4:00 pm | I/Eye in Conflict: The Mulberry House (15*) + Screen Talk (Film) Part of I/Eye in Conflict: Personal stories from the Middle East. Dir Sara Ishaq (2013), Yemen/Syria/UK, 64 min. After 10 years in Scotland, Sara Ishaq travels back to her childhood home of Yemen. She hopes to feel at home in the place that was once so close to her heart but the

Mariwan Jal. Autonomous Gallery. (See Exhibitions, p.34)

April – May 2015 The Middle East in London 31
complications soon become clear + Karama Has No Walls Dir Sara Ishaq (2012), Czech Republic, 26 min. Short documentary on the day that changed the course of Yemen's 2011 revolution (Friday of Karama [Dignity], March 18 2011). Tickets: Various. Cinema 2, Barbican Centre, Silk Street, London EC2Y 8DS. T 020 7638 8891 W www.barbican.org.uk

11:00 am | Persian Poetry Day Organised by: Iran Heritage Foundation in collaboration with Asia House. A celebration of Persian poetry, focusing on the theme of love and devotion, with lectures by Ahmad Karimi-Hakkak, SOAS and Alan Williams, University of Manchester, accompanied by intervals of poetry reading by Narguess Farzad, SOAS. Tickets: £20 (includes lunch). Asia House, 63 New Cavendish Street, London W1G 7LP. T 02036512121 E astrid@iranheritage.org W www.iranheritage.org

Sunday 17 May

6:00 pm | I/Eye in Conflict: Waves (Moug) (15*) + Screen Talk (Film) Part of I/Eye in Conflict: Personal stories from the Middle East. Dir Ahmed Nour (2014), Egypt, 71 min. In Waves the 30-year-old filmmaker from Suez, Ahmed Nour, invites audiences to share his perception of five special periods of his life, each portrayed as a wave, as he attempts to capture the essence of the generation of the Egyptian revolution. Tickets: Various. Cinema 2, Barbican Centre, Silk Street, London EC2Y 8DS. T 020 7638 8891 W www.barbican.org.uk

Wednesday 20 May

6:30 pm | Oriental Rug and Textile Society AGM and Show and Tell Event with Moroccan and Algerian Items Organised by: The Oriental Rug and Textile Society (ORTS). Bring your material for analysis and discussion. Some members will bring Moroccan and Algerian items for the Show and Tell so the evening will have a Maghreb flavour and Behnaz Atighi Moghaddam from the V&A will give a talk on Moroccan textiles. Tickets: £7 non-members/£5 non-member students (£20 for membership with one year of 11 events). St James Piccadilly Conference Room, 197 Piccadilly, London W1J 9LL. T 020 7639 7593 E membership@orientalrugandtextilesociety.org.uk / www.orientalrugandtextilesociety.org.uk / www.orts.org.uk

Thursday 21 May

5:45 pm | Quarry Workers, Quarry Marks and High Living at Gebel El Silsila, Egypt (Lecture) Sarah K. Doherty, MBI Al Jaber Foundation; archaeologist & ceramicist. Organised by: MBI Al Jaber Foundation. Part of the MBI Al Jaber Foundation Lecture Series. Admission free. Pre-registration required. MBI Al Jaber Conference Room, London Middle East Institute, SOAS (LMEI), University of London, MBI Al Jaber Building, 21 Russell Square, London WC1B 5EA. E info@mbifoundation.com W www.mbifoundation.com

Friday 22 May

9:30 am | Middle East and Central Asia Music Forum Organised by: Middle East and Central Asia Music Forum and the Institute of Musical Research. Followed by a book launch at 6:00pm: Laudan Nooshin Iranian Classical Music: The Discourses and Practice of Creativity (Ashgate Press, SOAS Musicology Series, published February 2015) and an evening concert at 7:00pm. Admission free. Pre-registration required. Room AG09, College Building, City University London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB. E l.nooshin@city.ac.uk W www.city.ac.uk/events/2015/may/middle-east-and-central-asia-music-forum

Tuesday 26 May

Wednesday 27 May

6:15 pm | I/Eye in Conflict: TransX Istanbul (15*) + Screen Talk (Film) Part of I/Eye in Conflict: Personal stories from the Middle East. Dir Maria Binder (2013), Turkey/Germany 114 min. Thousands of transwomen live in the big cities of Turkey. Since 2009 there has been an increase in the murder of trans* people but the perpetrators can usually rely on being exempted from prosecution. Ebru K, a transwoman from Istanbul, fights against the displacement and murder of her companions. Tickets: Various. Cinema 2, Barbican Centre, Silk Street, London EC2Y 8DS. T 020 7638 8891 W www.barbican.org.uk

Thursday 28 May

4:30 pm | The Palimpsest of Agrarian Change (Talk) Martha Mundy, LSE; Rami Zurayk, American University of Beirut. Organised by: LSE Middle East Centre. Food insecurity and ‘land grabs’ are very much in the news for the Middle East as for neighbouring regions such as Africa. Martha Mundy and Rami Zurayk present their research on agrarian change in Lebanon, taking comparative case studies of the village of Sinay in the south and Akkar in the east of the country. Admission free. Pre-registration required. Room 9.04, Clement’s Inn, LSE. Chair: Michael Mason, LSE. T 020 7955 6198 E s.sfeir@lse.ac.uk W www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/

EVENTS OUTSIDE LONDON

Thursday 7 May

5:15 pm | Title TBC (Lecture) Sir Richard Dearlove KCMG OBE. Organised by: Centre of Islamic Studies, Cambridge. Part of the seminar series Turbulent World: Maghrib, Mashriq and Gulf in the New Era of Uncertainty. Admission free. Thomas Gray Room, Pembroke College, Cambridge. E cis@cis.cam.ac.uk W www.cis.cam.ac.uk/lectures

Tuesday 12 May

5:00 pm | Modern Jewish and Islamic Philosophy (Panel Discussion) Moshe Behar, University of Manchester. Organised by: Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cambridge and the Woolf Institute. Panel Series: Muslim-Jewish Relations. Chair: Daniel Weiss, University of Cambridge. Admission free. Rooms 8-9, Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (FAMES), Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DA. E enquiries@woolf.cam.ac.uk

Saturday 23 May


Sunday 24 May

EXHIBITIONS

Until 2 April | **Iranian Urban Art**
Exhibition of top Iranian graffiti artists from around the world with free documentary film screenings, rap, graffiti workshops and academic panel discussions with luminaries such as Ala Ehtekar. Admission free. Graffik Gallery, 284 Portobello Road London W10 5TE. T 020 8354 3592 E art@graffikgallery.co.uk W http://graffikgallery.com

Until 10 April | **Perception**
Exhibition and installation by the Iranian visual artist Mehdi Ghadyanloo featuring original works and a sculptural installation exploring the concept of time and space through perspectival illusion. Ghadyanloo’s work encapsulates a sense of suspension in the life experience of most Iranians whose lives are dictated by outside forces and their future always uncertain. Admission free. Howard Griffin Gallery (London), 189 Shoreditch High Street, London E1 6HU. T 020 7739 9970 E london@howardgriffinart.co.uk W http://howardgriffinart.co.uk

Until 14 April | **Memory of a City**
For Syrian artist Khaled Al-Saa’i, Arabic calligraphy is a medium for expressing feelings, thoughts, and sensations without becoming tied to the language. In Memory of a City he reflects on the recent events that have ravaged his homeland and presents a new direction in his work with the inclusion of mixed media collage and layering, alongside non-Arabic script, such as Chinese characters and English letters. Admission free. Kashya Hildebrand, 22 Eastcastle Street, London W1W 8DE. T 020 3588 1195 W www.kashyahildebrand.org/

Until 25 April | **Imagined Futures**
First UK solo exhibition by Hrair Sarkissian showcasing two projects that deal with issues of temporality: Front Line (2007) draws on the artist’s Armenian identity to contemplate the predicament of a people and place with an unknown political destiny. Homesick (2014) depicts the artist destroying an architecturally-precise, scaled replica of his parents’ home in Damascus. Admission free. The Mosaic Rooms, 226 Cromwell Road, London SW5 0SW. T 020 7370 9990 E info@mosaicrooms.org W http://mosaicrooms.org/

Until 25 April, 2015 | **Autonomous Gallery**
The Gallery, which was founded under the principle of exploring contemporary affairs in a localised setting through the medium of Art, Visual Information, and Direct Communication, explores the theme ‘Conflict and Future of the Middle East’. By identifying key themes, the gallery sets forth potential narratives designed to raise awareness and provoke discussion. Admission free. P21 Gallery, 21 Chalton Street, London NW1 1JD. T 020 7121 6190 E info@p21.org.uk W www.p21.org.uk

Until 15 May | **Spirit of Nowruz**
As part of its UK-Iran Season of Culture, the British Council is running an exhibition to celebrate modern Nowruz festivities as they occur in communities across the world. Curated by Haleh Anvari the exhibition focuses on digital art and photography from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan and highlights how diverse and widespread this annual cultural festival is. Admission free. British Council, 10 Spring Gardens, London SW1A 2BN. T 020 7389 4385

**Monday 13 April**

Until 24 April | **Evolution: Art, Design & Architecture**
Iranian architects and designers Mehran Gharleghi and Amin Sadeghy showcase their research on a series of selected buildings in Iran revealing the sustainable strategies devised by Persian master builders, with the contemporary application of this research revealed through a number of architectural and design projects. See event listing on Tuesday 14 April for details of a panel discussion to mark the opening of the exhibition. Admission free. Asia House, 63 New Cavendish Street, London W1G 7LP. T 020 7307 5454 E enquiries@asi.house.co.uk W www.asiahouse.org

**Thursday 16 April**

Until 20 June | **The Tentmakers of Islamic Cairo**
In the labyrinthine milieu of old Cairo, in the vicinity of Bab Zuwayla, craftsmen have been producing textiles of both utility and beauty for centuries. Intended originally for tents, these decorative pieces of stitched cotton - known as khayamiyya - have long attracted local Cairoines as well as distant travellers. Photographer Massimiliano Fusari captures the tentmakers at work as stitchers and sellers, their medieval street and its changing neighbourhood, and the uses to which the textiles are put in daily Cairene life. Admission free. Brunei Gallery, SOAS. T 020 7898 4046 E gallery@soas.ac.uk W www.soas.ac.uk/gallery/

**Saturday 16 May**

10:00 am | **Veil**
Installation examining what it means to be a Muslim woman in Britain today. Three domes hang down, each forming a bubble of sound with a distinct voice. As part of the installation, a number of British Muslim women were interviewed and their voices recorded. Moving around, you hear their stories. Admission free. Includes three live ticketed (£10/£5) performances throughout the day. Spirit Level (Blue Room) at Royal Festival Hall, Southbank Centre, Belvedere Road, London SE1 8XX. T 020 7960 4200 W www.southbankcentre.co.uk
An intensive five-week programme which includes two courses: an Arabic Language Course (introductory or intermediate) and another on ‘Government and Politics of the Middle East' or 'Culture and Society in the Middle East'.

Beginners Arabic (Level 1)
This is an introductory course in Modern Standard Arabic. It teaches students the Arabic script and provides basic grounding in Arabic grammar and syntax. On completing the course, students should be able to read, write, listen to and understand simple Arabic sentences and passages. This course is for complete beginners and does not require any prior knowledge or study of Arabic.

Beginners Arabic (Level 2)
This course is a continuation of Beginners Arabic Level 1. It completes the coverage of the grammar and syntax of Modern Standard Arabic and trains students in reading, comprehending and writing with the help of a dictionary more complex Arabic sentences and passages.

To qualify for entry into this course, students should have already completed at least one introductory course in Arabic.

Government and Politics of the Middle East
This course provides an introduction to the politics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. It gives on a country by country basis, an overview of the major political issues and developments in the region since the end of the First World War and addresses key themes in the study of contemporary Middle East politics, including: the role of the military, social and economic development, political Islam, and the recent uprisings (the ‘Arab Spring').

Culture and Society in the Middle East
This course examines the major cultural patterns and institutions of the MENA region. It is taught through a study of some lively topics such as religious and ethnic diversity, impact of the West, stereotyping, the role of tradition, education (traditional and modern), family structure and value, gender politics, media, life in city, town and village, labour and labour migration, the Palestinian refugee problem and Arab exile communities, culinary cultures, music and media, etc.

FEES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Session (5 weeks)</th>
<th>Programme fee*</th>
<th>Accommodation fee**</th>
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<tr>
<td>22 June–23 July 2015 (two courses)</td>
<td>£2,500</td>
<td>from £300/week</td>
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* An early bird discount of 10% applies to course fees before 15 May 2015.

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