Migration and Conflict in the Horn of Africa:

A Desk Review and Proposal for Research

Submitted by staff of the Research and Evidence Facility For the EU Trust Fund for Africa Horn of Africa Window

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The Research and Evidence Facility (REF) Consortium is comprised of:

**SOAS**

Thornhaugh St, Russell Square
London WC1H 0XG
United Kingdom
www.soas.ac.uk
Team Leader: Laura Hammond
Communications Key Expert: Idil Osman
Eutf-hoa-ref@soas.ac.uk

**International Migration Institute**

Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University
3 Mansfield Road
Oxford OX1 3TB
United Kingdom
https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/
Migration & Development Key Expert: Oliver Bakewell

**Sahan Research Ltd**

Nairobi
Kenya
www.sahan.eu
Conflict & Governance Key Expert: Vincent Chordi
Research Coordinator: Caitlin Sturridge

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1 Executive summary

Population displacement and conflict are among the most significant contemporary problems facing the Horn of Africa. Political instability, economic deprivation, changing population dynamics, resource scarcity, and complex influences that travel back and forth between diaspora and home communities all combine to create an environment of flux, in which people are moving, sometimes out of choice but often in the absence of any positive choice, in search of a better life. Movement of refugees and irregular migrants towards Europe is extremely risky and is attracting a great deal of political attention. In 2015, it is estimated that over 1 million people entered Europe from Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Of these, it is estimated that 67,523 originated from the Horn of Africa (UNHCR figures).

As large as the numbers of refugees and irregular migrants entering Europe are, they are dwarfed by the numbers of people on the move within the Horn of Africa region. The vast majority of movement is undertaken for reasons related more to choice than force – people moving to take advantage of improved job prospects or educational opportunities, for instance, or as part of a livelihood strategy that is inherently mobile, such as pastoralism. Reliable data concerning the scale of mobility within the Horn of Africa is lacking. This is partly due to the fact that different databases track different kinds of flows – international movements within and out of the continent are tracked by such data sources as the World Bank’s Global Bilateral Migration Database and DEMIG C2C (Country to Country) Database (see also Ratha et al. 2011) – but internal movements are much more difficult to track. Some of the reasons for this are that the causes of internal movements are categorised differently by different analysts, and therefore may be included or excluded from databases, as well as the fact that a great deal of movement is irregular in the sense that it does not pass through legal channels and is therefore not officially counted, and that some migration is misreported (usually underreported, but in some cases overreported) for political reasons by countries concerned.

However UNHCR estimates that there are 3.1 million refugees in the region, and another 6.26 million IDPs. Most of the region’s displaced move across what are often short distances, often not crossing borders (and therefore undetected by many of the sources noted above) without either the intention or the realistic prospect of moving further outside the region towards Europe or another destination (Flahaux and De Haas, 2016). Many of the region’s displaced can be expected to remain in conditions of political and economic insecurity for decades. Mass displacement itself can be a trigger for further instability, creating a spiral in which people become trapped in a particular geographic location or condition of economic vulnerability.

In this Literature Review, we consider the state of research on migration, displacement and conflict in the Horn of Africa. We also consider the landscape of actors currently working on migration and conflict in the Horn, to identify areas that the efforts of the Research and Evidence Facility would be best placed to pursue over the coming two years.
Our literature review first considers the major population displacement and conflict hotspots within the region, and examines the types of mobility and displacement that have emanated from them. We then consider the following thematic areas:

a. Border Economies and Livelihoods, considering the ways in which migration takes place within and across border areas, and the extent to which dynamics within these areas contributes towards conflict and irregular migration. In this section we also consider rural-urban livelihoods and the ways in which migration influences them.

b. Population, age and gender. Each of these, individually and taken together, influences conflict and migration outcomes. We consider the issues and highlight key research available.

c. Dynamics of conflict and displacement, including an analysis of war economies, displacement and response strategies, and human trafficking and smuggling. We also consider evidence related to governance and conflict prevention and dynamics of forced displacement and irregular migration. In this section we are principally interested in the ways that conflict and irregular migration work to exacerbate one another. We are also interested in the impacts of efforts to support peacebuilding and respond to the needs of the displaced.

d. The Migration-Displacement Nexus and the need for evidence to inform questions about when and under what conditions development support may result in changes in the levels of irregular migration and displacement.

e. Finally, we turn the lens onto migration management practices, to document research on the legal and regulatory environment surrounding migration and mobility, the challenges to managing migration, the increasingly securitised nature of migration management, the governance of migration management at the sub-national level. We outline the array of actors engaged in migration management and the kinds of support they provide as well as the challenges and analytic questions that are worthy of attention in future research.

Our research suggests that there are five major themes of research in which we could provide much needed research expertise, and these form the core of the Research Agenda for the Research and Evidence Facility of the EU Trust Fund for Africa. The themes are:

1. Interactions between rural-urban, regional and international mobility

2. Experiences and impacts of voluntary, involuntary and diasporic return to countries of origin, including reintegration of ex-combatants.

3. Impacts of development changes on people’s movement choices and patterns of mobility, including consideration of the effectiveness of employment generation schemes (particularly targeted at youth) and evidence concerning the so-called ‘Brain Drain.’

4. Dynamics of cross-border economies and centre/periphery relations, including local tensions and conflicts and protection needs of displaced persons living in border areas.
5. Features and limitations of migration management systems and the role of regional collaboration

These themes are described in some detail at the end of this Review, but are also elaborated in more specific detail in the REF’s Proposed Research Agenda (See REF 2017).

2 Introduction

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was established in November 2015 to provide support programming aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict, displacement and irregular migration. Instability associated with these dynamics contributes to the fragility of governance and economic systems within the region and undermines resilience at all levels. The Horn of Africa window of the Trust Fund, valued at €700 million, consists of a range of programmes and projects designed to help communities, countries, and regional organisations address the challenges of conflict and displacement in the region.

The Research and Evidence Facility was established to provide research and evidence that directly relates to the projects and programmes implemented under the Trust Fund, as well as to provide a basis for monitoring of Trust Fund activities. The REF team, led by the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London and including the International Migration Institute at Oxford University and Sahan Research in Nairobi, is tasked with developing a strategy for research over the lifetime of the Trust Fund. The pillars of this strategy are aimed at providing research that supplements and complements other work being carried out by local and international actors, and that is directly focused on the areas with which Trust Fund activities are engaged.

This paper draws together the available literature on the themes of displacement, migration and conflict in Horn of Africa, highlighting the main findings and providing a critical analysis, with a view to identifying gaps and areas for future research. It lays the foundation for the proposed programme of research to be undertaken by the Research and Evidence Facility between December 2016 and November 2018. The programme of proposed research is provided in Section 11 of this report.

2.1 Sources and approaches

This report draws from published and unpublished literature, academic and that produced by NGOs and research institutions. We also carried out a preliminary mapping of organisations active in the region in research on conflict and migration. These include initiatives set up by service-providing NGOs, research-based organisations, as well as independent research commissioned by local or international organisations.

At the outset of the research process, a scoping workshop was held in July 2016 in Nairobi, Kenya. Participants included representatives of organisations involved in research and knowledge production related to conflict and migration in the region.

A key part of this workshop involved soliciting from participants their ideas about important areas where information and evidence are lacking. One of the main messages that
came from that discussion was the need to conduct research on conditions in areas of actual and potential return, particularly (but not only) in Somalia. Another key finding that came out of this workshop was that there is a need to create an information-sharing mechanism that those involved in this important work can take part in. This forms part of our plan for future work, as contained in Section 10.

This report sets out by outlining the key migration and conflict dynamics in the region as a whole. It then considers migration and conflict dynamics in each of the nine countries covered by the EU Trust Fund, focusing on issues common to each country in the region, and highlighting how they help shape people’s mobility patterns and choices. We start with the dynamics of livelihoods and conflict in the greater Horn of Africa that transect state boundaries. This points to the importance of examining borderland economies. We then turn to broader issues of demography, highlighting the growing population in the region, its relative youth and the implications for social change and migration, in particular the trend of urbanisation. The next section looks at how the dynamics of conflict and displacement have come to be entrenched to serve multiple interests; this creates a significant challenge for those wanting to change these patterns. The report then considers key literature and debates that relate to the relationship between migration and development. We consider the arguments, and evidence, concerning the relationship between positive development and migration, and conversely between underdevelopment and insecurity and displacement. We seek to break down this argument, to show where evidence is weak or not conclusive and where there does appear to be a clear correlation between development interventions and processes and prevention or resolution of displacement and conflict. We then consider the management of migration and conflict prevention, to show how the politics and practices of these forms of engagement can themselves shape conflict and migration outcomes.

We conclude with a proposed programme of research that addresses the main areas of research where we feel that the REF can make a concerted and valuable contribution to EU Trust Fund project implementation. The themes are briefly outlined below.

The following key themes for further research emerge from the existing literature that exists as well as the spaces where there is a lack of relevant literature. These form the basis of our proposal for a five-pillar programme of research to be undertaken during the lifetime of the Research and Evidence Facility.

1. Interactions between rural-urban, regional and international mobility
2. Experiences and impacts of voluntary, involuntary and diasporic return to countries of origin, including reintegration of ex-combatants.
3. Impacts of development changes on people’s movement choices and patterns of mobility, including consideration of the effectiveness of employment generation schemes (particularly targeted at youth) and evidence concerning the so-called ‘Brain Drain.’ (See Section 6)
4. Dynamics of cross-border economies and centre/periphery relations, including local tensions and conflicts and protection needs of displaced persons living in border areas.
3 Migration, Displacement and Conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa

The EU Trust Fund for Africa covers nine countries: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Within this region, we may think of three distinct conflict/displacement dynamics that demand our attention. First, there is the displacement out of Somalia, which has been going on to greater or lesser degrees since the late 1980s and particularly since the collapse of the Somalia state in 1991. This dynamic involves not only displacement within Somalia but also hosting of refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Tanzania and irregular migration through South Sudan and Sudan. It is estimated in 2016 that there are 1.1 million refugees and at least that many internally displaced people from Somalia. It also includes displacement out of the region, across the Red Sea to Yemen and the other Gulf Countries.

A second dynamic is conflict and displacement associated with the turmoil in South Sudan. This conflict is often seen as being internal, but it draws in relations with Sudan and northern Uganda as well, even as it pushes people across these borders as well as into Ethiopia and Kenya. At the time of writing, there were 1.3 million people displaced as a result of the instability in and around South Sudan. Displacement of South Sudanese has been a major problem in the region for many years. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 brought hopes for a resolution of the conflict and return of refugees and IDPs who had fled their homes during the 50-year war between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). However, despite some early returns, hopes that South Sudan would be entering a new chapter have been dashed by the resurgence of fighting, most recently in July 2016.

The third displacement dynamic centres not around a live conflict, but rather the steady outmigration of people from Eritrea, largely as a result of prolonged and indefinite national service requirements and lack of political pluralism. The region hosts 270,000 Eritreans, some of whom intend to remain in the region. But thousands of Eritreans – mostly youth – have taken on enormous risks and headed further afield, towards Europe, the Middle East or Southern Africa.

The map below, produced by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat, provides a general overview of some of the major migratory routes and displacement dynamics in the region.
Source: RMMS December 2016.

In this section, we consider the countries with the largest populations of displaced persons, particularly as they relate to one or more of these three dynamics. (For a consideration of the refugee hosting experiences of the different countries in the region, see Hammond 2014). We also consider border areas as sites of both vulnerability and opportunity and the possibilities for engaging with them.
A note of caution as we embark on our analysis of conflict and displacement dynamics in the different states of the region: it is important to remember that these borders may mean very different things to different actors. This is not to subscribe to the view of borders being colonial constructions that have no legitimacy to many African societies (Davidson 1993), but to recognise that they offer different opportunities and constraints, some of which may be seen in a very different light depending on one’s perspective. Smuggling, for instance, may be presented a criminal offence by the state but on the other hand can be seen as an excellent livelihood opportunity by those who stand to gain from it.

3.1 Ethiopia

Refugees

With an estimated 740,000 registered refugees in the country, Ethiopia is host to Africa’s largest refugee population. It hosts Eritrean refugees along the northern border, Somalis in the east and south, and South Sudanese in the west of the country. Most registered refugees live in camps, but there are also sizeable (yet undetermined, as official figures are underestimated) numbers of refugees living in Addis Ababa, the capital, and other urban centres throughout the country. The main entrypoints into the country are from Djibouti and Tog Wajaale, Somaliland in the East, Moyale (Kenya) in the South, Gambella in the Southwest on the border with South Sudan, and Assosa, Metemma and Humera along the western border with Sudan.

Internal migrants

Ethiopia has extremely high levels of internal migration, with key contributing factors including political instability, war, famine, drought, poverty, environmental degradation and economic decline (Mberu, 2006; Ezra, 2001). Since the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991, there has been significant repatriation and return to northern Ethiopia, with the return of refugees from Sudan as well as of as those forcibly relocated in the 1980s by the Derg to the western and south-western lowlands (Ezra, 2001; Clay and Holcomb 1986; Clay et. al. 1988). However, in the post-Derg period, new dynamics have led to further internal displacement. In 2015, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2015) estimated that there were 450,000 people internally displaced in Ethiopia as a result of conflict and/or natural disaster. Most were displaced within Somali Regional State and Oromia regions by inter-clan and ethnic violence, cross-border conflict and clashes between the state and armed group opposed to the government. Between August 2015 and February 2016, 280,000 people were displaced in Ethiopia, mainly from the pastoralist regions of Afar and Somali, with displacement caused by natural disasters exceeding that caused by conflict (IDMC: 2016). The conflicts causing displacement were widely attributed to increasing competition over diminishing natural resources.

For many people, particularly in poor rural areas, natural resources are insufficient to support livelihoods, resulting in families sending labour migrants to areas where there may be greater opportunities for employment. Significant capital has recently been invested,
particularly in Amhara Region, to respond to this mobility and to diversify the region’s livelihood portfolio, including in social services, tourism and real estate. However, 85% of the population in 2011 remained primarily engaged in agriculture as a livelihood source. In 2008, the Ministry of Education also launched the National Technical and Vocational Educational and Training strategy (TVET) to improve the teaching, capacity and infrastructures of institutions focused on technical and vocational training. This system is largely command-driven despite the Ethiopian government recognising that its efficacy will depend on it being responsive to industry demands. There thus remains much scope for reforming the TVET strategy to better match the labour market (Krishnan et al, 2012) – an issue that we return to in Sections 4 and 8 as we consider potential research on rural-urban migration.

Research in and on Ethiopia has been conducted to explore whether there is a connection between restrictions on private property rights and relatively low migration rates. This responds to the concern that risk reduction through income diversification is not proving successful in Ethiopia because families are concerned about losing access to land that they have insecure rights over (de Brauw and Mueller, 2012). Government policy within Ethiopia forbids the sale of land privately because all land is nationally owned. The government exercises total responsibility for how land is allocated. In order to maintain rights over land, households are required to show constant use, provide adequate care and maintenance, and remain resident in the same area. Recent changes that have attempted to promote land security by allowing it to be transferred without state interference have shown that increases in the rights of households to transfer land have positively impacted on productivity-enhancing investment (ibid.).

Young Ethiopian women are known to migrate to Addis Ababa to escape traditional gender roles, which limit their opportunities to access education and often encourage child marriage and to seize economic opportunities. Child marriage continues to be an enormous problem in Ethiopia, particularly vis-à-vis health as young women are at greater risk of complications from pregnancy and childbearing, their children are less likely to be healthy, and they have little to no access to reproductive health services and information (Edmeades et al, 2014). In Amhara, 74% of women aged 20-24 at the time of the survey married before the age of 18 (compared to 41% in Ethiopia more generally). 90% of women had no involvement in choosing their husband, and 75% of women did not consent to their marriage. Sensitisation and information campaigns on sexual reproductive health and family planning remain vital for targeting this demographic (Edmeades et al, 2014).2

Domestic worker emigration

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1 In 1974, during the Derg regime, all rural land was nationalised and individuals were given user rights over the land they occupied. Investment in farms was low because the risk of redistribution was high, and plots got ever smaller as families sub-divided these areas to pass land to the next generation. With the EPRDF’s ascension to power in 1991, centralised land distribution was abandoned but greater power was granted to regional parliaments to arbitrate the new land legislation. Under new registration procedures introduced in 2004, farmers can register their land and legally lease it out, though the sale of land remains illegal.

2 Similar findings emerge from research done in Sudan (see Ali et. al. 2013).
The emigration of young Ethiopian women to Middle Eastern countries has become a significant phenomenon, and is the subject of considerable study. A report by Agrinet for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2004: p. 8 and 12, as cited in ILO, 2011, p 19) found that 7.5% of Ethiopian migrants to the Middle East had left home between the ages of 13 and 17. Official Ethiopian Government data suggests that the typical profile for these individuals is young, unmarried Muslim women with some degree of secondary education. The high proportion of Muslim women outmigrating relates to the tendency for employment within the household to be seen as a socially acceptable occupation for them, unlike many informal jobs within Ethiopia. It may also be tied to the preference of employers in the destination countries to hire Muslim women. According to Gebre, some married female youth under 20 also leave for Arab countries to 'escap[e] the oppression of the marital home' (Gebre, 2012: 262).

Domestic workers from Ethiopia travel through three main channels to the Gulf States. First, there is the ‘public’ channel, referring to when individuals register as migrant workers with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) but access work permits through personal channels. The second channel utilizes private employment agencies, which can charge substantial fees for their services and often work in tandem with recruiting agencies in destination countries. Finally, there are illegal migration channels facilitated by brokers, through which at least the same number of individuals pass annually as do through the formal channels registered at the MOLSA (approximately 30,000 individuals according to Fernandez [2010]). The formal and informal brokerage system is dominated by Muslims, who have capitalised upon pre-existing trade networks and business connections to diversify into labour recruitment agencies.

Many of these individuals are employed through the Khafala system, which enables them to legally enter the Gulf Co-Operation Council countries with the appropriate documentation for short-term contract domestic labour. The ILO has criticised the Khafala system for lacking the appropriate safeguards for employees, particularly since their right to stay in the country is tied to their employer (Khan 2014). On 19 October 2013, the Ethiopian government banned labour migration from Ethiopia to the Middle East in response to the human rights violations being carried out against Ethiopian migrants (Asnake and Zerihun 2016). They lifted the ban for some countries three months later following a new set of labour agreements that included minimum wage and insurance guarantees for migrants (de Regt et al, 2016). Recent legislative changes in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have done little to substantively address these imbalances in power.

These movements must not be seen solely as a negative coping strategy. Some women report that migration to the Gulf States constitutes a liberating experience (Baker et al, 2012). Some studies suggest that domestic work is also a relatively reliable form of employment. While the recent economic downturn and unrest in the MENA region was largely responsible for the mass expulsion of male migrants from the Gulf States, to avoid the social unrest that could have resulted from the high unemployment rates of domestic youth, the same trend was not visible in terms of employment in women’s domestic workers (De Regt, 2008a; 2008b). As the Migrating Out of Poverty report states, ‘if domestic work is resilient to economic fluctuations it could offer a more sustainable option compared to other occupations, such as construction work, which have been noted to fluctuate rapidly with the
economy’ (Deshingkar et al, 2016: 14). Other studies challenge this. Fernandez’s (2010) work suggests that the political shifts that accompanied the economic downturn resulted in a sizeable reduction in the numbers of female domestic workers from Ethiopia travelling to the Gulf, as well as the remittances they were able to send back.

**Rural-urban linkages**

Urban areas with populations of up to 20,000 constitute the main point of contact for rural Ethiopians with non-rural environments. The numbers of settlements of this size in Ethiopia markedly exceed those in neighbouring countries, and are growing. These centres play a significant role in administration, marketing and distribution and the provision of services such as health, mechanical support and education. Small and medium-size settlements thus have a critical role to play in improving rural livelihoods and development (Baker, 2012). (We will return to consider this set of issues in the context of research on rural – urban migration in our Recommendations for Research.) What little research in this area there is, however, confirms the vulnerability of young migrants in Ethiopian cities, and suggests that poor labour regulations and a lack of support in major urban centres and regional towns leads many to move onwards (de Regt, 2015). Erulkar et al (2006) show that slum-dwelling adolescent migrants have been historically overlooked in programmes to reduce urban vulnerabilities, thus heightening their susceptibility to exploitative labour practices and markedly reducing their standard of living.

Ethiopia is currently embracing a policy of increasing industrialisation, which involves developing urban labour markets. This has the effect of accelerating internal migration into urban areas; this phenomenon has not been researched much yet as it is still very new.

**Out-migration to Yemen**

In recent years there has been a movement of Ethiopians through Somaliland and Somalia to the port of Bosasso to be transported to Yemen and other Gulf countries. The numbers of Ethiopians using this route has increased particularly since 2014, and currently far exceeds the Somali population seeking to use the same route. A report by RMMS examines the motivations and expectations of Ethiopians making this journey The report found that Ethiopian migrants have a high level of information about the risks of making the journey but are willing to take their chances and make the crossing anyway (RMMS 2014).

The increase in outmigrants through Bossaso is indicative of both a shift from the Red Sea crossing preferred by migrants between 2009 and 2014, and of an increase in the numbers of Ethiopians leaving their country of origin (Horwood and Reitano May 2016). Unofficial estimates are that as many as 120,000 Ethiopians may arrive in Yemen by the end of 2016, the highest rate on record. This, despite the continued insecurity in Yemen, points to the emergence an extremely serious humanitarian crisis that has the potential to worsen if the flow of migrants across the Red Sea increases.

**State-sponsored resettlement**

In addition to those displaced due to natural disaster, conflict and economic hardship, Ethiopia has a long history of state-sponsored resettlement. In the 1980s, the Derg carried
out a forced resettlement scheme, moving more than 600,000 people from their homes in the northern and eastern highlands to western and southern Ethiopia. Some of these former settlers have made their way back to their areas of origin in the post-Derg era, but many others remain in the sites that they were relocated to. They were later joined, particularly in 2003-2005, by more than 1 million more people who took part in what the GFDRE called a voluntary resettlement scheme. Billed as a pillar of the country’s food security strategy, people were moved out of the food insecure highlands to land in the southern and western lowlands. The resettlement programme was extremely controversial, and eventually was abandoned due to lack of volunteers to take part and extreme criticism from the donor population (see Hammond 2008; Gebre 2003).

More recently, the GFDRE has been carrying out resettlement and villagisation schemes to make way for large-scale development projects such as the Gibe III and Renaissance Dams and to facilitate large land leases for commercial farming. These moves have attracted criticism from human rights groups as well as other researchers, and most independent observers have been blocked from the resettlement sites so it has been difficult to monitor them. Reports from those who have visited the sites, however, suggest that the resettlements have been problematic in terms of providing essential social services and a reliable source of livelihoods; critics have also questioned the extent to which those who have been relocated have been voluntary participants as in many cases it appears that resettlement has been involuntary. Popular protest over some of these schemes have contributed to the recent unrest in Ethiopia.

Diaspora

Ethiopia’s diaspora is very large and has been growing in some places over several generations. Attempts to estimate its size are limited by the fact that usually only those born in Ethiopia are counted and thus second and third generation diaspora members are overlooked. Among the largest diaspora hubs are Washington DC, Minneapolis, Toronto, London, and Rome. It is estimated that remittances are greater than $3 – 3.5b per year (Carter and Rohwerder 2016, p. 6).

Ethiopia’s diaspora is multi-ethnic and representative of a wide range of political viewpoints and persuasions (Lyons 2012). When considering the drivers of outmigration from Ethiopia, the ties between Ethiopian diaspora and communities inside the country must be considered; social messaging and the perception that outmigration will result in material and social status gains often play a role in influencing would-be migrants’ decision-making in Ethiopia. A similar dynamic can be observed throughout the Horn of Africa region.

Conflict Dynamics

Ethiopia’s principle security concerns are related to the stalemate in its relations with Eritrea. A border conflict fought between 1998-2000 has never been fully resolved, and although actual violence between the two countries remains relatively rare, the border is closed and no official trade or communication goes on between the two neighbours. Each side accuses the other of resisting the finalisation of the conflict, and perceives the other as an aggressor, justifying a state of constant readiness to return to war if provoked.
Beyond this, Ethiopia remains concerned with trying to contain the Somali conflict and prevent it from spilling over the porous borders into the Ethiopian Somali region. That region has its own longstanding tensions with the central government in Addis Ababa, which centre around the role of the Ogaden National Liberation Front and operatives suspected of being associated with the violent extremist group al Shabaab in Somalia (Carter and Rohwerder 2016).

In 2016, internal opposition to the GFDRE’s single party rule also gained momentum, with Amhara and Oromo opponents joining forces to mount the most significant challenge to EPRDF domination since they came to power. This prompted the Ethiopian government to declare a six-month State of Emergency in the country to try to quell popular demonstrations. At the time of writing the State of Emergency is still in effect.

3.2 Eritrea

The out-migration of Eritreans to neighbouring countries and further afield has been occurring for many years, but has accelerated as more and more people have sought to escape their indefinite enrolment in the national service programme and the absence of economic and social opportunities within the country.

Eritreans leaving the immediate hardships of rural areas of the country, who often possess limited social and economic capital are more inclined to seek to stay within the region, seeking refuge in Ethiopia or Sudan. Most of those leaving the country are men younger than 40, although there are a significant number of women from this age category as well (GSDRC 2016). Increasingly there are large numbers of unaccompanied children leaving the country as well; many are seeking to avoid national conscription, which begins in the final year of high school (Ibid).

Those fleeing the country with aspirations of a more productive future illustrate no inclination to remain in refugee camps in neighbouring countries. Despite increased rations, in-cash benefits and livelihoods training for Eritreans in camps in northern Ethiopia, for example, the livelihood constraints created by encampment induce onward movement. This varies, however, according to ethnicity. Those from Zoba Maekel in central Eritrea, mainly composed of Tigrinya-speaking Christians, are thought to leave Eritrea to travel to Europe, while those from the western lowlands in Gash Barka are thought to migrate cyclically between ethnic groups straddling Sudan and Eritrea (Mehari, 2010).

A 2014 study by Samuel Hall Consulting highlights the low levels of self-reliance among Eritreans in the camps in Ethiopia and cited the following main reasons: Eritrean refugees have high literacy rates but low educational attainment; the jobs available are mainly in the construction sector, petty trading, or with NGOs and refugee-serving organisations; individuals have poor social and business connections to communities outside the camps; and there is a limited connectedness to urban markets within the camps, alongside a low demand for goods and services. Samuel Hall recommends that remittances be spent on bolstering ‘livelihood activities in the camps rather than potential harmful migration strategies.’ Such a strategy can only be successful if the camps are integrated with broader

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regional economies and refugees are assured of the legality and security of business investments within them.

While refugees are generally expected to remain in camps in Ethiopia, a limited number of Eritreans have benefited from the Ethiopian Government’s ‘Out of Camp Policy’ (UNHCR, 2011, p. 88). This allows them to live in urban centres provided they have no criminal history and can prove they have the financial capacity to do so (Samuel Hall Consulting, 2014). Ethiopia’s approach in this regard is said to be aimed at preparing refugees for productive livelihoods when they are eventually able to return to Eritrea. Creating a loyal base within the refugee population is part of Ethiopia’s long-term strategy to influence the political landscape inside Eritrea. Though some Eritrean refugees have reportedly said that the financial and educational opportunities made available through this scheme have discouraged them from further onward migration, limitations to the policy reduce its overall effectiveness. These include: poor employment conditions in urban centres as refugees must often engage in informal jobs with limited to no legal protection; the reliance of Eritreans on their Ethiopian guarantor, which can heighten their vulnerability to exploitation; the lack of formal work permits; and the challenges of covering urban living costs on the low wages associated with the informal sector. There is no guarantee that addressing these limitations will reduce migration, however. In the meantime, as Colletta (2015: 286) states ‘while the camps have become the outward symbol of the ‘protection’ industry, their inhabitants, particularly in Shire and Ali Addeh (in Northern Ethiopia) are on the move, relegating camps to ‘transit point’ for the young and able and UN subsidised social safety nets for the old, infirm and very young left behind (Humphris, 2013; Mekonnen and Estifanos, 2014).’

(For more discussion on Eritreans in Sudan, or passing through Sudan, see the section on Sudan, below.)

Diaspora

It is estimated that remittances from the diaspora make up as much as 1/3 of the national gross domestic product as well as an indeterminate yet significant proportion of private household income (GSDRC, 2016 p. 2). Eritreans living abroad are required to pay a tax of 2% of their total annual income to remain citizens in good standing, enabling them to come and visit their relatives. All currency exchange is controlled by the government, but there is no clear picture of what the Eritrean government does with the income it receives from remittances. The main diaspora hubs include Washington DC, London, Rome and other Italian cities, and increasing numbers in Germany and the Nordic countries.

Conflict Dynamics

Eritrea’s biggest security concern is its neighbour, Ethiopia, against whom it fought a 30-year war of independence (1961-91) and in the post-independence period a border war between 1998-2000. Although a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement was signed in 2000, full peace has not been restored, and skirmishes between the Eritrean and Ethiopian armies occur sporadically. The spectre of renewed war with Ethiopia underlies the national service programme and forms the basis for much of the Eritrean ruling party (the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, or PFDJ)’s prioritisation of all kinds of policy including security, military, development and economic sectors.
Relations with Eritrea’s neighbours have been fraught over the years, with tensions between Sudan and Djibouti at various points. Recently Eritrea has sought closer ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia is reportedly leasing the port of Assab to support its military operations in Yemen).

Internally, the PFDJ is the only legal political entity. Political opponents have mostly left the country and there is no organised political opposition to speak of at the moment. Those who defend the PFDJ against charges of being repressive argue that it is doing what it needs to in the face of Ethiopian threat, and that democratic pluralism is a luxury that it is not yet possible to enjoy. Others are not content to wait for the freedoms that they consider that they have fought for for so long. Debates between these two perspectives are often antagonistic, and are manifest in diaspora and social media communications (see Kibreab 2009).

3.3 Kenya

Kenya has been hosting large numbers of Somali refugees since 1991, when the latter’s state collapsed and a humanitarian food crisis sent an estimated 280,000 refugees pouring across the borders. Initially relatively receptive to refugees (allowing them freedom of movement and dispersing them in a network of smaller camps, for instance), Kenya’s approach has gradually become more restrictive (see Hammond 2014). Since the late 1990s, refugees have been required to be housed in either the Dadaab or Kakuma refugee complex (the former more for Somali refugees, and the latter for South Sudanese refugees, although other nationalities do reside in both camps). The Dadaab camp, which until recently was the world’s largest camp, was originally established for a maximum capacity of 90,000, but at its peak it hosted nearly 500,000 people. Many camp residents, despite their physical isolation, maintain strong ties with relatives living in Kenyan cities as well as further afield, and even in the Western Diaspora (see Horst 2001, Rawlence 2016).

Spontaneous and organised repatriations since 2013, as well as revision of population estimates, has seen the number of registered refugees drop to a 2017 figure of approximately 350,000, but Dadaab is still a massively overcrowded camp.

Since 2013, the Government of Kenya has sought to close Dadaab and send Somali refugees home. This position has been fuelled by security fears that are rooted in the idea that Al Shabaab is using the refugee population as its base of support to carry out violence within Kenya. The Government of Kenya has widespread public support for its position of wanting to stop refugee assistance, but has been hampered by legal challenges given that mass repatriation of refugees to a conflict zone would amount to refoulement (non-voluntary or forced repatriation). Most recently in February 2017, a High Court ruling found the GOK’s plans to close the camps unilaterally, without adequate security and provisions for return, to be illegal. The fate of the camps is now uncertain, although GOK pressures on UNHCR and the Government of Somalia to accelerate repatriation remain high.

Kakuma, with a population of approximately 215,000, has been seen by the GOK as less of a security risk, and is not under the same pressure to close. However, with the recent resurgence in violence in South Sudan, the population of the camp is expected to increase in 2016, raising questions about whether the same concerns about security and the need to push for repatriation will also come to be focused on this camp as well.
Meanwhile, despite legal restrictions on refugees’ movement, it is widely acknowledged that well over 100,000 refugees (though no reliable population estimates are available) reside in Nairobi (particularly in the Eastleigh district, but in smaller concentrations in other areas as well), Mombasa and other cities (Carrier 2017). In 2013, an attempt to round Somali refugees up and remove those lacking documentation to the refugee camps was widely criticised by human rights and refugee advocacy groups for violating people’s basic rights and for encouraging violence against the refugee community.

Beyond its role as a host of Somali and Sudanese refugees, Kenya is also a transit hub for mixed migrants from across the region, as well as a site of large levels of internal displacement. It is a country of concern in terms of trafficking and smuggling activity. For an overview of mixed migration issues and dynamics in Kenya, see RMMS (June 2013).

**Conflict and internal displacement dynamics**

Kenya’s role as a host of refugees often gets more attention than its experience as a site of internal displacement. In April 2015, IDMC estimated that there were 309,200 people displaced within the country. Most internal displacement is related to ‘social fragmentation, polarised ethnicity and partisan politics’ (Rohwerder 2015), as well as displacement as a result of political tensions along the coast. Kenya’s perception of al Shabaab as a major external threat must be considered alongside its own homegrown threat in the form of Al Hijra, a militant extremist movement associated with Al Qaeda in East Africa. There is evidence that at least some of the attacks carried out recently against civilians in Kenya have been perpetrated by Kenyan nationals with ties to this or another extremist group.

Insecurity is generally greater in the northern districts, particularly in the northeast districts bordering Somalia. This may be related to the general insecurity inside Somalia, but is also linked to the historical legacy of discrimination, neglect and differential governance that northern communities feel that they have been subjected to.

**3.4 Somalia**

As discussed above, Somalia lies at one of the epicentres of regional conflict and displacement. It is estimated that there are at least 1.5 million Somali refugees living outside the region, another 1 million refugees inside the region, and 1.2 million IDPs inside the country (see UNHCR statistics and also Avis and Herbert 2016).

Since the build-up of the Somali National Movement in the late 1980s that hastened the end of President Siad Barre’s control over Somaliland, and accelerating after the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991, the country has been a mass generator of displacement. Despite existing for a quarter of a century without a strong central government, however, displacement has undergone significant fluctuations, as the chart below shows. Periods of intense displacement have accompanied violent upheaval and humanitarian suffering. However there have also been periods of relative calm and low levels of displacement, as can be seen in the period 1995-2005. This period was characterised by low levels of violence, a lack of humanitarian crisis, and – curiously perhaps – low levels of humanitarian assistance. Thus it would be incorrect to refer to Somalia as an unvariegated basket case, as
much of the academic, policy, and newsmedia coverage suggests (see Lindley and Hammond 2014).

**Chart 1: Somali IDPs and refugees in neighbouring countries**

Displacement since the 2011 famine in Somalia has followed several different trajectories. Mass displacement out of the inter-riverine areas of Southern and Central Somalia resulted moved in two directions – towards Mogadishu, and outwards towards Kenya and Ethiopia. This has resulted in the expansion of IDP camps in the capital (as well as a few other urban centres), placing severe pressure on displaced populations that had already been living there. IDP camps in the cities have suffered from irregular and inadequate aid, poor security, and extreme exploitation by militia and others with access to weapons to are able to extort resources and carry out sexual violence against displaced communities with impunity (see Rayale et al: 2015). Those who live outside the displaced camps either seek support from their relatives and clansmembers, if they can, or else support themselves by living in houses or on land vacated by others. Destitution amongst IDP households is extremely high, and the worst humanitarian indicators can be found amongst this population. (See also Bryld et al 2014).

Those who have been displaced to refugee camps in Kenya, particularly in the Dadaab refugee complex, have also faced a lack of physical and resource security. This has been heightened in recent years by the Kenyan government’s firm determination to close to camps and send refugees back to Somalia (See Kenya, below).
Return of displaced persons and Somali refugees depends on the ability of receiving communities (whether or not they are the communities of origin of the returnees) being able to sustain them, together with ex-combatants and other voluntary and involuntary returnees. Such rehabilitation has not yet been possible due to the political and physical insecurity prevalent throughout much of the Central and Southern parts of the country. There is furthermore a lack of information about conditions prevailing in potential communities of return, the status of property rights of those who evacuated at different periods since state collapse (but particularly for those who fled since 2011, since it is assumed that they would have stronger claims to property and more active kin networks to call upon on areas of return). We will return to this theme further in this report. This theme speaks to our proposed focus on refugee return and integration (see Recommendations for Research).

More on the displacement context in Somalia will be discussed below.

Conflict Dynamics

Somalia continues to be plagued by insecurity, although the Somali Federal Government has made important inroads in pushing back Al Shabaab from all of the major cities in the country. The rebels are still in control of large areas of rural Somalia, particularly in the South and in parts of the northeast. More than 20,000 African Union troops (including from neighbours Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, as well as from Uganda) are stationed within the country to provide support to the Somali national security forces.

Violence very often takes the form of surprise attacks on public buildings and meeting places or on government buildings, as well as targeted assassinations of public figures. Security considerations underlie virtually all government policy, including the current drought/famine relief operation and the ongoing refugee repatriation process. These considerations are also paramount in discussions about the upcoming Constitutional reform that are anticipated in 2017 and 2018.

3.5 Somaliland

For the purposes of this study, we consider Somalia and Somaliland as separate entities because the conflict and displacement dynamics since 1991 have been quite different. Displacement in most of Somaliland tends to result from drought and a lack of access to resources. In the East (Sool and Sanaag regions) and parts of the West (Awdal region) displacement has taken place as a result of grievances against the Somaliland state by groups that are loyal to the state of Somalia (for example, the Khatumo state and the SSC – Sool, Sanaag and Cayn – groupings). Some displacement of minority groups such as the Gaboye who face severe discrimination and destitution is also documented.

Somaliland’s relative peace has also attracted people from Somalia’s Central and Southern regions. Considered IDPs by the international community and Somalia, they are treated as refugees by Somaliland, giving them a somewhat uncertain status.

The expansion of Somaliland’s cities, particularly Hargeisa, Burco, Berbera and Boorame, has brought about large-scale rural to urban migration, resulting in the creation of
peripheral communities of people who lack any kind of social services, who subsist on the most marginal of informal sector employment activities, and who lack any political voice. Unable to fully integrate into the city, and also unable to return to their rural livelihoods given that they have lost their animals and any other productive asset they may once have had. This phenomenon is the subject of research currently being conducted by the Universities of Sussex, Durham and SOAS together with the University of Hargeisa’s Observatory of Violence and Conflict Prevention. This theme speaks to our call for further research on rural – urban migration. (See our section on Recommendations for Research.)

**Conflict Dynamics**

Somaliland enjoys much greater security than areas under the control of the Somalia government, but does have its own challenges. Periodic insecurity in the west and east of the country, where the Isaq clan is not as dominant, is chronic. Al Shabaab has so far been kept out of Somaliland, at least in terms of active hostilities, largely through the efforts of the Somaliland national security forces.

**Somali Diaspora**

Diaspora from Somaliland and Somalia, as noted above, number at least 1.5 million; very likely the true figure is much higher. Remittances to Somalia are estimated at $1.3 to 2 billion per year, making them greater than international aid and foreign direct investment combined (see FAO/FSNAU 2013). Diaspora play key roles in the political and economic life of the Somali territories. The presidents of all of the most established three territories (Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu) are diaspora returnees, and their cabinets and the respective Parliaments also draw heavily from diaspora communities. The largest diaspora communities include Minneapolis, Washington DC, London, Toronto, the Scandinavian countries, and the Gulf countries.

**3.6 Sudan**

Black et al (2008) identify four main forms of migration in Sudan: seasonal migration, mainly in response to short-term climatic fluctuations; longer-term migration of several years, often to central Sudan because of the concentration of urban areas there; international migration mainly to Libya and the Gulf States; and forced displacement, mainly due to famine, desertification, drought, conflict and flooding. Climate-induced migration is said to be increasing because resilience has been undermined through decades of climatic challenges, growing environmental degradation and the lack of government investment in agricultural extension services and irrigation. Along the border with South Sudan, displacement is also related to insecurity linked to the political turmoil going on within the new nation, as well as ongoing disputes over land, boundary definitions, and access rights in light of oil concessions.

As a case study for the complex relationship between forced displacement and livelihoods, The Food Economy Group (2013) conducted a survey in refugee camps in Maban County in Upper Nile State, Sudan to look at the immediate livelihoods of individuals displaced from Blue Nile and Kordofan States in late 2011 and 2012. The primary livelihood in Maban County is sedentary agropastoralism in small, isolated, largely self-sufficient villages. The
population who fled to Maban County arrived with very limited capital and resources when the region was suffering from extensive flooding, resulting in dangerously high rates of malnutrition. Those who delayed their departure to Maban County suffered greater losses to their herds, either due to disease or because they were forced to sell herds at reduced prices in an already overwhelmed market. The herds did not then replenish upon arrival because their gestation period coincided with when animals and people were on the move. With fewer livestock births, milk production decreased with implications for the population’s nutritional security upon arrival in Maban. Camps lacked veterinary services meaning that even well-off pastoralists, who would normally have been able to afford these services to protect their herds, were affected by outbreaks of preventable livestock diseases. This resulted in the levelling out of wealth discrepancies in the camps, generally down to a very low baseline. The improved provision of veterinary services was recommended as an important mechanism to prevent the further impoverishment of these populations (Food Economy Group, 2013).

The conflicts in South Sudan and also in western Sudan, particularly in Darfur, have resulted in large numbers of people moving into the larger cities of the country, and particularly around Khartoum and Omdurman. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates that in 2015 there were 3.2 million displaced people within Sudan. In addition, the country hosts more than 666,000 refugees (UNHCR figures, cited by IDMC 2015b). The separation of Sudan and South Sudan has resulted in the loss of citizenship for many people of mixed heritage, leaving as many as half a million people stateless (Musinguzi 2012). Displaced people in Sudan’s urban centres, from both South Sudan as well as rural areas of Sudan, live in extremely precarious conditions. Women face particularly acute protection threats as they are often subject to discrimination and exploitation and are dependent upon low-paying informal sector jobs to support themselves and their children (see Bello et. al. 2014).

Close to the border with Eritrea, many Eritreans prefer to bypass the refugee camps in Eastern Sudan and travel directly to Khartoum; a report by Sahan/IGAD notes that the reasons many Eritreans gave for this include a fear of being abducted by trafficking gangs from the refugee camps, particularly Shagareb (Sahan/IGAD 2016, p. 10). They are formally not allowed to leave the Shagareb camp, though unofficial channels enable individuals to acquire citizenship, ID cards and travel permits to exit them. Local integration in Sudan is nonetheless harder for those leaving Eritrea now who are not of the same ethnic group as those who fled Eritrea in the pre-2000s. These communities were more able to move throughout Eastern Sudan without being detected. This issue speaks to our proposed theme on cross border economies and livelihood systems, see Recommendations for Research.

Safety in the Sudan camps is widely recognised to be deteriorating, with reports of regular abductions that local governing authorities are aware of but are unable or unwilling to stop (Humphris, 2013; RMMS, 2016a). Outside of the camps, some Sudanese law enforcement officers are said to be complicit in these smuggling operations and networks, demanding payments from individuals before handing them over to criminal smuggling groups. As Lijnders et al (2013: 150) state, ‘their location along the remote border, with no constant overview by superiors and little payment, makes them prone to involvement in illegal activities, such as profiting from the irregular cross-border movement.’ The absence of
registration points just inside the Sudanese border makes Eritreans even more vulnerable to trafficking networks. UNHCR has recently established a reception and screening centre at Hamdayet on the Eritrea-Ethiopia-Sudan border to ensure that individuals could register as soon as possible (Lijnders et al, 2013).

In addition, Sudanese authorities have recently deported hundreds of Eritrean nationals, including individuals who have applied for asylum (Sudan Tribune, 2016b) on the grounds that they entered illegally. It is unclear whether Sudan’s behaviour is connected to the EU-Africa Valletta Summit deal or a recent deterioration in relations between Sudan and Eritrea.

**Conflict Dynamics**

Conflict in Sudan centres generally around the border with South Sudan, including the disputed Abyei border area, as well as in the western Darfur region. Darfur has been in a state of chronic conflict since hostilities between the state-backed Janjaweed and local militias broke out. It is currently estimated that there are 1.98 people displaced within Darfur, and at least a further 300,000 refugees in Chad (UNHCR figures, 2016).

### 3.7 South Sudan

As mentioned above, hopes that independence would bring peace to South Sudan have been dashed in recent months by the resurgence of violence within the new country. Tensions between President Salva Kir and Vice President Riek Machar and their respective different factions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, have resulted in violence in Juba and many of the main towns in the country, and at the time of writing have resulted in 185,000 new refugees, bringing the number of South Sudanese refugees in the region to over 1 million (Winsor 2016). In addition, in September 2016 there OCHA estimated that there were 1.6 million internally displaced persons in the country (WFP 2016).

A survey conducted by WFP and UNHCR in 2012 of livelihoods among refugees in Greater Equatoria in South Sudan suggests that though the relevant legal frameworks provide for refugees’ access to services, this did not include natural resources or land, which are vital for rural livelihoods. Most refugees therefore depended on multiple income sources beyond agriculture. Their findings suggest that 23.1% of refugees at the time were casual labourers, 22.7% sold their crops, 14% brewed alcohol and 12.3% relied on food assistance to meet their subsistence requirements. Camp assistance forms just one (frequently inadequate) resource in individuals’ pursuit of a livelihood.

Literature on South Sudan displacement is sparse, reflecting the difficulties of conducting research in insecure areas. However, there are some notable exceptions, such as Grabska’s recent book *Gender, Home and Identity: Nuer Repatriation to Southern Sudan* (2014) which considers the transformation of gender roles as women have returned from camps in Kenya to their communities of origin in South Sudan.

### 3.8 Tanzania

Tanzania is included within the EU Trust Fund’s delineation of the Horn of Africa given that it shares some of the same migration and conflict dynamics as other countries in the region.
For the purposes of the REF, the dynamics most relevant for research include the policy frameworks and practices for migration management and assistance to displaced persons. Also of interest are the common security and conflict concerns that Tanzania faces, as threats from the East Africa franchise of Al Qaeda spread into Tanzania.

3.9 Uganda

Uganda’s geographical situation in East Africa but lying between the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes has resulted in it being strongly affected by the political and security upheavals in its many neighbours, even as it recovers from its own turmoil. As a result, the major narratives about migration have been concerned with forced migration, including both internally displaced persons and refugees.

From independence up to the mid-1980s, the country was itself the site of chronic political instability and violence, with civil war and ethnic conflict that created large numbers of refugees. With the establishment of the National Resistance Movement in 1986, most parts of the country achieved a level of stability which facilitated economic growth and development. The critical exception was the north, where hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced by the conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Ugandan Government.

It is the north of the country that has also seen huge influxes of refugees from South Sudan over decades. With the recent resurgence in violence, Uganda has received over 90,000 South Sudanese just since July 2016, and according to UNHCR a further 800-1,000 are arriving each day. This adds to the total of about 240,000 South Sudanese refugees already in the country. Note that these statistics only refer to registered refugees. Many others remained unregistered (see UNHCR 2016b). The second largest group of refugees in Uganda are the Congolese (approximately 215,000) who have fled the violence in eastern Congo to reach the south-west of Uganda. There are much smaller populations of Burundians and Somalis (around 40,000 each) and Rwandans (less than 20,000). Overall, the current population of registered refugees in Uganda is over 560,000.

When it comes to refugee policy, Uganda stands out as having one of providing one of the most open environments for refugee settlement (see World Bank, 31, Aug 2016). In particular, it has adopted a policy of settlements for refugees, granting them plots of land for cultivation and enabling them establish their own livelihoods. Moreover, refugees are not confined to live in these settlements and are permitted to move into Ugandan towns and cities. As a result, there are now about 80,000 urban refugees in Kampala. At the same time as facilitating their settlement, the formal policy is resistant to the integration of refugees, or their incorporation as citizens. Repatriation remains the preferred long-term solution for refugees. For South Sudanese, the end of the civil war and moves towards independence heralded the return of many refugees in a formal programme of repatriation. Nonetheless, research has shown how refugees adopted various strategies to ensure they were either able to keep a foothold both sides of the border, or find ways to secure more (informal) permanent settlement in Uganda (Kaiser 2010). Uganda’s refugee policy, and the changing situation of refugees in both settlement and urban areas has been the subject of large volumes of research over many years (for example, Lyytinen 2015, McMillan 2012, Kaiser
This theme relates to our proposed research theme on return and integration – see Recommendations for Research.

The analysis of forced migration has dominated research in Uganda and there is much less known about other forms of migration. An IOM migration profile from 2013 highlights the dearth of data on migrant stocks and flows in and out of the country. Most immigration is from neighbouring countries, with some evidence of a growing number moving towards Uganda’s growing education sector, especially the universities. In addition, there are small but distinctive populations from further afield, such as Nigerians and Malians (Bakewell and Binaisa 2016). Another growing area of research has been emigration of Ugandans to Europe and North America and diasporic return (Binaisa 2011). Ugandans feature little in discussions about irregular travel beyond the continent as the numbers involved in smuggling and trafficking are very small.

3.10 Djibouti & Yemen

Despite the very limited employment opportunities within Djibouti, resulting in unemployment rates exceeding 50%, very few Djiboutian citizens have chosen to leave and the country is instead experiencing net in-migration, both temporary/transitory and more protracted (Frouws et al 2016a, RMMS 2016b).

Many Ethiopians and Somalis pass through Djibouti on their way to Yemen, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. However, there has been a shift in recent years, as the graph below shows. Whereas in 2013 roughly ¾ of the arrivals in Yemen came through Djibouti, by 2014 this percentage had dropped to 46% and by 2015 flows through Djibouti accounted for only about 15% of the total crossings. Most of the crossings had shifted to the Somali port of Bossaso (see Somalia section, below).

Many of those who transit through Djibouti do not declare themselves as refugees until they arrive in Yemen. They wish to avoid being identified by UNHCR or Djibouti’s refugee agency because they do not wish their onward journey to be disrupted by being constrained within one of the country’s refugee camps. The shift to the Bossaso crossing point is likely related to increased controls on the border that have pushed these individuals into more clandestine migration routes, exposing them to a higher chance of ransom, extortion, trafficking and violence (US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report, 2015).

Once migrants and refugees arrive in Yemen, the same phenomenon occurs. Many Ethiopians choose not to register with authorities in the country or with UNHCR. The recognition rates for asylum-seekers from Ethiopia are low but refugee status is also seen as an impediment to individuals’ onwards movements to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. Some do remain in Yemen, working informally in agriculture, for example, though it is unclear whether this is to accumulate capital to facilitate onward movement or part of a long-term livelihood strategy (RMMS 2016b). The outbreak of conflict in Yemen has significantly disrupted migrants’ journeys. Organisations such as IOM continue to organise

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4 A similar effect was seen following the Ethiopian Government’s introduction of new amendments to the Private Employment Agency Proclamation in 2009, which sought to improve protection for migrant workers. Greater regulation and monitoring was linked to a surge in those travelling to the Gulf through illegal migration channels.
voluntary repatriation operations of ‘stranded migrants’ from Yemen who have experienced increased levels of brutality and violence by smugglers in recent years (IOM, 2016a; Sudan Tribune, 2016a).

The escalation of violence in Yemen since early 2015 has also seen – for the first time – the reverse flow of Yemenis, together with Ethiopians and Somalis, seeking to leave the country. Somaliland has reported the arrival of hundreds of Yemeni nationals in its capital city, Hargeisa.

3.11 Libya

Migratory movements to Libya have an enormous historical precedent, and have long been undertaken by individuals without a desire to travel on to Europe. As Bredeloup et al (2011) state, ‘The Sahara is not merely a desert to be crossed; it is an area that has been shaped for more than half a century by the various migrant, trader or pastoral communities who have contributed to its massive urbanisation and economic development’. The Sudanese have, for example, long found markets for their livestock in North Africa, and established trading routes have allowed smuggled goods to enter the Sudanese economy in the opposite direction (Drozdz, 2005, cited in Bredeoup et al, 2011).

Libya is the main staging area for the smuggling and trafficking of people through the Central Mediterranean Route. Migrants and refugees from the Horn of Africa generally travel through Sudan, across the Sahara, and into Libya, where they are held for a period of time, often under appalling conditions, before then being loaded onto boats for the passage across the Mediterranean Sea. Loss of life into and through Libya is very high – information about the risks and costs of these routes are just beginning to come to light through such data gathering initiatives as 4Mi (http://4mi.regionalmms.org/). Additional research by Sahan/IGAD reveals the complex networks that exist to facilitate the smuggling and trafficking of individuals between countries in the Horn and Libya (Sahan/IGAD 2016).

A repressive migration policy in Libya and widespread violence has contributed to a shift in the perceived opportunities for people along the migratory pathway and within the country, exacerbating the sense that the only opportunities for migrants involve transiting onwards to Europe. This theme speaks to our proposed research on Cross border economies and livelihoods, see Recommendations for Research.

3.12 Further migration

While most of the mobility involving the Horn of Africa involves movement within the region, significant numbers of people are also on the move towards Southern Africa and Europe. RMMS reports that in 2009, between 17,000 and 20,000 Somalis and Ethiopians were reported to be smuggled towards South Africa every year (RMMS 2016c). These numbers are notoriously difficult to verify and update and the actual current number is likely to be much larger.

Migration towards Europe is a major political issue for the destination countries, but it must be stressed that this forms only a small percentage of people on the move. The table below shows the numbers of refugees and migrants from the Horn of Africa known to have arrived
through the Central Mediterranean route, the main avenue for such movements (taken from RMMS 2016c).

Chart 2. Horn of Africa Arrivals via the Central Mediterranean, 2015-16

The figures fluctuate seasonally due in part to the changing conditions on the Mediterranean Sea. It is too soon to know for sure what impact changing policy has had towards reception of so-called Mediterranean migrants. What is clear is that the numbers continue to be high despite official efforts to discourage people from attempting the journey. Recent figures from RMMS also reports that the numbers of people who lose their lives crossing the Sahara is also high. They report that between 2014 and 2016, 1245 people are known to have lost their lives crossing the desert in Libya, Sudan and Egypt combined (RMMS 2016d).

4 Borders, Economies, and Livelihoods

As can be seen from the individual country profiles, borders and borderlands play a significant role in determining the levels of resilience and vulnerability, risk or protection of conflict-affected and displaced people. Borderlands are themselves the subject of attention both in the literature as well as in practice by some development and humanitarian actors. In this section, we will consider literature on borders and borderlands in the Horn of Africa. We also consider the different economies that both contribute to and result from conflict and displacement, and the demographic variations – particularly age and gender – that lead to different vulnerability and resilience outcomes. This discussion forms the basis of a proposal for further research into borderland economies and livelihood strategies.

4.1 Borders and Borderlands

Feyissa and Hoehne (2010) detail four resources that can be extracted from borders and borderlands. First are economic resources including cross-border trade and smuggling, import businesses and currency exchange. Rather than constitute an act of resistance that...
subverts national identities, smuggling relies on the spatially distinct regulatory environments produced by borders (Anderson and O'Dowd, 1999; Nugent, 2002). Second are political resources including access to alternative centres of political power, trans-border political mobilisation, and sanctuary for rebels wishing to alter national structures of power. Third are identity resources such as legitimising one group’s claim for statehood or confirming the boundaries of particular ethnic groups. Finally, borders can constitute status and rights resources by enabling people to make claims for citizenship and refugee status.

Understandings of borders are not, however, homogeneous and ‘how a state border is perceived by a group of people significantly shapes how it is used as a resource’ (Feyissa and Hoehne, 2010: 328). Feyissa and Hoehne (2010) highlight the need to understand different ethnic groups’ understandings of borders. They show that while the Anywaa of the Gambella region of Ethiopia conceptualise the border between them and the Sudanese Nuer as firmly delimiting bounded territories, the Nuer ascribe to a more flexible view of territorial identities and space. Both understandings are underpinned by strategic dimensions concerning the two groups’ relationship to each other, other ethnic groups and the central state. Tensions have abounded as both have used almost mutually incompatible historical records to emphasise their right to a dominant political role in the governance of the multi-ethnic Gambella State in Ethiopia, with the Anywaa relying on the 1902 international border agreement between colonial Britain and imperial Ethiopia and the Nuer relying on more recent census data to illustrate their numerical advantage in the region. More recently, the Anywaa have felt that the Ethiopian government has been tacitly allowing Nuer regional expansion in to Gambella in the hope of minimising their own power and autonomy in the region (Feyissa, 2010).

Further north, a border that is relatively ‘harder’ is that between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Since the cessation of hostilities in 2000, a state of no war-no peace, punctuated by brief outbreaks of violence along the border, as persisted. All official communication is cut off between the two countries, including physical border crossings as well as trade relations, postal and telecommunications exchanges. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission’s ruling awarding the disputed territory to Eritrea has not been enforced and the UN peace keeping force (UNMEE) left the border area in 2008. This border area is more permeable in some areas than others – Afar communities continue to share resources on both sides of the border, whereas in other areas there is less interaction. The impact of border closure on these communities continues to affect local food prices, wage labour rates and availability, and local security.

Borders need to be seen as ‘conduits and opportunities’, not barriers to interactions and productive relationships (Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996; Raeymaekers, 2009; Feyissa and Hoehne, 2010). Reorienting our understanding of borders may lead to less reliance on repressive, control-oriented policies aimed at borderland communities, which have undermined their potential economic vibrancy. Research could instead explore how populations navigate and shape borders and borderland areas, as though border areas and those inhabiting them may be geographically distant from urban loci of power, ‘they are partly in control of what happens at the borders, which is in turn vital for the centres’ (Feyissa and Hoehne, 2010: 9).
4.2 Rural and urban livelihoods and mobility

It is beyond the scope of this study to include all of the literature on rural livelihoods in the Horn of Africa. What is presented here are the key livelihoods issues affecting communities in border areas and those impacting upon the current high rate of urbanisation in the region. While urbanisation is not a new phenomenon, the rate at which it is occurring, and its links to other development challenges – youth unemployment, impoverishment, the capacity to absorb large numbers of returning migrants to expanding cities, and the possible impact on decision-making about onward movement out of the country of origin or out of the region make it a key issue needing further research.

Pastoral and other rural livelihoods

An estimated 20 million of people across the Horn of Africa region rely on pastoralism. Most of the rest of the population relies on precarious rain-fed agriculture for their livelihoods. For the former, mobility – often crossing international borders – is a fundamental livelihood practice. For the latter, mobility plays an important role in helping people cope with shortfalls in their production, as they rely on seasonal labour migration and other practices to secure their subsistence needs.

The Rural Poverty Portal, run by the International Fund for Agricultural Development, contends that 12.7 million smallholders in Ethiopia produce 95 per cent of agricultural GDP. Of these, over half cultivate plots of 1 hectare or less, and face annual periods of prolonged hunger before the harvest is ready. In Kenya, the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands cover 80 percent of the country, and 10 million people earn their livelihoods through them, albeit with the majority of these individuals subsisting on less than one dollar per day (Gomes, 2006). In Somalia, livestock contribute 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings (CIA 2014). Fre and Tesfagergis of the Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa (PENHA) (2013) nonetheless stress that the contribution of pastoralists and agropastoralists to domestic, national and regional food security is often overlooked by those formulating government policy, resulting in the inadequate apportionment of resources towards developing and supporting these sectors. Failing to recognise the contribution of these livelihoods to development means that counter-intuitive projects, such as allowing multinational companies to acquire essential riverine land for their commercial ventures, are undermining the productivity and viability of small-scale farming.

Gebeye (2016) and Markakis (2011) argue that in Ethiopia policies from the imperial regime through the Derg and current regime, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (the EPRDF) have largely responded to pastoralists in the same way. They have for the most part vilified pastoralists, with ‘improvements’ to their ways of life seen to lie in settling them away from what are seen as unproductive and unviable pastoral livelihoods. The Ethiopian government has promoted sedentarisation of these communities without the ability to provide the supporting infrastructures to make their settlements economically viable. Developing resources to assist pastoralists is nonetheless challenging, as Gomes’s

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5 http://www.southworld.net/horn-of-africa-pastoralism-and-conflicts/
6 http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/ethiopia
7 http://www.southworld.net/horn-of-africa-pastoralism-and-conflicts/
(2006) work on the provision of water to pastoralists in Kenya and Somalia illustrates. The creation of new permanent water sources, the increasing practice of enclosure of grazing land, and even the deliberate villagisation of formerly mobile peoples has resulted in environmental degradation, displacement due to exclusionary practices and conflict, and the privatisation of land. New hydraulic infrastructures have historically had a detrimental impact upon pastoral communities, heightening displacement and conflict.

Opportunities identified by Fre and Tesfagergis (2013) to improve the future viability and contribution of pastoralism to evolving challenges include: improving infrastructures so that pastoral communities can connect with urban markets; diversification of incomes and animal stock; the formalisation of land rights once communities have become semi-sedentary; and the improvement of mobile phone technology so that pastoralists can access up to date information about markets. Mobile phone technology can also help facilitate cashless payments, promoting secure trade in rural areas (as has been seen with livestock trade between Kenya and Ethiopia – see Mahmoud 2010). Alongside recommendations pertaining to greater support for, and recognition of, these communities’ roles in domestic and regional food security, Fre and Tesfagergis also recommend that greater research on livestock market chains be undertaken ‘to understand the opportunities for trade available for pastoralists locally, nationally and internationally thus enhancing the pastoralists bargaining power’ (Ibid.: 29).

Ignoring pastoralists’ concerns heightens the likelihood of dissent or uprising in rural areas. In the case of Karamoja region in Uganda, the absence of effective state-orchestrated security and investment in the region has resulted in the emergence and consolidation of localised and community-based security actors to protect pastoralists’ interests. These have exacerbated crime and conflict in the region (Simonse, 2005), and attempts by the Ugandan government to integrate these geographically and politically peripheral security actors into state institutions and structures were poorly conceived, resulting in the further deterioration of security in Karamoja. This trend is likely to become more widespread in the Horn of Africa due to the flow of weapons into the region to support various military conquests in wider sub-Saharan Africa ending up in the hands of pastoralist groups.

As livelihood systems in rural areas – in most of the key areas of focus in the Horn this involves pastoral livelihood systems – come under pressure, people seek to move into urban areas. Often they engage in this kind of move only once they have lost their productive assets (land, animals, etc.) in rural areas. Moving into urban spaces with the intention of benefiting from the urban economy, many people find themselves ‘trapped’, unable to better themselves through the urban labour markets, and unable to return to their rural way of life. This is the theme of a major research project being conducted in Hargeisa with support from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council and DFID. We anticipate linking the REF’s work on urban economies and rural-urban linkages to such ongoing research to maximise impact. (See Recommendations for Research.)

4.3 Urban studies in the Horn of Africa

There are a handful of studies of migration in urban areas in the Horn of Africa. Several of these are focused on urban refugees, and for the most part are centred around national
capital cities. Studies on urban displacement to Nairobi consider the rapid expansion of such areas as the Eastleigh neighbourhood, sometimes referred to as ‘Little Mogadishu’ (see Carrier 2017) by virtue of the large numbers of Somalis who have settled in the area and the vibrant business sector that developed as Somali businesspeople sought to shift their businesses from Somali cities to a less risky environment. These studies also consider the vulnerabilities and precariousness that are common features of the lives of the urban displaced, and which are sometimes worsened by state policy (see Campbell, Crisp and Kiragu 2011; Human Rights Watch 2013; FEG/UNHCR/DRC 2012). Other studies, such as those on urban displacement in Kampala, stress the resilience and comparative advantage that many urban refugees and displaced may have over those who are living in camps (see Omata 2012) or feature comparisons between refugees and displaced persons living in different cities in the region as compared to other regions of the world (see the contributors to Koizumi and Hoffstaedter 2015). The implications of political transformation on the lives of the displaced is also a theme of much of the work done on displacement in Sudan and South Sudan (see for example Abusharaf 2009 on Khartoum and Grabska 2015).

The literature on displacement has not, generally speaking, included much coverage of private sector development and labour markets, or on the link between unemployment, particularly among youth, and population mobility (Omata, cited above, and Betts et al 2016 are exceptions).

5 Demographic factors – population, age and gender

The size of the world population estimated at 7.3 billion as of mid-2015 is projected to increase to 9.7 billion by 2050. More than half of this projected increase will mainly occur in Africa bringing its share of the global population to 25% from an estimated 16% in 2015. Among the countries where this projected growth is expected to concentrate, Ethiopia, United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda are listed (United Nations 2015).

By 2100, the world population may increase further to 11.2 billion. For 2100, current projections identify 33 countries having “a high probability of at least tripling” some of those being in HOA such as Somalia, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania.

While demographic trends have not always been integrated in the planning process of development activities and policies, there is now a recognition of the impact demographic changes have and will have on development.

The rapid increase in population obviously presents challenges and can become an impediment to sustainable growth as economies are not able to absorb the large number of youths. In such situation, the negative impacts range from political and social instability, increase in poverty, decrease in access to essential services and stronger desire to migrate to have access to better opportunities.

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8 For brief but useful profiles of urban displacement in Dar Es Salaam, Khartoum, Kampala and Nairobi see http://urban-refugees.org/
It also presents opportunities if countries experiencing such a growth put in place policies integrating these projected demographic trends in the design of their development policies.

In the foreword of the report on Development Goals in an Era of Demographic Change, the widespread inequalities of opportunity in education, health and other sectors are considered to be one of the main three critical challenges with the reduction of income levels below the poverty line ($1.90 a day - the updated international poverty line) and the sharing of income in a more equitable manner. It also stresses that the objectives of poverty reduction and shared prosperity are being affected by unequal progress on the non-income dimensions of development such as access to essential services.

In that respect, the report further highlights that countries in the HOA categorized in the low or lower-middle-income countries need to promote effective policies aimed at improving maternal and child health, at expanding girl education and women’s empowerment as well as investing in human capital through vocational and technical training and strengthening conditions for job creation.

As poverty levels remain very high in the HOA and the majority of countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa with a slower pace at poverty reduction and a rapid population growth, it is argued that such policies, taking into account demographic dynamics, can make a critical difference in achieving development goals. The table below provides a snapshot of the extent of youth unemployment in the region, disaggregated by gender.

Unemployment, youth total (% of total labour force ages 15-24) – modelled ILO figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2014 Rate (Men and Women)</th>
<th>2014 Rate (Men as % of Male Labour Force)</th>
<th>2014 Rate (Women as % of Female Labour Force)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Young people are often framed as competing for a limited number of economic opportunities, rather than expanding economies by themselves creating jobs. Integral to this is the devaluation of the informal labour market in urban areas in the Global South; jobs in this sector are dismissed as precarious, low-skilled and poorly remunerated prior to any substantive engagement with how these economies function in reality. The ‘youth’ is often seen as a homogenous group within this. Shohdi Abul-Gader Mohammed Alhaj, a Youth Leader for the British Council’s Horn of Africa Leadership and Learning for Action (HOLLA) project, states that though young people are a major resource for development, it is not clear which ‘youth’ policies and programmes are aimed at. In Sudan, he divides the ‘youth’ into three categories: those loyal to the government, those with an education, and the uneducated majority (Chatham House, 2016). Each requires a fundamentally different approach, support and set of interventions, with a one-size-fits-all model chronically incapable of addressing their highly differentiated grievances.

Understanding gendered differences is important here. Aguiari (2012) highlights the current paucity of research in to how women’s livelihoods can be meaningfully enhanced in post-conflict settings. While funding predominantly focuses on how to ensure protection for women in post-conflict environments, largely in the context of presumed increases in sexual violence, she stresses that this often comes at the expense of attempts to rethink women’s labour market inclusion and livelihood opportunities. Aguiari (2012: 167) states that ‘The outcome of self-reintegration into communities for women in post-conflict society is often isolation and poverty, along with negative responses of communities and sometimes families. Their children are often not welcome, especially boys who are competitors for the family land. Women also have to cope with unresolved feelings of guilt.’ Livelihood training projects are rarely sensitive to these factors. ‘Instead of reshaping gender roles to be more equal, the interventions recrystallize more traditional gender patterns by making either gender-blind or only protection-focused interventions: training in traditional women’s work exclusively, access to very limited credit, little action to ensure rights to land and minimal productive assets, and, first and foremost, no interventions for prioritizing welfare systems that can relieve women of the burden of the unacknowledged work of care performed by women for children, elderly, and husbands (2012: 174).’

The role of family size in shaping vulnerability and resilience remains unclear. Some argue that living conditions improve as household size increases because individuals across multiple livelihood activities pool resources, providing some resilience against shocks (Mberu, 2006). This is used to explain why larger families are often more resilient. The converse argument is that family size should be treated as a dependent variable. Wealthier families host extended family members who have fewer financial resources, thus resulting in the greater number of children being made up of nieces and nephews of the main breadwinners. The complexity of these family dynamics is often lost. IDMC, for example, stresses the need to understand the interdependency of migrants within families as a way to identify those to whom support would prove most beneficial within social and familial units. This involves moving beyond automatic analyses that suggest women and the elderly to be the most in need of auxiliary protection mechanisms to more sophisticated mapping exercises that recognise social interdependence.
A common trend in the literature are statements such as ‘families are split up as men migrate to look for work, and this leads to significant rises in female-headed households and in divorce and separation rates’ (Small Arms Survey, 2015: 49). Though no judgement is explicitly passed, these statements imply that female-headed households are automatically vulnerable and that the disintegration of family units is negative. Greater nuance seems necessary. With the proliferation of child marriage and domestic abuse, divorce should not necessarily be seen negatively. Similarly, unless specific vulnerabilities are identified in specific contexts, ‘female-headed households’ should not be seen as a proxy for increased poverty and reduced development. Concerns about the reduced productivity caused by the dispersal of nuclear families rely on Western ideas which assume that having men living within households is necessarily a positive indicator for livelihoods. But with men having migrated from Western Sudan for over a century to work on agricultural schemes in central Sudan or as migrant workers further afield, women have long looked after agricultural responsibilities at home (Young et al, 2013). The trend towards excluding women from decision-making in agricultural settings should be understood and addressed as a contemporary phenomenon, not a historic artefact (Mulugeta et al, 2014). Furthermore, the Small Arms Survey report (2015: 49) states that ‘migration puts households under great pressure. The security services often harass women who work in the informal urban economy, such as tea sellers.’ It again seems important to re-calibrate thinking around such issues, to squarely confront abuses of power within police forces rather than to seek solutions through controlling migrants and workers in fully functional and innocuous ‘informal’ types of employment, such as selling tea.

Gendered social norms are reported to be changing throughout the region, albeit at different speeds in different locations and with migration playing no predictable role in this (Jones et al, 2014). Though youth unemployment in Ethiopia has been declining since 1999, this decline has been gendered, with women benefiting far less than men (Broussar and Tekleselassie, 2012). The lack of employment opportunities available to women in Ethiopia has led to migratory movements to the Arab States being composed largely of adolescent girls seeking domestic work. This is worsened by low levels of female educational attainment. Erulkar and Muthengi-Karei’s (2012) study of adolescent girls in Amhara Region found that a key reason for this was parents seeing limited benefits to schooling their daughters, which results in low school attendance rates for females. This is likely partially attributable to the fact that, according to the 2005 National Labour Force Survey in Ethiopia, the illiterate working population was only about ten percent greater than the literate working population. Even girls who complete secondary schooling are known to struggle to find employment. For parents therefore, the calculation around the long-term gains of

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9 Some studies have linked high levels of gender inequality with a higher probability of non-international armed conflict. Caprioli’s (2003) study for the World Bank suggests a causal relationship between high fertility rates and violence at the individual, societal and state levels, though this conclusion is arrived at through quantitative calculations that do not clearly substantiate the causal mechanisms through which this link occurs. Caprioli (2003: 15) nonetheless contends that ‘gender inequality increases the likelihood of civil war based on domestic levels of structural and cultural violence and the role of sexism in mobilising group militias.’ Cockburn (2010) is thus compelled to argue that ‘if gender relations are one of the root causes of war, a feminist programme of gender transformation is a necessary component of the pursuit of peace.’
schooling female children often does not work in favour of continued education. For those in education, the International Labour Organisation (2011) found that girls often choose to migrate after failing exams in the 8th, 10th or 12th grade.\(^\text{10}\)

Some studies suggest that intergenerational mobility for men continues to grow faster than women. An implication of this is that gendered inequalities continue to persist in parts of rural Ethiopia (Haile, 2016). While conditions for women are not necessarily worsening compared to their parents, relative poverty and deprivation can be a considerable driver of migration and thus the relative benefits being accrued by men may serve as a further factor inducing female migration. Conversely, in some contexts improved economic conditions may spur mobility, particularly among men, as those with more economic resilience can now afford to move, making good on their ambitions to realise economic opportunity and improved security for themselves and any family they may have, in another place.

In Eritrea, there is very limited evidence of substantive changes for women. Following Eritrea’s independence in 1993, traditional gender roles were largely restored despite the progressive approach towards gender equality espoused by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front during the liberation war (Cite). The decade post-1991 saw a 50 per cent increase in the breakdown of marriages among ex-combatants and a backlash, manifested through increased sexual violence and women’s experiences, against the socio-economic empowerment of women (Aguiari, 2012). Following the war with Ethiopia between 1998 and 2000, UNDP created a widespread and well-funded livelihood training programme for Eritrean female ex-combatants, which including tailoring, craftsmanship and hairdressing. As Aguiari states, however, ‘in several evaluations the proposed courses for women reinforced gender stereotypes and divisions, and prevented women from accessing fully the job market and economic opportunities offered by reconstruction, which was one of the few sectors offering opportunities, by not being trained with relevant skills’ (2012: 169). There remains limited evidence that women have transcended traditional gender roles, despite Eritrea’s continuing pride over their ostensibly progressive laws and programmes in this area.

In Somalia, women’s roles have changed dramatically since the collapse of the state and through the years of conflict and displacement. With many men either away from the home fighting or working, or else permanently absent, women particularly in urban and suburban areas came to take on more economic responsibility for the family. This brought them into new jobs, in more public roles than many had been used to, although for some it brought a return to the public sphere, as many women had worked in the civil service during the Siad Barre era (see Mohamud 2016). Women played significant roles in peacebuilding and in some of the key statebuilding negotiations, but have repeatedly been left out of formal political representation (See Gardner and El Bushra 2004). Masculinity has also undergone significant changes, as men have been unable to uphold of many of the traditional positive traits of masculinity and have fallen into crisis (see Gardner and El Bushra 2016)

In South Sudan, changes in women’s roles have shifted in response not only to war, but to migration, and more recently return migration. Grabska’s (2015) study describes the ways in which young South Sudanese women’s identities were influenced by life in the refugee

\(^{10}\) See also Endesaw et.al.’s Assessment of Trafficking in Women and Children in and from Ethiopia (2006).
camps, including through UNHCR gender awareness workshops. Upon repatriation, many returnee women were ostracised by members of the community who had remained behind, or been displaced towards Khartoum (who had themselves been subject to very different, more conservative, influences).

6 Dynamics of conflict and displacement

The many years of instability and violence have resulted in the creation of interest groups and patterns of behaviour that help perpetuate conflict and displacement. In particular, research has highlighted the emergence of war economies, humanitarian response and systems of people smuggling and trafficking that serve multiple interests in the region. In short, it highlights the importance of interrogating who has an interest in perpetuating structures of violence rather than assuming there is any consensus on the common good.

6.1 War economies

Over time, the protracted Somali and South Sudanese conflicts have generated their own ‘war economies’. These are marked by high levels of rent seeking by individuals and groups who have access to military might, political power or both. David Keen (1994) has written about how the aid resources and spoils associated with war can often become motivating factors themselves, whereby warlords and militia leaders have a vested interest in perpetuating violence, or at least blocking the return to peace, in order to maximize their own gains. This creates a vicious cycle, wherein those with the most to lose from a disruption in the status quo are the very brokers charged with negotiating political settlements, leading governance processes, or deciding about the distribution and use of public resources.

In such a context, humanitarian aid to the displaced and refugee assistance become grist for the mill. Individual actors will change their behaviour in order to maximise their access to these resources, and top-level political negotiations are often influenced by considerations about what the likely impact will be on an individual or group’s access to these resources.

Any research on economies in areas affected by conflict and displacement must take into account the dynamics introduced by aid itself, as well as by other resources of war – armaments, cash crops, etc. It must also consider the conditions for post-conflict recovery, including the challenges of integrating large populations of repatriating refugees, returning IDPs, demobilised combatants, diaspora returnees and others coming back into the economy.

In an evaluation of the South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission’s proposal to reintegrate 90,000 ex-combatants into the South Sudanese economy by 2012, a report by the International Growth Centre (Krishnan and Shaorshadze 2013) warned that this route towards ‘buying peace’, by hiring these individuals in well-paid jobs to disincentivise them from engaging in illegal and criminal activities, may end up distorting the labour market, with long term negative repercussions. Programmes to accommodate this demographic are essential - particularly in places like Eritrea should the national service employees ever be demobilised en masse, and in Sudan and Somalia following decades of conflict - but effective models for the Horn of Africa have received
limited recent attention (for older analyses, see Babiker et al, 2003; Dercon et al, 1998; Bashaw, 2001).

6.2 Experiences of Displacement and Response Strategies

Displaced individuals often experience a range of fairly common challenges to establishing and maintaining livelihoods. These include: restrictions on freedom of movement and settlement; discrimination in accessing employment, as well as limited opportunities in already job-scarce environments; laws that admit refugees only as temporary guests; a lack of financial assets and social capital; and a lack of secure rights to own land, property and businesses.

Crisp (2003) stresses that livelihood projects for refugees often ignore the connection between livelihoods, protection and rights. Without the secure right to land, employment and property, rural communities - whether refugees or not - will struggle to maintain a livelihood. This is often worsened by the location of refugee camps in ecologically marginal areas, where the scarcity of natural resources compounds the difficulty of sustaining agricultural ventures. Without a legal right to work, refugees are pushed into the informal economy. This may expose them to exploitation by employers, who are aware that they cannot appeal to law enforcement should problems arise, and result in increasing tensions with the communities because they constitute a cheaper, less regulated workforce.

Prevailing models of humanitarian assistance can further undermine individuals’ coping mechanisms. These models encourage, if not require, individuals to present themselves as ‘needy’ to gain access to these resources (De Vriese, 2006; para.53). Research shows that cash programming can be an effective form of support, but more research may be needed to understand the impact of cash programming on local economies where large populations of displaced are residing.

To move beyond a hand-out model of humanitarianism, cash benefits are often needed. These allow displaced people and refugees greater fungibility over expenditure, are the most productive and/or appropriate form of support. It also requires acknowledging that livelihood interventions must occur throughout the displacement cycle. The process of registering individuals for asylum or upon arrival in IDP or refugee camps can be accompanied by a process of determining peoples’ livelihoods. This ensures that those with marketable skills can be supported to continue working as soon as possible. Integral to this is the need for host communities and governments to recognise (and potentially to certify) the qualifications of refugees so that their access to labour markets is not impeded by a lack of recognition. Context- and occupation-specific guidelines and support structures, such as those proposed by West et al (2015) for retaining teachers in refugee camps in Algeria and Ethiopia, can also be developed to ensure that employees have an incentive to continue in those occupations rather than immediately transferring to more lucrative NGO jobs.

The resilience of refugees and displaced individuals is increasingly recognised to be greatly enhanced by moving beyond the sedentarist bias inherent in the existing durable solutions paradigm. Whether through the creation of regional migration agreements, as illustrated by ECOWAS and SADC (Adepoju, 2007; Adepoju et al, 2007; Levitt, 2001), or the promotion of labour mobility as a protective status through which to travel (Long, 2009; 2015), new
approaches stress that the viability of the livelihood systems of the displaced is best protected by supporting people’s own coping strategies, which often involve continued movement, either seasonally, in response to shocks, or as a regular feature of household economic practices. A resilience-based approach to displaced livelihoods would enable those who do not wish to apply for refugee status but nonetheless face protection risks if they remain in their country or place of origin to hold residence elsewhere until the situation has been satisfactorily addressed. It would also allow for residence to be portable – people may move in and out of the central protection point as security and livelihood options allow in order to take advantage of a wider range of resources. UNHCR’s (2007) 10-Point Plan for providing refugee protection in mixed migration flows recognises to a limited extent the need for alternative temporary migration options.

This continued mobility - internationally and internally - is argued to assist the development of transnational trading relationships, to stimulate the regionalisation of economies, and to constitute a critical component of successful repatriation and reintegration operations (Long et al, 2010). Being able to sustain a relationship to the place individuals left while they reside elsewhere is indeed considered to increase the likelihood of individuals returning once conditions in the source region change because this does not require re-establishing oneself from nothing (Jacobsen, 2008). It also leads to graduated repatriation operations, which take the pressure off services, land and resources in the region of origin. Governments in the region, particularly the Eritrean PFDJ, have always been acutely aware of the dangers of rushed, large-scale repatriation operations due to the political, social and economic strain they can present, as well as the potential conflict that can emerge when individuals return and make claims for land that others now inhabit (IRIN News, 2013). However, countries in the region that have been supporting refugees for a very long time – such as Kenya – are often under considerable public pressure to accelerate repatriation. Their eagerness to see refugees repatriate quickly is often influenced by shrinking support from international donors. Refugees thus must make the choice between continuing to live in refugee camps with inadequate support and returning to an uncertain and possibly unsafe environment in their country of origin. This lends to the idea of repatriation as being not purely ‘voluntary.’ (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Much research simply stresses that mobility-based assistance and protection better corresponds with communities’ lives pre-displacement. For those living in border areas, this will depend upon the ease of cross-border migration and trade (Bakewell, 2006).

Without placing responsibility on refugees and displaced individuals to simultaneously serve as catalysts for economic development, providing refugees with access to resources, freedom of movement, and the right to work within host communities is known to reduce dependency on aid and is argued to diminish tensions and conflicts with host communities if adequately facilitated and supported. Implicit within this is the sense that though refugees and displaced individuals may lack forms of capital lost during flight, including property and social networks, new opportunities may present themselves in their new host population given policies that facilitate this (Jacobsen, 2002). In addition, refugees may have access to resources not possessed by host communities, including increased human capital through possessing skills/education not found in the host area, due to transnational networks formed during flight, and because of their access to humanitarian support.
These factors can often be seen to be working together. For example, Young et al’s (2013) study of IDPs in Darfur highlights two interesting features. First, the proportion of women that were IDPs in Zalingei and Kebkabiya was significantly higher than the resident population. Women shouldered a three-fold burden in the camps: they have greater responsibilities because male members of their families have often migrated, either for work or to join militias; they are tasked with finding new livelihoods in employment-scarce locations; and many of their livelihood strategies, including firewood collection, grazing livestock cultivation, now have an added protection risk due to raiding. Second, income from the sale of livestock and agricultural products was virtually non-existent within the camps, despite this being individuals’ main livelihood pre-displacement. Livelihood strategies thus shifted for IDPs in both settings, towards casual labour, seasonal employment, relying on remittances, small business ownership, and selling aid. Dynamics of migration and displacement in Darfur is a proposed topic of research by the REF.

6.3 Trafficking and Smuggling of people

Much of the literature on trafficking and smuggling worldwide focuses on the exploitation of women and children. There is also considerable coverage of the problem of trafficking of women and children from and within the Horn of Africa. It cites push factors for their movement that include the absence of opportunities for women in rural agriculture (Baker, 2012) and the early age of marriage and high divorce rates in Ethiopia.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that the majority of arrivals to Europe are actually young men. UNHCR reports that between January and December 2016, 57% of arrivals were men, 17% were women, and 26% were children (from all origin countries). Trends suggest that the number of children arriving decreased during 2016 (from 34% at the beginning of the year to 15% in December) (UNHCR Dec. 2016). These trends mask considerable variation between nationalities. RMMS reports that in 2013 ‘close to half’ of the Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants arriving in Libya were women, whereas virtually all of the Somalis arriving were men (2016, p. 23). Thus while considering trafficking and smuggling, it is essential to examine the perspectives of men, women, and children together and the specificities of the different origin countries.

Two major reports which unpack the dynamics of smuggling and trafficking networks in the region are worth mentioning in some detail. The 2016 report by Sahan and IGAD’s Security Sector Programme entitled Human Trafficking and Smuggling on the Horn of Africa - Central Mediterranean Route, which provides a great deal of detail about the inner workings of smuggling and trafficking networks, the experiences of migrants and refugees caught up in these networks, and the attempts by national and regional authorities to combat illegal activity related to smuggling and trafficking. The 2013 report Migrant Smuggling in the Horn of Africa and Yemen, written by Bram Frouws for the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (Frouws 2013) which provides country by country profiles of smuggling and mixed migration within the region. The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat has also produced reports that look specifically at the vulnerabilities and experiences of female migrants in Yemen (see Abused and Abducted [2014]) and children (see Young and on the Move [2016]). (See also the World Bank’s Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa 2015).
Although migration from the Horn of Africa comprised only 7% of the total Mediterranean arrivals in 2015 (UNHCR data), the number of unaccompanied minors from the region is disproportionately large. According to RMMS, along the Central Mediterranean route, ‘Based on 2015 figures (as of end of October), the largest group of unaccompanied children (29 per cent) were from Eritrea, followed by Syria, Egypt, and then Somalia (at 9 per cent)’ (RMMS 2016, citing IOM and UNICEF figures. The fact that individuals leaving Eritrea are thought to be increasingly young as the age for conscription reduces is argued to leave unaccompanied children at particular risk of being trafficked, smuggled, abducted, detained, abused and exploited in employment (RMMS: June 2016). Eritreans are also often more vulnerable to being trafficked because traffickers see the potential ransom payments to be higher due to their connections to the diaspora (Shroeder, 2015). Furthermore, Van Reisen et al (2012) allege the involvement of senior PFDJ officials in the trafficking of Eritreans across the border.\(^\text{11}\) The Eritrean government has shown limited compliance with attempts to eliminate trafficking, including through failing to prosecute government officials alleged to have been complicit in trafficking offences (US Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report, 2015).

In a sample of 134 qualitative interviews with Eritreans, Lijnders et al (2013) note that many willingly sought the services of a smuggler to facilitate their journey from Eritrea to Israel. Smugglers’ services were seen as a vital lifeline for these populations, with their skills and networks enabling Eritreans to leave the country through several well-established and reliable routes. Though some experienced no physical abuse, many experienced some form of ‘aggravated smuggling’, which contains an element of inhuman or degrading treatment, or were trafficked. Eritreans held by trafficking groups are often forced to beg their families to provide money for their release, presenting a significant risk of impoverishment for Eritreans in the diaspora and within Eritrea who are forced to ‘beg for money or sell their belongings such as jewellery, property and livestock for their release’ (ibid.; 144).

In addition to the Mediterranean and Yemen routes, smuggling and trafficking takes place along the Southern migration route as well. In 2009, IOM estimated that up to 20,000 male Somali and Ethiopian migrants were being smuggled to South Africa from the Horn of Africa annually (Horwood/IOM, 2009). Much of this trade seems to originate within refugee camps. There have been allegations that some United Nations staff members at Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, and foreign embassy officials have been engaged in selling resettlement spots to wealthy refugees, as well as to facilitate the activities of smugglers within these spaces (Gastrow, 2011).

According to the 2016 Sahan/IGAD report, ‘The principal smugglers and trafficking kingpins who dominate the Central Mediterranean Route are predominantly Eritrean in nationality, but they collaborate with ethnic Somalis, Ethiopians, and Sudanese in order to

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\(^\text{11}\) One knock-on effect of this has been that even pro-government factions within the Eritrean diaspora have hesitated to continue supplying funding to the ruling party, both due to moral objections towards the PFDJ’s behaviour and because savings are withheld in case they need to be used to pay the ransom of family members crossing the Sinai and Sahara (Hirt, 2013). These economic shortfalls have been worsened the Eritrean government’s continuing international isolation. As Hirt (2013: 25) states, ‘one important side effect of the sanctions...is the increased awareness among parts of the Eritrean diaspora and the international community of the regime’s opaqueness and its involvement in the support of armed insurgencies and participation in criminal activities such as contraband and human trafficking.’
be able to operate easily across borders and amongst the diverse communities of the Horn of Africa’ (2016, p. 18). The ringleaders are responsible for the transport and storage of their human cargo, arranging through a series of informal subcontracts the movement and passage through checkpoints to deliver them, in the best possible scenario, to their final destination.

Smuggling in the Horn of Africa is widely-reported to be brokered by the Rashaida ethnic group from Eritrea (Humphris, 2013). This group has historically been marginalised by the government in Sudan and Eritrea and thus sees very few benefits to be had from engaging with State institutions (Baas, 2013). Restrictions on their involvement in illicit trade in commodities such as electronic goods, as has occurred in Eastern Sudan, has potentially pushed this community towards greater involvement in smuggling and trafficking as alternative livelihood sources were exhausted (Smith, 2011; cited in Humphris, 2013). More broadly Young (2007) contends that smuggling and trafficking have prevailed in Eastern Sudan due to the marginalisation, isolation, high unemployment and significant underdevelopment of the region.

Reports of organ removal from trafficked victims in the Horn of Africa have increased following the passage of Egyptian laws prohibiting organ donation from deceased individuals, resulting in major shortages of organs in Egypt (Ayyaantuu News, 2016). Work produced by the Coalition for Organ-Failure Solutions (COFS) suggests that human traffickers in Egypt are increasingly seeing African migrants as easy victims.

Where one form of illicit movement can occur, so can others. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2009) has declared that complacency around managing illegal flows around East Africa has meant that it ‘is becoming a free economic zone for all sorts of trafficking - drugs, migrants, guns, hazardous wastes, and natural resources.’ Failing to address trafficking and human smuggling networks is argued to perpetuate other forms of criminal activity, as well as to undermine the efficacy of the very institutions required to eliminate them. Gastrow (2011), for example, explores the threat posed by organised, largely transnational crime in Kenya to the political autonomy and efficacy of state institutions, including the police and judiciary.12

The Sahan/IGAD study of trafficking and smuggling notes that

Combating [trafficking and smuggling networks] effectively will require an equally sophisticated multi-lateral approach, but most governments concerned continue to treat human smuggling and trafficking as a domestic problem – in part because they naturally tend to focus on individuals who can be prosecuted within their respective jurisdictions. International cooperation to counter the threat remains limited and largely ad hoc, and action against the criminal networks responsible is further complicated by the fact that their operations span large areas where law enforcement and criminal justice capacities are weak or even – in parts of Somalia and Libya – nonexistent. Consequently, although efforts to counter human smuggling and

12 Trafficking in women and children from Somalia is, for example, said to use the same infrastructures that legally transport khat from Kenya to Somalia, with most individuals being sold in Nairobi and Mombasa.
trafficking along this route are gathering momentum, the challenges remain formidable (2016, p. 18).

This need for joined up approaches to effective policy to counter trafficking and smuggling will be the subject of research proposed by the REF (See Section 10).

6.5 Governance and conflict prevention and dynamics of forced displacement and irregular migration

The causes of conflicts in the Horn of Africa are geo-politically motivated but also internally driven and externally induced. Establishing good governance that encapsulates procedural, practical, institutional and citizenry rights with regards to exercising political, economic, administrative and legal authority, can be utilised as a tool for conflict prevention. Above all, the setup of that governance needs to address the roots and nature of the ensuing conflicts (Alemu, Yemane and Zeray 2015). Given the complexity of conflicts in the region, establishing good governance has become acutely challenging, particularly in countries where state authority is fragile and armed groups operate with impunity across porous borders.

The populations affected by challenges arising from these conflicts adopt strategies largely based on mobility to protect themselves (Horst 2015). However, as Horst (2015) explains, humanitarian approaches to displaced people do not take sufficient account of the mobility needs of those they assist. This is particularly crucial in this region as there is very little evidence of a permanent evolution from conflict to post-conflict. In fact, it is more likely that violence can erupt anywhere, at any time, leading to a state of radical uncertainty (Horst and Grabska 2015). Types of violence and conflict that are neither war nor peace, neither criminal violence nor political violence, are increasingly the norm in conflict regions (Richards 2005; Suhrke and Berdal 2012). For example, present-day conditions in Somalia are very different from those in the early 1990s at the onset of the civil war, yet the increased securitization of the Somali conflict in light of regional and global security concerns contributes to continued violence and uncertainty locally.

Most inhabitants of refugee camps dream of, and plan for, onward migration. They rely on their diaspora relatives for remittances that can facilitate those journeys as well as for immediate survival. Most refugees show low self-reliance levels and lack coping strategies, except for further movement, which increases their vulnerability (ReDDSS 2016).

There are some constructive efforts being made by state authorities in the region. Somalia’s National Development Plan includes durable solutions for the local integration of IDPs and creating links with development actors and government. Kenya is reflecting on the promises of local/sub-national and transitional solutions but the refugee-security nexus is hampering this. Uganda is putting effort in local economic integration, giving refugees the right to engage in gainful employment and the freedom to move. Ethiopia is exploring out-of-camp solutions, although this is only with Eritrean refugees at the moment. Whether the key actors will remain consistent in their efforts and take these tools forward remains to be seen.

Several EU Trust Fund activities are aimed at improving governance and policy of migration management. The Better Migration Management initiative
(www.giz.de/en/worldwide/40602.html) focuses on improving efforts to curb trafficking and smuggling through harmonisation of national migration policies, strengthening of institutions that can combat human trafficking, providing protection and support for migrants, and also providing them with information and advice on safe and legal migration routes, employment opportunities and available support.

The Regional Protection Programme, implemented since 2011 in the Horn of Africa, aims to strengthen protection and enhance assistance for refugees and asylum seekers in the region and provide border security and protection against trafficking.

These initiatives, insofar as they have had or are having an impact on the governance environment, will be part of the scope of study in our Research Theme 5 on Migration Management (See Section 10).

6.4 Local CVE and peacebuilding efforts

Throughout the region, there are multiple initiatives aimed at addressing the drivers of conflict at the local level. These take the form of what have come to be called ‘countering violent extremism’ (CVE) or peacebuilding activities. Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels note that CVE, conceived of as a preventive rather than reactive endeavour to address the threat of extremist violence, ‘in the Horn remains a fledging and largely underfunded practice. It also continues to be regionally fragmented and is mostly implemented in an ad hoc manner (2016, p. 1).’ These efforts are led by a handful of donors – the US, UK, EU, Denmark, IGAD and the East African Economic Community – and are directed at national level government or local civil society bodies for implementation. The EU’s CVE efforts have been largely led by the STRIVE (Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism) initiative launched in 2014. STRIVE has sought to identify the drivers of violent extremism and then use the evidence base to inform interventions. Many of the interventions involve engaging with civil society groups and law enforcement agents to provide support to at-risk groups (See Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels 2016 p. 3 and European Commission 2015).

CVE efforts in the Horn have been accused of being ad hoc and based on anecdotal evidence, and therefore to be less effective then they might otherwise be (See Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels 2016). In an attempt to improve coordination and coverage, IGAD has since 2015 taken over coordination of CVE activities. This move has been hampered, however, by a lack of commitment from donors to work through IGAD and to develop a regional CVE strategy.

Peacebuilding efforts are related to CVE, but include additional mechanisms such as efforts to promote dialogue in ongoing conflicts at all levels, from the most local to the national and regional level. Notable contributors in this field include SaferWorld, which has developed an innovative system of non-state actor platforms to promote dialogue and reconciliation, and the Danish Refugee Council and Danish Demining Group, who have sought to improve community security through a range of support activities aimed at promoting peacebuilding activities.

For further discussion of the activities of different actors, see Annexes 1 and 2.
7 Migration, mobility and development linkages, policies and interventions

The challenges of responding to large scale migration and displacement, and supporting economic development in resource-poor areas has stimulated much discussion about migration might affect development and vice versa in such contexts. In recent years, the focus has been on the former, with a global discussion about how migration can stimulate new resource flows, especially through remittances, and make a significant contribution to the areas of origin. On the latter, research has tended to be limited to concern about the implications of development initiatives that require people to move off their land, in particular with large infrastructure projects such as dams. This has come to be known as development-induced displacement. How far other development initiatives – such as investments in education or training – affect migration and mobility has been much less researched.

7.1 The Migration-Development debate

In recent years there has been a resurgence of debate about relationships between migration and development. High levels of out-migration—whether from rural areas to cities or international migration—are often associated with poverty, high levels of unemployment, political repression or other indicators of weak development, conditions which are prevalent in many parts of the Horn of Africa. At the same time, people are attracted to stay in or move to areas where the economy is growing and there are good opportunities to secure a desirable way of life.

Underlying much of the current response to high levels of migration to Europe and other regions is the assumption that investing in development in areas of origin will provide incentives to people to stay rooted in place. If people move as a result of economic desperation, or a lack of options to support their lives in their areas of origin, the logic goes, then providing people with more options and a means to support themselves will enable them to avoid taking perilous and expensive journeys further afield. This argument would make some sense if it were true that migration was caused by a single motivating factors. As de Haas (2014, see also Flahaux and de Haas 2016) has argued, however, there is little evidence to suggest that migration decisions are motivated by a single set of factors, or that development aid close to home can dissuade people from moving. De Haas refers to a ‘capability-aspiration framework,’ in which potential migrants assess their options based on the resources (capabilities) they have at their disposal in their homes, and weigh these against the expectation of what they expect to find when they move.

There does not appear to be a simple relationship between development progress and reductions in out-migration flows. In some cases, and for some people, positive development outcomes may serve as an incentive for them to stay in their areas of origin to take advantage of the increased opportunity. In others, the development opportunities may be visible on a macro level but not make an appreciable difference in the lives of would-be migrants. For still others, the opportunities afforded by development may benefit them such that they become more able to afford further onward movement; migration may increase as a result of some development interventions. Furthermore, it is clear that many people are
motivated not only by economic factors, but in fact are displaced as a result of persecution. Here, investing in development without a concomitant improvement in the human rights conditions that people fact, is not likely to prevent mass movement of refugees. Available evidence shows that while there does seem to be a correlation in some contexts (support for rehabilitation in areas of potential refugee return, for example), in others development can have either no appreciable effect on migration, or else can in fact increase some kinds of mobility.

This final point need not indicate a particular problem, if one takes as a starting point the idea that what is problematic is not migration per se, but rather displacement or movement that is made necessary by lack of alternative and safe choices. Sustainable livelihoods are founded on the idea of people being able to access the resources they need in the present and future and not being in the position of having to engage in coping or survival strategies that might have adverse effects. This kind of approach shifts the focus from one of containment to one of promotion of human welfare, with supporting people’s own strategies for resilience so that they can make positive decisions for themselves. More will be said about this further on.

Multiple arguments are advanced as to why an increase in migration may accompany an increase in development: the dissolution of financial barriers to migration with higher wages; an increase in population caused by falling mortality rates contributing to higher unemployment or lower wages and thus more reactive migration (though this contradicts the first point); rural-urban migration and a decline in traditional livelihood practices resulting in changes to people’s aspirations; developments in communications and transport infrastructures; and the network and imitation effects of previous migrants (Vogler et al, 2000; Bariagaber, 2013). Vogler et al (2000: 489) summarise that ‘Combining all these different arguments leads to a theoretical idea of an inverse u-shaped relationship between development and migration. Starting with very low income levels in the Third World, dissolving financial restrictions, population growth, societal change, improved communications and expanding networks will lead to increased migration to the industrialised countries in the short and medium run. In the long run, however, potential convergence of incomes and home preferences will cause migratory movements to fall.’ These dynamics will vary depending on the levels of economic strength in different countries of origin.

There is also much discussion about how migration may affect development progress increasing evidence (as discussed above) highlights the potential contribution of migration to financial development in the source country, through avenues such as remittances, greater human capital, and increased trade links. Among the families researched by Shaw (2010; cited by Deshingkar et al, 2014) in Sri Lanka, it was, for example, common for men to reduce their working hours due to remittances being received from female members of their household. While some see this as legitimising a culture of dependency, thus highlighting the unproductive side of remittances, others suggest that this allows other family members to withdraw from employment that may have been degrading, dangerous or of low return. Normative judgements around the good and bad sides of remittances, and thus their role in development, can obscure the lived experiences of development that have value for
individuals, such as maintaining dignity through not having to work jobs in ostracised occupations.

Migration is similarly for the most part still viewed suspiciously or negatively by many governments. In a 2001 review of the African Poverty Reduction Strategy papers (Black et al, 2004), it was found that of 22 PRSPs surveyed, only six countries - including Ethiopia - wrote anything positive about migration. Rural-urban migration was particularly demonised for resulting in increased unemployment and the fragmentation of traditional values. Much of this can be linked to an ongoing debate as to whether African youth constitute volatile populations as a result of unemployment and retrenchment of state services, or catalysts for economic growth due to their underutilised potential (Abbink et al, 2005; Honwana et al, 2005; Porter et al, 2010; Urdal, 2004; Sommers, 2011). While the former positions young migrants to urban areas as ‘ticking time bombs’, the latter imputes developmental potential into these populations.

A similar tension exists between those who ascribe to the ‘brain drain’ model of migration, and those who consider international migration contributing to ‘brain gain’. The former camp argue that the emigration of highly educated and skilled individuals deprives their sending countries of key contributors to the labour force. This coincides with broader models (Cumulative Causation theory, Centre-Periphery models and neo-Marxist development theories) that consider migration to heighten geographical inequality as developed regions or urban areas significantly benefit from cheap migrant labour at the expense of the sending regions. Further migration from these peripheral regions and countries then further weakens their economic base, leaving inhabitants dependent upon remittances, transfers and rents from migrant-receiving states, with the result of further emigration. The latter group argue that the aspirations of many to join an international, educated elite catalyses individuals to study harder, thus boosting educational attainment in source countries (World Bank, 2005). Castles, De Haas and Miller (2013, p. 77) contend that this phenomenon only occurs ‘if the opportunity to migrate increases the economic returns to education’. There is otherwise a disincentive to study if low skilled, irregular migrants do not experience any financial dividends for increased educational levels.

The desire to keep people in place, however, continues to inform development policies. As Bakewell (2008: 1350) states, ‘mobility is still excluded from the underlying model of development’ as initiatives are primarily intended to improve the livelihoods of people in situ, rather than to improve opportunities in diverse ways, for example through increasing graduates’ international competitiveness in a global market. ‘Development action to sustain some rural areas or even whole countries may be attempting to create artificial incentives to keep people in their place,’ he goes on to argue. ‘In some cases it could perhaps be asked if investing such aid is wasteful when migration may be a more attractive and sustainable option for those people who have the opportunity to take it’ (Bakewell, 2008: 1353). The result is few attempts by development agencies to lobby for greater freedom of movement for their beneficiary populations as they struggle to conceive of people’s desire to undertake risky migration strategies as anything but false consciousness. It also results in a fundamental tension. While development organisations consider that a reduction in out-migration constitutes a successful project, having raised standards of living such that people do not wish to migrate, this may clash with populations’ emic understandings of migration
as they ‘may see improved quality of life related to new opportunities, which may include moving and establishing a new ‘home’ elsewhere’ (Bakewell, 2008: 1351). Migration as such has an indeterminate relationship to development, as it is often pursued as an intrinsic part of individual’s livelihoods rather than as an indicator of successful or failing development interventions.

The EC stated in 2006 that ‘creating jobs in developing countries could significantly reduce migratory pressure from Africa’ (emphasis added) (CEC, 2006: 5). The relationship between these two factors, however, remains largely unknown. In our proposed research, we intend to examine the question of how and under what conditions employment and migration are related, and how development interventions impact on different types of mobility. The question is whether it is possible to establish a positive (and causal) correlation between the two. The decision to migrate is based on multiple stimuli, both long-term and proximate, meaning that isolating the impact of ‘development’ - however that is defined - will be nearly impossible. Significant economic and industrial growth in major urban centres in the Horn of Africa such as Khartoum, Addis Ababa and Nairobi may, for example, increase international migration from Somalia and Eritrea while reducing onwards migration of pre-existing populations through providing some employment stability.

There are some development initiatives which have a direct impact on migration patterns, although these need to be considered in a more disaggregated way than a mere binary relationship between all development and all migration. First, we consider the impact of major infrastructure projects – in particular dams – which require the relocation of people living in the areas to be affected by rising water. This has been subject to a large volume of research around the term ‘development induced displacement. Second, we consider the impact of changing ownership of land, focusing on the large scale investments in land for commercial agriculture, which disrupts the lives and livelihoods of those already living on it.

### 7.2 Development-Induced Displacement

Theoretical developments in the 1990s illustrated that Development-Induced Displacement not only results in economic impoverishment through asset and job losses (Cerneea, 1996; 1997; 1999; 2000; Picciotto et al, 2001). It also creates profound social, political and cultural disempowerment through ‘the breakdown in social and food security, credit and labour exchange networks, social capital and kinship ties’ (Dwivedi, 2002: 710). Furthermore, few pre-emptive resettlement initiatives adequately address disruptions to populations’ livelihoods and societies by factoring in appropriate economic, environmental and social considerations.

The most influential model for thinking about DID is Cernea’s (1996) ‘Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction model’ (IRR). This contends that displacement in the absence of a well-managed resettlement project increases impoverishment through: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, increased morbidity and mortality, food insecurity, loss of access to common property and social disarticulation (as summarised by Dwivedi, 2002). Cernea’s framework is intended to highlight these risk factors so that mitigating
programmes can be designed, for example through cultivating productive agricultural land in areas prior to populations being moved to them.

Major weaknesses with this approach include that its prescriptive format excludes displaced individuals from defining their own matrix of losses, and thus from defining their own priorities for resettlement and dispute resolution. Research indeed suggests that direct compensation of like-for-like is often not desired by affected populations. Their requirements vary markedly over time and are often more successfully achieved through establishing people’s right to develop rather than through the direct provision of services. The relative success of resettlement initiatives appears to depend on the degree of participation accorded to displaced populations, which involves an extensive period of consultation, sensitisation, negotiation and conflict resolution (World Commission on Dams, 1999). Importantly, the IRR model also excludes the ‘larger consequences of displacement, including violations, humiliation and indignation...assets, resources, livelihoods, institutions, networks, traditions, values, identities, rights, entitlements, securities, services and knowledge’ (Dwivedi, 2002: 718). In a context like the Horn of Africa, where identity politics are so influential for national politics, factoring in these less quantifiable issues seems critical, along with individuals’ own perception of risk differentiated according to class, gender, religion, age and ethnic group and the regulatory framework of the concerned countries and organisations (Picciotto et al, 2001). This requires the recalibration of a traditional cost/benefit analysis, ensuring that non-traditional and non-monetised costs, such as the erosion of customary rights and market access, are adequately factored into analyses and compensation frameworks (Dwivedi, 2002).

One important form of DID is displacement within urban areas following regeneration projects. Ambaye et al (2015), for example, analyse the experiences of 352 households displaced to a peripheral part of the city by the construction of a new stadium in Bahir Dar city, Ethiopia. Common problems included: lack of services, including drinking water, education and health services; lack transportation to travel back to areas of the city where the markets for their goods exist; lack of affordable and available housing; the limited provision of compensation beyond the allocation of limited new housing plots, worsened by the fact that few people had security of land ownership prior to being resettled; and experiences of social isolation and disintegration as communities were not resettled in the same social units they had lived in pre-resettlement areas. One positive aspect of resettlement was that the IDPs were given legal right to use the land they were moved to (although, as with all land in Ethiopia, actual ownership remained in the hands of the government).

7.3 Climate Change and Migration

Climate change is already affecting the Horn of Africa. In the last 10 years, there have been prolonged droughts in Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania and devastating floods in parts of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. At the time of writing, famine has been declared in South Sudan, and the threat of famine has been identified in Somalia.

Various predictions on climate change concur on a rise in minimum temperatures but do not come up with similar rainfall projections. It is however clear that weather systems are
becoming more erratic and violent with varying effects on different countries depending on geography and agro-ecological zones as well as economic, social and cultural factors.

According to a 2013 report by the International Food Policy Research Institute, agriculture drives the economy of the region and accounts for more than 50 percent of gross domestic product in Ethiopia, Sudan and Tanzania while it accounts for less than 30 percent in Kenya and Eritrea. While there is a growing urbanization across the region as well as more industrial development, the agricultural sector will continue to dominate the countries’ economies and its performance to determine fluctuations in poverty levels and food security on yearly basis.

Agricultural systems in East Africa are mainly rain-fed and highly vulnerable to climate change and variability. The frequency and severity of climate shocks such as drought, floods, heat and cold stress have increased with negative impacts on agriculture and food security.

Many areas are likely to see less rainfall in future and an increased incidence of droughts. Rising temperatures in many areas are likely to result in reduced crop yields: harvests of wheat, soybean, sorghum and irrigated rice could decline by between 5 percent and 20 percent, with irrigated rice production being the hardest hit. However, output of rain-fed maize and rain-fed rice might increase slightly, due to increased rainfall in some areas.

Within the agricultural sector, livestock production is essential as many rural populations depend heavily on its income. The changes in temperature, the patterns of rainfall and the occurrence of extreme events such as droughts has and will have a direct effect on livestock as they affect feed availability and quality, grazing ranges, weed and disease incidence. The loss of animals as a result of the above may thus increase having a maximum impact on vulnerable pastoral communities engaged in extensive livestock production systems in the semi-arid and arid lowlands of the region.

The climate change will have far-reaching consequences for the poor and marginalized groups in different parts of the region, among which the majority depend on agriculture for their livelihoods and have a lower capacity to adapt.

Research on rapid warming of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea have also raised concerns about the reduction in the amount of phytoplankton (microscopic plants at the base of the ocean food chain) which together with an increase in industrial fisheries and pollution, impact on the fish population. Coral reefs seem to be affected as well through coral bleaching with consequences on the numerous species of marine life using corals as habitat. Such changes linked to coastal erosion could obviously affect negatively human populations living in the coastal areas and depending on the sea for their livelihoods.
7.4 Diaspora and Origin Country Relations

All of the countries in the Horn of Africa have large diaspora populations living outside the region. It is estimated that there are at least 3 million Ethiopians living outside the region, for instance, and more than 1.5 million Somalis. Diasporas are crucially important not only in the sending of remittances – estimated at $1.2-2 billion per year in the case of Somalia (FAO 2013), $1.6 billion to Kenya, $900 million to Uganda, $600 million to Ethiopia and $500 million to Sudan (World Bank 2016). These figures reflect officially declared funds only, and thus should be seen as minimum levels; actual amounts are expected to be much higher.

Remittances are used for all manner of purposes. In Somalia, research has shown that nearly 75% of remittances received in Somaliland and Puntland were used for recurrent, essential expenses – food, education and healthcare. When asked what they would do if remittance funds stopped coming, one-third of the survey respondents indicated that they would not be able to meet their basic food needs (FAO/FSNAU 2013). In areas and with recipients who are economically more secure, remittances can play an important role in funding business investment, land purchases, house construction, and other longer-term investments. Remittances are also channelled towards development and emergency humanitarian aid, in
addition to dedicated fundraising that engages diasporas in giving (see Hammond et. al. 2009, Hoehne, Feyissa and Abdile 2011).

Beyond the significance of financial transfers from the diaspora, the influence that they have over other aspects of life in the country of origin is often enormous. Senior politicians from all of the countries in the region regularly court diaspora communities in Europe and North America to shore up support for their campaigns and policies at home. In Somalia, all three Parliaments (in Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu) draw members from the diaspora, as do the three executive cabinets (See Hammond: 2012). Such engagement is sometimes referred to as ‘political remittance’.

Another important way in which diaspora engagement influences directly on migration is with the flow of information back and forth between diaspora hubs and areas of origin. Social media usage is very high in all countries of the region, and young people in particular have easy access to information, images, and advice from a wide range of sources. Messages sent back to youth who might aspire to travel ranges from stark warnings about the dangers that such journeys involve. However there is also a troubling collection of narratives that extols the benefits of migration. Images of young people posing in front of fancy sports cars or wearing the latest fashions, even if they themselves are living in conditions that are not as glamorous, help to perpetuate the idea that life far from home is much better and that whatever risk such a journey entails is worth the odds, given the rewards that are assumed to await the migrants. There is increasing research being conducted into this aspect of diaspora/home relations, which critically examines the role that diasporas have to play in building up the hopes of potential migrants, and considers how this might be tempered with more realistic information about the costs involved (see for instance Frouws et al 2016b).

As important and positive as diasporas can be, as highlighted above, they can also present challenges to the interests of local government, other donors or development efforts in the country. Fear of diaspora financing for al Shabaab and other terrorist groups in the region influences donor government policies towards remittance sending, and while these fears may be disproportionate to the reality of diaspora funding for conflict, it would be misleading to imply that none of this more negative type of diaspora engagement takes place.

8 Migration management practices

8.1 Migration laws and regulations

There are a range of laws and regulations in place that govern the situation of migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs within the HOA. At the international level, HOA countries have signed up to a number of protocols designed to manage migration, mainly linked to refugees, smuggling, trafficking and transnational organised crime. Beyond refugee- and migration-specific legislation, several international human rights instruments are also applicable in the region. (The individual laws and regulations have been outlined in detail in Annex 2).

At the regional level, the AU, IGAD and the EAC have developed additional multi-country agreements, including the AU Migration Policy Framework, the Khartoum Process, the EAC
Common Market Protocol, OAU Refugee Convention and the AU Kampala Convention on IDPs, among others. In addition to these, individual countries have developed their own domestic legislation, dealing predominantly with irregular labour migration, trafficking, and refugee and asylum law. While Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan do not yet have well-established legislation and institutions in place, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda have taken the lead in enacting a number of migration-specific acts and laws, and put in place dedicated commissions and departments to deal with migration.

8.2 Efforts by non-state actors

Beyond national or state-driven policy and practice, a number of international and national non-state actors are also closely involved in migration management initiatives and programmes. IOM carries out a number of migration management programmes, often with a focus on building the capacity of government and border authorities. Its Immigration and Border Management (IBM) programme helps governments create policy, legislation, administrative structures, operational systems and the human resource base necessary to respond effectively to diverse migration challenges.

As the UN entity responsible for refugee affairs, UNHCR funds and supports a wide range of refugee initiatives in the Horn of Africa. It coordinates protection and delivery of services to refugees, and is responsible for managing a large number of refugee camps throughout the HOA. It often coordinates RSD, as well as return, resettlement and local integration activities, and takes the lead on IDP activities.

A large number of international NGOs also provide basic services to refugees and IDPs, and support the management of camps and settlements. They include Save the Children, Norwegian Refugee Council, Danish Refugee Council, International Committee of the Red Cross, Care, International Medical Corps, International Rescue Committee, Médecins Sans Frontières and Oxfam, among others. There are in addition thousands of local NGOs operating within the region on issues related to development and humanitarian assistance, many of whose work touches directly on the themes discussed here. In Ethiopia, a central coordinating mechanism is the Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Associations (CCRDA – [www.ccrdaeth.org](http://www.ccrdaeth.org)), established in the 1970s to coordinate famine relief, and today with 336 members, both international and national. Somalia’s NGO Consortium ([somaliangoconsortium.org](http://somaliangoconsortium.org)) has 81 members and provides a central coordinating function for local NGOs.

Increasingly, the private sector is also involved in supporting refugee and humanitarian relief. To give but one example from many available, during the 2011 famine in the Horn, the Kenyan telecommunications company SafariLink carried out a fundraiser and provided more than $67 million in relief (Ighobor 2011).

8.3 Challenges to managing migration

In spite of the wide availability of dedicated legislation and programmes, HOA countries face a number of challenges that hamper efforts to effectively and consistently manage migration within their respective countries and the wider region.
Firstly, migratory flows in the HOA are mixed, both in terms of population and individual motivations for moving. People and groups moving in the HOA may be labour migrants, irregular migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, victims of trafficking, stateless persons, unaccompanied minors and/or separated children. This complicates successful application of migration management tools, especially due to the blurring of lines between voluntary and forced migration, meaning that, in practice, migrants do not fit neatly within the different categories assigned to them.

Secondly, the scale and scope of migration in the HOA is enormous. The area has long been an epicentre of large-scale migratory and refugee movements. While it is difficult to calculate the exact number of regular and irregular migrants, data suggests that the region hosts over 6.5 million IDPs and 2.2 million refugees (UNHCR 2016a). Managing such large numbers is a challenge, especially for countries already dealing with a range of often destabilising issues, such as poverty, conflict, insecurity and natural disasters.

Thirdly, there is a lack of reliable and comparable data on migration drivers, patterns and numbers, which undermines countries’ abilities to develop effective and responsive policies. Due to the irregular and clandestine nature of much of the migration in the HOA, in particular trafficking and smuggling networks, it is not surprising that data is inconsistent, unreliable and, in many cases, unavailable. This is compounded by the myriad of routes adopted by different migrants. Few systems exist to effectively monitor migration flows either nationally or regionally. RMMS’s Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative (4mi) attempts to address the need for better data by collecting and analysing data on mixed migration flows in HOA.

Fourthly, in many instances, migration management tools are not well-known or enforced, thereby undermining their value. For example, in theory the 2012 Kenyan Counter-Trafficking in Persons Act lays down stringent punishments for those involved in trafficking crimes. In practice, however, the Government has been criticised for the low numbers of traffickers prosecuted and official corruption and complicity in trafficking networks. Ethiopia has established a national taskforce and council to deal specifically with trafficking. Nevertheless, the ILO has been critical of the lack of coordination, limited implementation and ineffective monitoring. Poor enforcement of migration legislation not only limits states’ abilities to control migration, but also undermines protection mechanisms for migrants, who can find themselves marginalised and criminalised by the state.

These challenges have led national governments to adopt reactive measures and an often inconsistent set of responses when it comes to managing migration. For example, to address terror alerts in Kenya, the Government significantly restricted the movement of urban refugees in 2012 through relocation and encampment directives, which were subsequently declared unconstitutional by the High Court. Similarly, in 2014, the Kenyan Parliament passed a controversial Security Amendment Act, which limited the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya to 150,000. In January 2015, the High Court again suspended parts of the Act, including the provision that limits the number of refugees. These examples highlight the lack of a clear and overarching vision on migration that is mainstreamed over time and across government departments and policy areas.
8.4 Securitisation of migration management

In many cases, migration management is viewed through a security lens, with migrants treated with suspicion and restrictive measures put in place to deal with them. The use of immigration detention to manage migration is widespread, especially in countries like Djibouti, Kenya and Tanzania. The Kenyan Government has responded to the growing number of security and terror threats by arresting and detaining large numbers of migrants. In 2014 it launched ‘Usalama Watch’, a security operation that saw the arrest and detention of over 4,000 people, the majority of them Somalis. Similarly, in 2013 the Tanzanian Government launched operation ‘Oparesheni Kimbunga’ to round up irregular migrants and send them back to their countries of origin. Most governments in the region cannot afford to deport migrants, due to a lack of funds, and many migrants who have been convicted and imprisoned for criminal offenses find themselves languishing in prison cells long after their sentences have ended.

Refugees are also viewed through a security lens, in spite of international and regional conventions and protocols designed to ensure their freedoms and protection. This is demonstrated by the fact that, with the exception of Uganda, most of the institutions tasked with refugee issues are housed within ministries also dealing with security issues. Furthermore, the majority of HOA countries have enacted strict encampment policies designed to restrict refugees’ movements to camps located in periphery border areas. In Sudan, no refugee has the right to free movement, and controls have become increasingly strict since South Sudanese independence. Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia have also adopted strict encampment policies. Uganda stands out as taking a less security-focused approach by allowing refugees greater movement and employment opportunities than neighbouring countries.

The increasing securitisation of migration management highlights that migration practices do not occur in isolation from the wider political, social and economic context. Fluctuating factors such as an increase in terror threats, changes in government, simmering inter-country tensions, ethnic conflict and financial pressures impact on countries’ approaches to migration management. Kenya’s decision to close Dadaab refugee camp, due to national security and the perceived financial burden, after over 20 years and in spite of intense international pressure, is a good example of this. Viewed from this perspective, migration management practices are not static; rather they shift and change over time in relation to the wider environment.

8.5 Managing the movements of national migrants

Migration management practices are not limited to foreign nationals, but also extend to nationals, including nomadic groups, emigrants and the diaspora. In this context, many HOA countries seek to positively or negatively manage the movement choices of their own citizens.

National development programmes have been used to manage internal migration. In Ethiopia, the Government policy of villagisation has been interpreted as a way of curtailing the mobility of nomadic groups, in particular shifting cultivators and pastoralists, by settling them into farming communities. This has significantly restricted their movement and
undermined their traditional livelihoods. The policy has also led to widespread internal displacement of communities moved from their homelands. In South Omo, around 200,000 indigenous peoples are being relocated and their land expropriated to make way for state-run sugar plantations.

To manage the movements of would-be emigrants beyond national borders, HOA countries have employed a range of techniques, including information campaigns, temporary bans, and even criminal proceedings. Following abuse of Ethiopian migrants in the UAE, in 2012 the Government banned its citizens from applying for domestic and blue-collar jobs. A national council was also established to advise would-be emigrants of the dangers of irregular migration to the area. Eritrea has taken a more authoritarian approach to control the movements of its own people; imprisoning those who attempt to flee and, reportedly, adopting a shoot-on-sight policy towards those found in off-limit areas on the Ethiopian border.

Once people have left their country of origin, national policies can extend abroad to reach out to the diaspora, often in an attempt to capture human and financial capital. Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia have all taken tangible steps to harness the benefits and opportunities of their diaspora communities. Ethiopian institutions have been promoting collaboration with the diaspora since the 1990s, through the creation of a Diaspora Coordinating office, a Diaspora Engagement Affairs Directorate General, as well as diaspora regional offices. These institutions disseminate information on investment opportunities, land rights, trade and government affairs. The Somali Federal Government also proactively reaches out to the diaspora community, in order to encourage return and investment, and to capitalise on the estimated USD 1.2 – 2 billion generated annually by remittances. The Somaliland Government also operates a Diaspora Liaison Office and is promoting a voluntary ‘Development Contribution’ associated with remittances (see the Somaliland National Development Plan, 2015). Adopting a less inclusive approach, the Eritrean government has imposed a 2 percent tax on all income earned by diaspora while abroad.

8.6 A joined-up approach

National responses to migration are not homogenous across the HOA, and vary significantly from country to country depending on the nature and profile of migration and migrants, the outlook of authorities, the security context, and relations with neighbouring countries. Generally speaking, Uganda has adopted a more liberal approach to migration management in comparison to countries like Kenya, Eritrea, Tanzania and Ethiopia. The level of emphasis attributed to managing migration also varies, with the aforementioned countries enacting more migration legislation and regulation in comparison to others, such as South Sudan, Somalia and Sudan.

This heterogeneity of migration management not only exists between countries, but also occurs within national borders. For example, state responses often vary depending on the nationality of migrants. In 2010, the Ethiopian Government introduced a new policy allowing self-sufficient Eritrean refugees to reside outside camps in urban areas with better access to services. The policy was not extended to refugees from other countries. Sudan has also tended to be more welcoming to Eritrean refugees than to other nationalities. In
contrast, Ethiopian refugees entering Sudan are often regarded as irregular migrants, as a result of security concerns and concern on the part of Sudan for its relationship with Ethiopia. Security restrictions have also been imposed on Somalis entering Sudan, especially single males, despite their prima facie refugee status in the African Union, as provided for by the 1969 Convention on the Status of Refugees. In contrast, Djibouti offers most asylum seekers from Somalia refugee status on a prima facie basis, while those from Eritrea, Ethiopia and other neighbouring countries must undergo individual RSD.

In spite of these differing and disconnected approaches, a collaborative and joined up approach would improve efforts to manage migration through a strengthened framework for regional cooperation. There are positive examples of collaboration and partnerships between governments and with non-state actors. Ethiopia has a bilateral open border policy with Kenya, allowing citizens to cross without visas. Furthermore, the two countries recently signed an agreement to foster job creation, environmental protection, trade, development and peaceful coexistence in their border regions. Non-state actors, most notably UNHCR and IOM, have also successfully partnered with HOA Governments on issues such as RSD, capacity building, awareness raising, voluntary returns and emergency assistance. In South Sudan, UNHCR and the Ministry of the Interior are working together to build asylum-related capacity and develop regulations to realise the Refugee Act. In Djibouti, IOM and the Government are building border management capacity, conducting border assessments, profiling irregular migrants and strengthening the task force on migration.

IGAD, EAC and the AU have taken the lead in putting in place a number of regional agreements, conventions and partnerships. More could be done, however, to expand on and implement these in full, and ensure that all HOA countries have signed and ratified and abide by these agreements. Greater collaboration on managing migration was a central recommendation of the Valetta Summit, and would help HOA countries to engage with some of the challenges outlined earlier in this section. It would help to ensure better collection of migration data and a more consistent implementation of migration legislation. Through joint mechanisms, HOA countries can also confront more effectively the trafficking and smuggling networks that span multiple countries.

9 Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa

9.1 Overview of regional dynamics

To the complex dynamics of conflict and displacement, threats of radicalisation and violent extremism (henceforth, VE) have added yet another problematic factor to the landscape over the past decade. Terror groups such as al Shabaab have managed to recruit and carry out attacks across the region. Although terror activities in the region are not new (consider for instance the Al-Qaeda-backed attack on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998), groups and attacks have now become more regionalised, yet at the same time, have managed to acquire an international element by forming alliance with international terror groups or by recruiting foreign fighters. In addition, porous borders and historical and cultural ties have also allowed groups such as al Shabaab to build a regional presence and clandestine support networks, as well as being able to recruit outside their home territories
(ICC, 2012). Furthermore, groups like al Shabaab have set themselves apart from earlier groups by their ability to hold territory and transform themselves in a way that challenges international state systems (GCCS, 2015).

The rise of al Shabaab and the recurrent attacks they have managed to carry out in Uganda, Kenya and Somalia, have made it one of the most notorious radical Islamist groups currently active in the region (cf. Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels, 2016). However, looking at the different forms of violence taking place in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Darfur (Sudan) and South Sudan in general, highlights that Islamist radicalisation is not the only form of radicalisation leading to violent activities taking place in the region (Ibid). Consequently, a complete understanding radicalisation and VE in the region requires looking beyond Islamist radicalisation. However, as will be noted in the discussion below, the literature on radicalisation and VE is overwhelmingly biased towards Islamist forms of radicalisation and in the case of the Horn of Africa, the activities of Al Shabaab.

Literature on drivers of radicalisation highlights a number of “push” and “pull” factors behind the rise in the radicalisation and VE in the region. Chronic structural challenges such as underdevelopment, high levels of unemployment and underemployment, poor governance in some places and absence of governance in other areas, have been noted as crucial “push” factors that facilitate the radicalisation and recruitment of “vulnerable” young people into these groups (GCCS, 2015). The presence of the demographic youth bulge in the region – youth that have been reported to have limited social, economic and political stakes – provide an important recruitment pool for radical groups. These groups are adept at capitalising on long-standing grievances within societies to maximise their appeal to youth – this has been noted to be the case for Somali youth in the marginalised North Eastern regions of Kenya (cf. ICC, 2012).

Micro-level factors, such as the material and non-material benefits young people achieve by joining radical groups, are referred to in the literature as the “pull” factors that are crucial in incentivising individuals to join radical groups (Government of Kenya and UNDP, 2015; Hassan, 2012; ICC, 2012; Kessels et al., 2016). Research from the region, however, highlights that there is a diverse range of factors that compel young people to join radical groups such as al Shabaab. In the case of ex al Shabaab fighters, Hassan (2012) found that factors such as access to employment, obtaining respect and finding something to do in an environment where young people have limited alternatives, were amongst key reasons for joining al Shabaab. Findings from such research reveal that motivations to join groups such as al Shabaab are diverse and not all are religious based – an important point to consider when designing initiatives for countering violent extremism (cf. Glazzard et al. 2016).

The activities of radical and violent groups in the region have made the Horn of Africa a major theatre for countering violent extremism (henceforth, CVE) initiatives. Many governments in the region, in conjunction with donor agencies, are in the process of developing, or have established, CVE policies. These policies have moved from the initial military-based coercive responses, such as Kenya’s counterterrorism efforts that have been subject to widespread criticism for its alleged human rights abuses (Amnesty International, 2014; Government of Kenya and UNDP, 2015; Kessels et al., 2016), to the latest rounds of
'holistic' and ‘inclusive’ CVE initiatives centered around development, community empowerment and community resilience (cf. Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels, 2016).

How affective CVE initiatives have been in the region is difficult to judge. Early military-based initiatives were reported to have potentially promoted further radicalisation and retaliatory attacks from radical groups (Amnesty International, 2014). On the other hand, “softer” touch approaches – empowering communities and building resilience to radicalisation and extremisms – are often more difficult to define and evaluate. Criteria for which part of the community to target for these programs are also not clear. The fact that drivers of radicalisation and VE are non-static, diverse, interrelated and context-specific make the formulation of CVE policies highly complex.

9.2 Literature on radicalisation and violent extremism

The academic and policy literature on radicalisation and violent extremism (henceforth, VE) is characterised by five interrelated trends. First, the majority of this literature focuses on Islamist extremism and Jihadist terrorism. This is largely due to the fact that the bulk of this literature, especially in Europe, emerged after the bombings in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005, respectively (Allan et al., 2015; Schmid, 2013; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Terms such as radicalisation and VE thus started to appear in policy circles in Europe only after these events (Expert Group, 2008, p. 5).

Second, and relatedly, the fact that radicalisation and VE started to be used after the terror attacks in Europe means that this literature is largely biased towards “homegrown” terrorists. Literature focuses on the radicalisation process of the would-be radicalised individual residing in the West. Main models of radicalisation (discussed further below) are thus built on the presumptions of the process of radicalisation that these individuals generally go through. Therefore, although this literature and subsequently main models of radicalisation provide important insights into the process of radicalisation including why some foreign fighters might travel to overseas locations to engage in VE, both are limited in their capacity to explain drivers of radicalisation in contexts outside the ‘homegrown’ terrorists space in the West. Questions such as why and how people join radical groups such as Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, and whether these individuals go through a ‘radicalisation process’ or are merely recruited on another basis – for example for material gain (cf. Allan et al., 2015), are difficult to answer using the predominant literature and main models of radicalisation.

Third, there is a huge diversity in the definition of the terms radicalisation and VE in both the academic and policy literature. These two words are often used interchangeably and often in circular form – for instance, in the case of radicalisation statements such as ‘a radical is someone who has radical ideas or who has been radicalised’ are not uncommon (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011, p. 13). The multiplicity of definitions used in conjunction with these two terms makes policy formulation, especially in respect to effective CVE policies (discussed further below) extremely problematic. Furthermore, it also makes comparisons of policies and initiatives across countries and agencies difficult.

For instance, while the European Commission’s Union’s Migration and Home Affairs Directorate-General (DG) defines radicalisation as a ‘complex phenomenon of people
embracing radical ideology that could lead to commitment of terrorist acts’, the Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation established in 2006 by the European Commission focuses on the ‘violent’ aspect of radicalisation and defines it as ‘socialization to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism’ (Expert Group, 2008, p. 7). Not only do these two examples capture the existing contradiction in the literature on the propensity of those radicalised to violent activities (discussed further below), but both are also extremely ambiguous in regards to the referred radical ideology and conditions under which the mentioned socialisation process leads to violence.

Schmid (2013, pp. 12-13) reviews a range of diverse definitions of radicalisation from a number of security agencies across Europe and highlights the lack of consensus over the use of the term. The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) defines radicalisation as ‘a process, by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective’. The Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) defines radicalisation as ‘the (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal order (effect)’. The Swedish Security Service (Säpo): notes that radicalisation can be both ‘a process that leads to ideological or religious activism to introduce radical change to society’ and a ‘process that leads to an individual or group using, promoting or advocating violence for political aims’. The diversity in the above definitions suggests that any attempt to compare data across these agencies is likely to problematic.

Although often used interchangeably, other experts have pointed out differences between radicalisation and VE. Schmid (2013), for instance, contrasts radicalisation with VE. He argues that while ‘radicals might be violent or not, might be democrats or not, extremists are never democrats. Their state of mind tolerates no diversity’ (p.10). This definition follows the work of German academics Bötticher and Mares that distinguishes between ‘closed mind’ extremists from the ‘open minded’ radicals and views extremists as being driven by the quest to impose conformity on the society as a whole by coercion if necessary while radicals on the other hand might tolerate diversity (also in Schmid, 2013, p.10).

It is also not uncommon for VE to often be used synonymously with terrorism in the literature (Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011). This is built on the assumption that the process of radicalisation leads to VE and to the radicalised individuals carrying out acts of terror. However, Mroz (2009), argues that VE and terrorism are structurally very different and compared to terrorism VE is extremely difficult to counter as it mainly involves ‘lone wolf attacks’ (cited by Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011, p. 9). Mroz (2009) defines VE as ‘violence in the absence of reason, or rather, the belief that committing an act of violence will produce benefits that outweigh the cost of human life. Violent extremism is homicide, genocide, fratricide, and, yes, it can also be terrorism’ (cited by Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011, p. 9).

The fourth trend is that, although there is a huge diversity and inconsistent in the definitions and the use of the terms radicalisation and VE, the term radicalisation is overwhelmingly portrayed as destructive to the individual and the wider society. Since the majority of this
literature focuses on Islamist radicalisation, the underlying assumption is that the process of radicalisation is inherently a negative one and imparts to the individual ideologies that contrast with mainstream beliefs. However, a nuanced view of radicalisation, in particular, one that considers the ways in which radicalisation has been understood historically, questions this assumption. Schmid (2013) argues that historically radicalisation has not always been associated with negative connotations and it has in fact been considered a force of progress.

The assumption that radicalisation is inherently ‘bad’ also furthers assumptions that all radicalised individuals are prone to violence. This not only limits our understanding of other forms of radicalisation that do not lead to violent activities, but also narrows the investigation into why not all individuals who go through the radicalisation process proceed to carry out violent acts (cf. Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Furthermore, it also confines our understanding of drivers of radicalisation by presuming that those joining radical groups pursue ideologies that contrast with the mainstream. Although this might be true for the case of homegrown terrorists in the West, it fails to capture the situation in Somalia, for instance. As will be discussed below, young Somalis in Al Shabaab-occupied areas sometimes join Al Shabaab because it is expected for all young and able-bodied individuals do so and not joining might itself be considered a radical act by the community. An ex Al Shabaab fighter, when asked why he joined Al Shabaab, responded that “My father bought me a gun and brought it home. He said that if he were me, young and healthy, he would be at the front line of the battle and not at home” (Hassan, 2012, p. 19).

Finally, literature on radicalisation and VE is largely biased towards non-state actors often referred to as ‘militant’ individuals or groups (cf. Schmid, 2013). This literature suggests that non-state actors are the ones capable of radicalisation or being radicalised. This literature ignores the role of the state in the radicalisation process and the potential for the state itself to be radicalised (Ibid). The analyses of how state actors across the globe have responded to threats of radicalisation and VE highlights that the state plays an important role in the radicalisation process. Counter radicalisation and VE measures carried out by governments highlight the highly politicised nature of these measures and can be manipulated by states to further specific agendas (Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels, 2016; Nünlist, 2015).

9.3 Theoretical Models of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism.

Although there is no consensus on the general definition of radicalisation, most experts agree that radicalisation is a process (Al-Lami, 2009). A number of models have been developed to try and capture this process. In their review that specifically focuses on ‘homegrown’ Jihadists King and Taylor present five models of the radicalisation process that leads to acts of terrorism (King and Taylor, 2011, pp. 604–609). The bulk of these models are ‘phase’ models that try to chronologically (and to some extent linearly) capture what takes place as the individual goes through the process of being radicalised to joining terror groups or carrying out terrorist attacks.

In Understanding the Terrorist Mind-set, Randy Borum, a forensic psychologist, presents a four-stage pathway to radicalisation and to carrying out acts of violence (Borum, 2003, pp.7-
10). These four stages are not restricted to Islamist radicalisation but rather general stages that seem to be common in framing a process of ideological development. The first stage, “it’s not right”, refers to the realisation by the individual or group that their conditions (unemployment, poverty, discrimination, restrictions to individual freedoms economic) are undesirable. The individual perceives his or her conditions to be not as they should be. The second stage, “injustice”, involves the person’s comparison of his or her condition to that of others whereby he or she concludes that the undesirable condition, whatever this might be, does not apply to everyone. In the third stage, “it’s your fault”, the individual attributes the perceived injustices to a particular group in the society. The individual assigns the blame for perceived unjust conditions to this group. The individual then moves on to the fourth and final stage where he or she considers the blamed group as “bad”, “evil” and generally dehumanises the group. This allows the individual to justify violence towards this group.

In the Theory of Joining Extremist Groups, Quintan Wiktorowicz analyses data from a UK Al-Muhajiroun group, which was banned by the UK government in 2005. Using this case study, the author presents four stages which represent a pathway to joining an Islamist extremist group (Wiktorowicz, 2004 also in King and Taylor, 2011). In the first stage, “cognitive opening”, the would-be member experiences a personal crisis (unemployment, discrimination etc.) that makes him or her susceptible to ideas that might have been unacceptable prior to the crisis. In the second stage, “religious seeking” the would-be member turns his receptiveness as a result of crisis into seeking religion. Here, this individual is more likely to accept worldview presented by the extremist group. This stage can happen either through a person-to-person contact or via the Internet. In the third stage, “frame alignment”, the would-be member starts to align his worldview with the one promoted by the extremist group. In the final stage, “socialization and joining” the individual officially becomes the member of the extremist group and through interactions with other members, the group ideologies is internalized and the individual reframes his identity to that of the group.

In the Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration Moghaddam uses the metaphor of a ‘staircase’ to describe the decision tree/process that the would-be radicalised individual makes as he or she is faced with a wide range of factors (Moghaddam, 2005 also in Moghaddam, 2006). How this individual responds to these factors determines whether he or she will move on to higher ‘floors’ towards legitimising terrorism. In each stage, however, the individual may chose an option that stops them from proceeding towards higher levels. This model tries to capture why some individuals might move on to become terrorists and commit acts of violence whilst others stop at some point during the radicalisation process and do not become terrorists.

The stages in the Moghaddam ‘staircase’ model are very similar to Borum’s model above, albeit, they are more detailed. In the first stage (ground floor), an individual or group is discontent with the status quo and feels deprived. The perception that this individual or group is deprived (this can be subjective and based on a wide range of factors) vis-à-vis another group triggers the individual to make a decision. Here, if there are opportunities in the society for the individual or group to address their perceived injustices, then it is more likely these individuals will not move on to the next floor towards the path of radicalisation. However, if these do not exist, then the individuals would proceed to the next stage.
In the second stage towards the path of radicalisation and terrorism, the individual or group assigns responsibility of their discontents of being deprived to a particular group (or country). The blamed group then becomes a target and frustrations and anger are directed towards this group. Individuals that consider radical actions against the blamed group at this stage move on to the next floor up. In this stage, justification of terror activities against the blamed group takes place. Some individuals that have reached this group normally join terrorist groups. The solidification of identity of ‘them against us’ or ‘good against evil’ takes places and those that continue on this path are eventually willing to carry out terror attacks (see also King and Taylor, 2011).

In the Radicalisation in the West: The Homegrown Threat, Silber and Bhatt of the City of New York Police Department Intelligence Division use case studies of homegrown terrorists in the US, Western Europe and Australia to create a trajectory of radicalisation (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). They identify four stages that they have found to be consistent across their case studies. Their model is however restricted towards radicalisation by the Jihadi-Salafi ideology. The model begins with the “pre-radicalisation” stage where the authors create a profile of the would-be radicalised individual: young, men, second or third generation immigrant mostly of Middle-Eastern origin, educated, no criminal record, not necessarily a devout Muslim, but might also be a recent convert to Islam (King and Taylor, 2011).

The second stage, “self-identification”, is where the radicalisation process begins in earnest. Here, the individual, influenced by a wide range of factors, starts to explore radical Islam such as the Jihadi-Salafi. The catalyst that pushes the individual towards this exploration is a “cognitive opening”, as noted in the Wiktorowicz model above, as a result of some form of personal crisis such as losing a job, identity crisis or discrimination or international conflict involving Muslims. At this stage the individual may also meet other individuals with similar views. This association helps solidify the newly created identity and pushes the individual to the next stage. In the next stage, “indoctrination”, the individual accepts the radical worldview and this view is encouraged and re-enforced by other members of the group. In the final stage “jihadisation” the individual accepts his or her duty to participate in jihad and may get involved in the planning, preparation and execution of terror attacks. Silber and Bhatt (2007, p.7) point out that while the earlier stages of radicalisation can take place gradually over a number of years, the “jihadisation” component can happen very quickly.

In A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists Mark Sageman outlines four ‘prongs’ that are key in the transformation of ordinary people into extremists capable of using violence (Sageman, 2008). The first factor, “a sense of moral outrage” is associated with the response of an individual to events that he or she perceives to be immoral or against Muslims (i.e. the Iraqi war). The second factor “a specific interpretation of the world” is associated with the lens by which the individual construes the world. Narratives such as the West “waging a war against Islam” (King and Taylor, 2011, p. 608), can facilitate an interpretation that is conducive to radicalisation.

Third, “resonance with personal experiences”, relates to personal or moral maltreatments that the individual has experienced that tend to render this individual sensitive to discrimination being faced by others especially those he or she can relate to (i.e. other
The fourth prong, “mobilization through networks” refers to the interaction of the would-be radicalised individual with other individuals holding a similar worldview either in person or via the Internet. This interaction can work to re-emphasise and re-enforce radical views and further accelerate the radicalisation process. In contrast to the above models, which are all sequential, Sageman’s model does not present stages in the process of radicalisation. Rather, the above four factors are seen largely as facilitators leading to the individual becoming radicalised.

A number of experts on radicalisation and VE have noted serious methodological shortcomings in the above models. First, these models, for instance the popular NYPD model, presumes that the radicalisation process follows a chronological order, which has been argued to be misleading. Al-Lami (2009) argues that the process of radicalisation is neither linear nor sequential and the presumed ‘stages’ can be skipped or abandoned altogether by the would-be radicalised individual. Al-Lami continues that ‘radicalisation is a gradual process of change and transformation that involves different stages. However, it is not a linear process and the stages are not clear-cut, nor necessarily sequential. The acceleration, slowing down, or even abandonment of the process depends on internal and external variables.’ (Al-Lami, 2009, p.8).

Veldhuis and Staun (2009) also question the methodological standings of the chronological models. The authors argue that these models suffer from a ‘selectivity bias’ since the empirical cases used to formulate them are based entirely on successful cases of radicalisation. The findings of these models are thus questionable since they can only account for one form of radicalisation – ideological radicalisation that leads to violent activities. Furthermore, focusing on success cases can emphasise a specific radical identity that tends to be assigned to a specific social group indiscriminately and can lead to biased counter-radicalisation policies.

9.4 Drivers of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

A USAID policy paper highlights a number of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that can, in combination with other factors, give rise of VE and insurgency (USAID, 2011). The paper notes that ‘push’ factors come from the wider social, economic, and political environment, including poor governance, high levels of social marginalisation and fragmentation, corruption and cultural threats that particular groups in society face. These factors produce an environment conducive to the rise of VE. Glazzard et al. (2016) also highlight similar macro level factors conducive to VE. Focusing on Islamist VE, the authors argue that wider macro factors such as governance failure and civil conflicts produce an environment in which VE can flourish.

In the context of the Horn of Africa, “push” factors are also covered in the literature. Kessels et al. (2016) point out the crucial structural challenges that the region faces such as underdevelopment, lack of access to education or employment, and social marginalization, can fuel and lead to VE. This is particularly important since radical groups are known to tailor their message in accordance with existing social grievances in order to recruit new members (ICC, 2012).
USAID (2011) also captures the ‘pull’ factors, such as the personal rewards that individuals may get when they join radical movements. Such micro-level factors may include access to physical and non-physical material such as status, respect and the feeling of belonging. The authors argue that “pull” factors are necessary for the “push” factors to have direct impact on individuals’ radicalisation and recruitment into violent groups.

Although both “push” and “pull” factors are noted in the literature on drivers of radicalisation, the bulk of this literature centres around the micro-level factors affecting ‘vulnerable’ individuals, in particular young people (Schmid, 2013; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). Young people facing personal crises, brought about by a range of factors such as unemployment, discrimination, and poverty, are identified as the most at-risk group for radicalisation. It is argued that these individuals feel a sense of socio-economic depravity – a (subjective) perception that their social, political and economic position differs from that of the majority in the society (Al-Lami, 2009; Allan et al., 2015; King and Taylor, 2011; Sageman, 2008; Tobias, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2004).

In addition, vulnerable individuals are also said to feel alienated from the mainstream, an issue aggravated by the apparent identity crisis that they also tend to face (cf. Borum, 2004; Expert Group, 2008; Hannah et al., 2008; Nasser-Eddine et al., 2011; Sageman, 2004; Schmid, 2013; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009). The basis for this argument lies in the case studies used to build the theoretical models of radicalisation that identify second or third generation migrants (mostly of Middle Eastern origin) to be more likely and prone to radicalisation (Schmid, 2013).

Literature from the Horn of Africa largely follows these threads. The Government of Kenya and UNDP (2015) notes that one of the key drivers of radicalisation is the socio-economic depravity faced by young people in Kenya making them vulnerable for recruitment by radical groups. Similarly, Odhiambo et al. (2015) highlight youth marginalisation as a key driver for the radicalisation of Kenyan youth. Vulnerable youth are often those belonging to specific social groups that have had a long history of being marginalised, such as the ethnic Somalis residing in the north-western region of Kenya. However, the ability of Al Shabaab to recruit from different social groups in Kenya challenges this assumption somewhat (Ibid).

The assumption that “vulnerable” youth are more receptive to radicalisation and to VE is problematic in two ways. First, it makes an assumption that youth in this context have no alternative but to join radical groups in reaction to their prevailing conditions. Although this assumption does have elements of plausibility, it fails to explain why only fractions of youth in these contexts join radical groups. Second, the assumption that vulnerable youth in these contexts are more susceptible to ideological radicalisation also presumes that religion plays a central role in the radicalisation process. An analysis of factors that compelled young people to join al Shabaab in Somalia, for instance, reveals that religion does not always play a part (Hassan, 2012).

In his interviews with ex-al Shabaab fighters, Hassan (2012) revealed a wide and diverse range of factors that had propelled them to join al Shabaab. Ex-fighters noted that they had joined al Shabaab in the hope of acquiring a good reputation and respect in the community. A respondent noted that ‘walking the city with a gun as a member of al Shabaab ensured
everybody feared and respected you. Girls also liked you’ (Hassan, 2012, p. 19). Given that in the Somali social system there are very few ways for young people to obtain social standing, it is not a surprise that young people would go to extremes to obtain it.

Lack of employment was also noted to have been an important factor. Joining al Shabaab meant they could earn in the region of USD 50 to 150 per month doing jobs that they considered to be quite easy. One respondent noted that ‘All one had to do was carry around a gun and patrol the streets…It was an easy job compared to other jobs such as construction work’ (Hassan, 2012, p. 18). In an environment where youth unemployment is high (UNDP, 2012), al Shabaab becomes the employer of choice especially if alternatives, such as pursuing further education, are limited.

For those living in areas of Somalia with a significant al Shabaab presence, Hassan (2012) found that joining al Shabaab was simply something they felt they had to do to avoid being seen as weak or putting themselves in danger. Not joining al Shabaab would have led to them being instinctively perceived as supporters of the government forces. One respondent noted that ‘you have to make a choice. You are either on one side or the other (p. 18).’

Hassan’s (2012) research reveals a number of important factors regarding motivations behind joining radical groups such as al Shabaab. First, joining such a group does not mean an individual has gone through a radicalisation process before becoming a member – as captured in the dominant theoretical models above. Individuals could simply join the group as a way to further their own agenda such as obtaining the material and non-material resources that are gained once one becomes a member. Here, young people have their own agency and are not merely “vulnerable”.

Second, what this also means is that the process of becoming a member does not have to be a bottom-up path when an individual becomes radicalised and seeks membership of certain groups. It could also be a top-down approach where, through material and non-material incentives, individuals are instead recruited to the group.

Third, Hassan’s (2012) research also reveals the crucial role context plays in our understanding of radicalisation and VE. A perception of al Shabaab in the areas they control in Somalia and in other areas is completely different. While, in other parts of Somalia and in the neighboring country, this group may be perceived as a terror group, in the territories they control they are perceived as ‘defenders of country’ or ‘defenders of religion’ (Ibid). Here, the motives for joining could purely be those associated with wanting to defend one’s country – a gesture considered honourable in many societies.

The multiplicity of drivers of radicalisation and VE make the formulation of CVE activities extremely challenging. Adding to this complexity are the contextual differences in the perceptions of what is considered to be a radical and violent group. Nevertheless, in the last few years the Horn of Africa has become one of the main theatres of international counter radicalisation and VE efforts (Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels, 2016). The next session briefly summarises these efforts.
9.5 Countering Radicalisation and Violent Extremism

A recent comment by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon that: “Missiles may kill terrorists. But I am convinced that good governance is what will kill terrorism” (Nünlist, 2015), highlights a significant change that had taken place with counter violence extremism (CVE) initiatives. From the early harsh military-based responses, many governments, including the US, now promote a “soft” approach that involves putting the community at the centre of CVE efforts (Ibid). ‘Empowering’ and ‘building’ the community’s resilience to extremism are now key words in any CVE policy formulation.

The Horn of Africa has seen (and to some extent continues to see) both types of CVE initiatives. Earlier CVE approaches were largely military-based (i.e. the activities of the African Union’s peace support operation (AMISOM) and the Kenyan and Ugandan armed forces that mostly targeted al Shabaab in Somalia or their respective countries. These CVE efforts resulted in the acceleration of retaliatory attacks and backlashes from al Shabaab (Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels, 2016). Moreover, in 2014, after an attack in Mombasa on 23 March 2014 and explosions in Eastleigh on 31 March 2014 (which left ten people dead and scores injured) the Kenyan government launched a security operation known as ‘Usalama Watch’. This operation targeted ethnic Somalis indiscriminately. A report by Amnesty International argues that Somalis became scapegoats in this security operation and thousands were arbitrary arrested, harassed, extorted, and many were forcibly relocated to refugee camps (Amnesty International, 2014). Through ‘Usalama Watch’ the Kenyan state breached a number of international laws and agreements (Ibid). In addition, the indiscriminate targeting of Somalis has been reported to have led to the radicalisation of Somalis and other Muslim youth in Kenya (Government of Kenya and UNDP, 2015).

The fact that military-based CVE approaches have produced, and continue to produce, limited success (excluding the expulsion of al Shabaab from most areas of Mogadishu in 2011) has triggered a change in CVE policy formulation in the region. Governments and donor agencies have increasingly adopted the UN and US “soft” approach that considers CVE to be part and parcel of the development challenge.

In 2011, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), for instance, set up a four-year Sustainable Employment and Economic Development (SEED) programme in Somalia. This program was designed to serve two objectives – development and CVE (Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels, 2016). The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has also adopted a policy that acknowledges the essential role of development in addressing grievances that drive violent extremism (Ibid). Similarly, the European Commission’s pilot CVE project, part of the Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) initiative, was launched in 2014 in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia (Ibid).

Current CVE programs in the region thus aim to bring together issues of development, radicalisation, VE, and community resilience together. Although these initiatives are indeed comprehensive, compared to the military-based initiatives, they nonetheless suffer from a number of crucial conceptual problems. First, effective CVE efforts need to be comprehensive enough to address intricate, diverse and interrelated drivers of radicalisation
and VE. However, given that CVE projects in the region are fragmented, un-coordinated and tend to be implemented on an ad hoc basis, their likelihood of being able to address these drivers in a comprehensive manner are limited (Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels, 2016).

Second, although descriptions such as ‘empowering’ and ‘strengthening communities’ resilience’ to extremism make CVE initiatives sound holistic, these words are notorious in their vagueness and are extremely difficult to define. For instance, the Horn of Africa Working Group of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) defines its effort to foster community resilience through the incorporation of community-based civil society organisations (CSOs) in discussions. However, it is not clear how including CSOs can translate into community-wide resilience. Questions such as ‘Are CSOs accountable?’ ‘Are they representative of the part of the community that needs to be empowered and strengthened? are not easy to address within this framework.

Third, some CVE initiatives, such as DFID’s SEED have exclusively targeted young people, mostly unemployed, in their initiatives (Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels, 2016). The targeting of unemployed youth largely follows assumptions of the “vulnerable” youth that are economically marginalised and are thus subsequently susceptible to radicalisation. Although there are some merits to this assumption, the exclusive targeting of unemployed youth disregards a whole strata of young people in Somalia that are compelled to join al Shabaab for reasons other than a lack of employment. Focusing on employment alone may thus divert attention from other key drivers of radicalisation and VE that CVE initiatives should also address.

As will be discussed in the next section, research on conflict dynamics and governance will be mainstreamed, and covered in every one of the research themes discussed below. This is done in view of the fact that displacement, irregular migration, and conflict and violent extremism are intricately intertwined throughout the region to different degrees.

10 Discussion

We have provided a broad overview of some of the main areas of research relating to the priority areas of action for the EU Emergency Trust Fund in the Horn of Africa. We make no claim that this is a fully comprehensive review – it is impossible to cover all of the relevant material from across the region in such an exercise. In this section, we discuss some of the trends in this research – key themes that recur in multiple settings – and also highlight some of gaps and the questions which are not addressed, or even remain unasked. It is on the basis of this discussion that we put forward our proposal for critical research to be undertaken by the REF.

First, we note the critical role of migration and mobility in both the economic vitality and the dynamics of conflict across the region. The livelihoods of millions of people depend on being able to move as pastoralists, to find employment or for trade, especially in the face of extreme poverty and resource shortages. For better or worse, each state’s development initiatives depend to some extent on managing where people move, whether it is concerned with investments in education and training, attracting new workers into agricultural improvement schemes or moving people off land to make way for dams or other large scale
development projects. At the same time, the conflict and instability in the region has generated massive levels of displacement, exacerbating people’s poverty pushing them to ever more desperate measures to achieve some level of human security.

This displacement is contributing to further insecurity as the large-scale movement of refugees and IDPs destabilises local communities and economies, reinforcing drivers of further migration. Moreover, there is evidence that many attempts to manage migration flows seem to push it underground, increasing irregular migration and feeding into further insecurity.

In short, the picture that emerges from the region is one of several interlocking vicious circles, including:

- Violence and insecurity displacing people, increasing their insecurity and creating conditions for further displacement;
- Disruption of mobility patterns (as seen for pastoralists) undermining people’s livelihoods and resilience forcing them to move in much worse conditions;
- Attempts to control irregular migration making it harder for people to move and increasing the demand for services of smugglers.

One major challenge for the EUTF is to start to unpick the operation of such circles and identify fruitful areas for intervention – ones that can avoid unintended consequences such as those outlined in Section 8.

10.1 Research Gaps

As this review shows there has been a huge volume of research on migration, displacement and conflict in the region but it has left some important gaps.

First, the overwhelming focus of work on migration has been on displacement and irregular migration. There have also been studies on pastoralism and on the rural-urban migration (for example in Ethiopia) which have examined the rationales for people’s moves to towns and cities – although this is more limited than can be found in other regions of Africa. However, there is very little research that looks at how contexts of instability and insecurity are influencing the movement and settlement between rural and urban spaces in the region, (and the onward movement of people out of the region). For example, we can see that movements to urban areas may offer the opportunity for livelihood diversification enabling others (particularly relatives of those who move into the cities) to remain in rural areas, a source of shelter and safety, a zone of transit en-route to more distant destinations, and a place of social and economic opportunity. In this context the linkages between rural and urban households is critical. All these possible motivations may be at play in shaping people’s decisions.

Of course, there is a huge volume of research on urbanisation, but much of this is done at an urban planning level, and less has been done on urbanisation in this environment of conflict, insecurity and huge levels of regional and international migration. In the Horn of Africa,
more than other regions of the continent, we might expect to see the underlying process of urbanisation being transformed by these conditions. Understanding how the attraction of the cities is affected by the context of conflict and instability is critical for the work of the EUTF, with projects that seek to make rural areas more attractive, or improve social cohesion among urban dwellers (including IDPs and refugees).

In our research, we propose to consider rural-urban migration and linkages in some of the secondary cities of the region. These are cities that have grown rapidly in recent years, usually without concomitant investment. Movement is accelerated by environmental factors, displacement within the region as a result of conflict and instability, and by a lack of rural livelihood options.

Second, the literature clearly shows the importance of cross-border mobility for many people’s livelihoods and the economic vitality of the region. At the same time, there is a huge volume of research on the plight of refugees and a growing amount on smuggling or trafficking in the region. However, the language of regular and irregular migration has limited purchase in many of these borderlands where few people move with papers, nor have they needed them in previous generations. Attempts to make such movements ‘regular’ introduces a whole new layer of bureaucracy (especially from the perspective of those used to moving without papers) and with it opportunities for rent-seeking, with the danger of undermining the mobility that enabled people to live in the area and ironically creating ‘irregular’ movements. This dilemma is clearly recognised in some of the initiatives within the EUTF, such as the support for freedom of movement within IGAD. However, there is a danger that without a solid understanding of the longstanding role of informal cross-border movement and livelihoods in the borderland economies and their links into the national economies, and an understanding of how these borderland economies respond to conflict and instability in the region, interventions in the borders may have unintended negative side-effects.

Third, the EUTF priorities for action rest on a theory of change that links development progress – enhanced security and stability, improved employment opportunities, strengthened community resilience – with migration outcomes, in particular the reduction in forced and irregular migration. We have presented some of the rapidly expanding literature on the inter-relationships between migration and development, which gives no conclusive answer to how and under what conditions different development initiatives affect mobility patterns. This has been little explored even in more stable contexts, but many parts of the Horn of Africa introduce the added ingredient of conflict and instability, which may dramatically change the outcome. If people cannot be confident of having security for their families, no amount of vocational training can be expected to discourage them from leaving. Likewise, if the security situation improves dramatically, people’s incentives to leave may fall regardless of the training on offer. If we are to understand the impact of the EUTF actions, it is important to examine this relationship. While the academic literature in this area may be limited, there is a wealth of documented experience of a huge variety of development initiatives, particularly in the area of youth employment and training, in the region and this may give a good starting point for research.
Fourth, a major theme running through all the countries in the region is how to incorporate people on the move within their societies. Much of the existing research has focused on the reception of refugees and IDPs, who have faced huge protection needs. This provides a basis for analysing many of the RDPP and similar initiatives within the EUTF. However, alongside this, there is a growing recognition of the scale of the return movements of different groups of migrants ranging from voluntary repatriation – both self-organised and through formal programmes - deportation from the EU and other countries and the diasporic ‘return’ of those who may never have lived in the ‘origin’ country before. In countries emerging from conflict there may also be the return of IDPs to their areas of origin and resettlement of demobilised soldiers. When one group returns or is ‘rehabilitated,’ they have an impact on other groups. Returning refugees to Somalia may seek to establish themselves on the land or to reclaim the property they left, only to find that IDPs have taken up residence there. Demobilised soldiers seek to establish their livelihoods together with returning populations; if not managed well, they may pose a renewed or continued security threat. This implies that the experiences and needs of all of these groups need to be considered together. This mix of returns can present both enormous challenges and opportunities. Our research will focus on return and reintegration to and within Somalia from Kenya, Ethiopia, and the wider region, as well as within the country.

Finally, a very important area of intervention for the EUTF is capacity building for states and regional bodies to enhance the quality of migration management in the Horn of Africa. This is seen most clearly in the Better Migration Management activities which work with different government departments with a view to enhancing policy coherence and their implementation capacity. As we show in Section 8 above, there are enormous challenges facing such initiatives, not least the scale and variety of mobility, the rapidly changing environment and the limited resources. While these may be rather intractable problems, and certainly beyond the scope of the REF to fully address, if we can gain a better understanding of the way different actors view the vast array of forms of migration and their interests in it, this may identify new and more effective approaches. While adopting a common language of migration – regular, irregular, labour, forced, and so forth – may be essential for developing policy, if this is adopted too soon – in particular, as part of an emerging global discourse on migration management – there is a danger that all the important subtleties that will make any policy work will remain uncovered. For example, local government in borderlands may have a very different view of what they mean by irregular migration from those in the capitals. Likewise, the interests of the Ministry of Agriculture in terms of managing migration may be very different from those of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

11 Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research

Through this review, we have attempted to touch on the main areas of research relating to migration and conflict in the Horn of Africa. We have chosen to adopt a thematic rather than a geographic approach to most of our analysis due to the fact that the same issues cross-cut different territories within the region. We have highlighted some of the key literature on these themes, although we are aware that limitations of space have not allowed us to mention all of the work that is available. As a companion to this report, a bibliography is
being prepared of all of the sources used here, as well as other resources, and this can be made available on request from the REF team (and a link to it will be posted on our website).

The themes that we have covered here show that despite the many local variations in conditions, there are several cross-cutting themes that are relevant to most, if not all, of the region. These relate to interactions between rural and urban communities and livelihood systems, the challenges of return, the interactions between diaspora and origin communities, links between development and mobility choices which need to be further unpacked and better understood, dynamics of cross-border economies and livelihood systems and impacts and influences on the migration management system(s) in place within the region.

These themes run throughout the EU Trust Fund activities as well, and are the focus of many of the activities already approved and expected to be approved in the coming months. In our recommendations for research below, we take these themes as pillars of our research programme going forward, and propose specific research projects. As noted above, the themes of conflict and violent extremism can be found in each of these pillars, and will be investigated alongside the migration/displacement dynamics being considered.

The themes and project descriptions incorporate input from the consultations that were held in the region as well as in Brussels and online. The research agenda is aimed at providing useful evidence and guidance to support EU Trust Fund Activities and to fulfil the objectives set out in the Operational Plan for the Trust Fund. Additional detail about project implementation, management, and oversight is available in the document ‘Research Strategy and Project Descriptions’ (20 January 2017).

In Annex 2, a table is provided of each of the Trust Fund Activities already approved for implementation and the research theme(s) that relate to them.

11.1 Research Theme 1: Interactions between rural and urban mobility

Justification

Much of the migration of people within and out of the Horn of Africa begins as a move from rural to urban areas. Driven by climatic events – particularly drought – a quest for security, an attempt to secure employment and/or access to services, rural to urban migration is occurring throughout the region. Some of this mobility may be aspirational, in that people are choosing to move in order to increase their options, whereas other mobility may be more akin to displacement, where people feel that they have no choice but to move into cities to escape unsustainable physical or economic insecurity. This kind of movement sets up new patterns of mobility that may become more long-term and long-distance. While in-migration to the capital cities of the Horn are better studied, large-scale movement to secondary cities is occurring under the radar and often with no response from governments, NGOs, or donors. Provincial and regional capital cities are playing host to increasing numbers of migrants who are placing pressure on fragile physical and social infrastructure. Dynamics between urban settlement and rural livelihoods are also not well understood. Some preliminary research suggests that it may be the case that some urban migration actually
may help those kin who remain in rural areas to maintain their agricultural or pastoral livelihoods, supplemented with income shared by urban relatives.

For the migrants themselves, it is not clear that the move into cities is always a positive one. They often move out of desperation, their rural livelihoods having lost their ability to sustain them. They may come to cities expecting the move to be temporary, until conditions in the countryside improve, only to find that their stay, like those of refugees living in camps, becomes protracted and even permanent. Others make the move expecting that they are making a permanent shift, but also expecting that life will be better in the cities. Many newly urban residents find that they lack secure access to housing, employment, services, and essential resources. The move may not deliver them to a better standard of living but instead may trap them into a cycle of destitution from which it is virtually impossible to emerge.

Project Description

Overall research questions:

1. To what extent and how does rural-urban migration enhance people’s livelihoods and resilience? How much do such movements lead to improved access to services/higher incomes, better employment, improved security? How effective are urban linkages in introducing a safety net for those who live in rural areas – as a place of safety, place to send children for education, and/or as a supplementary form of income?

2. What is the impact of people’s movement into secondary cities on infrastructure and services, social cohesion, and security? What impact does a growing population have on strengthening the urban economy, or on putting pressure on services, exacerbating tensions, and contributing to insecurity?

3. How does migration to secondary cities affect subsequent migration? Does the first experience of migration prepare people for further migration? Does population pressure from new arrivals encourage others to leave or help establish a market for smuggling?

We propose to conduct this study in Awassa (Ethiopia), Eldoret (Kenya) and Gulu (Uganda). These cities have been chosen on the following basis:

- Awassa is the largest city in Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) of Ethiopia and is the regional capital. It has in recent years also become a focus area for the country’s industrialisation policy, whereby industrial parks are being created to generate manufacturing jobs. This creates a magnet for people seeking employment as well as those hoping to benefit from the stimulated urban economy.
- Eldoret in northern Kenya is a city that has grown dramatically in recent years due to both the in-migration of Kenyans from other parts of the country as well as from refugee and immigrant groups from Somalia, Uganda, South Sudan, and Congo.
- Gulu in northern Uganda is a major destination for displaced persons from South Sudan, and has also over the years hosted large numbers of Ugandans displaced by the war.
The study will involve focus group and semi-structured interviews in three cities. Interviews will be held with in-migrants, local (non-migrant) populations, city planners, line ministry personnel, police, private sector, NGO staff and others involved in policy concerning migration and urbanization. These will address the following issues:

1. The profile of migrants in these cities – origin areas, gender, age, economic activities etc. – and evidence for how this is changing over time.
2. The main drivers for the movement of people into urban areas, including a breakdown of who is on the move, what are their assets and vulnerabilities, and what are their expectations and objectives in moving into the cities.
3. The experiences of migrants who arrive in these urban areas, including their access to social networks, property, infrastructure, and social services.
4. Assessment of the employment opportunities available to newly-arrived migrants and the level of security/rule of law available to them.
5. The actual and perceived effects of in-migration on education, employment and security (human and political) in the city – including current or potential pressures on public services, threats to social cohesion or local/national political stability.
6. The responses of municipal governments, state officials (including police, education and health staff) and civil society to the presence of large numbers of migrants, and the extent to which policies and planning accommodates their needs.
7. The future aspirations of such migrants – do they anticipate further onward migration, return to their areas of origin, or continued residence in the cities they have come to?

Efforts will be made to link to work being done by HABITAT relating to urban planning and development and to other research activities being undertaken on rural to urban migration in Hargeisa (ESRC/DFID-funded project) and other urban areas on the region to expand the reach and efficiency of this research. The Hargeisa project, for instance, will be conducting a training workshop to introduce GIS mapping capabilities to researchers working on rural to urban migration issues, and may be accessible to REF researchers working on this project.

Related EUTF Activities

- Regional Development and Protection Programmes (Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda). In Uganda RDPP is aimed at addressing the increased influx of South Sudanese refugees
- Ethiopia’s blending operation with the EIB (Mojo city) – creation of employment in the leather sector (currently on hold)
- Cross-border programme (especially the shift of people from pastoralism due to successive shocks)
- Uganda urban slums programme (radicalization element)
- Somalia – expectation that many returnees will head to urban areas
- More generally useful in the context of the National Indicative Programmes Mid-Term review
  - Reset 2 (Ethiopia)
  - Strengthening resilience (Sudan)
11.2 Research Theme 2: Experiences and impacts of voluntary, involuntary, diasporic and ex-combatant return and reintegration in Somalia

Justification

Currently Somalia is faced with the challenge of integrating its citizens from the diaspora, the organised and spontaneously returning refugees, deportation asylum seekers and others from Western countries, and demobilised ex-combatants. In addition an estimated 1.1 million IDPs are displaced within Somalia and – given the security and economic situation in parts of the country – face challenges in returning to their places of origin.

The question of refugee returns to Somalia has gained increasing prominence in recent months following the announcements by the Government of Kenya linked to the closure of Dadaab camp. UNHCR estimates that over 284,000 Somalis are currently hosted in Dadaab. The potential return of such a large population presents a number of security and development concerns, as well as major challenges around absorption capacity in Somalia. This was indicated by the temporary suspension in August 2016 of voluntary returns by the Jubaland authorities in Somalia.

In addition, as many as 500,000 Somalis live in Yemen, of which 230,000 are registered as refugees. Conflict in Yemen since 2015 has already forced many Somalis living in Yemen to return to Somalia. As of June 2016, UNHCR estimates that over 28,000 Somalis have been displaced back to Somalia together with over 4,000 Yemenis.

A number of EUTF programmes focus on these issues. The most relevant to this research pillar is RE-INTEG (Enhancing Somalia’s responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows). This programme aims to support the sustainable and durable reintegration of refugees, returnees from Yemen, Kenya, Europe and other areas of departure and IDPs in Somalia, and to anchor populations within Somalia. RE-INTEG aims to support the management of the voluntary return of Somalis hosted in Kenya, as well as other parts of the region and Europe, or fleeing conflict in Yemen, into stable regions of Somalia. It aims to create a favourable environment for return and reintegration, including through economic and social development, increased access to basic services, economic opportunities and reduced vulnerability for both returnees and return communities. These initiatives must be seen in the wider frame of ongoing negotiations about the repatriation of Somali refugees and the many organisations responding, in particular to returns from Dadaab. The research will be coordinated with ongoing work by such actors as UNHCR, IOM, the Norwegian Refugee Council, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and members of the Somalia NGO Consortium, to research and/or facilitate return and repatriation.
Project Description

To integrate and absorb these different groups into Somali society, much more needs to be known about the experiences of return. The overall objective of this project is to improve understanding of the different types of return to Somalia and their impacts with a view to helping identify areas for donor intervention that may be effective in improving outcomes. This project will address the following core research questions:

1. What factors shape the outcomes of people’s return or re-integration in Somalia: expectations of return, preparations, forms of assistance, social networks, access to services, livelihoods security, wider conditions? All returnees have cultural, social and economic adjustments to make but it may be easier for those with resources (e.g. diasporic returnees) than those without. Alternatively, those with resources may not be so committed as they have other options (especially if they have an alternative passport).

2. What is the impact of the return or re-integration on the wider community – security, employment, pressure on services? E.g. returnees bringing resources seen as stimulating the local economy, or creating tensions as they gain economic power.

3. What role do state and donor interventions play in enabling peaceful and sustainable settlement of different groups? Balance between programmes aimed at direct assistance for integration and those aiming at creating enabling environment for integration.

The research project will address these research questions through interviews and visual methods that gather data to answer the following specific questions:

1. What are the expectations and aspirations of potential returnees as they consider repatriation – especially among refugees in Dadaab?

2. What are the experiences of the different sets of people who have already returned to Somalia, including their access to social networks, property, infrastructure, and social services, employment opportunities and security/justice? What are the differences between them?

3. What are the risk profiles of the different groups of people resettling in Somalia (including women, disabled, those without family ties, IDPs, minority clans, etc.) in terms of livelihoods and security, including potential engagement with violent extremism/criminal networks?

4. How have property or kinship ties changed and what are the implications of these changes for livelihoods and protection?

5. What are the opportunities for bringing returnees into productive and sustainable livelihoods (including skills and vocational training) and how do returnee prospects relate to those of local populations? Are there differential levels of access determined on the basis of returnee/host, clan, other distinctions?

6. How effective are the systems in place – from the Somalia federal government, regional or local administrations, the private sector, the clan systems, religious associations,
NGOs and the international community – to facilitate the return and integration of different groups? (Specific attention will be given to the UNHCR-sponsored comprehensive refugee/repatriation framework) And what further steps should be undertaken to accelerate their stable return?

Methods

In order to trace how processes of return and re-integration play out over time and space, the research will be undertaken in three parts using mixed methods. The first will establish a 'visual baseline' by exploring the situation of Somali refugees in Dadaab anticipating return. A video will be made showing living conditions on the ground in Dadaab and the predicaments that the refugees are finding themselves in. It will highlight the expectations and aspirations of the refugees and provisions and networks they are relying upon in the camp and as they consider repatriation. The video will feature interviews with refugees still in Dadaab and camp workers.

In the second stage, the focus will move to Somalia, where a further visual baseline will be established by following refugees who have been repatriated to Mogadishu and relating their experiences of return. This will capture the realities they find themselves in, including challenges of return and differential risk profiles faced by women, the elderly, minority groups, and so forth. It will also focus on those who are dealing with returning refugees such as Somali government agencies, donor organisations, NGOs and advocacy and research agencies. It will bring to light the level of management systems that are in place to facilitate return and provide analysis of the complexity of repatriation of such a large number of refugees and the conditions of conflict they are returning to.

This video work in Mogadishu will be complemented by further research in the city and a number of other targeted locations within Somalia, including Kismayo, Hargeysa, Berbera and Bossaso (research in Somaliland and Puntland may be combined with research in project 5b, see below, to achieve efficiency). At least one rural area to which refugees are likely to be returned will also be studied. Here the research will rely on semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with key stakeholders, including returnees, refugees, diaspora, IDPs, receiving communities, government authorities, UN agencies, NGOs, civil society, private sector and IGAD). Interviews and discussions will be complemented by an extensive desk review of existing and relevant literature.

A third stage will follow up in the same sites six months later. Here the visual baseline will come into its own. The team will re-visit the video interviewees in Mogadishu and also if possible any of those interviewed in Dadaab who have repatriated. Interviewees will be shown the video and asked for their reaction to the testimonies and to comment on what has changed in their individual circumstances in the intervening six months,. In addition, the videos will be used in focus group discussion to stimulate more general discussion about changes over time. This will be supplemented by further semi-structured interviews, including repeat interviews with respondents from the second stage.
Related EUTF Activities

- Regional Development and Protection Programmes (RDPP) of which RE-INTEG: Enhancing Somalia’s responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows;
- Promoting a Culture of Tolerance and Dialogue;
- Strengthening IGAD’s Ability to Promote Resilience.
- Cross border programme (Gedo region)

11.3 Research Theme 3. Impact of Youth Training and Employment on Migration and Conflict Dynamics

Justification

One of the widely recognised drivers of displacement, irregular migration and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa is youth unemployment. Faced with lack of opportunity and made vulnerable by an inability to support themselves and their families, it is assumed that young people are more likely to look to migration or enlistment in violent extremist groups when there are few effective development options. The implication of such an argument is that if youth can be given more employment prospects, they will be less likely to be forced – out of economic desperation – to be subjected to smuggling and trafficking networks or recruitment by violent extremist groups, and will remain in their areas of origin to further contribute to development processes there. This assumption has not been tested within the region and it may be unfounded. Evidence from other contexts suggest that as young people broaden their horizons through education, gain higher-level skills and increase their incomes, both their aspiration and capacity to migrate – by regular or irregular means – may increase.

Therefore, there is a need to examine the evidence to see whether, having benefited from vocational training and employment schemes, youth change their intentions and perceptions about the desirability of incurring risks by engaging in outmigration or enlistment in violent extremist activity.

Project Description

The study will consider the impact of youth vocational training and employment schemes in the Horn of Africa on attitudes and behaviour with respect to both migration and enlistment in violence extremism. The main aim of the research will be to determine whether there is a positive correlation between youth vocational training and employment activities and
changes in attitudes towards migration or openness to violent extremism. A starting point of this research is to query an assumption that is often made that greater employment prospects and/or improvements in income are likely to lead to individuals deciding not to migrate. Evidence from many different contexts (not just in the Horn of Africa) suggests that the relation between employment and livelihood prospects and migration decisions may be more complicated than this. Rather than a singular correlation between employment and mobility, a more useful guiding question is:

*For whom and under what conditions do vocational training and employment support programmes lead to changes in migration attitudes and behaviour and/or changes in violent extremist enlistment, and what changes are those?*

To address this focus, the research will consider the following questions:

1. What are the range of employment and vocational training opportunities available and who is providing them (state, private sector, donors, NGOs)?
2. Which employment and vocational training programmes are perceived by different actors as the most valuable or successful and why?
3. How successful are different sectors of the youth who are targeted by vocational training and employment schemes in finding secure employment within the region?
4. How far do employment and other associated programs contribute to addressing the aspirations of those youth at highest risk of irregular migration?
5. How do their employment outcomes influence young people’s thinking about whether, where or how to migrate?
6. Which youth (differentiated by gender, age, education levels, employment history) are more likely to remain within their area of origin, to migrate towards urban centres, or to attempt to (or aspire to) migrate across longer distances, either within the region or even further afield (e.g. towards Southern Africa, the Gulf or Europe)?
7. In cases where an improvement in employment prospects is evident but does not appear to influence mobility decisions, what are the reasons that youth give for their intentions to migrate?
8. To what extent do returnees from the diaspora create opportunities for newly trained youth, or conversely take up opportunities that might otherwise be available to local youth?

This research may be undertaken as a random control trial, in which a group of youth who have not taken part in vocational training and/or employment generation schemes is compared with a group who have, and measures whether there are different outcomes in terms of migration decisions taken, changes in aspirations and views of violent extremism.

The study should be undertaken where there are youth employment activities being implemented by the EU Trust Fund (See list of relevant EU Trust Fund activities, below). Fieldwork is planned for Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Djibouti. Fieldwork is anticipated for a period of 1 month in each country, for a total 7-month study period (6 weeks preparation, 6 weeks analysis and write-up of the report.

The focus of this research project is on young people seen as most susceptible to irregular migration and recruitment into violent extremism: i.e. those who are targeted by
interventions. However, the analysis will also be informed by the findings from the other REF projects that have interviewed people who have undertaken irregular migration (See for instance Project 5a). They will be asked about their motivations for migration and will be prompted to indicate the importance of training and employment opportunities in their decisions.

Related EUTF Activities

- Eritrea - Employment creation for youth
- Ethiopia’s blending operation with the EIB (Mojo city) – creation of employment in the leather sector (currently on hold)
- Djibouti - Employment creation for youth
- Kenya: rider to on-going project "Conflict prevention, peace, and economic opportunities for the youth"
- Implementation of the Special Measure for Sudan – East Sudan (livestock)
  o SINCE (Ethiopia)
  o Reset 2 (Ethiopia)
  o Slum Social Cohesion (Uganda)
  o RDPP (Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia)
  o Strengthening Resilience (Sudan)
  o CVE Somalia
  o RDPP (Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia)

11.4 Research Theme 4: Dynamics of cross-border economies and centre/periphery relations

Justification

Mobility is a common feature of border economies. It is central to people’s livelihoods and the economic vitality of the region. For example, for the millions of pastoralists living in border areas, crossing international borders is a fundamental livelihood practice. For those relying on precarious rain-fed agriculture for their livelihood, mobility plays an important role in helping cope with shortfalls in production, as they rely on seasonal labour migration and other practices to secure their subsistence needs.

As livelihood systems in rural areas come under pressure, people seek to move into urban areas. Often they engage in this kind of move only once they have lost their productive assets (land, animals, etc.) in rural areas. Moving into urban spaces with the intention of benefiting from the urban economy, many people find themselves ‘trapped’,
unable to better themselves through the urban labour markets, and unable to return to their rural way of life.

Academics have pointed to four major resources that can be extracted from borders and borderlands. First are economic resources including cross-border trade and smuggling, import businesses and currency exchange. Second are political resources including access to alternative centres of political power, trans-border political mobilisation, and sanctuary for rebels wishing to alter national structures of power. Third are identity resources such as legitimising one group’s claim for statehood or confirming the boundaries of particular ethnic groups. Finally, borders can constitute status and rights resources by enabling people to make claims for citizenship and refugee status.

The EUTF is planning to implement several projects in cross-border areas. These will include work aimed at promoting resilience, strengthening border management capacities, supporting free movement where appropriate and facilitating conflict prevention. However, there is a lack of information about the dynamics of such border areas, about the opportunities and constraints of livelihood systems in place there and the possibilities for greater cross border collaboration or parallel programming to more equitably spread the development opportunities in these zones. There is also a danger that without a solid understanding of the longstanding dynamics of informal cross-border movement in the borderland economies and their links into the national economies, interventions in the borderlands may have unintended negative side-effects.

In addition to the EUTF work in border areas, other international actors are engaged in work in border regions of the Horn of Africa. This research will link up with the World Bank’s work on ’Movement of People and Border Regions of the Horn of Africa (Human Mobility and Development)’, which seeks to develop a conceptual diagnostic to guide approaches to working in borderlands of the Horn. Research will also draw from work being undertaken currently by USAID in selected border areas of the region. It is anticipated that significant synergies and efficiencies can be realised through this joined up approach to research.

**Project Description**

This research will consider cross-border economies as zones of common livelihood practices, with similar vulnerabilities and areas of resilience, and with social and political ties that bind their members together. The research will examine the characteristic political economy of these cross-border areas with the aim of understanding how far this presents opportunities or barriers to building community resilience, enhancing security and stability and reducing irregular migration, conflict and displacement.

The following questions will be asked:
1. How do informal movements and cross border activities contribute to livelihoods and local economies – in terms of household livelihoods, formal and informal businesses, trade, and markets? And, by extension, to national economies?
2. Linked to this, how do smuggling and trafficking networks impact both local economies and security?
3. How does mobility in cross border areas contribute to conflict and insecurity, and vice versa?
4. What are the underlying interests in perpetuating localised conflict and insecurity contributing to mobility or displacement?
5. How do governance and centre-periphery relations address, or not, conflict, insecurity and their drivers in border areas?
6. What are the impacts and opportunities of major current and future changes in terms of shocks (climate change, transition out of pastoralism, etc.) and opportunities (infrastructure development) in terms of affecting mobility and conflict patterns? What opportunities might there be to engage with these?
7. How do national, regional international initiatives to address migration management (such as BMM) take account of these cross-border movements and exchanges in their programming?

The REF has already undertaken a preliminary, baseline analysis of four cross border areas (South Omo/North Turkana (Kenya-Ethiopia), The ‘Mandera Triangle’ (Kenya-Ethiopia-Somalia), Kassala-Humera (Ethiopia-Sudan) and Beni-Shangul-Blue Nile (Western Ethiopia-Eastern Sudan). This research will explore the above-mentioned questions in three targeted locations. Locations will be drawn from the following list: Karamoja-Turkana (Uganda-South Sudan-Kenya), Gulu (Uganda-South Sudan), Moyale (Kenya-Ethiopia), and/or Somaliland-Ethiopia-Djibouti corridor.

Justifications for the selected border areas are as follows:

Karamoja-Turkana (Uganda-South Sudan-Kenya) – the Karamoja cluster involves shared livestock, water, trade and market resources. It is the site of frequent local conflicts over resources. In 2017, over half of the population of Karamoja region in Uganda is estimated to be at risk of severe food insecurity (FEWSNET estimate). Recent attempts to shift pastoral groups to sedentary agriculture appear to have rendered them more vulnerable to the effects of drought. On the Kenya side in Turkana county, an estimated 69% of children are in danger of malnutrition, and livestock herds are reportedly stricken with disease. On the South Sudan side, conflict and population displacement have placed stress on the lives of those living in the border area. Some displacement has brought people out of South Sudan to the Kakuma camp in Kenya and into Karamoja in Uganda. Analysis of this key border area will help support programming related to pastoral livelihood support, conflict prevention, and border management.
Uganda-South Sudan border area – At the time of writing, it is estimated that 2400 people are crossing the South Sudan border into Uganda every day. Many are seeking shelter in one of the refugee camps near Ajumani. However, Uganda has an open camp refugee policy, which means that refugees can also settle outside the camps in rural or urban areas. This displacement is the latest in a long history of population displacement, both internal to South Sudan and Uganda, and across the border in both directions due to the conflicts that have been fought there over the past four decades. Understanding the dynamics of border economies and mobility will help programmers to respond to local resilience programmes as well as conflict and famine early warning and response activities.

Moyale (Kenya-Ethiopia) – The Moyale border crossing between Kenya and Ethiopia is one of the most important throughpoints for goods traded between the two countries. It is a key trading point for camels and cattle. It is also a major passageway for local mobility, with people taking advantage of markets and social services on either side of the border. It is also reportedly a key link in smuggling and trafficking networks between the two countries. Understanding more about the economic activities in this border region and the links that transect the border will provide key information for better migration management practices and for promoting resilience among rural communities.

Somaliland-Ethiopia-Djibouti Corridor – The corridor that trisects these three countries is one of the most important crossing points for migration out of Somali territories, as well as of Ethiopians seeking to move to Yemen and other countries in the Gulf. It is also an important economic zone, with circulation of livestock as a central pillar, supplemented by trade in imported food and non-food items from the Gulf towards Ethiopia, labour migration towards Djibouti and Hargeisa, and khat from Ethiopia to Djibouti and Somaliland. The economies of each of these three countries can only be understood in relation to each other. This analysis will be relevant for migration management, pastoral development activities, and promotion of economic opportunities in this key area.

In terms of methodology, the research will rely on semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with key stakeholders. These stakeholders will include migrants, refugees, local communities, government authorities, UN agencies, NGOs, civil society, private sector and IGAD. Interviews and discussions will be complemented by an extensive desk review of existing and relevant literature. The Desk Review will share resources with ongoing work being undertaken by the World Bank through a shared bibliography.
Related EUTF Activities

- Cross Border Resilience initiatives in partnership with IGAD
- Resilience Building in Ethiopia (RESET II);
- Regional Development and Protection Programmes (RDPP);
- Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for Youth;
- Strengthening Resilience for Refugees, IDPs and Host Communities (East Sudan);
- Free Movement of Persons and Livestock;
- Strengthening IGAD’s Ability to Promote Resilience.

11.5 Research Theme 5. Migration management systems and their impacts on mobility patterns within the Horn of Africa

Research within this theme will follow two complementary tracks. The first explores the political economy of migration management programming in relation to efforts to achieve sustainable development. The second looks more closely at migration management in action in response to a specific ongoing migration challenge – the growth of irregular migration from the Horn of Africa to Yemen. Further components may be added through the lifetime of the REF.

11.5.1 Assessing the impact of migration management systems on livelihoods and migration/conflict outcomes

Justification

There are currently major investments in migration management in the Horn of Africa, in particular within the Better Migration Management project led by GIZ. These are focused around a number of priorities: addressing smuggling and trafficking in order to reduce irregular migration and the abuse of people’s rights; supporting the development of coherent national migration policies; improving the quality of border control and capacity to implement policies; enhancing the protection of migrants who are vulnerable to abuse, in particular those who are subject to trafficking; developing alternative livelihoods and options for those who are most likely to consider irregular movement. This involves interventions with a wide range of stakeholders – government officials, NGOs and others who have some direct engagement with migrants or potential migrants.

However, migration and mobility plays an important role across many levels and sectors of state and society which may have marginal or no interaction with the array of migration management initiatives. There is little analysis of what are the perspectives, ideas and concerns about migration and mobility that are exercising the minds of politicians, state officials, civil society and the private sector, many of whom are not so involved in migration debates. The assumption here is that, if the international drive on migration management has gained limited traction within this core group of actors, these initiatives will remain superficial, with very fragile institutional support. It is therefore important to understand better how different parts of state and society view migration and mobility in order to see how to better approach different aspects of it more effectively.
Furthermore, there is a need to assess the impact of migration management policies currently in place, to determine whether they are contributing to more effective protection regimes in which people’s rights are safeguarded and the risks of entering into irregular migration are reduced. There is also a need to examine the impacts of migration management mechanisms and developmental outcomes, in terms of facilitating employment, trade, and transport links.

Project Description

The overall objective of this research project is to improve understanding of the actual and potential impact of migration management initiatives on sustainable development. It will examine the extent to which migration and migration management is plays a major role in shaping development outcomes. This research project will address this gap by asking the following questions.

1. What is the role of migration and mobility in shaping different areas of socio-economic activity?
2. To what extent do contemporary migration management initiatives affect different areas of socio-economic activity (e.g. trade, labour markets, transport links, etc.)?
3. How do migration management initiatives affect the lives of migrants, potential migrants and the wider society?

The study will be undertaken through case studies in several different sites – towns or rural areas that see relatively high levels of movement/potential movement focusing on current or potential sites for Better Migration Management interventions. Some of the sites will be covered through the cross border theme (Research Theme 4 above). A preliminary selection of sites includes:

- Somalia (Bosasso) and Djibouti (Obock) – sites of outmigration of Ethiopians and Somalis towards Yemen
- Ethiopia - Assosa, Metemma or another area used as a throughpoint for outmigration,
- Sudan - Kassala and Gedaref which are principle throughpoints for Eritreans arriving from Eritrea and Ethiopia and seeking to leave the region
- Uganda – the north – to be covered in the Cross Border research theme (See Theme 4 above)
- Kenya – Moyale – to be covered in the Cross Border research theme (See Theme 4 above).

In each site, the project team will undertake three sets of interviews:

1. Semi-structured interviews with migrants and community members - exploring their perceptions of mobility and migration management;
2. Key informant interviews with stakeholders involved in migration management initiatives;
3. Key informant interviews with those engaged in areas of activity not directly focused on migration issues – e.g. policing, education, health, agriculture/industry. Interviews with line ministry officials, local administrators, managers (e.g. school heads, business owners), front-line staff (e.g. police officers, teachers, agricultural extension officers, farmers) focusing on the following questions:

- Who do they think of as migrants?
- What benefits does mobility/migration offer for them?
- What challenges/problems does it create?
- How significant is migration/mobility for their sector? How does it compare to other issues?
- What responses would they like to prioritise?
- What do they know of migration management initiatives?
- How does it relate to their day to day work?

The first phase of the project will run over 2 months, and will be undertaken in Bossaso and Obock – to feed into a related but separate study on analysis of migration dynamics between the region and Yemen (see 5b below). In the second round, 4 months will be spent conducting research in Ethiopia and Sudan, with a 2-week follow up research trip to Bossaso and Obock to identify any changes relevant to the overall study or to EUTF programme interventions.

Related EUTF Activities

- Better Migration Management
- IGAD Freedom of Movement
- RDDPs, of which RE-INTEG: Enhancing Somalia’s responsiveness to the management and reintegration of mixed migration flows;

11.5.2 Migration dynamics through Bossaso (Somalia), Obock (Djibouti) and Yemen

Justification

Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen has been taking place for many years, occurs in both directions, and involves a range of people, including refugees and migrants from Somalia, Ethiopia and Yemen, among others. According to data collected by RMMS and UNHCR, between March 2015 and April 2016, 114,093 migrants crossed from the Horn of Africa into Yemen, and 86,738 migrants moved in the opposite direction towards the Horn of Africa.

A number of interesting observations have emerged from these migratory movements, and have been highlighted by institutions such as RMMS.13 Firstly, in spite of ongoing conflict in Yemen, migrants continue to move towards and through Yemen, often in the hope of securing work opportunities in Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries (as indicated by the above-mentioned migratory figures), or engaging in onward migration to Sudan, Libya and

Europe. At the same time, the instability in Yemen is causing some people – both Yemenis and people who are originally from the Horn of Africa, to relocate to the Horn, in particular to Somaliland, Puntland and Djibouti, to escape the violence.

Secondly, until fairly recently, the majority of migrants from the Horn of Africa opted to cross to/from Yemen via the Red Sea route, often using Obock in Djibouti as a point of departure or arrival. Since 2014, this trend has shifted in favour of the Arabian Sea route via Bossaso (Puntland, Somalia). An estimated 54% of migrants that arrived in Yemen in 2014 departed from Bossaso; a figure which rose substantially to 85% in 2015, and 84% in 2016 (RMMS, UNHCR).

Project Description

This research aims to contribute to the identification of areas of effective policy interventions by achieving the following objectives:

- To provide a rigorous, research-based analysis that improves understanding of the causes of dangerous and exploitative migration between the Horn of Africa (Somalia and Djibouti) and Yemen;
- To understand the actual and potential role of policy interventions in mitigating the impacts of this migration in areas of origin and transit in the Horn of Africa.

In order to achieve these objectives, the research will address the following core research questions:

- What is driving the growth in migration from the Horn of Africa (HoA) to Yemen despite the dangers of the journey and the deteriorating security situation in Yemen?
- Who is migrating?
- Why are they migrating? What are the main drivers?
- What routes are migrants taking and who is making decisions about which routes to use?
- What is driving the increase in migrant numbers along these routes?
- Are migrants aware of the risks of irregular migration (including smuggling/trafficking networks) and the dangers of travelling through conflict-affected Yemen? What is their knowledge of border management policies?
- To what extent are smuggling and trafficking networks involved in facilitating these movements?
- What is the impact of these movements on the lives of migrants and the wider society in areas of origin, transit, and destination?
- Are people successful in achieving their objectives for migrating?
- What difficulties do they encounter along the journey and at the destination?
- What are the consequences (financial, legal, physical, etc) of migration along these routes?
- Do migrants have a positive or a negative impact on Bossaso and Obock? What is their impact on issues such as employment, basic services, clan dynamics, local conflict and instability, crime rates, etc?
• What are the existing policy and programme responses to this migration?
• What services and support are provided to vulnerable migrants and victims of trafficking?
• What are the perspectives of government bodies (at the local, regional and national level), and what has been the policy response to these movements?
• What are other actors (civil society, NGOs, UN agencies, etc) doing to respond to this migration?

The causes of this movement can be analysed in three inter-related components. First, there are the changing political, economic and security conditions: we anticipate that a deterioration in living conditions is likely to contribute to people’s incentives to take desperate measures to leave. Second, there are the underlying socio-political structures, including but not limited to state policies, established migration routes and agents, and assistance frameworks, that shape responses to these conditions. In addition to considering the factors that have led people to seek passage across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden thus far, this research will also explore the possible implications of a deterioration in conditions in the region (perhaps the most significant risk being an escalation of outmigration from Ethiopia given the current state of emergency), which may result in more people moving towards Yemen. What are the factors and triggers that encourage people to make the decision to travel along these routes? Who are the actors facilitating these movements? Whose interests does such migration serve both for the migrants and those who facilitate their movement?

The study begins with the recognition that while migrants may describe in some detail the rationale for their behaviour, their range of choices is likely to be constrained or shaped by the socio-political structures – what options are available to them. Understanding the balance of these components in shaping the flows of migration will give guidance about the most effective direction for programme interventions.

The impacts of the growing migration between the HoA and Yemen will reflect the causes behind it. For example, if the use of this route is driven by networks of smugglers working in collaboration with corrupt officials, we may expect to see more violations of migrants’ rights and deteriorating quality of governance – including officials’ resistance to attempts to manage the migration. In contrast, if migrants are more active in choosing the route, with a clearer sense of what they hope to achieve by using it, we may see them exercising more control over the process. Here, the strongest resistance to migration management may arise from the migrants themselves. The research will focus on the impacts of this migration on the lives of the migrants, the communities through which they transit and the local and national administrations.

Methods

The research will take a comparative approach, looking at migration through the two main gateways to Yemen in the Horn of Africa: Bossaso in Puntland, Somalia and Obock in Djibouti. The methods for primary data collection will be qualitative based on semi-structured interviews, key informant interviews and focus groups. These are discussed in more detail below. The researchers will also gather secondary data in the form of available reports and statistics on the migration flows, such as those produced by UNHCR, IOM and RMMS.
In order to ensure comparability of findings, a set of common research protocols will be developed for each of the following sets of respondents:

- Somali and Ethiopian migrants en route to Yemen (total 40 interviews in each site, approx. 10 Somali, 30 Ethiopian – adjusted according to estimates of migration flows);
- Somalis, Ethiopians and Yemenis arriving from Yemen (total 20 interviews in each site, proportions to be decided);
- Key informants from institutions – representatives of national and local authorities, local and international NGOs, international organisations, donors (total 10-15 interviews in each site);
- Community key informants – community leaders, market associations, teachers, police officers, religious leaders, smugglers. Other potential respondents include, boat owners, boat crews, restaurant and café owners, telephone centre owners, businessmen, truck owners, landlords and remittance company agents, who have been identified as potentially playing an important role in smuggling\(^\text{14}\) (total 15-20 interviews in each site);
- Focus group discussions – communities where migrants settle/transit (4 per site).

### 11.6 Implementation

The above themes are intended to be central pillars of our research agenda. We envision carrying out some of the work within the REF team, and sub-contracting some of the work to partners working within the region. Some of the themes may be usefully disaggregated into smaller components, to look at a particular issue (e.g. youth employment or ‘Brain Drain’ evidence, or to understand the particular drivers of migration in a given area). Other activities will be defined more broadly.

We anticipate a period of consultation to go on throughout October and November 2016, with final proposals being made to the EU Trust Fund’s Operational Committee in November or December 2016. We will be ready to begin implementation of the research agenda as soon as it is approved.

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Bibliography

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http://www.eldis.org/go/home&id=17216&type=Document#.WG0mP9Ptmkq.


Annex 1: Key stakeholders and interventions

A large number of actors are involved in addressing issues of migration and instability in the HOA. These include research institutions, national and international NGOs, community-based organisations, campaign and lobbying groups, the UN and other global organisations. For a full breakdown of these actors and accompanying description, please refer to Annexe 2. Annexe 2 also provides a detailed database of the different programme interventions and research initiatives taking place within the HOA.

1 Research institutions

Local, national, regional and international research institutions are carrying out a large body of research into issues around migration and instability. Not surprisingly, local institutions tend to be more focused on particular aspects or geographies of migration and instability, whereas the larger regional/international organisations take a wider approach in terms of thematic and country focus. In many cases, issues around migration and instability are investigated somewhat separately, and many smaller institutions tend to focus on either migration or instability. In larger organisations that are conducting wider research, the two themes are often managed by different teams or departments. This suggests that a more joined up approach to exploring issues around migration and instability would be helpful in generating a more holistic understanding of the drivers, patterns and linkages.

The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) is particularly active in the HOA and Yemen. It is principally concerned with understanding the nature of mixed migration flows, and has carried out research on a wide range of themes and topics, including: detention and criminalisation of migrants, migration-development nexus, the plight of women and child migrants and their particular vulnerabilities, the experience of migrants in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, smuggling and trafficking and their routes, abuses faced by migrants in the HOA, migration policy and practice, and protection, among others.

The Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) is a coalition of 11 NGOs working to improve programming and policy in support of durable solutions for displacement-affected communities in East and HOA. It is not an implementing agency but a coordination and information hub, which conducts research into durable solutions and acts as a resource and information hub.

The Rift Valley Institute (RVI) carries out action-oriented research into issues around conflict, insecurity, diaspora and remittances and peace processes. RVI also runs a borderlands project, which explores border and boundary issues across East Africa, but with a particular focus on Sudan, Uganda and Somalia.

African Migration and Development Policy Centre (AMADPOC) undertakes policy-oriented research into migration and development. It has published research on rural-urban migration and urbanization, labour migration and remittances, among other topics.
At a local level, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) and the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Somalia, as well as political inclusion and local development.

Samuel Hall Consulting, Integrity Global and International Crisis Group (ICG) operate at a regional level, with offices in the HOA. Samuel Hall’s research portfolio is focused on migration, resilience and youth, and includes labour migration, durable solutions, displacement and local integration. Integrity Global prioritises research in conflict, post-conflict and fragile environments. ICG researches conflict prevention and management, with a focus on Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.

On the international level, investigative and lobby organisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been most active in exploring abuses to refugees and labour migrants, land conflict, war crimes, trafficking and smuggling. The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) conducts a wide body of research into both migration and instability through its Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) whose core research themes include displacement, migration and urbanization, and protracted crises and transitions.

A number of useful tools have been developed by these research institutions. RMMS produces monthly migration updates, which include up to date facts and figures on mixed migration in the HOA. Its Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism initiative (4mi) is also an innovative mechanism for tracking and collating mixed migration movements. ICG’s Crisis Watch Tool provides monthly early warning bulletins. RVI holds regular forums that offer a space for critical discussion of political, economic and social issues. Peace Direct, a peacebuilding and conflict prevention organisation, has produced a mapping tool that details local organisations and their conflict prevention activities.

Included in the list of relevant research activities should be included research already carried out by the EU Trust Fund Research and Evidence Facility (REF). This includes research in four border cluster areas of the Horn of Africa as a preparatory study for a suite of projects to be implemented by UNDP and IGAD. In addition, prior to the commissioning of the REF, a series of Rapid Fragility studies were undertaken through the University of Birmingham (see the Bibliography). Research on conflict and violent extremism has also been undertaken by the Morse Centre (see http://ct-morse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Report-CVE-Mapping-Research.pdf).

1.1 International and Local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

Local, national and international NGOs are carrying out a range of programme interventions linked to migration and instability across the HOA. For a detailed overview of over 100 different initiatives, please refer to Annex 2.

For the most part, NGO interventions linked to migration tend to deal with displacement of refugees and IDPs and the impacts on hosting communities. International organisations like the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Medical Corps (IMC) work directly with refugees, IDPs and host communities. They implement a variety of projects, including water and sanitation
(WASH), shelter, protection, livelihoods, foods security, nutrition, health and education. They also work directly in camps and settlements in Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, Djibouti, South Sudan and Sudan. Organisations like ICRC also facilitate family tracking and reunification for refugees and immigrants.

Fewer migration-focused initiatives deal with smuggling and trafficking, and even less with irregular labour migration. Local entities like the Anti-Tribalism Movement (based in Somalia), Awareness Against Human Trafficking (HAART) and CAN International are an exception to this, and they actively seek to raise awareness on these issues, often through the involvement of young people and the diaspora. Projects dealing with pastoralist communities, resilience and environmental degradation are also most commonly implemented by national entities such as Nomadic Assistance for Peace and Development (NAPAD), Seeds for Peace and Concordis. That said, the World Bank is funding a number of large-scale programmes looking into this theme, including ‘Pastoral Community Development Project III’, ‘Kenya: Adaptation to Climate Change in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (KACCAL)’ and ‘Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project for Africa’.

While displacement may be the main focus of most initiatives to date, in the context of the European Migration Crisis, NGOs are increasingly exploring opportunities to engage in the wider issue of migration. Save the Children is establishing a new Migration and Displacement Global Initiative, tasked with developing a global strategy for migration and development that will be mainstreamed across the organisation within two years. The initiative will drive forward related policy, advocacy, programme content and research across the organization.

1.2 UN and other global organisations

UNHCR, IOM and the World Bank are involved in numerous migration and instability-related interventions. ILO, UNDP, UN-Habitat, UNICEF, UN OCHA, WFP and the WHO are also active in various programmes, though to a lesser degree. In many cases, these large-scale programmes are multi-country initiatives that involve close partnership with national governments and include an emphasis on state capacity building.

As the UN entity responsible for refugee affairs, UNHCR funds and supports a wide range of refugee initiatives in the HOA. It coordinates protection and delivery of services to refugees, and is responsible for managing a large number of refugee camps throughout the HOA. It often coordinates RSD, as well as return, resettlement and local integration activities, and takes the lead on IDP activities. In the area of capacity building, UNHCR provides training activities and workshops to enhance the skills of Government staff and relevant stakeholders to uphold UNHCR’s mandate.

While UNHCR deals with refugees, IOM takes the lead in interventions linked to migration and migrants. Its projects and programmes include migration management, capacity building of border authorities, awareness raising, emergency assistance and assisted voluntary return. IOM is also involved in pre-departure orientation for migrant workers and facilitating labour export.
The World Bank is also funding a number of large budget initiatives across the HOA, which cut across the refugee-migrant divide. These include a focus on countering radicalisation through youth engagement, strengthening the livelihoods of pastoralist communities, cross-border security, climate change adaption and resilience, managing the impacts of large-scale forced displacement, and peacebuilding and conflict prevention.
Annex 2. Directory of Relevant Actors and Programme Interventions

The Academy for Peace and Development (APD)

Established in 1998, APD is a research institute in Somaliland, working in collaboration with Interpeace. Since its inception, APD core activities have mainly focused on peace-building using Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology. The organization has brought together representatives from different sectors of society to identify priorities in the process of rebuilding Somaliland. The Academy has been instrumental in facilitating dialogue on issues such as peacebuilding, state building human rights, democracy and good governance. It has produced research papers on land reform and land-based conflict, democracy, socioeconomic studies, resource-based conflicts, small arms assessments, role of diaspora in peace building efforts, and an analysis of indigenous approaches to peacebuilding.

Action Against Hunger

Action Against Hunger is an international NGO that carries out programmes in the following areas: nutrition and health; WASH; food security and livelihoods; and emergency response. In the Horn of Africa, it specialises in malnutrition in Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia, including the Dollo Ado refugee camp.

African Migration and Development Policy Centre (AMADPOC)

AMADPOC undertakes and streamlines policy-oriented research, training and dialogue on internal as well as international forms of voluntary, forced and irregular migration as they affect and are in turn affected by development within the sub-Saharan Africa and in the region’s interrelations with the North and the rest of the South. AMADPOC has published research on rural-urban migration and urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa; South-South labour migration; a historical perspective of migration in Kenya; remittances and their opportunity for investing in Kenya’s agricultural sector; and an overview of migration and development.

Amnesty International

Amnesty has carried out a number of investigative research reports into migration in the Horn of Africa. These include: an exploration of Eritreans fleeing compulsory national service; the effect of the closure of the Somali-Kenya national border on Somali refugees and asylum seekers; forced evictions and land conflict in Mau Forest, Kenya; and an investigation into war crimes in Sudan’s Blue Nile State.
Anti-Tribalism Movement (AMT)

AMT is a non-profit organisation aimed at educating and raising awareness about the effects of tribalism within communities. The majority of its projects focus on creating dialogue among communities in Somalia and with the Somali diaspora, with a particular focus on young people.

Awareness Against Human Trafficking (HAART)

HAART works to build capacity and mobilize citizens to overcome trafficking in persons and violence against humanity in Kenya. It does this through awareness raising, protection of victims, prosecution of trafficking offenders, and policy and cooperation with other organizations.

CAN International

CAN was originally registered in Canada and Somalia by a group of Somali diaspora and has been supported by the Canadian humanitarian and development funding. CAN’s objective is to work for lasting peace, security and stability in Somalia (and Somali communities in Kenya) through civic engagement of youth at risk in urban and semi-urban communities. It has engaged youth in Mogadishu in peace education to promote nonviolent alternatives to local conflicts. At the moment, CAN is engaged in planning and designing reintegration projects with local and international partner NGOs to target youth returnees in peace education and livelihoods activities to mitigate the risk of radicalisation.

CARE International

CARE works in the following sectors: emergency response, education, HIV and AIDS, food security, women and girls, climate change, maternal health, economic development and WASH. In Ethiopia, CARE implements these programmes with a focus on pastoralist girls, food insecure rural women, and young girls living in urban and peri-urban areas. In Somalia, CARE works in Puntland and Somaliland in water and sanitation, sustainable pastoralist activities, civil society and media development, small-scale enterprise development, primary school education, teacher training, adult literacy and vocational training. In South Sudan, CARE works in Western Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile States to support returnees from the refugee camps, and the organization has since broadened its operations to include development programs. In Sudan, CARE runs programs mainly in South Darfur and South Kordofan, where it provides relief services to IDPs, assists conflict-affected populations to restore livelihoods, and promotes peace and stability. CARE’s programming in Uganda is in response to armed conflict, natural disasters and economic and social marginalization, mainly in rural areas of the country.

CEDEJ Khartoum

The CEDEJ Khartoum, the Centre of Studies and Documentation in Economy, Law and Social Sciences based in Khartoum, is a French government sponsored research centre affiliated to the French ministry of Foreign Affairs and the French National Centre for Scientific Research. The CEDEJ
Khartoum has a longstanding partnership with the University of Khartoum aiming, among other aspects, to foster the organization of joint scientific activities (programmes, conferences, workshops), as well as the collaboration between researchers and students from both institutions.

The CEDEJ Khartoum currently hosts and supports several researchers working on individual projects that relate to migration. Academic works have been published by these researchers on migration. The CEDEJ Khartoum has also a network of researchers specialized on migration, following the organization, in November 2015, in Khartoum, of a scientific conference on this issue - that brought together about forty researchers.

**CRADLE**

CRADLE is a child-focused NGO in Kenya, committed to the protection, promotion and enhancement of the rights of children. One of its objectives is the eradication of violence to and exploitation of minors, including child trafficking.

**Danish Refugee Council (DRC)**

DRC’s mandate is to provide direct assistance to conflict-affected populations – refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) and host communities – across the world. DRC works in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen on a variety of issues such as WASH, shelter and non-food items, protection, income generation, food security and education.

- In 2015, DRC began operations in Djibouti in response to the growing refugee situation within the country as well as to the mixed migration flows from the Horn of Africa – particularly from Ethiopia and Somalia.
- In Ethiopia, DRC works in Gambella, Dolo Ado, Filtu regions to support refugees with a range of projects, including WASH, shelter, “cash for work”, protection projects, agriculture, vocational training, irrigation and livestock development.
- In Kenya, DRC works in Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps, as well as in Nairobi and Mombasa to assist urban-based refugees.
- The DRC Somalia Programme is the largest of the six country programmes in the Horn of Africa and Yemen region. It supports refugees, migrants, internally displaced populations and other persons affected by crises in both urban and rural settings. Its activities include WASH, Shelter and Non Food Items (NFIs); Protection; Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL).
- In South Sudan, DRC carries out emergency response, mine action, armed violence reduction, and food Security and livelihoods activities. In Unity and Upper Nile States, it is responsible for Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) in three camps (Doro, Yusuf Batil and Ajuong Thok), and supports a further two camps in Maban County, as well as UNMISS Protection of Civilian sites in Bentiu and in Malakal.
- In Sudan, DRC’s programme is based in Central Darfur, in the Zalingei Corridor and operates in the area of Jebel Marra. It aims to promote durable solutions for the conflict affected population through community driven interventions, livelihood programming and infrastructure support.
• In Uganda, DRC is working in West-Nile, Northern Uganda, Western Uganda and Karamoja. Its activities include livelihoods, WASH, infrastructural development, armed violence reduction, protection and community services, general food distribution, and emergency response.

• DRC was registered in Tanzania in June 2015 in response to the massive influx of refugees in Burundi. DRC is active in Nduta and Mtendeli camps in the sectors of: emergency response, camp management and camp infrastructure, protection and community services, and shelter.

FilmAid International

FilmAid International provides information on health, HIV/AIDS and prevention of GBV through programmes in refugee camps in Kenya (Kakuma and Dadaab) and Tanzania (Mtendeli and Nduta), as well as short term projects in Sudan, Uganda and Yemen.

The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS)

HIPS is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit policy research and analysis institute based in Mogadishu, Somalia. Its mission is to advance peace, the rule of law, and a culture of learning in Somalia. It has published research on the following themes: Somali electoral model, infrastructural development, political engagement of women, educational challenges in post-transitional Somalia, and humanitarian negotiations with Al Shabaab, among others.

Heshema

Heshema Kenya supports refugee women and girls through a number of activities, including: basic education, life skills development vocational training and income generation activities.

Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch is a nonprofit NGO that investigates human rights conditions in some 90 countries around the world. Migrants and refugees feature among its research focus areas, and it has produced a number of reports and briefings on these topics. Of particular concern to Human Rights Watch are labour migrants, domestic workers, trafficking, smuggling and the detention of refugees and asylum seekers. Research includes: Abuse and exploitation of migrant domestic workers in the Gulf States; the plight of unaccompanied refugee children; the refugee crisis in Europe and the dangers they face along their routes and in crossing the Mediterranean; abuses faced by trafficked migrants from the Horn of Africa to Yemen, and the complicity of Yemeni border authorities; trafficking and torture of Eritreans in Sudan and Egypt; ill-treatment of Sub-Saharan African migrants in Morocco; the impact of mining on human rights in Karamoja, in the north east of Uganda, on the border with Kenya; and climate change, environmental threats, and human rights in Turkana county, Kenya.

Ikea Foundation
The Ikea Foundation is the largest private donor to UNHCR. In 2015, the company donated €38 million to make refugees and heavily stretched host communities more resilient in Burkina Faso (€5 million) and Ethiopia (€33 million) by supporting self-reliance initiatives, improving basic services and fostering peaceful co-existence. The grant will last until 2017. In addition, Ikea Foundation will support UNHCR’s global efforts to address refugees’ energy needs in a sustainable manner. The grant will fund clean and renewable energy sources for household lighting and cooking, as well as environmental rehabilitation programmes in and around the Dollo Ado refugee camps.

Integrity Global

Integrity implements programmes and carries out research, monitoring and evaluation in conflict, post-conflict and fragile environments.

• In Somalia, it evaluated DFID’s Somalia Stability Fund and remote management practices, and consulted Somali media actors in the UK diaspora on the Somali government’s draft media law.
• In Kenya, Integrity carried out assessments into child trafficking, community attitudes towards violence, safety and security, and evaluated countering violent extremism activities.
• In South Sudan, Integrity analysed livelihoods and peacebuilding activities, investigating whether increasing livelihoods programming would support peacebuilding objectives. The organization also supported the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) to learn lessons from a pilot ex-combatant reintegration project.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

ICRC provides humanitarian help for people displaced by conflict and armed violence. It works specifically with migrants, offering protection, legal support, family tracing and medical support. In the Horn of Africa, the ICRC regional delegation in Nairobi carries out humanitarian activities in Kenya, Djibouti and Tanzania, and is the logistical centre for operations in Somalia: for example, it assists in the return of Somali IDPs and provides food, shelter and other essential items. ICRC also facilitates family tracing and reunification for refugees and immigrants in Kenya, Tanzania and Djibouti.

International Crisis Group (ICG)

The International Crisis Group is an independent organisation that carries out analysis and advice on how to prevent, resolve or better manage deadly conflict. It combines field-based research, analysis and engagement with policymakers across the world in order to prevent wars and shape policies that will build a more peaceful world. Within the Horn of Africa, ICG focuses on Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.

Many of ICG’s research reports have focused on the drivers of conflict and instability in South Sudan, and strategies for peacebuilding. ICG’s shorter, briefing documents also provide useful analysis on topics such as: the impact of clan dynamics, smalls arms proliferation, refugee populations and violent extremism on security and instability in
northern Kenya; religious radicalization in Ethiopia and an analysis of the domestic policy so far; political and judicial reform in Somaliland; Al Shabaab in Kenya, and its role in stirring up communal tensions and historic divides; and the exodus of young, educated Eritreans in the context of national service, among others.

Through its thematic focus on the ‘humanitarian fallout of conflict’, ICG argues that the blurring of lines between refugee-migrant, coupled with the dramatic rise in the number of refugees, are undermining adherence to humanitarian ideals and international law. ICG research also points to the key role of women in conflict prevention and building resilient communities. The organization examines the evolving threat posed by terrorist groups (such as the Islamic State and Boko Haram) and their role in conflict and instability.

ICG’s CrisisWatch tool provides a monthly early warning bulletin designed to generate regular updates on the state of conflict situations around the world. These provide a useful overview of security developments in, for example, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan and Somalia.

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

IFRC includes migration as one of its main focus areas, providing protection and assistance to vulnerable migrants in all countries within the region. The National Societies provide food, shelter, clothing, healthcare, first aid and psychosocial support to migrants throughout their journey. They also work with the ICRC to restore links between migrants and their families, and to protect migrants in detention.

The International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA)

FIDA is a non-profit, women-led organisation for women’s rights in Kenya. It was involved in the development and drafting of the Counter Trafficking in Persons Act 2010.

International Labour Organisation

ILO brings together governments, employers and workers representatives of 187 member States, to set labour standards, develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and men. The main aims of the ILO are to promote rights at work, encourage decent employment opportunities, enhance social protection and strengthen dialogue on work-related issues. ILO works in the following thematic areas:

- Labour Migration: The ILO works to forge policies to maximize the benefits of labour migration for all those involved.
- Work, peace and resilience: Through its distinctive rights-based development approach, the ILO contributes to building the resilience of nations and people caught in fragile and disaster situations.
- Forced labour, human trafficking and slavery

ILO produces reports and research on issues such as refugee access to labour markets, fair migration agendas for African domestic workers, preventing trafficking and smuggling, migration and development, and global estimates of on the numbers of migrant workers.
International Medical Corps

International Medical Corps (IMC) works in emergency response and preparedness, health services support, mental health and psychosocial support, WASH, and nutrition and food security.

- In Ethiopia, IMC is providing gender-based violence (GBV), mental health and sexual reproductive health services to 150,000 refugees living in three refugee camps in Gambella. It also provides GBV, mental health, sanitation-hygiene and prevention of sexual exploitation/abuse services to 120,000 refugees in three refugee camps in Dolo Ado.
- In Somalia, IMC is responding to the drought and famine crisis with targeted emergency nutrition and WASH services in Somalia as well as services in Somali refugee camps.
- In South Sudan, IMC serves more than 483,000 refugees, returnees, and other vulnerable populations with a fully integrated package of public health services such as primary health care (including maternal and child health), secondary health care, HIV/AIDS, nutrition, Water/Sanitation, and capacity building programs.

International Organisation for Migration (IOM)

IOM is involved in a number of migration programmes and interventions, in partnership with national governments, other donors and NGOs. Its projects and programmes include migration management, capacity building of border authorities, awareness raising, emergency assistance and assisted voluntary return. IOM is involved in pre-departure orientation for migrant workers and facilitating labour export.

- In Djibouti, IOM works with the Government and partners in the international community to: build capacity in migration and border management for senior government officials; conduct border assessment for appropriate policy and operational response; and profiling irregular migrants residing in or transiting through Djibouti as well as strengthening existing task force on migration.
- In Ethiopia, IOM coordinates humanitarian responses for refugees and IDPs, including emergency transportation, pre-departure medical checkups, provision of primary healthcare and construction of transitional shelters. It provides strategic advice to humanitarian actors and the government, and carries out trainings on information management and gender awareness. IOM also addresses the root causes of irregular migration through awareness creation and advocacy, assisted voluntary return and reintegration, livelihood support and capacity building. IOM assists thousands of refugees who are eligible for third country resettlement and is actively involved in harnessing the contributions of the Diaspora communities towards the country’s development.
- In Kenya, IOM responds to forced, regular, irregular, mixed and traditional/cross-border migration. It provides assistance for mobile populations affected by conflict and natural disaster. It addresses irregular migration by providing capacity building for migration management, coordinating health programmes for migrants and
carrying out research on new migration trends. To reduce trafficking and smuggling, IOM runs community awareness programmes, strengthens national capacity to detect and counter trafficking, assists the victims of trafficking, and provides legislative and policy support to governments. IOM also facilitates regional dialogue on migration practices in Kenya and the Horn of Africa.

- In Somalia, IOM has projects in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia that seek to raise awareness among potential migrants; improve livelihood opportunities in the areas of origin and transit; enhance the government’s border management capacities; and further investigate the occurrence of human trafficking in the region.

- In Tanzania, IOM works in the following migration-related areas: (i) Integrated and Coordinated Border Management (IBM); (ii) mixed migration projects that support the GoT with training, equipment and infrastructure; (iii) anti-trafficking initiatives to build national capacity, collect data, assist victims, and support the Tanzanian Anti-Trafficking Committee; and (iv) migrant health policy and intervention in line with the SIDA-funded regional Partnership on Health & Mobility in East & Southern Africa (PHAMESA) programme.

- In Uganda, IOM delivers assistance for refugees, IDPs, victims of trafficking, stranded migrants and other mobile populations. It provides technical support to the GoU on migration policy, border management, combatting trafficking in persons and data collection. IOM promotes migration health and address HIV among mobile populations. It also strengthens the migration–development nexus by highlighting the benefits of safe and orderly labour migration and mainstreaming migration into development policies.

**International Rescue Committee (IRC)**

IRC’s works in the following thematic areas: economic wellbeing, education, health, power and safety. In the Horn of Africa, IRC works in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. It focuses on child protection, education, Gender Based Violence (GBV), health, livelihoods, protection, and water and sanitation in different refugee camps in Ethiopia and Kenya, including Dadaab refugee complex and urban areas such as Nairobi.

**INTERSOS**

INTERSOS is an Italian humanitarian aid organization that works with people in danger, victims of natural disasters, armed conflicts or living in conditions of extreme exclusion. Its projects fall under the following themes: emergency relief, food security, protection, education, WASH, health and migration. In the Horn of Africa, INTERSOS is active in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan. For example, it provides IDPs in Central and Southern Somalia with medical, psychosocial and material support. INTERSOS also implements family tracing projects. In Yemen, it is particularly involved in assisting refugees through social welfare centres, where they take care of the victims of violence, especially women and children, to whom INTERSOS offers legal aid and safe housing.

**Kituo cha Sheria**
Kituo cha Sheria is a Kenyan NGO, assisting refugees with legal issues and obtaining work permits. The organisation has also played a major role in appealing punitive legal measures against migrants in the country, such as the December 2012 encampment directive.

**Life and Peace Institute (LPI)**

Since its formation, LPI has carried out programmes for conflict transformation in a variety of countries, conducted research, and produced numerous publications on nonviolent conflict transformation and the role of religion in conflict and peacebuilding. LPI’s Kenya Programme contributes to building sustainable peace through reinforcing community resilience to divisions and strengthening relations between social groups. LPI’s Somalia programme contributes to reconciliation efforts in south-central Somalia through community engagement and national-level policy engagement. In Sudan, LPI is supporting inclusive and sustainable peacebuilding processes in partnership with universities and civil society actors. In Ethiopia, LPI is supporting local peacebuilding organizations and academic institutions to promote a culture of tolerance, non-violent conflict resolution and amicable relationships between diverse groups.

LPI has released a number of research reports, including on: community perspectives of peace and security related issues in urban settlements in Kenya; mobility in the Horn of Africa; the role of Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean diasporas in mitigating socio-political and economic problems; the problem of terrorism and radicalization in the Horn; drivers of conflict in Gambella region, Ethiopia, including the impact of ethnicity; and alternatives for conflict transformation in Somalia.

**The Lutheran World Foundation (LWF)**

LWF works in the following thematic areas: Relief, risk reduction, and resilience; Human rights, protection, and peace; and Sustainable livelihoods in a changing climate. Within the Horn of Africa, it supports refugees in camps in Kenya (Dadaab and Kakuma) and Djibouti (Ali Addeh and Hol Hol) and assists with the return and resettlement of refugees in Somalia and South Sudan. For example, LWF is providing primary education, early childhood development, child protection and sustainable livelihoods programs in Kakuma and Dadaab, as well as support to people with disabilities and elderly people in Dadaab. In Ali Addeh and Hol Hol refugee camps LWF is providing education and protection. In Ethiopia, LWF supports tens of thousands of refugees with programs in water and sanitation, education, psychosocial support, livelihood development, and environmental conservation.

**Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)**

MSF brings humanitarian medical assistance to victims of conflict, natural disasters, epidemics or healthcare exclusion. It provides medical services to displaced populations and refugees in several countries in the Horn of Africa region. In Ethiopia, MSF provides medical and health services to Eritrean refugees in Tigray, Somali refugees in Dolo Ado, South Sudanese refugees in Gambella, and migrant workers in Abdura. It also delivers a full range of health services to displaced people in Somalia. In Sudan, MSF provides medical and health services to South Sudanese refugees in White Nile State. In South Sudan, MSF runs hospitals and clinics in Unity and Upper Nile States, and provides medical assistance to
50,000 Sudanese refugees in Doro refugee camp, as well as the host population in Maban county.

**Migrating out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium**

Migrating out of Poverty is a seven-year research programme funded by DFID from 2010-2017. It focuses on the relationship between regional migration, internal migration and poverty and is located in six regions across Asia, Africa and Europe and with a focus on the following countries: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, South Africa and Zimbabwe.

The goal of the Migrating out of Poverty RPC is to maximise the poverty reducing and developmental impacts of migration and minimise the costs and risks of migration for the poor. This includes generating new knowledge related to migration and poverty; creating new datasets; engaging policymakers, and building capacity to understand and research migration and poverty linkages. A global research programme is complemented by focused programmes in the regions of the Consortium’s core partners.

The Consortium focuses on the links between migration and development, and has carried out research in the following topics: migration and poverty alleviation in Kenya; rural-urban migration of poor Ethiopian youth; drivers of migration along the Somali-southern Africa corridor; international trade, aid and migration; migration of domestic workers and its impact on poverty, in particular on family incomes in source countries; internal remittances and their impact on poverty; and migration linked to the construction sector, among others.

**Nomadic Assistance for Peace and Development (NAPAD)**

NAPAD is community-based NGO with a presence in both Kenya and Somalia. It works to promote peace and development for sustainable livelihoods among nomadic communities through advocacy, social-economic and political empowerment. Its thematic areas are socioeconomic, ecological and political justice, and emergency response and management. NAPAD has carried out a series of needs assessments in Mogadishu, Belet-Hawa, Dolow, El-Wak, Luuq and Mandera. These studies capture socio-economic data relating to livelihoods, environment and natural resource management, climate change, environment and governance. NAPAD is also involved in a number of resilience, livelihoods, conflict prevention and civic dialogue projects on the border between Kenya and Somalia.

**Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)**

NRC is an independent, humanitarian non-governmental organisation which provides assistance, protection and durable solutions to refugees and internally displaced persons worldwide. Its activities in the field include: camp management, education, food security, legal assistance, shelter and WASH.

- In Djibouti, NRC provides cash grants, business training, livestock and shelter support to refugees and host communities. It is also the main provider of WASH services in Djibouti’s refugee camps.
In Ethiopia, NRC is the main shelter provider in refugee camps, working to provide displaced people with basic and immediate physical protection, and to improve their access to food and livelihoods in the four regions of Gambella, Shire, Dollo Ado and Assosa.

In Kenya, NRC helps refugees and IDPs in camps to access clean water, food, education, and shelter, and exercise their rights. NRC provides Somali refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma with information and counselling, and assists them in returning voluntarily and safely to Somalia. It also implements information, counselling and legal assistance (ICLA) activities to assist the IDP in Mandera, with an emphasis on access to housing, land and property rights and civil documentation.

In Somalia, NRC provides lifesaving assistance, builds resilience and create opportunities that support durable solutions. It has offices in Mogadishu, Dollow, Dhobley, Baidoa, Mogadishu, Kismayu, Hargeisa, Erigavo, Bossaso, Galkayo and Garowe.

In South Sudan, NRC focuses its activities in Unity, Upper Nile and Jonglei states. Its activities include education, food security, shelter, ICLA and WASH activities.

In Uganda, NRC is supporting South Sudanese refugees with education, WASH and food security programmes. It has offices in Adjumani, Arua and the West Nile region.

Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

ODI’s Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) is dedicated to improving humanitarian policy and practice through a combination of high-quality analysis, dialogue and debate. Its five core research themes include: Principles, politics and the humanitarian system; Civilian security and protection; Displacement, migration and urbanization; Livelihoods and food security in crises; and Protracted crises and transitions. Forced displacement, particularly in protracted crises, remains a key area of focus for the Humanitarian Policy Group. Of particular concern are under-explored dimensions of displacement, such as access to land for returnees, and the emerging challenge of displacement in urban contexts. HPG also conducts research on livelihoods, food security and basic welfare in humanitarian crises.

This includes various aspects of livelihoods in conflict and a major body of work on cash and vouchers programming in humanitarian response.

Oxfam

Oxfam’s activities include emergency response, active citizenship, gender justice, inequality and essential services, natural resources, saving lives and sustainable food. In Ethiopia, Oxfam is focusing on building sustainable livelihoods through access to production technology and sustainable markets, and by facilitating private and public sector engagement to enable access to markets. The organisation is also responding to the drought in Somalia and Oromia regions. In Somalia, Oxfam promotes active citizenship and gender justice by strengthening social organizations and building the accountability of local institutions. It provides humanitarian assistance to people affected by drought and conflict in Lower Shabelle, Mogadishu, Middle/Lower Juba and Gedo regions with safe water, sanitation facilities and hygiene promotion, as well as cash relief, cash for work and skills training. To build resilience and sustainable livelihoods, Oxfam supports the livestock
sector, arable farming, natural resource management, alternative livelihoods, remittances and climate change adaptation. In South Sudan, Oxfam supports livelihoods, gender justice, good governance and active citizenship.

**Pact**

Within the Horn of Africa, Pact works in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Tanzania. Its programme activities include health, livelihoods, capacity development, natural resource management, governance and markets. The organization is currently implementing the USAID-funded PEACE III programme along Kenya’s borders with Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Somalia. The project aims to strengthen conflict-management systems and build the capacity of regional and national institutions to stem cross-border conflict.

**Peace Direct**

Peace Direct works with local partners and peacebuilders to promote locally-led peacebuilding and conflict prevention. In Sudan, Peace Direct is supporting a rapid response operation by the Collaborative for Peace in Sudan (CfPS). It rests on a network of village Peace Committees operating across South and West Kordofan that can mobilise entire communities to watch for trouble and defuse it. In Somalia, Peace Direct is working in Kismayo to prevent conflict and create jobs for young men through training in leadership, conflict transformation and organisational management, and apprenticeships. Peace Direct also produces a useful mapping tool ([https://www.insightonconflict.org](https://www.insightonconflict.org)) which details local organisations and their conflict prevention activities in the Horn of Africa and globally.

**The Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK)**

RCK is a national NGO, working with refugees and other forced migrants. Its activities include: protection monitoring in border towns, providing legal assistance to refugees, preparing them for RSD, securing their release from police stations and representing them in court. It also conducts public and community based forums aimed at informing refugees and other stakeholders about refugee rights, advocacy, capacity building and research.

**Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat**

Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) is involved in a number of migration research initiatives, including:

1. ‘Mixed Migration People on the Move’ Series, which attempts to bring together wider research into one document.
2. Briefing Papers - these are shorter products on specific topics
3. Discussion Papers
4. 4mi (Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism initiative) - this is an innovative mechanism for tracking and collating mixed migration movement in a fast-changing and virtually data-free context.
5. Regional Mixed Migration Monthly Summaries - The RMMS compiles a summary each month of all relevant movement with statistics, where known, as well as
CRMMS is principally concerned with understanding the nature of mixed migration flows. It defines mixed migration flows as including the following groups: irregular migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, victims of trafficking, stateless persons and unaccompanied minors and separated children and other vulnerable persons on the move. In this context, its research has focused on a wide range of themes and topics, including: detention and criminalisation of migrants, migration-development nexus, the plight of women and child migrants and their particular vulnerabilities, the experience of migrants in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, smuggling and trafficking and their routes, abuses faced by migrants in the Horn of Africa, migration policy and practice, and protection, among others.

RMMS has also collaborated on joint research projects. For example, it worked with the Global Migration Futures project of the International Migration Institute (IMI) (within the University of Oxford) to explore future migration trends in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. RMMS also worked with the Danish Refugee Council on the conditions, risks and protection failures affecting Ethiopian migrants in Yemen.

**Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS)**

ReDSS is a coalition of 11 NGOs working to improve programming and policy in support of durable solutions for displacement affected communities in East and Horn of Africa. Consortium members include Danish Refugee Council, Norwegian Refugee Council, International Rescue Committee, World Vision, Acted, Mercy Corps, Oxfam, Care, Refugee Consortium of Kenya, Intersos and Save the Children.

It is not an implementing agency but a coordination and information hub, which carries out:

1. Research and information management: the Secretariat acts as a resource and information hub promoting a culture of learning and reflection that leads to improvements in durable solutions programing and policies.
2. Capacity development: the Secretariat contributes to strengthening capacity of NGOs and key stakeholders in the field of durable solutions in the region.
3. Advocacy and policy: the Secretariat initiates and supports advocacy and policy actions based on evidence to ensure that durable solutions issues are adequately addressed in policies and funding systems.
4. Coordination: the Secretariat supports internal and external coordination to ensure synergies and maximize opportunities.

ReDSS has carried out research into: opportunities of engagement for durable solutions with the Somalia new deal compact; a review of durable solutions initiatives in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda; assessment of how Kenyan devolution can generate potential solutions in Kenya’s key refugee-hosting counties of Turkana and Garissa; and an overview of the achievement and gaps of Uganda’s durable solutions framework, among others.

**Rift Valley Institute**
Rift Valley Institute (RVI) carries out research activities in the Horn of Africa and beyond, with a particular emphasis on local realities and action-oriented research. RVI also implements long-term programmes designed to shape aid interventions, expand space for public participation in policy, support local research capacity, preserve communal histories, and promote social justice.

A large section of RVI’s work focuses on conflict, diaspora and remittances in Somalia. RVI also runs a borderlands project, which explores border and boundary issues across East Africa, but with a particular focus on Sudan, Uganda and Somalia. The RVI touches on a range of wider issues such as conflict, insecurity, political economy, elections, peace processes, and mega-projects, among others.

**Samuel Hall**

Samuel Hall is an independent think tank specializing in socio-economic surveys, private and public sector studies, and impact assessments for a range of humanitarian and development actors. Its research pillars are: migration, resilience, youth, implementation research and methods, and innovation.

Samuel Hall has undertaken research into the following themes: achieving durable solutions in the context of Somalia and, linked to this, the importance of regaining or accessing housing, land and property; labour migration of young people from Somaliland and Puntland; an exploration of alternatives to camp-based assistance in Ethiopia for Eritrean refugees; local integration as a viable durable solution for IDPs in Puntland and Somaliland; the impact of local markets on displacement; and the potential for old people to contribute to local economics and promote greater stability.

**Save the Children**

Save the Children provides emergency supplies and support, improves access to food and health care, secures good quality education, provides protection to vulnerable children, including those separated from their families because of war, natural disasters, extreme poverty and exploitation.

To respond the growing issue of migration, Save is establishing a new Migration and Displacement Global Initiative, tasked with developing a global strategy for migration and development that will be mainstreamed across the organisation within two years. The initiative will drive forward related policy, advocacy, programme content and research across the organization.

Save the Children operates in all countries in the region, for example by providing clean water and health care to young children and mothers in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. In Somaliland, Save the Children also runs the Refugee Welfare Centre (funded by UNHCR). In Yemen, Save the Children provides basic health, protection and education services, both at the Kharaz refugee camp and among the host population in several communities in Yemen.
Save has been involved in a number of research projects linked to migration, including: the impact of migration and displacement on children and youth; the migration routes adopted by children in the Horn of Africa; policy gap analysis; rural-urban migration; adolescent girls and migration; linkages between internal and out migration for Ethiopian youth, among others.

**Somali NGO Consortium**

The Somalia NGO Consortium promotes information sharing, cooperation and joint advocacy initiatives amongst local and international NGOs working in Somalia and Somaliland. It provides a forum for and actively supports members to promote dialogue, collaboration, learning experiences and information exchange. It regularly shares information collectively and advise NGOs bilaterally. It represents Consortium members to governments, UN agencies, donor groups, and multilateral organisations at local, national, and international level. It facilitates and supports advocacy initiatives, including raising public awareness of programming in Somalia, on behalf of the membership.

**Somalia Stability Fund**

The Somalia Stability Fund is a multi-donor fund which supports peace and stability in Somalia. It is designed to strengthen local stability, improve the co-ordination of international support and enhance its delivery, in accordance with the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The Stability Fund’s objectives are to: (i) support representative and responsive local governance; and (ii) support the resolution and mitigation of conflicts.

The Fund makes targeted investments which support representative and responsive Somali governance, as well as the mitigation and resolution of conflict. It invests in a broad range of initiatives across Somalia and is open to working with an array of partners, from national and international non-profit organisations to private enterprises. Existing investments include community driven development programmes, youth empowerment projects, and peacebuilding and community safety initiatives.

**UK Department for International Development (UK DFID)**

DFID has set up a Sustainable Employment and Economic Development programme in Somalia in 2011 (and renewed four years later). It has, according to Luengo-Cabreras and Pauwels (2016) focused on analysing the implications for CVE of its development activities, and more recently has sought to maximise the CVE impact of its development and stabilisation activities, largely through job training and creation activities (most recently in Mogadishu).

**UNDP**

UNDP works to tackle poverty, inequality and exclusion. Its activities fall into three main categories: sustainable development, democratic governance and peacebuilding, and climate and disaster resilience. In Eritrea, UNDP is involved in a number of resilience and climate change initiatives, designed to improve sustainable land and farming practices. In Ethiopia,
UNDP carries out resilience and disaster risk reduction projects, as well as cross border initiative on trade, development, environmental protection and peaceful coexistence with Kenya. In Sudan, UNDP is implementing a number of peacebuilding, livelihoods and youth programmes, including cross-border initiatives with South Sudan.

**UN Habitat**

UN-Habitat works to promote socially and environmentally sustainable human settlements development and the achievement of adequate shelter for all. In its World Cities Report 2016, UN Habitat identified the following emerging urban issues: climate change, exclusion and rising inequality, rising insecurity and the upsurge in international migration. It goes on to highlight the increase in forced migration across international borders and its implications for cities. The organization advocates inclusive planning for rapid urbanization, migration and displacement, through improved rights and protection for migrants and refugees, access to adequate services, opportunities and space, and regulations that create an enabling environment. UN Habitat argues that these measures will maximize the skills, resources and creativity of migrants and refugees that drive sustainable development.

**UNHCR**

As the UN entity responsible for refugee affairs, UNHCR funds and supports a wide range of refugee initiatives in the Horn of Africa. It coordinates protection and delivery of services to refugees, and is responsible for managing a large number of refugee camps throughout the Horn of Africa. It often coordinates Refugee Status Determination (RSD), as well as return, resettlement and local integration activities, and takes the lead on IDP activities. In the area of capacity building, UNHCR provides training activities and workshops to enhance the skills of Government staff and relevant stakeholders to uphold UNHCR’s mandate. It is also involved in activities linked to education, protection and livelihoods. In recent years, UNHCR has been promoting a strategic shift in addressing needs of the displaced populations from “care and maintenance” to “social cohesion and self-reliance.”

**UNICEF**

UNICEF’s work comprises child survival and development, basic education and gender equality, HIV/AIDS and children, basic education and gender equality, and child protection. The idea of ‘children on the move’ has emerged as an important priority for countries in the region, and UNICEF is increasingly engaged in this issue in the Horn of Africa and is a member of the Global Working Group on Children on the Move.15 It advocates for a more robust inter-country and multi-agency child protection system that addresses the protection needs of migrant children. UNICEF supports efforts to develop regional systems for

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15 The Save the Children regional seminar on Children on the Move (2009), with USAID and the Department of Force Migration at South Africa’s Wits University, pinpointed key areas of concern: children left behind when care givers migrate, stateless children, children who are trafficked, undocumented and unaccompanied children, and children living on the street. Additional issues raised in the seminar included lack of access to services, the need for greater advocacy and information including policy development as well as community sensitization, child labour and protection – noting the importance of documentation/birth registration as means of protection.
information sharing around migration, and to improve policy and legislation by drafting protocols that support government efforts to better protect migrant children.

For example, UNICEF ESARO supported the development of strong links between family tracing and interim care across national and regional boundaries in the Great Lakes region, as well as between Yemen and Ethiopia, by working with partners, including IOM, to develop standards of appropriate care for children in mixed migration flows. In education, national policy frameworks were strengthened through strategic engagement with 14 country teams (composed of ministries of education, national disaster management bodies, UNICEF and civil society), which aimed to identify substantial ways of integrating disaster risk management and conflict-sensitive approaches into national education policies. Enhanced strategic engagement between UNICEF and UNHCR at country and regional levels resulted in improved service delivery for women and children in refugee camps in the region. Given the heightened risks of exploitation and abuse associated with increasing levels of irregular displacement and child migration, UNICEF is also working to improve understanding of the drivers of migration, as well as appropriate child protection and sectoral interventions for prevention and response. It has commissioned research on child migration, labour, trafficking and protection, and explored the links between child migration and development and the impact of land conflict on displacement.

**UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)**

OCHA is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA’s Regional Office for Southern and Eastern Africa (ROSEA) has been developing humanitarian outlook reports collectively with humanitarian partners in the region presenting four-month trend analysis to inform preparedness and advocacy efforts to mitigate and manage humanitarian risk in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region. In addition, out of a need for unified and comprehensive analysis, OCHA supported IGAD and its Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) with a regional analysis of acute and chronic needs and responses for the Horn of Africa. The aims is for IGAD to lead and convene humanitarian actors together with development actors and national governments, to develop a plan for prioritized joint humanitarian and development action.

**USAID**

USAID has several CVE programmes. The Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) works to address the drivers of extremism. An off-shoot of this programme (KTI-E) is focused on the Nairobi district of Eastleigh, home to tens of thousands of Somalis and a suspected centre of extremism and provides support for a range of activities including youth training, trauma counselling, and multi-faith dialogue events and processes.

**Welthungerhilfe**

Welthungerhilfe is one of the biggest private aid organisations in Germany, with a focus on combatting hunger and promoting sustainable development. The organisation is focused on projects for refugees globally, emergency aid in South Sudan, and drought in Ethiopia,
among other areas. WelthungerHilfe also provides water and sanitation in Dadaab refugee complex.

**WFP**

WFP programmes centre around food assistance, nutrition and emergency preparedness and response.

- In Ethiopia, WFP provides food assistance in camps and at border points. Refugees from Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea are also receiving WFP monthly food assistance.
- In Kenya, WFP operations support 500,000 refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps. WFP’s South Sudan response helps people affected by the conflict, by delivering life-saving food assistance and food-for-assets activities.
- In Sudan, WFP launched a new two-year plan (2015-2017) to provide 5.2 million people with life-saving food assistance, nutrition support as well as recovery and resilience-building activities to help communities become self-reliant.
- In Djibouti, WFP programmes include school meals, food-for-work activities and a pilot food voucher project for the lean season.
- In Somalia, WFP’s programmes range from relief interventions during emergencies, to activities designed to strengthen the resilience of households against future shocks, such as droughts and floods.
- Through its Market Access, Food for Assets, Nutrition, School Meals and Refugee support activities, WFP reaches half a million Tanzanians in chronically food-insecure regions.
- WFP’s programmes in Uganda aim to assist 1.2 million people in 2016, with a focus on three main areas: refugees; the Karamoja region; and agriculture and market support, which includes reducing post-harvest food losses.

**Windle Trust**

Through sponsoring refugees and others affected by conflict in Africa at secondary, vocational and tertiary level, the Trust is developing the technical expertise and professional skills to strengthen institutions, diminish gender-based inequalities and reduce the risks of social division.

**The World Bank**

The World Bank aims to end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity, and is a source of financial and technical assistance to developing countries around the world. Recognizing the close links between migration and development, the WBG is deepening its engagement on broad agenda, including: Building partnerships and strengthening collaboration; Mobilizing diaspora financial resources for development; Improving data collection; and making remittances more transparent and cost-effective.

In the area of migration research, the World Bank initiated the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), which is aimed at generating and synthesizing knowledge on migration issues for countries, generating a menu of policy choices based on multidisciplinary knowledge and evidence, and providing technical assistance and capacity building to sending and receiving countries for the implementation
of pilot projects, evaluation of migration policies, and data collection. Research generated by KNOMAD has focused on remittances, women, migration policy, and the ‘brain drain’ phenomena. Beyond the migration development nexus, the World Bank has also carried out a number of studies into displacement, mixed migration, conflict and instability in the Horn of Africa.

The Global Program on Forced Displacement (GPFD) was established by the World Bank in 2009 to enhance the global development response to forced displacement through economically and socially sustainable solutions. The programme has generated research on sustainable refugee return; the development impact of refugees on neighbouring countries; the development challenge of finding durable solutions for refugees and IDPs; an analysis of displacement in Somalia; and an assessment of Uganda’s progressive approach to refugee management.

World Health Organisation (WHO)

WHO directs and coordinates international health within the United Nations’ system. Its main areas of work are: health systems, communicable and non-communicable diseases, and preparedness, surveillance and response. WHO’s work in the domain of migrant health is guided by the action points of the Resolution on the "health of migrants" which was endorsed by the Sixty-first WHA in May 2008. WHO has also produced reports and documents on migration health and human rights, recommendations on screening migrants and refugees, public health challenges of large scale migration, interventions to prevent communicable, non-communicable, food- and water-borne diseases, and how health systems can address health inequities linked to migration and ethnicity.

World Vision

World Vision is a global Christian relief, development and advocacy organization. It aims to achieve the sustained well-being of children within families and communities, especially the most vulnerable by implement health, education, food security, WASH, protection, community resilience, and emergency response programmes. Within the Horn of Africa, the organization works in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

ZOA International

ZOA is an international relief and recovery organization supporting vulnerable people affected by violent conflicts and natural disasters in fragile states. In Ethiopia, ZOA implements programmes in Gambella with Ethiopian returnees, mainly focusing on livelihoods and community cohesion. In Tigray, ZOA supports Eritrean refugees in Shire camps with psycho-social support, energy for cooking at household level and the promotion of sustainable livelihoods. Additionally, ZOA implements programmes in Somali Regional State in refugee and IDP camps in Dollo Ado, Jigjiga and Hudet, which aim at long-term self-reliance through livelihood activities. In Sudan, ZOA supports the sustainable recovery of conflict-affected rural communities through WASH, food security, livelihoods and education activities. In Uganda, ZOA supports returnee communities to rebuild their livelihoods through education, water and sanitation, food security, economic development
and civic education. It's focuses on the regions of Acholi (Pader and Nwoya districts), West Nile and Karamoja (Amudat district). ZOA also provides relief to South Sudanese refugees.