Migration Between the Horn of Africa and Yemen
A Study of Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen

Submitted by staff of the Research and Evidence Facility For the EU Trust Fund for Africa (Horn of Africa Window)

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Executive Summary

This report on migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen was produced by the Research and Evidence Facility (REF) at the request of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). The project involved primary and secondary data collection in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen between January and June 2017. The objective of the research is to better understand what is driving the growth in migration from the Horn of Africa to Yemen, and the extent to which smuggling and trafficking networks are involved in facilitating these movements. It also explores the impact of these movements on the lives of migrants, the local communities and wider society. Finally, it examines the existing policy and programme responses to this migration in order to identify potential gaps and opportunities for future policy and programming.

The year on year increase in migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen has slowed in the past twelve months. Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen has been taking place for many years and involves a range of migrants, including so-called economic migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, victims of trafficking and unaccompanied migrant children from Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen and, to a lesser extent, from other countries in the region. In this sense, this migration can be described as mixed, both in terms of who is migrating, but also in terms of their motivations and drivers. Journeys between the Horn of Africa and Yemen have traditionally been made across two sea routes whose relative popularity has ebbed and flowed over time: the Red Sea via Djibouti and the Arabian Sea via Puntland. UNHCR and partners estimate that over 800,000 people have made the crossing to Yemen between January 2006 and December 2016, and data collected over the last ten years shows an upward trajectory in migration along this route, with record numbers arriving in 2016. More recently, however, there is a common perception that the number of Ethiopians migrating to Yemen in the last year has reduced; a claim which is broadly substantiated by available data. Travelling in the opposite direction, UNHCR estimates that just under 96,000 people have left Yemen for the HoA since the start of the conflict in 2015, with most of these movements occurring during the first five months of fighting in Yemen.

The demographics and routes taken show significant changes. Young men primarily from Ethiopia, but also Somalia, represent the majority of those making the crossing to Yemen. However, a sizeable and growing number of female migrants are also on the move, estimated to be between 20-30%, and attracted by the considerable demand for domestic workers in the Gulf states. While some migrants stay in Yemen, the majority are hoping to make it to Saudi Arabia. A growing minority of mainly Somali migrants are choosing to migrate to Europe via Yemen. This research tracked the emergence of a new route from the Horn of Africa to Yemen, back through Sudan and onward to Egypt and Libya. For those who successfully reach Europe, this amounts to three dangerous sea crossings in their attempts to reach their destination. Movements in the opposite direction, towards the HoA, are mainly comprised of Yemeni and Somali migrants, for the most part towards Djibouti and Somalia. Among this group, the male-female and adult-child balance is more evenly split, and arrivals from Yemen were 52% male and 48% female, with 46% under 18 years (UNHCR,

1 Throughout this report, ‘migration’ is used to refer to all kinds of movement, including voluntary migration, displacement, and mixed migration. The report does not aim to take a position on whether people on the move are economic migrants, refugees, or another category of persons.
Data on child migrants is limited, though key informants describe growing numbers of children travelling along these routes, and indicate that unaccompanied migrant children could make up as much as 20-30% of migrant flows towards Yemen.

As in many contexts, the drivers of migration and displacement are multiple, overlapping and change over time. Socioeconomic, political and security factors were key reasons behind decisions to migrate, although state policy, cultures of migration, family and social networks, and the growth in the smuggling industry also play a role. Many of these drivers are linked to a general deterioration of conditions, associated with conflict in Yemen, political unrest in Ethiopia, and drought in the region. Although, it is worth noting that, while these developments significantly impact movement choices and patterns, those affected by conflict, insecurity and drought may be more likely to migrate internally, or to neighbouring countries than to attempt sea crossings to and from Yemen, and beyond. This is likely related to the fact that these groups lack the ability to finance sea crossings or long-distance movements.

Despite the difficulties of the journey, most people do not regret leaving. Movements between the Horn of Africa and Yemen are dangerous, with many living in deplorable conditions and experiencing extreme suffering and abuse. However, in spite of this, migrants demonstrate significant resilience and determination to move, and most do not regret their decision to migrate; calling into question the effectiveness of campaigns that seek to deter movements by raising awareness of the risks, dangers and difficulties. Furthermore, migrants and local communities suffer many of the same hardships.

Communities in transit and destination areas carry much of the cost of supporting migrants and refugees. This report is also concerned with migration’s impact on local communities and wider society. Poverty, unemployment, vulnerability and drought affect both groups, and the influx of large numbers of migrants can put further pressure on already overstretched social services, natural resources and livelihoods. In general, however, community respondents voice mixed feelings towards migrants and recognised both the challenges and opportunities associated with migration.

A range of programme and policy gaps and opportunities are identified. A range of governmental, non-governmental and civil society organisations are involved in responses to migration. However, given the sheer scope and scale of migration, efforts have generally been undermined by poor coordination, limited funding and capacity, inconsistencies in policy and practice, and difficulties of accessing remote and sometimes dangerous migration locations. In this context, five main gaps and opportunities for programme and policy emerged from stakeholder consultations: (i) greater protection and assistance to all migrants, regardless of their status; (ii) adoption of a more holistic approach to smuggling and trafficking; (iii) expansion of regular opportunities for regular migration; (iv) better support to local communities affected by migration; and (v) improvements in data collection and monitoring.
Key findings from the Research

Trends in Migrant Routes and Profiles

1. **There is a perception on the part of key informants and local communities that there has been a reduction in migration to Yemen in the last year.** In spite of the reported year-on-year increase in migration from the Horn of Africa to Yemen, respondents in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen indicated that they believed there had been a drop in the numbers of Ethiopian migrants passing along both the Arabian Sea and Red Sea routes in the past 12 months. A number of factors may be behind such a reduction. These include: restrictions on movements of Ethiopians under the ongoing State of Emergency in Ethiopia; drought and its erosion of resilience, livelihoods and opportunities for migration; an increase in the costs of the journey as smugglers extend their geographic reach and borders become harder to cross; worsening conditions of conflict, insecurity, hardship and abuse in Yemen (although, contrastingly, this can also serve as a pull factor for migrants who believe this will enable them to transit Yemen undetected); and tighter border controls by transit and destination countries. The perception that migrant numbers have fallen across the Arabian Sea (Puntland) route is supported by data collected by UNHCR and partners, which shows a noticeable decline in arrivals to Yemen across the Arabian Sea since June 2016. In contrast, data shows that arrivals across the Red Sea have remained fairly consistent and even show signs of a moderate increase between November 2016 and March 2017. Although, it should be noted that constrained access, brought about by conflict and insecurity in Yemen, is affecting the accuracy of data collected on migrant numbers. Nevertheless, the popularity of these two routes has ebbed and flowed over time and, while the Arabian Sea remains significantly more popular (attracting around 74% of migrants so far in 2017), this albeit modest shift could signal a resurgence in popularity for the Red Sea route, and this trend should be monitored over the coming months for greater clarity.

2. **New routes to Europe are being used.** While most migrants hoping to reach Europe continue to use the so-called ‘western route’ (through Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya and/or Egypt) a growing minority of mainly Somali migrants are choosing to migrate to Europe via Yemen. This takes them across multiple sea crossings from Puntland to Yemen then back across the Red Sea to Sudan and overland to Libya or Egypt, and on to Europe. This route is relatively new (first cited in 2015), and appears to be growing in popularity with young Somali men from relatively affluent backgrounds. There are reports that small numbers of Ethiopians are also embarking on this route. It is not yet clear why people are migrating to Europe along this route, rather than the cheaper and more popular alternative through Ethiopia and Sudan. The smuggling networks, support structures, and information and knowledge that facilitate movements along this route have strengthened, making it easier to move along this route than before. Tempting ‘leave now-pay later’ schemes are also being offered to would-be migrants by smugglers operating in Puntland to encourage them to migrate to Europe through Yemen. Furthermore, the strengthening of border controls in Sudan and Ethiopia (particularly in the wake of the State of Emergency)
has made it more difficult and dangerous for migrants to transit through these countries.

3. **Migration to Yemen is gendered but the numbers of women using sea routes are increasing.** Men, typically characterised by respondents as young, single and with limited education, make up the majority of people moving towards Yemen. However, a sizeable and growing number of female migrants are also on the move, estimated by key informants to be between 20-30%, and attracted by the considerable demand for domestic workers in the Gulf states. Crackdowns by both the Ethiopian and Saudi authorities have limited legal opportunities for labour migration, pushing many women to engage in irregular and less visible movements, suggesting that the actual numbers of female migrants may be larger than assumed, as many move ‘under the radar’. While male migrants continue to outnumber their female counterparts, the gap is therefore likely to be narrowing. Travelling in the opposite direction, from Yemen to the HoA, the male-female and adult-child balance appears to be fairly evenly split. Arrivals from Yemen were 52% male, 48% female and 46% are under 18 years (UNHCR, 2016). When taken together, women and children make up 71% of arrivals.

4. **The socioeconomic status of different groups of migrants varies.** Evidence suggests that Somali migrants travelling through Yemen may be more diverse in terms of their socioeconomic and educational background than their Ethiopian counterparts. Ethiopian migrants travelling to Yemen are typically described as having limited education and low economic status, especially those of Oromo origin who tend to come from poorer families. Low economic status and extremely limited disposable income explains why nearly all Ethiopian migrants complained of the high living costs in Djibouti and Bossaso, and a large number said they had had to borrow money in order to pay for medications, food and rent. In other cases, they went without medical attention, food and other provisions, slept in open areas and often resorted to begging due to a lack of money. The research found that while some Somali migrants come from poor families, others are better off. This is supported by the growing number of Somalis choosing to migrate to Europe; a journey that can cost up to US$ 10,000, and which is considerably more than the cost of travelling to the Gulf States. The assumption that Somalis may be better off than Ethiopian migrants is also supported by differences in their means of travel through Djibouti. Most Ethiopians make much of the journey on foot, whereas Somali migrants are more likely to travel by vehicle, perhaps due to greater financial assets and/or better access to smuggling networks. Furthermore, traffickers have been known to particularly target Somali migrants, whose families they perceive to be more affluent, and therefore more likely to pay ransoms for release.

**Factors that Drive and Shape Migration**

5. **The drivers of migration are varied; most people are motivated to move by a mix of factors.** Economic issues, characterised by a lack of employment and livelihood opportunities, were the main reasons cited by both Ethiopian and Somali migrants
for their decision to move towards Yemen, and on to Saudi Arabia and Europe. A shortage of employment or livelihood opportunities, low salaries and land scarcity (amongst Ethiopians especially) were the main contributing factors to economic uncertainty. Amongst Ethiopian respondents, there was also the perception that the best jobs are reserved for particular groups of people or elites, and that these opportunities are not available to young people from rural backgrounds or marginalized groups such as the Oromo. In addition to economic factors, Ethiopian Oromos expressed fear of political persecution by the Government of Ethiopia as a factor behind their decision to move. Many migrants also voiced aspirational or abstract objectives, such as the search for a ‘better life’, which may, ultimately, be difficult to quantify and fulfil. For migrants moving from Yemen to the Horn of Africa, insecurity brought about by conflict and fighting was the main reason for moving, and all interviewees identified war, conflict and insecurity as the principle driver for moving. However, the relationship between insecurity and migration is complicated by insecurity in multiple places of origin, transit and destination, meaning that migrants cannot necessarily exchange a place of insecurity for one of security through movement alone. What’s more, while insecurity may be a push factor for migrants looking to flee insecure contexts, it can also be a pull factor for irregular migrants looking to pass through the country undetected (see next paragraph for more details).

6. **Conflict in Yemen has had a significant impact on the movement choices and patterns of different groups of people.** Two million are internally displaced in Yemen and over 180,000 have fled the country. Logically, places of conflict are often characterised by increased out-migration and reduced in-migration as people look for greater safety and security elsewhere. However, for a number of reasons (including lack of financial resources and a tolerance of hardship and risk) this has not occurred to the levels expected, leading to large flows of people travelling in both directions, depending on their circumstances, hopes and expectations. What is more, many Ethiopian and Somali migrants have been encouraged by the breakdown of state institutions in Yemen and subsequent lack of policy and control. They believe (or are led to believe by smugglers) that this vacuum provides an opportunity to enter, travel through and exit the country unnoticed. Smuggling and trafficking networks have also taken advantage of Yemen’s deteriorating situation to establish profitable transnational networks that operate with relative impunity in the country.

7. **Political unrest in Ethiopia influenced migration patterns.** Unrest in Ethiopia following violent clashes between protestors and the state in 2016 was described by many respondents (both migrants and key informants) as a significant underlying factor behind the migration choices and patterns of many Ethiopian nationals. However, while some interviewees made the link between unrest and increased out-migration, others said they thought that Ethiopia’s current State of Emergency had contributed to falling rates of out-migration. Available data would appear to support the latter hypothesis, with the number of Ethiopian arrivals in Yemen declining, from a high of 12,106 in June 2016 to 4,747 in March 2017. While the proportion of Oromos moving to and through Yemen may have increased over the last two years,
the absolute numbers of Ethiopians on these routes in the wake of political unrest has decreased. This could be as a result of restrictions on movements under the State of Emergency, or due to policies and events in the wider region that are encouraging Ethiopians to either stay put or use alternative routes.

8. **Drought and potential famine in the region does not appear to have contributed to migration along the routes in question.** The drought and severe food shortage affecting the Horn of Africa region has been described by analysts and commentators as a major driver of migration and displacement. Some migrants interviewed as part of this research cited drought as a reason for moving to Yemen; one Somali was planning to travel to Saudi Arabia to help his family after they lost their animals and crops to drought. Overall, however, few migrants linked their movement specifically to drought. This suggests that while the drought may be one of a number of reasons for migrating to Yemen and beyond, it is not necessarily the main driver. This is substantiated by the available data which shows an overall downward trend in movements to and from Yemen in recent months. Drought does not, therefore, appear to be linked to a significant increase in migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen. This may be because drought-affected communities often lack the resources and ability to engage in long-distance migration, or any movement at all. Indeed, while people may not be moving in large numbers to and from Yemen, this does not mean that drought is not driving migration elsewhere. Those who are able to move are more likely to migrate to nearby urban areas, internally within their own country, or to neighbouring countries than to attempt to cross the sea to Yemen and beyond. Those experiencing extremely depleted resilience and resources no longer have the funds to pay for their journey, and stay put or move shorter distances rather than leaving the region.

9. **A ‘culture of migration’ fuels the flow of people out of the region.** Common traditions or cultures of migration have emerged, which shape migrants’ decisions and choices about when, where and how to move. These traditions or cultures of migration become established and strengthened over time by the formation of determined routes, recognised agents and diasporic groups in destination countries. When asked why they had decided to migrate, respondents indicated that friends and family members had migrated before them, and that this had encouraged them to follow, often along the same routes and using the same brokers and agents. Migrants who successfully reached their intended destination seem to be particularly influential in these decisions; giving would-be migrants advice, encouragement and even financial support in order to make the journey. As social capital grows and gains momentum, this helps to perpetuate the ongoing popularity of different routes over time. For example, a large number of migrants already take the Arabian Sea route, which encourages others to follow in the same footsteps. Information about the route becomes more widely available and shared, ensuring that the route is better known and trusted.

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2 The proportion of Oromos registered in Yemen has risen significantly from 64% in 2014 to 95% in 2016 (RMMS, 2016)
10. **Families can be motivations for migration but they can also help discourage young people from leaving.** The desire to help families is a factor behind many decisions to migrate: to diversify household incomes, improve wellbeing, and fund educational opportunities for family members. However, families can also act as an obstacle to migration, and actively work to deter members from moving. In general, families expressed mixed feelings towards the migration of their children, in spite of the potential for remittances and improved employment and educational prospects. Respondents in Puntland were particularly concerned by the increase in young Somalis undertaking journeys to Europe, with one interviewee stating, “the kids you used to see in the neighbourhood have all gone. It is like the city [Bossaso] has no young kids anymore.” What is more, while families play a central role in many cases of migration (providing information, support and loans), there is growing evidence that migrants are choosing to migrate independently and without the approval of family members. The ‘leave now, pay later’ scheme increasingly adopted by smugglers to entice would-be migrants negates the need to involve family members in the decision to migrate, whilst also implicating them later on in the associated costs. Of the Somali migrants interviewed in Puntland, none had informed their families of their intention to travel to Europe, but were expecting them to pay the costs of the journey once they received a call from the smugglers demanding payment. In this scenario, the family may find itself subsequently involved in paying for a journey it never agreed to or even knew was occurring, with significant consequences for the economic security of the wider household. Families reported having to sell assets or use savings in order to pay for their release. The controversial ‘leave now, pay later’ arrangement is most common amongst Somalis, and may explain why Somali families in Puntland and Somaliland had particularly negative perceptions of migration.

11. **Decisions about which route to take, where they are possible, depend on a range of factors including cost and ease of access.** Respondents frequently cited the lack of law enforcement and ease of passage through Somaliland and Puntland as a reason behind the route’s popularity with migrants and smugglers alike. They also suggested that local law enforcement officials there were more open to bribes, and that detention and deportations were therefore less common than in Djibouti, where the authorities and police are perceived to be much more vigilant and less corruptible. The presence of ‘good’ or trustworthy smugglers along particular routes may also increase their popularity among migrants, who believe that this will facilitate access and improve their chances of reaching their intended destination. Respondents who chose the Arabian Sea route widely believed that smugglers in Somalia were more trustworthy than those operating in Djibouti and Yemen. While danger and risk were certainly taken into account, migrants’ resilience and determination to reach their intended destination ‘at any cost’ meant that, while they might make some adjustment to their journey, these factors were generally not enough to deter them from continuing along their chosen route. Journey time was least likely to influence decisions about routes, so long as extended journey times did not have a cost implication. Overall, however, migrants’ ability to decide on the route may be limited, and respondents in Puntland consistently stated that smugglers, not migrants, decide the final route. What is more, as smugglers’ scope of
geographic control expands to both maritime and overland sections of the journey, the decision-making space available to migrants is likely to shrink further in favour of the smugglers.

**Smuggling Activities**

12. **There has been an expansion of smuggling activities particularly over land routes.** A combination of growing migrant numbers, substantial profits, and an operating environment of relative impunity has led to an increase in the scale and scope of smuggling activities in recent years in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen. Respondents claim that smugglers and their brokers are well known and easy to find, and yet live without interference from the authorities. Indeed, the research team was provided with the names and contact numbers of Puntland smugglers by a government official. The increase in scope and scale of smuggling activities is most clearly highlighted by the expansion of smugglers’ geographic reach to include both maritime and overland sections. While maritime routes have, for some time, been made with the assistance of networks, the overland sections through Somalia were typically made independently. Since 2015, smugglers have extended their reach and control over the overland sections through a network of operatives positioned in Somaliland and Puntland, thereby encouraging or coercing migrants to utilise their services much earlier in their journey. This expansion in geographic control has further reduced migrants’ ability to choose the routes and conditions of their journey, increased the possibilities for exploitation and abuse, and increased the potential profits available to the smugglers.

13. **Organised crime groups are carrying out ‘smuggling with aggravated circumstances’.** This is defined as practices that endanger the life or safety of the people being moved, as well as inhumane or degrading treatment. This report highlights numerous examples of abuse, torture, degradation, risk of life and death of migrants at the hands of smugglers. In these scenarios, the migrant-smuggler relationship is no longer based on the definition of a consensual transnational transaction, but one that crosses the line between smuggling and trafficking. Sources, including smugglers themselves, describe a deliberate shift in smuggling from facilitating movement to the buying and selling of human beings. In this context, migrants are increasingly coerced or forced into using smugglers’ services, and report being picked up or “captured” by smugglers who oblige them to pay for their services, or risk facing detention or abuse. It is worth noting that many migrants don’t necessarily want to use smugglers to facilitate their journey, as it can be more expensive and leave migrants with less control. Smugglers’ ability to coerce migrants into using their services is linked to the relative impunity under which they operate and the irregular status of migrants. In this unequal balance of powers, smugglers are able to extort large fees to cover the costs of transport, food and protection, and migrants may struggle to negotiate on prices or appeal for help from the authorities.
14. Smuggling activities and networks are facilitated by state collusion. Numerous interviews highlighted the involvement of government officials from Somalia, Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia in these networks. These include officials from the police, military and intelligence services, as well as border guards, coast guards and customs authorities. Allegations against state actors range from turning a blind eye to irregular migration in exchange for bribes, to active involvement in facilitating smuggling and trafficking, and even participation in trafficking, abuse and torture of victims. In Puntland, for example, migrant respondents reported widespread collusion between police and security officers and the smuggling networks, particularly in migration ‘hotspots’. Respondents from the Ministry of Security and the police themselves also confirmed these allegations to the research team. Interviews further indicated that the boats used to transport migrants from Bossaso are owned by government officials, suggesting that collusion is also taking place amongst the higher ranks.

15. Migrants make distinctions between “good and bad” smugglers. While the actions of traffickers can in no way be justified, it should not be assumed that all those associated with smuggling are necessarily exploitative or abusive. While it is true that a great many smugglers carry out or threaten to carry out violent acts of abuse on migrants, others may offer much needed support and reportedly do not engage in abuse of their clients. For example, one female migrant who found herself stranded without money to pay for her journey and at risk of abuse and exploitation, said she was lent the money by a smuggler she had met on the Ethiopian-Somali border. Furthermore, for Yemeni refugees and Somali returnees, smugglers may ultimately offer a vital lifeline to those wanting to flee conflict and instability in Yemen. In this context, smugglers are not universally viewed in a negative light, in particular amongst migrants and local communities from where they operate. Migrants reported spending time looking for ‘trustworthy’ or ‘good’ smugglers, and also looked to share details and information of ‘safe’ smugglers within migrant networks. In Obock and certain neighbourhoods of Djibouti town, there is a common perception that smugglers are not organised criminals per se, but normal people responding to economic opportunities. Nevertheless, this perception can be problematic when shared by agents of the law, as it can make them more amendable to corruption and participation.

Experiences and Outcomes of Migration

16. Despite enormous and varied challenges, most migrants do not regret their decision to leave their country. Challenges suffered by migrants typically include widespread protection risks and abuse, as well as general hardship, including a lack of access to food and water, basic services, shelter, livelihoods, insecurity and harsh climatic conditions. Yemen is a centre for much of this abuse, due to a reduction in in-country protection and assistance, and a general breakdown in law and order, which has allowed smugglers and traffickers to operate with impunity. In spite of this, most migrants do not regret their decision to migrate, and prefer to continue with their journey rather than return to their country of origin no matter what the
consequences. This also highlights how movement can be an important means of protection for people in contexts of conflict, persecution and abuse, where they feel they have no choice but to leave their place of origin and move elsewhere. Fear of return can increase migrants’ tolerance of abuse and hardship along their journey, as can the risk of economic destitution that they and their families could face if they are not successful in reaching their intended destination, as many will have sold assets and taken out loans in order to pay for the journey. Religion and the feeling that their fate is predetermined may also be factors behind migrants’ tolerance of hardship and abuse. A number of migrant respondents said they felt their migration decisions and consequences were out of their control and in the hands of God. To a certain degree, such sentiments remove migrants’ agency, and make them more likely to accept their circumstances, even if the outcome is not positive.

17. **Migrants are aware of, but are not dissuaded by, the risks and dangers of migration.** The known risks do not outweigh the potential benefits of migration. While awareness may encourage migrants to adjust or reconsider which route they take, it is not enough to deter them from migrating in the first place or continuing with their journey. Furthermore, as decisions often extend to family members, friends, fellow migrants, and smugglers and traffickers, an understanding of who is making the decisions around these questions is key to effectively formulating and targeting policies and programmes that seek to manage irregular migration. To mitigate against risk, it is common for migrants to take precautionary steps, such as arranging for family members to set aside money to pay ransoms, or women taking contraceptives to avoid pregnancy if raped. Young Somalis hoping to reach Europe from Puntland not only expressed awareness of the risk of kidnap, abuse and torture at the hands of smugglers once they reached Libya, they also knew that the threat of this could help to leverage payment from family members. Many of the Somalis interviewed were not planning to tell their families of their intention to leave and, lacking the funds to pay the smugglers themselves, felt sure that their relatives would feel compelled to pay the costs of the journey on their behalf, for fear that they might be subjected to torture and abuse if they did not.

18. **Host communities expressed mixed feelings towards migrants.** Transit communities, such as Obock and Bossaso, have been impacted by the influx of large numbers of migrants travelling to and from Yemen. Complaints about migrants commonly centred around poor sanitation, the spread of disease, competition over jobs, cultural differences and inter-ethnic clashes between migrants. Nevertheless, most respondents recognised that migration has both positive and negative impacts, highlighting also new economic opportunities associated with new businesses, markets and skills. This somewhat nuanced response can be attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, migrants on their way to Yemen are in transit, and most will pass through in a matter of days or weeks (although refugees and returnees from Yemen are likely to stay for longer periods of time). Secondly, levels of interaction between migrants and communities may be limited by language barriers, camp residency, or the actions of smugglers who house them in specific neighbourhoods and place limits on their movements and interactions. Thirdly, different members or groups of the community are impacted both positively and negatively, and to greater and
lesser extents, depending on a range of factors, including levels of interaction, socioeconomic status, and personal experience. Finally, community perceptions of migration may shift over time. A number of community respondents in Obock described how migration has economically benefitted their community in the past, but now the situation is no longer sustainable as services and resources are under too much pressure.

19. **Smuggling has generated huge profits, but the benefit to local economies is variable.** Smuggling in migrants represents a multi-million-dollar industry; the networks that operate the Red Sea and Arabian Sea maritime crossings together are estimated to earn at least US$ 14.7 million per year. Nevertheless, those who benefit directly or indirectly from this industry represent a minority of the overall population, and it is not clear whether the wider economy stands to gain. Most community respondents in Puntland suggested that, in their experience, the presence of migrants had little impact on the local economy. It is true that migrants represent a potential market for local businesses, however the majority are poor with little disposable income, and the amount they spend in transit is likely to be minimal. Furthermore, in places like Bossaso, smugglers tend to keep migrants away from the local community by lodging them in separate housing units and providing their own food. Migrants’ movements are often limited, and they are sometimes kept under armed guard, which reduces their potential to contribute to the economy. Some migrants boost the local economy by taking up employment or livelihood opportunities, or establishing their own businesses. The economic benefits of working migrants has not gone unnoticed by governments in the region, with the Government of Djibouti recently moving forward with new legislation to allow refugees to work in the country. However, their impact on the labour market is mixed, and perceptions varied depending on who was asked and how they were affected. Respondents from the private sector and a number of institutions recognised the potential benefits of migration to the labour market. They asserted that migrants bring new skills in farming, catering and construction, which can benefit local businesses and the economy. In contrast, community respondents tended to see migrants’ contribution to labour markets as less positive, as it had a more direct impact on their own livelihoods and wellbeing, placed additional strain on already high levels of unemployment, and drove down local wages due to increased competition.

20. **Migrants are not necessarily associated with insecurity.** Given the securitisation of migration in popular rhetoric and discourse, it was surprising that communities in Puntland and Djibouti did not perceive migrants as more of a security threat. Most local respondents saw migrants as a relatively peaceful group that did not pose a threat to the community. Linkages between migrants and insecurity were more commonly made by government respondents, who were uneasy about a lack of control over who was coming and going. Government respondents were particularly

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3 This figure is a conservative estimate based on the number of migrants moving along these routes multiplied by typical costs of the sea crossings. Sea crossings represent only a small part of the total journey revenues and it is likely that many more migrants are taking these routes than suggested by official data, suggesting that actual revenue will be significantly higher when overland routes are also taken into consideration.
concerned with the growing presence of criminal groups involved in smuggling and trafficking, and their links with an influx of weapons and connections with extremist groups. These groups are often armed and dangerous, and are known to control strategic areas of the towns and coastal areas. In these scenarios, insecurity has more to do with the criminal networks than migrants themselves.

21. Official mechanisms of assistance, protection and support provided by states, UN agencies and NGOs are extremely limited due to a lack of funding, capacity, political interest, challenges of security and access, and apprehension at the scope and scale of the issue. In this context, grassroots support can play an important role in filling vital gaps. While pressures between communities and migrants exist, this research has identified a number of cases where local residents provide life-changing support to migrants in danger or in distress. Members of the community give migrants food, clothes, medical assistance, and sometimes money. Some respondents also reported intervening when migrants were being harassed by the authorities, helping migrants with translations, and guiding them to particular places or offices where they could access support and assistance. Due to their irregular status, migrants may be wary of approaching official channels of support, for fear of being registered, arrested or deported, and may be more likely to seek assistance from informal community-based structures. What is more, they may be unaware of official mechanisms for support, or experience language or cultural barriers in accessing these. In this context, policy and programmes should seek to strengthen and build upon grassroots structures of support through funding and capacity building.
1. Introduction

Migration between the HoA and Yemen has been taking place for many years and occurs in both directions. It and involves a range of migrants, including so-called economic migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, victims of trafficking and unaccompanied migrant children, from Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen and, to a lesser extent, from other countries in the region. In this sense, this migration can be described as mixed, both in terms of who is migrating, but also in terms of their motivations and drivers. Furthermore, a significant, if unknown proportion of people moving to and from Yemen have protection needs that would classify them as refugees, even if they are not official recognised as so.

A number of interesting and important observations have become evident from regional tracking data. In spite of ongoing conflict in Yemen, migrants continue to move towards and through Yemen, often in the hope of securing employment opportunities in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, or engaging in onward migration to Sudan, Libya and Europe. In contrast to the widely predicted drop in migrants along this route (in the wake of escalated conflict in Yemen), there has been an upward trend in migrant arrivals in Yemen, with a record high of 117,095 in 2016, although with some subsequent slowing since then.

At the same time, escalation of conflict in Yemen has caused some people (both Yemenis and people who are originally from the HoA) to relocate to the HoA, in particular to Djibouti, Puntland and Somaliland. While much of this report focuses on migration from Puntland and Djibouti to Yemen, it will also take into account the significant counter flow of refugees and migrants from Yemen to the HoA. This counter flow is important in understanding and contextualising the migration, conflict and instability dynamics of the wider region.

In this context, the report examines who is migrating, with a particular focus on nationality, gender, socioeconomic status and age. It also seeks to map out the routes undertaken, and provide an analysis of who decides on the routes, and what factors are behind these decisions. A key question is: what is driving migration between the HoA and Yemen despite the dangers of the journey and the deteriorating security situation in Yemen? The causes of movement are analysed through three inter-related components. The first are the changing economic, social, political and security conditions, which may have a direct impact on migrants’ lives and opportunities. It is assumed that a deterioration in living conditions is likely to contribute to people’s incentives to move. Secondly, while migrants may describe in some detail the rationale for their behaviour, their range of choices is likely to be constrained or shaped by socio-political structures that determine what options are available to them. These structures include state policies, cultures of migration, and family and social networks. Thirdly, and adopting a forward-looking lens, this section considers the possible implications for migration of a deterioration of conditions in the wider region, with a focus on conflict in Yemen, political uncertainty and unrest in Ethiopia, and drought and potential famine in the region. Understanding the balance of these components in shaping the flows of migration will give guidance about the most effective direction for programme interventions.

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4 For an overview of terms and their definitions, refer to Annex 6 for a glossary of key terms used.
In order to better understand the drivers, routes and choices around migration, a section of the report is dedicated to smuggling and trafficking networks that operate between the HoA and Yemen. Evidence suggests that the scale and scope of smuggling and trafficking networks has increased in recent years, and the report seeks a better understanding of how and where these networks operate, who is involved and their linkages with other criminal activities. A key theme is the extent to which these networks are involved in facilitating people’s movements between the HoA and Yemen. If the use of migration routes is driven by networks of smugglers working in collaboration with corrupt officials, we may expect to see more violations of migrants’ rights and deteriorating quality of governance, including officials’ resistance to attempts to manage the migration. In contrast, if migrants are more active in choosing the route, with a clearer sense of what they hope to achieve by using it, we may see them exercising more control over the process. Here, the strongest resistance to migration management may arise from the migrants themselves.

The research also attempts to better understand migrants’ experiences, and to ascertain to what extent they are successful in meeting their objectives for moving. Journeys between the HoA and Yemen are often characterised by danger and risk, particularly for undocumented and vulnerable migrants. Migrants frequently report incidents of abuse from unscrupulous smugglers and traffickers, state officials, criminal groups, local communities or other migrants. They also experience significant hardship en route and on arrival at their destination. Many complain of a lack of access to food and water, basic services, shelter and livelihoods, as well as challenges of security and climate. In this context, this report also explores which migrants are most vulnerable during the journey. It examines the extent to which migrants are aware of the risks they may face, either before or during their travel, and the implications of this on their migration decisions.

Some migrants move relatively quickly on to their next transit destination. Others may stay on for a number of weeks, months and even years, while they work to save up for the next section of their journey, wait for smugglers to organise the next section of their journey, or recover from illness or destitution. Regardless of the length of stay, the impact of large numbers of migrants on relatively low population and impoverished areas can be significant, with the potential for both positive and negative outcomes for local populations, authorities and infrastructures. The report examines the effect of migration on local economies, labour markets, health, security and local values. It charts the sometimes complex relationship between migrants and host communities, and the perceptions held by each group of the other. The report explores who stands to gain or lose from these interactions, and what would be the consequence of a reduction in migrant levels. Particular emphasis is given to Bossaso and Obock, and the impact of relatively large numbers of migrants on these communities.

States (at the national, regional and international level), local authorities, UN agencies, donors, international and national NGOs, civil society and other local organisations all have a role to play in addressing and responding to migration between the HoA and Yemen. Ongoing activities generally focus on efforts to manage and reduce these movements through regulations, border controls and cross-country agreements. Additionally, a number of projects and programmes seek to respond to the humanitarian and developmental needs and challenges faced by local communities and migrants, in particular refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), victims of trafficking and unaccompanied migrant children (UMC).
Nevertheless, it seems that policy and programmes are not achieving their intended goals. In spite of efforts to reduce and manage irregular migration, and counter smuggling and trafficking, the networks facilitating these movements remain resilient and far-reaching and the numbers continue to rise. Furthermore, migrants continue to live in deplorable conditions during the journey and upon arrival at their intended destination, suffering from abuse and hardship, illness and death. In this context, it is useful to consider the impact of migration management policy on the individuals involved, and subsequently analyse who stands to lose and gain from these efforts. A mapping of some of the organisations working with migrants across the region, as well as the governmental ministries and departments involved in migration in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen can be found in Annexes 3 and 4.

The final section of this report builds on the above-mentioned findings in order to identify gaps and opportunities for future programming. These will ultimately be shaped by underlying socioeconomic and political structures, such as government policy, national and regional capacity, and available funding. Furthermore, given the transnational nature of migration, successful interventions may involve multiple geographies, including places of origin, transit and departure and a range of actors and stakeholders of different nationalities. Five key recommendations on gaps and opportunities have been identified:

1. Provide greater protection and assistance to migrants;
2. Adopt a more holistic approach to smuggling and trafficking;
3. Expand opportunities for regular migration;
4. Support local communities affected by migration;
5. Improve data collection and monitoring.

1.1. Overall objectives and research questions

This research aims to contribute to the identification of areas of effective policy interventions by achieving the following objectives:

1. To provide a rigorous, research-based analysis that improves understanding of the causes and consequences of dangerous and exploitative migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen;
2. To understand the actual and potential role of policy interventions in mitigating the impacts of this migration in areas of origin and transit in the Horn of Africa.

In order to achieve these objectives, the research addresses the following core research questions:

1. What is driving the growth in migration from the HoA to Yemen despite the dangers of the journey and the deteriorating security situation in Yemen?
   - Who is migrating?
   - Why are they migrating? What are the main drivers?
• What routes are migrants taking and who is making decisions about which routes to use?
• What is driving the increase in migrant numbers along these routes?
• Are migrants aware of the risks of irregular migration (including smuggling/trafficking networks) and the dangers of travelling through conflict-affected Yemen?

2. To what extent are smuggling and trafficking networks involved in facilitating these movements?
• How and where do they operate?
• Who is involved in the smuggling and trafficking industry, and do they have links to other criminal activities?

3. What is the impact of these movements on the lives of migrants?
• Are people successful in achieving their objectives for migrating?
• What difficulties do they encounter?
• What are the consequences (financial, legal, physical, etc) of migration along these routes?

4. What is the impact of these movements on local communities and wider society?
• Do migrants have a positive or a negative impact on Bossaso and Obock?
• What is their impact on issues such as employment, basic services, clan dynamics, local conflict and instability, crime rates, etc?

5. What are the existing policy and programme responses to this migration?
• What services and support are provided to vulnerable migrants and victims of trafficking?
• What are the perspectives of government bodies (at the local, regional and national level), and what has been the policy response to these movements?
• What are other actors (civil society, NGOs, UN agencies, etc) doing to respond to this migration?

6. What are the gaps and opportunities for future policy and programming?

1.2. Methodology

1.2.1. Field Work

The research takes a comparative approach, looking at migration through the two main gateways between the HoA and Yemen: Puntland and Djibouti. Research teams were established in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen, each comprising of a Coordinator and between one to three Field Investigators. In Puntland, the researchers focused their work on Bossaso, Qardo and Garowe. In Djibouti, the focus was Djibouti town and Obock. In Yemen, the teams were located in Sana’a, Aden, and Al Hodeidah. The final selection of these field
locations was made through consultations with the field researchers and main stakeholders, including national government, UN and NGOs, and the EU.

*Image 1: Research locations in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen*

The research teams carried out qualitative primary data collection through semi-structured interviews, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. In order to ensure comparability of findings, a set of common research protocols was developed for each of the following sets of respondents:

- Somali and Ethiopian migrants travelling from the HoA to Yemen.
- Somali, Ethiopian and Yemeni migrants and refugees travelling from Yemen to the HoA.
- Key informants from institutions, including: representatives of local, national and regional state authorities; UN agencies, local and international NGOs; international organisations; and donors.
- Community key informants including: community leaders, activists and elders; police and security personnel; café, restaurant and hotel owners; religious leaders; teachers and doctors; migrant and diaspora groups; school and university students; traders and shop keepers; and private sector representatives, among others.
- People involved in smuggling and trafficking networks, including: agents, brokers, middlemen, transporters, smugglers and traffickers.

Interviews lasted an average of one hour, and focus group discussions were conducted over a space of around three hours.
Focus group discussions (FGDs) were also conducted in Puntland and Djibouti with a range of community members from areas where migrants settle or transit, as well as groups of migrants. On average, 15 people participated in each FGD. The purpose of these discussions was to collect information on the impact of migration on local communities, and their perception of migrants and their movements. Four topics for the focus group discussions were identified:

1. What changes have you seen in the number and profile of migrants passing through your community?
2. Who is involved in organizing people’s migration to/from Yemen?
3. What impact do migrants have on the community?
4. What is the government doing to support you and/or migrants?

Field activities were conducted between January and June 2017 in Puntland (January – March), Yemen (April – May) and Djibouti (May – June). In total, 283 interviews and 8 focus group discussions involving 123 people, were carried out by the research teams across the three country locations. Ten interviews with Key Informants were also carried out in Nairobi (Kenya) and Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). This brings the total number of people consulted as part of this study to 416. For a full overview of the different respondents and groups engaged as part of this research through interviews or focus group discussions, refer to Annex 1.

Table 1: Breakdown of the numbers and categories of people involved in interviews and FGDs as part of this research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Community Key Informants</th>
<th>Institution Key Informants</th>
<th>Smugglers and Traffickers</th>
<th>FGD Participants</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Puntland</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>26</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>170</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2.2. Desk Review

In addition to collecting primary data, the research team carried out an extensive desk review of existing literature, reports and data from academics, UN agencies, NGOs, government bodies and other sources, on migration between the HoA and Yemen. Findings and data from the desk review have been incorporated throughout the report to enhance the coverage of the final output, and a full bibliography can be found in Annex 2. The desk review was supplemented by a comprehensive mapping exercise in order to catalogue the relevant activities and programmes being carried out by governments, donors, UN and
other agencies, international NGOs, local NGOs and civil society actors, details of which can be found in Annexes 3, 4 and 5.

1.2.3. Report Structure

The report structure broadly follows the research questions outlined above, and is divided into five main sections.

1. The first section explores what is driving the growth in migration from the Horn of Africa (HoA) to Yemen despite the dangers of the journey and the deteriorating security situation in Yemen.

2. The second section considers the extent to which smuggling and trafficking networks are involved in facilitating these movements.

3. The third section examines the impact of these movements on the lives of migrants.

4. The fourth section examines the impact of these movements on local communities and wider society.

5. The fifth section considers the existing policy and programme responses to this migration.

6. Finally, the sixth identifies a set of gaps and opportunities for future policy and programming.

1.3. Challenges

The project faced a number of challenges, particularly with regards to conducting field work:

- **Insecurity is commonplace** in the research locations, in particular Bossaso and Yemen, where indiscriminate attacks by extremist groups or rival parties was routine. During the field work in Bossaso, there were at least seven violent security incidents between January and February 2016. Conducting research in Yemen was especially dangerous for the researchers involved and, on one occasion, the team was caught up in heavy crossfire in Aden, which fortunately left no one hurt. As a consequence, access and travel around the country was extremely limited and risky.

- **Migration remains a sensitive issue,** and securing the necessary government approvals from relevant Ministries and Departments was a time-consuming process. In the case of Djibouti, this delayed the start of field work by nearly six months, and various ministries at all levels needed to be involved in the process. It is not clear why the authorities postponed granting their approval, however contacts on the ground suggest that this occurs fairly regularly, and that outright rejection of research proposals is also not uncommon. In spite of the delays incurred, it was important for the research team to follow the necessary protocol, in order to ensure subsequent buy-in and acknowledgement of the research findings by the authorities.
• **Language was a significant barrier** to conducting the research, and the teams needed to be constituted of people able to communicate in Somali, Amharic, Oromo, Tigrinya, Arabic, Afar, French and English so as to be able to communicate with migrants, host communities and the wider research team. Transcripts were often written in the local or national language, before being translated into English for analysis by the REF team.

• **Collecting information on transnational journeys** involving multiple countries of origin, transit and destination is challenging. The teams were able to carry out key informant interviews in Ethiopia and Kenya, however findings would have been further enriched with additional field work in sending and receiving locations like Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and Europe. Within Somalia, dedicated fieldwork in Somaliland (another key transit location) would also have contributed some additional and interesting insights.6

• **Obtaining accurate data on migration** between the HoA and Yemen is a challenge. The most reliable and widely quoted data is that collected by UNHCR and partners, much of which has been included in this report. However, there are a number of gaps associated with this data. For example, the figures do not include migrants, refugees and asylum seekers not served by UNHCR programmes. The patrol teams do not function at night and do not cover the full length of the Yemeni coast, and would not therefore capture the many migrants who arrive outside of these hours or in unpatrolled locations. Many people use the services of smugglers to facilitate their journey undetected, making it difficult for monitoring groups to pick them up. Finally, in a context of conflict and insecurity, detailed and accurate data collection and monitoring of the Yemeni coast is further complicated. Data on migration is also collected by other sources both governmental and non-governmental;7 however, much of this has been undermined by inaccuracies, bias and inconsistencies. Furthermore, this data is not always widely shared or coordinated and, due to different methodologies and systems, cannot easily be used to make national or regional comparisons with other data sources. Many of these shortfalls are attributed to a lack of dedicated training, capacity, funding and equipment, and a reluctance on the part of government institutions to share sensitive or restricted information. Furthermore, as a number of different entities are simultaneously

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6 Fieldwork in Somaliland is being commissioned in July 2017 and will be appended to this report when it is completed.
7 In Puntland, mixed migration data is primarily collected by Department of Refugees, Returnees and Mixed Migrants, which sits within the Ministry of Interior. The Department has a number of ‘mixed movement monitors’ in place to track and record data on migrants passing through Puntland, and releases monthly reports on the findings. The Bossaso MRC also collects data on migrants passing through its premises, and additional data on maritime and security issues are gathered by the PMPF and the Puntland Intelligence Agency. In Djibouti, data is also being collected by a number of state agencies, including the army, the gendarmerie, border police and the Etat Majeur. IOM Djibouti has also been active in collecting data. It has a database of around 6,000 migrants interviewed since 2011,7 and has recently launched flow monitoring (a component of its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM)). The organisation is also working with the University of Louvain in Belgium to understand which institutions are collecting data, and what kind of data they are collecting.
collecting data, a formal and structured system of coordination has often been lacking (RMMS, 2017).

2. What is Driving the Growth in Migration from the HoA to Yemen Despite the Dangers of the Journey and the Deteriorating Security Situation in Yemen?

2.1. Migration Numbers and Trends

Migration between the HoA and Yemen has been taking place for many years for the purposes of trade, livelihoods, family reunification, religious pilgrimage, educational opportunities and in times of emergency. Yemen and the HoA are separated by the narrow strait of Bab al-Mandab, and their close proximity has encouraged long-standing migration flows in both directions, as well as deep political, economic, social and religious ties. A surge in the oil market in the 1970s created a demand for unskilled migrant workers in the Arab Peninsula from the HoA and beyond. During the 1990s, shortly after the unification of Yemen in 1991, large numbers of Ethiopian labour migrants began moving to Yemen in search of employment opportunities (IOM, 2014). These were joined around the same time by Somalis moving to Yemen as refugees to escape war and a deteriorating security situation in Somalia.

Journeys between the HoA and Yemen have traditionally been made across two sea routes: the Red Sea via Djibouti and the Arabian Sea via Puntland. The popularity of these two routes has ebbed and flowed over time, and the possible reasons behind these changes will be explored in more detail in Section 2.3. Since 2014, the Arabian Sea crossing gained in popularity to become the preferred route for migration (see Figure 1 below). In 2014, 54% of migrants arrived in Yemen through the Arabian Sea route, a figure which rose significantly to 85% and 84% in 2015 and 2016, respectively. 2017 figures so far seem to point to a similar trend, though with some reduction as 74% of migrants arrived through the Arabian Sea route in the months of January to April.

In order to understand the size of the flows of migrants between the HoA and Yemen, secondary data from UNHCR, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) and partners has been included in this report (for ease of reference, this group will hitherto be referred to as UNHCR and partners in the report). UNHCR and partners have been collecting data on new arrivals and refugee registrations in Yemen on a daily basis since 2006 through monitoring patrol teams positioned along the coastal roads of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. Due to issues of access, it is likely that the actual number of recorded migrants moving between the HoA and Yemen is higher than the available statistics suggest. Indeed, data from other sources suggests this is likely to be the case. For example, IOM respondents in Djibouti claim that up to 400 migrants transit through the country every day, amounting to 146,000 per year, which is significantly higher than the 18,457 migrants recorded as arriving in Yemen in 2016.
2.1.1. Migration from the HoA to Yemen

While the number of migrants crossing from the HoA into Yemen has fluctuated year on year, data collected by UNHCR and its partners on migrant arrivals in Yemen since 2006 points to an overall upward trajectory, with a record number of 117,095 arrivals recorded in 2016 (see Figure 2, below). What’s more, it is likely that the figures for 2016 under-report the scale of movement, as there has been a reduction in monitoring missions in the wake of conflict in Yemen. It is estimated that between January 2006 and December 2016, over 800,000 people have made the crossing to Yemen. Included in the flows towards Yemen are migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as smaller numbers of Yemeni returnees, Eritreans, Djiboutians and Sudanese.
Figure 2: New arrivals in Yemen from 2006 to 2016 (Data Source: UNHCR and partners)

Some migrants, in particular Somalis, Yemenis and small numbers of Ethiopians, intend to remain in Yemen. They plan to seek employment opportunities there (for example, qat farming, domestic or low-skilled work), obtain refugee status, or return to lives they had fled when the conflict in Yemen escalated. Somalis enjoy prima facie refugee status in Yemen and, prior to the 2015 escalation of conflict in Yemen, 244,204 recognised Somali refugees were residing in camps or urban areas (IOM, 2015). While some migrants choose to stay in Yemen, others find themselves trapped there, either by conflict or a lack of funds, and unable to continue with their journey.

Indeed, for the majority of migrants, the intention is not to stay in Yemen, but to continue on to the GCC states, in particular Saudi Arabia. This is the most popular destination amongst Ethiopians, who have an established tradition of taking up low-skilled work (typically as domestic and manual labourers). The Government of Ethiopia believes there are currently around 400,000 undocumented workers in Saudi Arabia (APA, 2017). Following the Gulf Wars, there was a strategic shift to non-Arab migrant labour workforces in the GCC, resulting in increased employment from Asian and African countries, in particular the Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Ethiopia (Fernandez, 2014). Nearly all Ethiopian migrants interviewed as part of this research expressed a desire to reach Saudi Arabia. Likewise, interviews conducted with Ethiopian migrants by RMMS found that 87% intended to move on to Saudi Arabia and find work, 8% were planning to seek asylum in Yemen, and 5% hoped to work in Yemen (RMMS, 2016).

In spite of the year on year increase in recorded arrivals in Yemen, there was a consistent perception amongst many Puntland, Djibouti and Yemeni key informants (including governmental, non-governmental, communities and smugglers) that the numbers of Ethiopian migrants passing along the Arabian Sea and Red Sea routes has reduced in the past 12 months (leading up to May 2017).8 The Puntland Maritime Police Forces (PMPF) also reported a reduction in the number of boats departing for Yemen. In the case of the Arabian

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8 This observation was noted by Bossaso offices of UNHCR, DRC, Puntland Maritime Police Forces (PMPF), as well as a large number of community respondents, such as landlords, restaurant owners, and private sector.
Sea, this perception is supported by the data, which shows that, while 2016 may have been a record year, there has been a noticeable decline in the monthly arrivals since June 2016 (see Figure 3 below). When asked to account for the fall in migrants, respondents typically pointed to greater restrictions placed on movement by the Ethiopian authorities, an increase in the costs of the journey, and tighter border controls by Saudi Arabia (these factors shall be explored in more detail in Section 2.4.3 below). However, it is also possible that constrained access, brought about by conflict and insecurity in Yemen, is affecting the accuracy of data on migrant numbers collected by monitoring teams operating in the area. The majority of respondents in Djibouti (mainly community interviewees) also reported seeing a decrease in the number of Ethiopian migrants during the past year or so, often attributing this fall to an increase in border controls, checkpoints and migrant and smuggler arrests by the authorities. Nevertheless, this downward trend is not apparent from the data on Red Sea arrivals from Djibouti, where the number of Somalis has remained more or less stable, and the number of Ethiopians has seen an increase since a drop in November 2016 (see Figure 4). The popularity of these two routes has ebbed and flowed over time and, while the Arabian Sea remains significantly more popular (attracting around 74% of migrants so far in 2017), this modest shift could signal a growing popularity for the Red Sea route. It is also possible, and perhaps more likely, that constrained access, brought about by conflict and insecurity in Yemen, is affecting the accuracy of data collected on migrant numbers, suggesting that migration levels may in fact be continuing much as before and without a reduction. In either case, these flows should be monitored over the coming months to track any changes and trends.

In addition to movements towards Yemen and Saudi Arabia, a growing minority of mainly Somali migrants choose to migrate to Europe via Yemen.⁹ This route involves multiple sea crossings from Puntland to Yemen, and then Yemen to Sudan, followed by overland journeys through Sudan and Libya or Egypt, before another sea crossing to Europe. Evidence suggests that this journey is most popular with young Somali men. Women tend to migrate through a more formal system of agent-facilitated employment, and travel by air. The route to Europe is also significantly more expensive than the route to Saudi Arabia, so only migrants with sufficient resources or support are able to move in this direction. Exact numbers of Somalis moving along this route are not available, but figures are unlikely to match those taking the more conventional and cheaper route that passes through Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya or Egypt and then onto Europe.¹⁰ Indeed, data on arrivals in Yemen indicates a more or less constant flow of Somali arrivals into Yemen, which suggests that there has not been a radical uptake of this route in recent months (see Figure 3).

Nevertheless, the research team was able to interview a number of Somalis planning to undertake this journey, and Puntland respondents were extremely concerned by the increase in Somalis moving in this direction. According to one interviewee, “the kids you used to see in the neighbourhood have all gone. It is like the city [Bossaso] has no young kids anymore.” Respondents accused smugglers of actively encouraging this new route by allowing migrants to leave Puntland without having to pay any of the costs upfront. This phenomenon shall be explored in more detail below.

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⁹ This route was highlighted by a number of different respondents including those from key governmental and non-governmental institutions, as well as community representatives.

¹⁰ The overland route through Ethiopia and Sudan costs around US$ 4,000 to 6,000, which is substantially cheaper than the Yemen equivalent, which costs between US$ 8,000 to 10,000.
2.1.2. Migration from Yemen to the HoA

The large number of migrants moving in the opposite direction from Yemen to the HoA is mixed, and includes migrants, refugees,

“In the case of Somali youth, the smugglers lure them to take the trip by taking them to Libya without paying any money in advance. Later, they call their family to pay ransom to release their kids. This has happened a lot, and many families suffered in this process.” Key informant, Qardo.
asylum seekers and returnees from Yemen, Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as smaller numbers of Djiboutian and Sudanese returnees and Eritrean refugees. UNHCR estimates that 95,807 people have left Yemen for the HoA since the start of the conflict in Yemen.\footnote{UNHCR began collecting this data from 1 April 2015, and these figures were last updated on 30 April 2017 at \url{http://data.unhcr.org/yemen/regional.php}.} Most of these movements occurred during the five months immediately following the escalation of conflict (March to July 2015), after which the scale of migration slowed (see Figure 5). In addition, the Yemen Task Force for Population Movement (TFPM) believes that nearly 2 million people are internally displaced in Yemen, constituting around 11% of the total population (Task Force on Population Movement, 2017). UNHCR and humanitarian agencies are concerned that recent military escalations in Taizz and Al Hodeidah governorates could displace an additional 100,000 to 500,000 people, and at the time of research were pre-positioning humanitarian supplies and multi-sector service hubs along major displacement routes (UNHCR, 2017).\footnote{Hadi government forces launched ‘Operation Golden Spear’ in January 2017 in an effort to drive back al Houthi-Saleh forces in Taiz and Lahij governorates.}

While most of the displaced are likely to remain in Yemen, many choose to move towards the HoA. So far, the majority have moved to Djibouti (39%) and Somalia (39%), with a smaller proportion registered as migrating to Ethiopia (15%) and Sudan (7%).\footnote{37,428 people are registered as arriving from Yemen to Djibouti; 36,763 to Somalia; 14,570 to Ethiopia; and 7,046 to Sudan (as of 30 April 2017).} Within Somalia, UNHCR estimates that most migrants arrive in Puntland (68%), followed by Somaliland (31%) and South Central (1%). Some Somali returnees may remain in Somaliland and Puntland either in IDP camps or integrated within the community, but the majority intend to travel further south, possibly to their place of origin, or to Mogadishu where they may be able to access employment and more support. According to data released by the Somalia Inter-Agency Task Force on Yemen, just over 50% of Somali refugees and returnees intend to travel to Mogadishu, followed by Hargeisa, Kismayo, Bossaso, Baidoa, Marka and Afgoye (UNHCR, 2016). It is also worth noting that nearly as many people (90,880) are estimated by UNHCR to have fled to the GCC, namely Oman (51,000) and Saudi Arabia (39,880).
Relatively few Yemenis are so far making the journey to Europe. After conflict in Yemen escalated in March 2015, there was a small peak in the number of Yemenis recorded as arriving on the borders of Europe (see Figure 6), and several Yemeni respondents indicated a desire to travel to Europe if conditions allowed. According to data collected by IOM and National Authorities, 155 Yemenis were registered as arriving in Italy and Greece during the first half of 2016 (IOM, 2017). This compares to 3,181 Ethiopians, 6,445 Somalis and 15,444 Eritreans (IOM, 2017). Wealthier Yemenis in Djibouti generally move to Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and India; however, the majority of Yemenis remain in Yemen or move nearby to Djibouti or Somalia, due to a lack of resources and diasporic connections, and strong regional ties (RMMS, 2016).

Figure 5: Number of migrant arrivals from Yemen to Djibouti and Somaliland, Puntland and South Central (Data Source: UNHCR)

Figure 6: Arrivals of Yemeni migrants to Europe (Source: Frontex)
2.2. Who is migrating?

2.2.1. Nationality

Ethiopians and Somalis represent nearly all of the migrants moving towards Yemen, with the former constituting the significant majority. Of the 117,095 people who made the journey in 2016, 83% were Ethiopians, and 17% were Somalis (UNHCR and partners). Broken down by route, Ethiopians made up 98% of all migrants moving along the Red Sea route through Djibouti, and 80% of migrants along the Arabian Sea route through Puntland. Migrants of other nationalities appear in very small numbers among the official data. The research team was able to interview a number of Eritrean migrants in Yemen, particularly around Sana’a. It is possible that Eritreans are posing as Ethiopian migrants when transiting through Djibouti, believing that they will face less resistance from the authorities and transit communities. This belief was shared by a number of local researchers interviewed as part of this project, although research did not uncover evidence in support of this. This approach is not unusual and, due to shared language and cultural affinities, Ethiopians have been known to pose as Eritreans when migrating to Europe, as Eritreans stand a better chance of being granted asylum (TesfaNews, 2015). If this is true, it would suggest that the actual numbers of Eritreans migrating through Yemen, and possibly on to Europe, are greater than official data would suggest. What’s more, the data tracks migrant arrivals into Yemen, and does not therefore include those migrants from the HoA who fly directly to GCC countries or Europe (which includes a much higher proportion of women, as discussed above).

According to biodata of Ethiopian returnees assisted by IOM, most migrants originated from Oromia (37%), Amhara (33%), Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region (SNNPR) (18%) and Tigray (10%). The majority are from the Oromo ethnic group. Oromos are Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, and it is not surprising that they are well represented amongst migrants. Nevertheless, the proportion of Oromos registered in Yemen has risen significantly from 64% in 2014 to 95% in 2016 (RMMS, 2016). The rise in Oromo migrants has been widely attributed to political unrest in Ethiopia, an assumption that shall be explored in more detail in Section 2.4.3. Many respondents also reported seeing an increase in the number of Tigrayans and Amharas moving along these routes. Of the migrants continuing to Europe via Yemen, most are Somalis. However, unconfirmed reports suggest that a small number of Ethiopians may also use this route. Approximately 80% of Somali nationals travelling to Yemen come from the Banadir, Shabelle Hoose, Shabelle Dhehe, Bay and Bari regions. About 36% of Somali nationals came from the Hawiye clan with 30% from the Digil-Mirifle clan (RMMS, 2017).

Moving in the opposite direction from Yemen to the HoA, Somalis and Yemenis make up the majority, constituting 35% and 30% of the totals respectively (see Table 2, below). Many of these Somalis had been living in Yemen as refugees, often for years. At the end of November 2016 there were 278,342 refugees and asylum seekers in Yemen, 91% of whom were from Somalia (RMMS, 2016).
Table 2: Movements of Yemenis, Somalis, other nationalities and national returnees from Yemen to Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan (UNHCR, 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movements of/to</th>
<th>Djibouti</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
<th>Ethiopia</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yemenis</td>
<td>19,636</td>
<td>5,316</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>1,896</td>
<td>28,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalis</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>31,129</td>
<td>2,515</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>33,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>15,531</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>17,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National returnees</td>
<td>1,964</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,409</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>16,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,428</td>
<td>36,736</td>
<td>14,570</td>
<td>7,046</td>
<td>95,807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Preferred destinations for Yemeni and Somali migrants within the HoA (UNHCR, 2016)

2.2.2. Age and Gender

In terms of age and gender, young men make up the majority of migrants moving towards Yemen by sea. When describing migrants travelling along this route, respondents from key institutions and communities commonly reported single young males. Likewise, the majority of migrants interviewed by this project fit this profile. Data on the number of women migrating to Yemen by sea is limited, but anecdotal evidence suggests that between 20 to 30% of Ethiopian migrants are female.\(^1\) During interviews and FGDs in Bossaso, respondents reported an increase in the number of Ethiopian female migrants in the past six months. This is substantiated by research from Ethiopia, which shows that there has been a marked increase in the number of women working away from home (WIDE, 2016). This

\(^1\) This estimate was given during interviews with representatives from UNHCR, DRC, RMMS, IOM and local authorities.
could be attributed to changing cultural norms, as well as to the 2013 ban by the Ethiopian government on mainly domestic workers from travelling abroad, which compelled more women to engage instead in irregular migration to the GCC. This suggests that while male migrants continue to outnumber their female counterparts, the proportion of women migrating is likely to be growing. Moreover, it is likely that women are migrating in larger numbers than is often assumed, as they are often less visible than their male counterparts. Saudi and Ethiopian crackdowns and travel bans on foreign domestic workers over the past few years may have pushed many women into alternative routes, and made their movements less visible. Sources in Djibouti suggest that women make up a large percentage of those crossing the border, but they are not seen at the points where people seek assistance, and are instead moved in vehicles between smugglers’ houses and during the journey carry out domestic work in private homes, which again limits their visibility in public spaces. IOM Director for East and HoA, Jeffrey Labovitz, reported that women are largely invisible because smugglers take them to Saudi Arabia by car to work as domestic servants (Schlein, 2016). On the whole, it would seem that female migrants’ journeys tend to be better organised and financed, with better information about how much the full journey will cost them, which may allow them to travel more surreptitiously (RMMS, 2015). It is worth noting that this does not mean that women themselves are necessarily in control of their journeys. In many cases, they travel with an escort, and have little personal knowledge of the risks, logistics or costs of the journey they are undertaking. One female Ethiopian interviewed in Djibouti stated, “I have no idea what routes I am taking, and I take no decisions. I am just following the group of people I am travelling with, which include two of my cousins.”

As gender-disaggregated data is limited, migrant registrations recorded at the Migrant Response Centres (MRCs) in Obock and Bossaso can be a useful resource in monitoring gender patterns. Although, as most migrants do not report to MRCs (for fear of being identified and deported by the authorities, or because they are unaware of their existence) it is possible that these figures may not be a true representation of the distribution of migrants. According to IOM figures from 2016, 88% of migrants evacuated from Yemen, and 97% of migrants stranded in Obock were male. Unaccompanied migrant children (UMC), for the most part male, also made up a significant proportion of those evacuated from Yemen (18%) and those stranded in Obock (26%). At the Bossaso MRC, data is broken down into ‘Ethiopian migrants’ and ‘Yemeni refugees/ Somali returnees’ (see Table 3 below). Amongst the category of ‘Ethiopian migrants’ travelling to Yemen, 85% were male, and there were no children under 18 years registered at the MRC.

Table 3: Proportion of migrants registered at the Bossaso MRC (January 2015 to July 2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2016</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopian Migrants</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemeni Refugees/ Somali returnees</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 These figures were shared with the research team by the Director of the MRC in Bossaso.
Travelling in the opposite direction, the data on ‘Yemeni refugees/Somali returnees’ highlights a very different gender profiling (see Table 3). The male-female balance is more equal, and children represent a much larger proportion of the numbers; over a third in 2015 and a quarter in 2016. Inter-agency data collected by the Somalia Task Force on Yemen estimates the gender breakdown of arrivals from Yemen as 52% male, 48% female (UNHCR, 2016). In terms of age, 46% are under 18 years, 51% under 60 years, and 3% over the age of 60. When taken together, women and children make up 71% of arrivals. This is corroborated by 2016 figures on arrivals from Yemen to Somaliland and Puntland collected by the Ministry of Interior; of the 3,378 recorded arrivals, 39% were children, 35% men and 26% women. It is not unusual for women and children to make up a significant proportion of displaced migrants who, for the most part, are fleeing conflict in Yemen. Nevertheless, the figures serve as a reminder that not all people moving along these routes are young male economic migrants, as is often described in much of the literature, and that programme and policy should be developed with adequate consideration of these groups.

 Whilst some data is available on child refugees and returnees arriving in the HoA from Yemen, information on the numbers of children and youth migrating towards Yemen is less clear. The 2015 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report estimates that 20% of the 91,000 migrants who arrived in Yemen in 2014 were unaccompanied children (US Department of State, 2015), a statistic shared by IOM. This figure does not include accompanied children but, based on updated arrival figures, would suggest that 23,419 unaccompanied children entered Yemen in 2016, and 4,339 in the first five months of 2017. Based on these figures, the route via Yemen is seeing more unaccompanied children than any other route out of the HoA (RMMS, 2016). While this project was not able to interview any child migrants, these figures are backed up by interviews with key informants working with UMCs, particularly those interviewed in Djibouti. IOM staff in Djibouti suggested that as many as 30% of migrants are UMCs. A large number of child migrants, particularly Ethiopians, intend to stay in the Djiboutian capital. Of the 154 children receiving support from Caritas, nearly all reportedly wanted to stay in the city, and were not planning to move elsewhere. In terms of children’s nationalities, local organisations working with street children in Djibouti reported to the researchers that 60% are Ethiopian, 20% are Somalis, and the remaining 20% are Djiboutian nationals, while IOM staff estimated that 95% of UMCs were Ethiopians. Local NGOs interviewed in Yemen also expressed concern about the increasingly young age of children moving along these routes, with many aged between 12 and 17 years.

2.2.3. Socioeconomic background

Ethiopian migrants travelling to Yemen are typically described by interviewees as having limited education and low economic status, especially those of Oromo origin who tend to come from poor families. Most are primary or secondary school drop outs, although a few have university degrees. Of those interviewed 44% had primary education, 14% had secondary, 1% had tertiary education, and 39% had no education at all. Nearly all the Ethiopian migrants interviewed complained of the high costs of living in Djibouti and Bossaso, and 56% of Ethiopian respondents in Puntland had had to borrow money in order to pay for medications, food and rent. In other cases, migrants went without medical

16 Between January and May 2017.
attention, food and other provisions, slept in open areas and often resorted to begging due to a lack of money. These examples suggest that most Ethiopian migrants come from relatively poor backgrounds with little disposable income.

Evidence suggests that Somali migrants travelling through Yemen may be more diverse in terms of their socioeconomic and educational background. The research found that while some Somali migrants come from poor families, others are relatively better off. This is supported by the growing popularity amongst young Somalis to migrate to Europe through Yemen; a journey that can cost up to US$ 10,000; considerably more than the alternative cost (on average US$ 800 to US$ 900) of travelling to the GCC. The assumption that Somalis may be better off than their Ethiopian counterparts is also supported by differences in their means of travel through Djibouti. Most Ethiopians make much of the journey on foot, whereas Somalis are more likely to travel by vehicle, perhaps due to greater financial assets, or better access to smuggling networks. The educational status of Somalis also tends to be more mixed than Ethiopians. According to one of the international NGOs in Bossaso, Somali migrants travelling to Yemen and beyond may have no education, or they may be educated up to secondary and tertiary level.

Migrating in the opposite direction, from Yemen to the HoA, Yemeni refugees and Somali returnees typically come from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds. This is because their reason for moving is principally due to conflict (rather than economic circumstances), which indiscriminately affects a wide section of the population. While migration between the HoA and Yemen is generally seen as cheaper than alternative routes going to Europe or heading south, it is worth noting that movement still comes at a cost, and only those with a certain amount of financial or social capital will be able to move across borders, if at all. Yemeni refugees interviewed in Djibouti generally had assets to sell, and describe selling off their property, gold and other goods in order to pay for the journey to Djibouti. In contrast, poorer segments of Yemeni society may not have valuable assets to sell, and are therefore more likely to move internally within the country to neighbouring governorates, or not be able to move at all.

2.3. What routes are migrants taking and why?

This section examines migrants’ routes to and from the HoA and Yemen. As has been described above, the Red Sea and Arabian Sea crossings are the two main connecting routes between the HoA and Yemen, and their popularity has oscillated over time. This section will begin by providing a detailed mapping of the routes that migrants take. While migrants’ journeys typically follow these traditional crossing points, their specific paths and intended destinations vary depending on their choices and circumstances. As well as identifying and mapping the specific routes, the section also seeks to understand why and how and by whom decisions are taken about which route to use. In order to better understand why some routes are more popular than others, it also considers how factors, such as state policy, associated risks and dangers, access, costs and journey time, influence the popularity of different routes amongst migrants and those who facilitate their journeys.
2.3.1. Mapping the routes

*Image 2: Regional map of migratory routes*

*Image 3: Djibouti map of migratory routes*
2.3.2. Who decides on the route?

In seeking answers to this question, there are a number of decisions to consider: the decision to migrate in the first place, as well as decisions about which route to use, how long the journey will take, and the final destination. Those involved in these decisions include the migrants themselves, family members, friends and fellow migrants, and smugglers and traffickers. An understanding of who is making the decisions around these questions is key to effectively formulating and targeting policies and programmes that seek to manage irregular migration. For example, awareness campaigns that target migrants may have a limited impact in cases where decisions around migration are taken by family members or smugglers. Likewise, policies that focus on migrants through arrest and detention do little to deter the activities of smugglers and traffickers who, in many cases, are central to decision making about how and where to migrate.

The ability to decide often depends on who is holding the information about the different routes. In some cases, migrant respondents report having information about the journey beforehand through friends, family and other contacts. In other cases, they pick up information as they go along from other migrants embarking on the same journey, or from smugglers. Other research along these routes found that most migrants (49%) obtained
information from family and friends, 18% of migrants were informed by smugglers; 17% gathered information from returnee migrants and 16% relied on migrants in the destination country (Altai Consulting, 2016). However, in many cases, migrants reported having no information about the route at all, particularly once they crossed into Yemen. In these cases, migrants had little decision making power about the routes, and admitted having to rely completely on other migrants or smugglers.

It is also worth noting that ‘who decides’ may shift and change over time. When deciding which routes to take, the power to decide may alternate between the different actors along the journey. At the start of their journey, migrants interviewed by this project tended to make their own decisions about the route to take, as they are often travelling regularly through their own country as nationals and do not need to employ the services of smugglers. For example, most Somali migrants travelled independently through Somalia, following the main road north to Bossaso, and only employed the services of smugglers once they needed to cross the sea and transit through Yemen. Under this scenario, migrant interviewees travelled using their own means and arrangements, and were more likely to make their own decisions. The same can be said for Ethiopian migrants travelling to the Ethiopian border, although in the context of the State of Emergency in Ethiopia, movements of all nationalities, including Ethiopians, have been constrained.

Once migrants cross the border out of their country of origin, their ability to decide on their route may weaken in favour of the smugglers. When Ethiopians cross into Somalia, it becomes more likely that they will engage, or be coerced into engaging, the services of smugglers. In Somaliland (for migrants on their way to Puntland’s Bossaso port, as well as to smaller ports), this process tends to occur in migration ‘hotspots’ such as Tog Wajaale or Guumays, where agents linked to the networks are most active. When making maritime crossings, migrants nearly always rely on smugglers to arrange the journey as they require boats, crew and knowledge of the crossing. Once they engage the services of smuggling networks, migrants describe having little choice or information about their route. Their freedom of movement is limited, and they are transferred from one staging post to another with little idea of where they are, which route they will take, or how long the journey will last. According to one respondent, once under the control of smugglers, migrants have little or no choice about the route, the means of travel, or the points of departure – “they have very little say in the whole matter”. Indeed, when asked why migrants chose a particular route, respondents in Puntland consistently reported that it is the smugglers, not the migrants who choose the final route.

Finally, migrants’ ability to actively decide may be stripped away in contexts of conflict and instability, where they may feel that they have little choice but to move elsewhere in search of safety. Yemeni refugees and Somali returnees fleeing violence and conflict in Yemen faced a more limited range of options than economic migrants looking to improve their living standards. Likewise, Ethiopian Oromo respondents fleeing state persecution often felt that the only choice available to them was to move to avoid detention and abuse.
Overall, therefore, there is no definitive answer to the question of who decides. Decision making about migration generally involves a range of people whose influence ebbs and flows over time, depending on the information they have, the stage of their journey, the involvement of smugglers and traffickers, and their reasons for migrating in the first place.

2.3.3. What factors influence decisions about migration routes?

A range of factors influence decisions about migration routes. This section examines a number of potential determinants, including cost, access, danger and risk, and journey time; however, there are likely to be many additional factors behind decisions about which route to take. Cultures of migration, and family and social networks also play a role, and are explored in more detail in Section 2.4.2. Given that migrants’ choice of route is limited to the Red Sea or Arabian Sea crossings, the relevance of these factors is tested, where possible, against decision making and the trends in popularity along these two different routes.

The relative weight of these factors depends on the decision maker and his or her individual context and circumstances. While migrant respondents often voiced similar rationales behind their decision making, the prevailing factors often varied depending on issues such as age, gender and socioeconomic background. Time is another determinant, and the importance or influence of these factors has shifted over the years, as contexts and situations change, and as journeys progress. This is most clearly underlined by the oscillating popularity of the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea routes in response to evolving events and trends (see Figure 1). In this context, final decisions may be made through a complex calculation of these different factors, or they may be made on impulse or in response to an unexpected event before or during the journey. According to one Ethiopian migrant interviewed in Sana’a, “my decision came overnight, when I heard that migrants who go to Saudi Arabia live in comfortable conditions.” In general, however, decisions are rarely made based on one issue alone, but a number of contributing factors of relevance for that individual.

While a range of factors undoubtedly contribute to decision making, broadly speaking, factors such as the cost of the journey and access were most commonly cited as key determinants across a range of respondents, suggesting that they play a central role in influencing decisions about migration routes. Danger and risk were certainly taken into account, but migrants’ resilience and determination to reach their intended destination ‘at any cost’ meant that, while they might make some adjustment to their journey, these factors were generally not enough to deter them from continuing along their chosen route. Finally, journey time was least likely to influence decisions about routes, so long as extended journey times did not have a cost implication. While all migrants expressed a desire to reach their intended destination as quickly as possible, many migrants did not have sufficient funds for the entirety of their journey and had to work or wait for funds to be transferred so that they could continue on their way.
Cost of the journey

Cost is major key factor behind the popularity of different routes amongst migrants, their families and smuggling and trafficking networks. This is not surprising given the relative poverty of most migrants in the region, the economic and financial drivers behind many decisions to migrate, and the potential profits to be made by the networks that operate there. Migration through Yemen (also known as the Eastern route) is cheaper than alternative migration routes, such as the Western or Southern route, however the costs are still significant for the majority of migrants who come from impoverished families and communities.

Based on interviews with migrants and smugglers, the average costs of the five main routes have been outlined below in Table 4. The five main routes are: (i) Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia via Bossaso; (ii) Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia via Obock; (iii) Puntland to Europe; (iv) Yemen to Puntland; and (v) Yemen to Djibouti. The average costs of smaller sections of the journey can be calculated from the individual journey sections, also highlighted in the table below.

Table 4: Average journey costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Range (US$)</th>
<th>Average (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Journey 1: Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia (via Bossaso)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia-Somali border to Bossaso</td>
<td>200 – 300</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bossaso to Yemen</td>
<td>120 – 150</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen to Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>500 – 550</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>820 – 1,000</td>
<td>892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journey 2: Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia (via Djibouti)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia-Djibouti border to Obock</td>
<td>70 – 400</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obock to Yemen</td>
<td>60 – 200</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen to Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>500 – 550</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>630 – 1,150</td>
<td>855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journey 3: Puntland to Europe</td>
<td>7,500 – 10,000</td>
<td>8,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journey 4: Yemen to Puntland</td>
<td>0* – 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journey 5: Yemen to Djibouti</td>
<td>60 – 90</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Most of the refugees and returnees interviewed who crossed from Yemen to Puntland had been offered free passage by humanitarian and other organisations.

As outlined in Table 4, journey costs vary significantly, even along the same routes, which makes it difficult to establish a definitive price. Costs vary depending on the distance and directness of the route, the relative level of safety, means of travel (on foot or by vehicle), and whether a smuggler is involved or not. Smugglers and their brokers tend to offer a range of different ‘packages.’ Wealthier migrants can purchase a complete and more expensive package to their destination, and can generally expect to receive a better and safer service than poorer migrants who must rely on a combination of self-reliance and ad hoc services bought en route (UNODC, 2013). Many of the migrants interviewed in Puntland

17 Although one smuggler admitted to requiring up to US$ 250 from Somali migrants, who he perceived as being wealthier, and therefore able to pay higher fees.
stated that they chose to take the Arabian Sea route specifically because they had heard that it was cheaper than the Red Sea route, which might help to explain why the Djibouti rate is less popular than journeys via Puntland. One migrant had previously made the journey via Djibouti, but opted for Puntland on the second attempt because of the difference in price. This example is significant as repeat migrants are generally tempted to return to the routes they know on subsequent journeys. While journeys through Djibouti can cost as little as US$ 630 (compared to US$ 820 through Puntland), the average costs of the two routes are not in fact that different (US$ 855 in comparison to US$ 892). This suggests that the perception of costs may be as relevant as actual costs in understanding why migrants decide on particular routes. For example, many migrants did not have detailed information on specific costs before or during their journey, and often relied on hearsay or rumour when deciding on which route to take.

In many instances, migrants’ control over costs may be limited. In general, they were able to negotiate the fees of the journey, or a particular section of the journey, upfront with agents or brokers affiliated with smugglers, or with the smugglers themselves. However, many also reported being forced to pay unanticipated and unplanned for payments, generally to members of the smuggling networks or corrupt officials. Furthermore, prices varied, and migrants reported receiving a range of rates from different brokers. For example different routes varied in price, and even costs for the same route may be higher or lower, depending on the means of travel, whether on foot or the type of vehicle, and whether food, drink and accommodation costs are included. In some cases, prices depended on nationality, and how much disposable income they were perceived to have. For example, one smuggler in Bossaso stated that whilst Ethiopians pay around US$ 100 for the sea crossing to Yemen, Somalis are expected to pay more, as they can afford the higher price. Travelling in the opposite direction, Yemeni refugees fleeing conflict reported being able to cross the Arabian Sea for free thanks to support from humanitarian organisations and local groups that chartered boats on their behalf to help them escape conflict. In other cases, the cost of the maritime crossing varied depending on how many people were on the boat. Age may also play a role, as migrant mothers reported paying half the usual cost for their children to move across the Gulf of Aden by boat, although it is not clear whether cheaper costs extend to unaccompanied migrant children.

The timing of payments and implications for cash flow is also important. When using smugglers for shorter journeys, migrants tend to pay the costs upfront, or in smaller portions. In some instances, migrants were able to leave the money with a trusted contact at the place of departure, who would then transfer the funds to the smugglers upon their safe arrival at the destination, thereby reducing the risk of being defrauded by smugglers.

“Once in Tadjourah, the smuggler ordered us to pay more than the agreed price, and said he would denounce us to the Government if we refused to pay.” Ethiopian migrant, Obock

18 For example, migrants travelling from the Ethiopian-Somali border to the coast of Yemen, tended to pay the cost of transport from Tog Wajaale to Bossaso, and then Bossaso to Yemen as two separate, upfront payments.

19 This arrangement may be more acceptable if the person holding the money is from the same clan or ethnic group as the smugglers. It also requires having a trusted contact at the point of departure, and was therefore commonly cited by Somali migrants crossing from Bossaso to Yemen, who had relatives or friends in Bossaso with whom they could deposit the money in the interim.
When journeys are longer, or more expensive, smugglers allow and actively encourage migrants to pay later or in instalments. A number of Somali respondents, who were planning to travel to Europe, reported being allowed to move from Somalia to Libya without payments being made first. Once in Libya, the first of a series of payments is demanded by the smugglers from the migrants’ families. This ‘leave now, pay later’ agreement has been developed by smugglers to make migration more attractive and accessible to young migrants who could not otherwise afford the costs of journeying to Europe (Ali, 2016). In one case, smugglers reportedly allowed a group of female Ethiopian migrants travelling through Djibouti to travel first, and then repay the fees once they had found work in Saudi Arabia. However, this does not seem to be common practice in Djibouti, where respondents typically paid upfront instalments for the different sections of the journey. Greater flexibility over payments may also be linked to smugglers’ preference not to carry large sums of money on their persons, as this puts them at greater risk of being identified by the authorities, and having their income confiscated. In recent years and with the sophistication of mobile transfers, smugglers increasingly request money transfers made by family members or the migrants themselves instead of cash payments (RMMS, 2017).

**Access**

Access is another important factor behind migration decisions and the relative popularity of different routes. Access is determined by a number of different factors, including geographic proximity, established networks and information about the route, the nature of the terrain, levels of assistance they may hope to receive, migration management efforts and, linked to this, the chance of interception by the authorities, and the risk of subsequent detention and deportation. In this context, access is closely correlated with migrants’ likelihood of success in reaching their intended destination. It is therefore a key decision-making factor for nearly all migrants who do not wish lose their investment in their journey if they are unable to reach their intended destination.

The issue of access has been a key driver behind the relative popularity of the Arabian Sea route over the Red Sea option in recent years. Respondents frequently cited the lack of effective law enforcement and ease of passage through Somaliland and Puntland as a reason behind the route’s popularity with migrants and smugglers alike. Generally speaking, the border between Ethiopia and Somalia is not closely monitored, particularly on the Somalia side, which enables Ethiopian migrants to cross relatively easily from Ethiopia into Somalia. Since the State of Emergency was declared in Ethiopia in October 2016, some migrant interviewees reported that Ethiopian migrants, allegedly Oromos in particular, have been stopped from crossing the border by both Ethiopian and Somali (both Somaliland and Puntland) security forces and returned to Ethiopia. Respondents also suggested that local authorities in Somaliland and Puntland were more open to bribes, and that detention and deportations were therefore less common than in Djibouti, where the authorities and police are perceived to be much more vigilant and less corruptible.

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20 Typically, migrants are requested to pay for the sea crossing from Bossaso to Yemen only (between US$ 120 – 150) and do not need to pay the more expensive onward costs until they arrive in Libya.
For Yemeni refugees and migrants, access determined by distance is an important factor behind their decision-making. For example, due its geographical proximity, Djibouti is particularly popular with Yemeni refugees from Aden, Taiz and Bab el Mandeb (RMMS, 2016). Close historical, cultural, social and linguistic ties between Djibouti and Yemen are also contributing factors. Linked to this is the nature of the terrain, and Ethiopian migrants described being deterred from choosing the Djibouti route due to the long distances over rough roads that they would need to walk in order to avoid checkpoints.

The presence of smugglers along particular routes may also increase their popularity among migrants, who believe that this will facilitate access and improve their chances of reaching their intended destination. Many migrants had little practical information about their route, and were completely reliant on smugglers, or other migrants, to guide them. Likewise, smugglers can offer protection from corrupt officials and armed groups by paying bribes on migrants’ behalf and making use of their networks. On the other hand, migrant respondents tended to be fearful of smugglers and traffickers located on the Red Sea coast of Yemen, who were perceived to be more dangerous and likely to be involved in kidnapping, torture and extortion. In these scenarios, the presence of smugglers is not always a draw, and the increase in abuse and extortion along these routes has led migrants to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ smugglers. The common perception that smugglers in Djibouti and Yemen are less trustworthy than those operating in Somalia has been a factor in leading many migrants to choose the Arabian Sea route over the Red Sea option.

**Danger and risk**

Migrants are subjected to a number of dangers and risks along the journey, including exposure to the elements, physical violence, sexual assault, abduction and torture, mental abuse and discrimination, economic deprivation, detention by the authorities, extortion, trafficking and enslavement, dehydration, starvation and loss of life (RMMS, 2014). When migrants are able to choose their own route, their awareness or perception of the risks and dangers along certain channels can be a critical factor behind their decision making, and is a key reason for why the Arabian Sea route has proven more popular in recent years. Migrants interviewed in Puntland were very aware of the greater risk of danger and abuse at the hands of unscrupulous smugglers, traffickers and other criminal gangs along the Red Sea route, particularly upon arrival in Yemen. This is confirmed by data from UNHCR monitoring missions, which shows that abuse and kidnapping are much more common along the Red Sea route (RMMS, 2016). Additionally, migrants’ awareness of the concentration of fighting in the western governorates of Yemen, and numerous airstrikes in Taiz and Al Hodeidah in particular may also be a factor behind decisions to migrate via the Arabian Sea route instead of via Djibouti.

“I did not know about Yemen before, but I had heard a few people talk about it. I expected it to be a wonderful country, but when I arrived I was astonished.” Ethiopian Oromo migrant, Aden.

“I did not know about the travel dangers. I thought it was safe. I did not hear from anyone that there were risks.” Ethiopian migrant, Sana’a.
However, it is not clear the extent to which migrants are aware of the dangers and risks involved. Level of knowledge often depends on the phase of the journey, and is likely to increase as the journey progresses. Pre-departure, migrants’ knowledge and awareness may be limited to information they can gather from family and friends. However, once they begin the journey, this is usually supplemented with information from other migrants, smugglers and communities, as well as first-hand experience of the dangers and risks. Socioeconomic and educational background can also determine levels of awareness and knowledge. Migrants travelling to/through Yemen tend to be less knowledgeable than those travelling to Europe, possibly in part because of their lower incomes and educational attainment. Some women, particularly those travelling with an escort, also demonstrated less awareness about the risks, routes and costs of their journey. In any case, testimony from migrants indicates that smugglers have repeatedly lied about the safety of areas, encouraging people to keep travelling in large numbers in spite of the dangers. What’s more, migrants themselves may contribute to untruths, as those who reach their destination frequently fail to give the full picture of what they endured, preferring to give friends and relatives back home a more positive version of their experience (UNHCR, 2017).

For many migrants, however, the dangers and risks are well known, but do not outweigh the potential benefits of migration, and therefore may have less of an impact on decision-making than is commonly assumed. A significant number of migrants have made the journey once or multiple times before, and are therefore likely to be aware of the risks and dangers involved from previous experience. Most migrants interviewed by this research admitted to knowing of the risks, but migrating anyway, and even taking precautionary steps to minimise the consequences. This includes arranging for family members to keep aside money to pay ransoms to smugglers, and women taking contraceptives before embarking on their journey to prevent pregnancy if raped. Accounts of migrants knowing of the dangers and risks, but migrating anyway, are backed up a number of different studies. According to IOM and RMMS, 80% of Ethiopian migrants are aware of a range of abuses and risks, and longitudinal research conducted by WIDE since 1994 indicates migrants have been aware of the dangers and risks for some time, but choose to migrate irregularly nonetheless (RMMS, 2014) (WIDE, 2016).

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21 RMMS estimate that 25% of migrants are repeat migrants (RMMS, 2014), and one migrant interviewed in Bossaso had made the journey to Saudi Arabia six times in the past seven years.

22 These include extortion and robbery, exhaustion, dehydration, starvation and deprivation of sleep, mild to moderate or extreme physical violence, criminal kidnapping for ransom and degrading treatment and verbal and sexual abuse.

23 Ethiopia WIDE is an ongoing longitudinal study of twenty rural communities which began in 1994. Subsequent rounds of fieldwork were carried out in 2003 and in three stages between early 2010 and late 2013. There are plans to revisit the communities in the future.
Taking this concept further, young Somalis hoping to reach Europe from Puntland not only expressed awareness of the risk of kidnap, abuse and torture at the hands of smugglers once they reached Libya, but they also knew that the threat of this could help to leverage payment from family members. Many of the Somalis interviewed were not planning to tell their families of their intention to leave and, lacking the funds to pay the smugglers themselves, felt sure that their relatives would feel compelled to pay the costs of the journey on their behalf, for fear that they might be subjected to torture and abuse if they did not.

In sum, it would seem that knowledge of risks and dangers may cause migrants to adjust or reconsider which route they take; however, it is not enough to deter them from migrating in the first place. Furthermore, migrants are less likely to change their minds about migrating the further they progress along their journey, as the investments (in terms of cost and time spent) and sacrifices (in terms of the risks and hardships they have already endured) increase. While not all migrants who are returned choose to migrate a second or third time, the fact that some do shows that, for many, the benefits of migration outweigh the dangers and risks.

**Journey Time**

It is not clear whether journey time influences migration decisions in a meaningful way. During interviews, migrants expressed more concern around cost, access, and danger and risk, than journey time, so long as extended journey times do not have a cost implication. For example, when asked why he had decided to migrate via the Arabian Sea, one migrant described the alternative Red Sea route via Djibouti as shorter but more expensive. Another described it as shorter but more dangerous, indicating that, in these cases, journey time carried less weight than cost, and danger and risk. The Arabian Sea crossing is longer and more exposed than the Red Sea, but remains significantly more popular, with over 84% of migrants taking this route in 2016.\(^{24}\) Furthermore, many migrants are unaware of journey times, suggesting that this is not a key factor in their decision making. A 2014 survey of Ethiopian migrants found that 80% of respondents had little or no information about their journey time (RMMS, 2014).

In any case, many migrants do not have sufficient funds for the entirety of their journey, and settle temporarily in transit to work and earn for the next section of the journey. In some cases this settlement turns out to be permanent. This suggests that time implications are not a major consideration. One Ethiopian migrant described spending six months in Obock while working to save money to cross into Yemen. Another had spent over two years working and saving in Djibouti. Some migrants make multiple stops during the journey, with an Ethiopian migrant spending three months in Dire Dawa (Ethiopia), two months in Tadjourah (Djibouti) and two further months in Obock in order to work and save enough money to pay for each leg of the journey. In Yemen, some migrants are known to spend years working as domestic workers and in qat farms in order to save the funds needed to

\(^{24}\) The trip from Bossaso is longer, covering around 200 nautical miles including open sea, and may take one to three days. In contrast, the Obock route is only about 100 nautical miles in more sheltered water, and may be completed in just seven or eight hours (UNODC, 2013).
move on to Saudi Arabia. While migrants in this situation acknowledged that these situations were far from ideal, they also accepted that it was sometimes a necessary stage in the journey. In these scenarios, journey times varied greatly among those interviewed. For example, Ethiopians interviewed in Bossaso had taken between one to ten months to make their journey so far, with journeys most commonly cited as taking five months (not including the time that they could expect to spend in Yemen once they had made the crossing). Those interviewed in Obock reported taking between one and seven months, with the average journey taking around two months from Ethiopia to Obock.

2.4. What is driving migration in the region?

As in many contexts, the reasons or drivers for migration between the HoA and Yemen are multiple, overlapping and change over time. Some of the drivers may be aspirational in nature, in that migrants are choosing to move in order to increase their options in the search for a ‘better life’, which, ultimately may be difficult to quantify or fulfil. Other drivers may carry less agency or ambition, whereby migrants feel that they have no choice but to move in order to escape unsustainable physical or economic insecurity. An understanding of the drivers of migration can help policy makers and programmers to address the root causes of migration, and tailor interventions to migrants’ needs and aspirations. Furthermore, an appreciation of migrants’ motivations and expectations, and their relative weights and pressures, is key to answering a fundamental question of this research: namely, why do migrants continue to migrate in spite of the difficulties, risks and dangers, which, in many cases, are known to them?

Broadly speaking, there exists a common set of drivers voiced by migrants across different backgrounds, including nationality, socioeconomic background, age and gender. These typically include economic factors (lack of employment opportunities, low or unsustainable incomes), social factors (lack of access to basic services, such as health and education), political factors (persecution or repression), climatic or environmental factors (drought and floods causing loss of harvests, livestock or livelihoods) and security factors (conflict or insecurity leading to displacement). Data collected by DRC and UNHCR when registering refugees and asylum seekers in Yemen (2011-2013) highlights nearly identical trends in drivers of migration amongst Somali and Ethiopian migrants (RMMS, 2014). ‘Seeking economic activities’, ‘lack of access to basic needs and services’ and ‘insecurity’ were identified as the first, second and third most important drivers of migration for both groups.

In order to gain as much depth as possible, the drivers of migration will be analysed below through three inter-related components. First, there are the very chronic poor political, economic and security conditions that have persisted over many years. Second, there are the socio-political structures that shape the responses to these conditions. Thirdly, the research explores the possible implications of the recent further deterioration in conditions in the region, with a particular focus on conflict in Yemen, political unrest in Ethiopia, and drought and potential famine in the region. In this context, while drivers may be linked to

“Multiple factors led me to leave. First is the conflict between the government and the Oromo community. Second are economic issues and unemployment. Thirdly, poverty is a threat to my family and I want to help them. The solution is to leave for a country that offers a better life.”

Ethiopian migrant, Obock
migrants’ specific circumstances or individual situations, they may also be structural and underlying in nature, over which migrants can have little or no control.

2.4.1. The chronic poor economic, social, political and security conditions

For decades, thousands of people across the HoA have been faced with very poor living conditions, associated with socioeconomic, political and security factors, which stifles their hopes for their future lives at home. This contributes to people’s incentives to move elsewhere, and is a principal driver of migration between the HoA and Yemen.

Socioeconomic factors

Economic factors were the most common driver voiced by both Ethiopian and Somali migrants interviewed during this research. A shortage of employment or livelihood opportunities, low salaries and land scarcity (amongst Ethiopians especially) were the main contributing factors to economic uncertainty. Amongst Ethiopian respondents, 81% of which cited economic drivers for their migration, there was also the perception that the best jobs are reserved for particular groups of people or elites, and that these opportunities are not available to young people from rural backgrounds or marginalized groups such as the Oromo. Most respondents said they were not able to earn enough money, and their main aspiration for moving was to find a good job and save money for themselves and their family. In contrast to difficult conditions at home, many migrant interviewees believed that it would be relatively easy to secure a well-paid job abroad, and they were encouraged by friends and other migrants who described broadly positive experiences in countries like Saudi Arabia.

In many cases, migrants had been unable to secure any employment at all in their country of origin. This was particularly common amongst Somali respondents, many of whom had a good level of education (up to secondary school) and complained that even with a university degree they would not be able to secure good jobs in Somalia. In many other instances, migrant respondents had a job but felt that the salary was too low to meet their needs. This group of respondents typically reported working as drivers, shopkeepers, livestock traders, domestic workers or factory workers. Female Somalis complained of unequal gender structures that prevented them from securing the same educational and employment opportunities as men. Amongst the Ethiopians, a large proportion of interviewees were farmers, and some complained that their lands had been confiscated or their traditional livelihoods undermined, leaving them with little choice but to migrate in search of new livelihood opportunities.

The lack of educational opportunities in Somalia was also mentioned as an important reason for moving elsewhere. Migrants intending to travel to Europe said they hoped that moving would help them to improve their education and go to a good university. Education was also a driver amongst Ethiopians. Several young Oromo Ethiopians reported that their decision
to migrate stemmed from the government’s closure of their schools following political unrest, and they were no longer able to study. A lack of welfare support provided by government was also listed as another reason for Somalis migrating to Europe. There was a perception amongst respondents that European states would provide them with grants and assistance to access schools and universities. Many also believed that they would have access to housing and other financial support.

In many instances, respondents did not voice a well-defined reason for migrating, other than the search for a ‘better life’. This group has been described by one key informant as the ‘MTV Generation’, whose primary motive for migrating may be aspirational and linked to a desired lifestyle choice, rather than for purely economic reasons. These motives have been fuelled by socioeconomic advances in sending countries, which have improved would-be migrants’ access to social media and communications channels, and enabled them to compare their lives with those in other countries. What’s more, as the reasons for this type of migration are more abstract and difficult to define, measuring success may be hard for migrants to quantify. That said, a number of repeat migrants did describe life as much ‘better’ in Saudi Arabia, and this was a reason for their decision to return. According to an Ethiopian migrant interviewed in Obock: “in Saudi Arabia, I had a well-paid job in a cafeteria, earning US$ 200 per month, and my situation was much better.”

**Political factors**

Political factors, in particular the fear of political persecution, were a common driver amongst Ethiopians interviewed. Somali interviewees currently travelling to the HoA did not generally highlight political factors or state-sponsored persecution as a reason for migrating. However, Somalis returnees did raise these factors as a historical driver for their initial migration to Yemen over the past decade or more.

Forty-five percent of Ethiopian respondents, particularly Oromos, identified fear of persecution by the Government of Ethiopia as a key factor behind their decision to migrate. This is linked to recent unrest within the country and the subsequent announcement of the State of Emergency (which is discussed in Section 2.4.3). However, it is much more deeply entrenched and long-standing than this; it also stems from the historical

“I want to have a better life like some of my friends in Europe. I want to study at university, get a good job and have a decent life there.” Somali migrant, Bossaso.

“There is not future for me in Somalia and Yemen, and so I am looking for a better life in Europe. I am seeking work, money and safety.” Somali migrant, Al Hodeidah

“I expect that Saudi Arabia is like heaven where we can find money scattered over all the roads.” Ethiopian migrant, Sana’a.

“I believe that once I reach Saudi Arabia, I will fulfil my dreams.” Ethiopian migrant, Obock

“Nothing is better than home but, for me, given the current political oppression in Ethiopia, I feel happier here [in Bossaso].”
Ethiopian Oromo migrant, Bossaso.

“Life became hard in Ethiopia. We are afraid of being targeted by the Ethiopian government as they oppress us. Also, I want to get a good job in Arab countries, and earn good money.”
Ethiopian Oromo migrant, Bossaso.

“Persecutions against Oromos and its consequences, combined with unemployment and instability made me decide to leave again and take my chance.” Ethiopian migrant, Obock
experience of the Oromos who have suffered from decades of discrimination. Respondents presented the treatment by the government as part of a long familiar pattern of harassment. Some describe being arrested and tortured by the authorities and, upon their release, fleeing the country for fear of being detained again. One person claimed that he had been tortured by the Ethiopian authorities for three months. Many other respondents said they had family members or friends who had been arrested and detained, and were fearful of being arrested themselves. Another respondent, a university graduate who had worked for the government, fled Ethiopia after he was targeted by the government for participating in a protest; his name and photo were released on state TV in an effort to secure his capture. In many cases, persecution was framed in terms of religious persecution, and the obstacles faced by Oromos in practising their religion openly. In these examples, migrants described a desire to move to a Muslim country, such as Yemen or Saudi Arabia, that would accept them as Muslims, and allow them to practice their faith openly and without discrimination. Another Ethiopian decided to move after his land and harvest were allegedly confiscated by the state because he was Oromo. Research conducted by other organisations yields similar findings, and Ethiopians interviewed by UNHCR and its partners in Yemen consistently reported arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and killings at the hand of government officials as a key reason for migrating (RMMS, 2016). This chronic discrimination cannot be neatly separated from the recent political unrest and government responses discussed in section 2.4.3 below, but the end of this current crisis is unlikely to address these much more deeply seated grievances.

**Security factors**

Insecurity, often as a result of conflict, is another key driver of migration between the HoA and Yemen. Somali migrants interviewed during this research commonly cited a lack of security as a reason for choosing to leave Somalia, brought about by fighting between government forces and Al-Shabaab, as well as conflict at the local level between clans. The escalation of conflict in Yemen has also had a direct correlation with levels of out-migration from Yemen. All Yemeni refugees and Somali returnees interviewed as part of this research identified war, conflict and insecurity as the principle driver moving from Yemen to Somalia and Djibouti. Over 98,000 people were registered by UNHCR in receiving countries across the region in April, May, June and July 2015. The Migrant Response Centre (MRC) in Bossaso also reported a significant increase in the number of refugees and returnees seeking its services in April, May, June and July 2015. Nevertheless, the scale of this out-migration quickly slowed after the first few months, and the anticipated larger

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25 Data shared by the Director of the Bossaso MRC indicate that in March 2015, 26 refugees and returnees were received by the MRC. This figure rose significantly to 2,177 in April, to 6,008 in May, to 4,518 in June, and 2,683 in July, before going back down to 182 in August.
influx of refugees never occurred. Data from UNHCR shows that the number of refugees leaving Yemen for Djibouti and Somalia decelerated from an initial peak of 7,000-8,000 per month for the first few months to the hundreds shortly after (see Figure 5). More recent and ongoing dynamics in the Yemen conflict are discussed in 2.4.3.

This hints at a more complex relationship between insecurity and migration in the HoA and Yemen. Indeed, understanding security and its implications for migration is complicated by insecurity in multiple places of origin, transit and destination along these routes. Somalia and Yemen are both highly insecure contexts, and yet people are moving from, through and to these locations. This means that security is likely to be an ongoing driver of migration, as migrants cannot necessarily exchange insecurity for security through movement alone. In this scenario, they may find themselves in another insecure context, leading to repeat or return movements. For example, since the escalation of conflict in Yemen, nearly 35,000 people have fled from Yemen to Somalia. However, Somalia is also a context of conflict and insecurity, and this (along with a number of other factors, in particular economic), has encouraged many of these migrants to return again to Yemen, in spite of ongoing conflict there and before it may be safe to do so.

The link between insecurity and out-migration is not straightforward. While Yemenis and Somalis may leave their place of origin to avoid insecurity, this does not mean that they or others will also avoid countries of transit or destination where security is a concern. With the escalation of conflict in Yemen in March 2015, many had anticipated a fall in the number of Ethiopian and Somali migrants seeking to travel to or through the country. Arrival figures did see a temporary reduction during the months of April and May 2015. However, this was not enough to prevent an overall increase (albeit small) in the number of migrants reaching Yemen in 2015 from the previous year (refer to Figure 2). The only significant drops occurred in 2010, conceivably as a result of war along the border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni clampdown on Somali migrants, and in 2013, due to the mass expulsion of Ethiopian migrant workers by the Saudi authorities (RMMS, 2016). In this sense, while insecurity may be a driver or push factor for migrants looking to flee insecure contexts, it can also be a pull factor for others, who actively move towards such contexts. This subject will be explored in further detail in Section 2.4.3.

2.4.2. Underlying socio-political structures

Underlying socio-political structures are another important factor in understanding these movements, as they often shape migrants’ responses to the above-mentioned economic, political and security conditions. These include state policies, culture of migration, and family and social networks, which can play a central role in determining whether, when and how migrants move or stay put.

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26 According to UNHCR data, there were 11,003 recorded arrivals in Yemen in March 2015. Numbers dropped in April 2015 (4,060 arrivals) and May (1,944 arrivals), before rising again in June (2,044 arrivals), July (3,903 arrivals) and August (7,029 arrivals).
State policies

State policies can have a significant impact on migration and its drivers. In some cases, state policy is a direct driver of migration in itself. The previous section highlighted how large numbers of Ethiopian Oromos are moving as a result of fear of political persecution from the Government of Ethiopia. In other cases, state policy may have very little to do with migration, and yet still have an impact, unintended or not, on people’s decision to move. For example, 2010 saw an increase of out-migration of Ethiopian Oromos disillusioned at being excluded from the benefits of aid received by the Ethiopian government from international donors (RMMS, 2016).

The relationship between the Governments of Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia, and their attempts to control and manage migration, presents a useful example of how far state policy can shape how, when and where migrants move. Since the mid 1990s and in response to concerns of national unemployment and the exodus of billions of dollars leaving the economy as remittances every year, the Saudi government has been implementing a policy of ‘Saudization’, which seeks to replace migrant workers with Saudi citizens (RMMS, 2014). In this context, the Saudi government has taken a number of steps to reduce irregular migration, including restrictions on visas, construction of a border wall with Yemen, and mass deportations of irregular migrants. Following the end of a seven-month amnesty period for undocumented migrants, the authorities expelled more than 160,000 Ethiopians between November 2013 and March 2014. Large numbers of Yemeni and Somali migrants were also deported during this campaign. Most recently, Saudi Arabia announced a 90-day amnesty period (starting on 29 March 2017) after which all irregular migrant workers will be subject to deportation and possibly face fines (Toumi, 2017). At the same time, amid concerns of abuse and poor treatment of its workers, the Government of Ethiopia banned domestic workers from travelling abroad in 2013, with an emphasis on Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries.

These deliberate state policies to manage migration certainly have had an impact, and were linked by a number of institutions to the drop in the numbers of migrants entering Yemen en route to the Gulf States in 2013 and 2014 (see Figure 2). However, their long-term impact remains limited, and the numbers of migrants moving from Yemen and on towards Saudi Arabia has continued to climb. This suggests that even the most targeted and stringent state policies may ultimately have a limited long-term impact on shaping migration, as migrants and those facilitating their movements find alternative and often more dangerous means and routes to reach their intended destinations. With legal opportunities for migration curtailed, Ethiopian migrants looking to undertake domestic and manual work in Saudi Arabia have been pushed towards irregular migration channels, to the benefit of the smugglers and traffickers who have gained increasing control over these routes.

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27 The number of migrants arriving in Yemen dropped from a high of 107,532 in 2012 to 65,319 in 2013 and 91,592 in 2014 (UNHCR).
Culture of migration

Common traditions or ‘cultures of migration’ have emerged, which shape migrants’ decisions and choices about when, where and how to move. These traditions or cultures of migration become established and strengthened over time by the formation of determined routes, recognised agents and diasporic groups in destination countries. When asked why they had decided to migrate, many interviewees indicated that friends and family members had migrated before them, and that this had encouraged them to follow, often along the same routes and using the same brokers and agents. Migrants who successfully reached their intended destination seem to be particularly influential in these decisions. They give would-be migrants advice, encouragement and even financial support in order to make the journey. As social capital grows and gains momentum, this helps to perpetuate the ongoing popularity of different routes over time. For example, a large number of migrants already take the Arabian Sea route, which encourages others to follow in the same footsteps. Information about the route becomes more widely available and shared, ensuring that the route is better known and trusted. Likewise, the relatively new route from Puntland to Europe via Yemen seems to be gaining in popularity as growing social capital and other facilitating networks help to open up the route to a wider audience.

In many instances, migrants reported travelling with a group of two or more friends, relatives or acquaintances from the same neighbourhood or community, particularly when travelling through Djibouti. According to one Ethiopian interviewee, “I am travelling with my cousin. We are always together, and we plan to continue our journey together.” Travelling with a group, rather than alone, may be a means of improving personal security along dangerous routes. However, it also suggests that people from similar backgrounds may choose to migrate along similar routes due to shared cultures of migration built up over time. These findings are backed up by longitudinal research in Ethiopia, which found that people from certain communities tend to migrate in different ways depending on longstanding or more recent traditions of migration (WIDE, 2016). For example, in SNNPR, migrants from Girar tend to follow the Gurage tradition of urban migration, while in Aze Debo’a, migration to South Africa had become a ‘tradition’ in recent years. In Harresaw (East Tigray) migrants have built on trade links with Saudi Arabia through Afar. In Adele community (Oromiya) it has become a tradition for women to migrate seasonally to Djibouti as domestic workers, and men to move there with the qat trade for men, with some continuing their journey to Yemen and Saudi Arabia (WIDE, 2016).

“When my friends came back from their migration, they told me about the advantages of migrating and helped me to save the money I needed to travel. That was why I decided to migrate.” Ethiopian migrant, Sana’a.

“I chose to migrate because in my youth I have often seen young people in my neighbourhood who succeeded in becoming rich through migration”. Ethiopian migrant, Obock.
Family and social networks

Family and social networks were an important framing factor in determining migration choices and patterns amongst those interviewed by this project. In some instances, families actively pushed or pressurised would-be migrants into moving, in order to improve and diversify household income streams. In other instances, migrants may make the decision to move, out of concern for the welfare of the family. When asked why they were migrating, a number of respondents voiced their desire to support relatives, to improve the wellbeing of their children in particular by providing them with better educational opportunities, by securing a better paid job abroad. On some occasions, the desire to establish and support a family was framed within gendered stereotypes of roles and duty. “As a man, I must earn enough to take care of my family,” stated one migrant. However, female migrants also expressed a desire to support relatives and children as their principal reason for migrating, suggesting that typical gendered roles are being challenged by migration.

In other scenarios, families acted as an obstacle to migration, and actively worked to deter relatives from moving. One Somali migrant believed that the only obstacle to migrating was from his family who, if they suspected him of moving, would try to stop him and even inform the police at the checkpoints. An Ethiopian migrant interviewed in Obock described stealing the money he needed to migrate (nearly US$ 500) from his mother, as his family were against his decision to move. In this context, it is worth noting that different family members may perceive migration differently depending on a number of factors, including their age, background and past experience of migration.28 Nationality can also play a role, and negative associations of migration were particularly common amongst Somali communities in Puntland and Somaliland.

Once the decision to migrate has been made, social capital through the presence of family members, friends, or migrants from similar clans or religious and ethnic backgrounds contributes to migrants’ decision-making about which routes to take.29 Migrants can obtain information, support, loans, shelter and employment opportunities through these networks, and interviewees reported receiving financial support from relatives at home and in the diaspora. At times, this assistance has proved lifesaving, and respondents reported receiving

28 Research suggests that older people are more likely to associate migration with poverty, whereas younger people are more likely to connect migration with income generation and, more broadly, with ideas of modernity and success (WIDE, 2016).

29 Social capital is defined by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as “networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate co-operation within or among groups”.

“I wanted to change my life. I wanted to change my family’s life. I wanted to spend on myself, get married and help my family.”
Ethiopian migrant, Sana’a.

“I wanted to build a house for my children and wife. This was the main goal: just to build two rooms, a bathroom and kitchen for my children.” Ethiopian migrant, Sana’a.

“My wife insisted that we leave and search for a better life, rather than staying and living in poor conditions.” Ethiopian migrant, Bossaso.

“My mother got the information about the route and the journey from a friend who had travelled before, and shared information about the route, cost, which boat to use, and which smuggler would help me to arrive safely.” Somali migrant, Aden.
much-needed food, water and money via these networks. Likewise, families may be called upon to pay ransoms on behalf of relatives who have been kidnapped by smuggling and trafficking groups. In Yemen, migrants reported their family members paying ransoms of up to US$ 2,000, without which they would have been subjected to ongoing torture and, potentially, death (IOM, 2015). Families interviewed in Bossaso described paying ransoms of between US$ 8,000 to 10,000 to cover the costs of their children’s journey to Europe via Yemen and Libya.\(^{30}\)

While families play a central role in many cases of migration, there is growing evidence that people are choosing to migrate independently and without the approval of family members. The ‘leave now, pay later’ scheme increasingly adopted by smugglers negates the need to involve other family members in the decision to migrate, even if it also implicates them later on in the associated costs (Ali, 2016). Of the Somali migrants interviewed in Bossaso and planning to travel to Europe, none had informed their families of their migration plans, but were expecting them to pay the costs of the journey once they received the call from the smugglers. In this scenario, the family may find itself subsequently involved in paying for a journey it never agreed to or even knew was occurring, with significant consequences for the economic security of the wider household. This highlights how the risks and benefits of migration are often experienced by the wider family unit, and not just the person migrating, as families have to sell assets or use savings in order to send a family member abroad or pay for their release. The controversial ‘leave now, pay later’ migration is most common amongst Somalis, and may explain why Somali families in Puntland and Somaliland had particularly negative perceptions of migration.

2.4.3. Deterioration of conditions in the region

Yemen, Ethiopia and Somalia have all experienced a deterioration of conditions in recent years for reasons of conflict, political unrest and climatic instability. Such conditions have often given rise to greater levels of migration, and many analysts and observers have attributed the growth in migration between the HoA and Yemen to these factors. When planning for this project, the research team logically considered the potential for similar patterns and trends. Indeed, during interviews, a large number of respondents from government and institutions often cited these factors to justify record movements to Yemen in 2016.

Nevertheless, a more thorough analysis of the available data shows that, while the number of Somalis arriving in Yemen has remained more or less stable, there has been a 68% drop in the number of Ethiopians since the high of June 2016. While it is true that patterns of movement fluctuate over the year due to weather, political and religious conditions (migration numbers tend to peak over Ramadan), a comparison of monthly migration numbers in 2016 and 2017, also suggests a significant and sustained drop over the last seven months (see Table 5).

\(^{30}\) One Somali respondent described how the family had received a call from his brother in Sudan, saying that if the family did not pay US$ 6,500 to cover the costs of the journey from Somalia to Libya, he would be tortured by the traffickers who were now holding him captive. Three weeks later, the family received another call from an affiliated trafficking group in Libya demanding an additional US$ 1,500 to transport the brother to Italy, and then on to Austria.
Table 5: Monthly comparisons of Ethiopian arrivals in Yemen (Data source: UNHCR and partners)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>% Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>11,429</td>
<td>6,209</td>
<td></td>
<td>-46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>3,001</td>
<td>4,090</td>
<td></td>
<td>+36% *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>11,234</td>
<td>4,209</td>
<td></td>
<td>-63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>9,193</td>
<td>3,943</td>
<td></td>
<td>-57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>6,569</td>
<td>3,703</td>
<td></td>
<td>-44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>8,665</td>
<td>4,747</td>
<td></td>
<td>-45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>10,218</td>
<td>4,709</td>
<td></td>
<td>-54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Arabian sea crossings in November 2016 saw a significant drop due to adverse weather conditions brought about by cyclones Chapala and Magh, and so this figure should be viewed as an anomaly (RMMS, 2017).

This would suggest that, while the recent deterioration of conditions may have had a significant impact on people’s movement choices and patterns, it has not necessarily led to an increase in out-migration along routes to Yemen, as commonly expected or assumed in much of the literature. This implies that the relationship between the deterioration of conditions and migration remains complex, and underpinned by a range of other factors, such as increases in the costs of the journey, tightening of border controls, and the current threat of deportation from Saudi Arabia (although it is worth noting that migrant flows had already been falling before the Saudi announcement on deportations was made in March 2017). Exploring these factors further would require more research examining later stages of people’s migration trajectory. It is also possible that the data does not reflect the actual situation on the ground, as ongoing conflict in Yemen continues to have an impact on monitoring missions in the country, and the total number of arrivals into Yemen could in fact be much higher than the data is able to suggest (RMMS, 2017). In this context of uncertainty, this section avoids making any clear statements of fact, but rather seeks to explore a number of different and potential avenues and influences that may be driving migration trends.

The deterioration of conditions in the region may also have had consequences for the numbers of migrants arriving in Europe. Data from Frontex shows that people recorded as being from Ethiopia and Somalia on the borders of Europe increased from 8,261 in 2014 to 20,429 in 2015 (see Figure 8) to just under 11,935 in 2017. Prior to 2015, only a small number (several hundred) of Ethiopians were recorded on the border of Europe. This changed in 2015 and 2016, when 2,735 and 3,660 Ethiopians reached Europe respectively. The route through Libya to the Central Mediterranean was the most commonly used. However, as indicated earlier in the report, the route to Europe via Yemen appears to be growing in popularity, especially amongst Somalis. That said, data collected by UNHCR and RMMS shows a decline in HoA arrivals to Europe during 2016 and 2017, mainly attributable to a 90% fall in the number of Eritreans, who are reportedly finding it increasingly difficult to reach Europe due to a tightening of border controls in Sudan (RMMS, 2017).
Conflict in Yemen

Since fighting escalated in Yemen in March 2015, the current situation in the country continues to deteriorate significantly. OCHA describes the country as being in protracted crisis, characterised by widespread poverty, conflict, poor governance and weak rule of law, including widely reported human rights violations (UNOCHA, 2017). The economy is near collapse, public and private services have all but disappeared, and Yemenis have lost most of their livelihoods and savings (Yemen Mixed Migration Task Force, 2017). Over 17 million people do not have access to adequate food and frequently miss meals, and seven million Yemenis are ever closer to starvation (UNOCHA, 2017). Conflict continues to devastate the country’s health facilities; less than half are fully functional and many public health professionals have not been paid in months (UN, 2017). This has severely undermined efforts to contain a cholera outbreak brought about by collapsing national health, water and sanitation systems. The disease has since spread to 20 out of 22 governorates, and claimed the lives of 1,300 people, and affected 200,000 more (as of 24 June 2017) (WHO, 2017).

Now entering into its third year, the conflict in Yemen has also resulted in high levels of displacement and migration. UNHCR estimates that over 2 million people are internally displaced, and over 180,000 people have fled the country to either the HoA or GCC countries. However, in spite of these large figures, migrants from the HoA have not necessarily responded as might be expected. Logically, places of conflict are often characterised by increased out-migration and reduced in-migration as people look for

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31 Fighting is taking place between two rival governments. On the one side, there is the internationally recognized government of President Abed Rabbo Mansour al-Hadi, which is currently based in Aden and has the backing of a coalition of allies including the US, UK, France, and Saudi Arabia (RMMS, 2017). On the other side, are the Houthi rebels, who have taken over Sana’a, and are allegedly backed by Iran. In addition, a range of tribal militias and insurgent groups, some with ties to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State group, control or operate within certain territories.
greater safety and security elsewhere. While the numbers of people displaced remain considerable, the scale of the out-migration from Yemen quickly slowed after the first few months, and the anticipated larger influx of refugees into neighbouring countries never occurred, in spite of ongoing conflict. Furthermore, according to interviews with key informants and the migrants themselves, Somali returnees and Yemeni refugees are increasingly opting to return to Yemen, in spite of the dangers they may face there, and as a result of diminished living standards in Puntland and Djibouti.

At the same time, the expected reduction in in-migration by Ethiopian and Somali migrants also did not materialise. Many Ethiopian and Somali migrants say they have been encouraged by the breakdown of state institutions in Yemen and subsequent lack of policy and control. They believe (or are led to believe by smugglers) that this vacuum provides an opportunity to enter, travel through and exit the country unnoticed. Indeed, a number of Yemeni authorities interviewed as part of this research described the government’s response to migration as significantly weaker in the wake of conflict. The conflict has dramatically reduced border security along the Yemeni-Saudi border, with border posts on both sides of the frontier destroyed (RMMS, 2017). According to official data shared by Yemen’s Ministry of Interior, 4,000 migrants were deported in 2015 in contrast to 1,000 in 2016 (although it has not been possible to reconfirm these figures). Smuggling and trafficking networks have also taken advantage of Yemen’s deteriorating situation to establish profitable, transnational networks that operate with impunity in the country. One member of a smuggling group interviewed in Bossaso claimed that before the escalation of conflict in Yemen, his boats were regularly targeted by the Yemeni Navy patrolling the sea. Since then, patrols seem to be less regular and effective, although smugglers do report being disrupted by the PMPF and the Saudi-led coalition. In this scenario, a lack of state policy and control can be as much of a factor in determining migration levels and choices as the introduction of migration management policy. Similar trends have been seen in other war-torn settings, such as Libya, where a breakdown in law and order encouraged large numbers of migrants to seek transit to Europe.

While the numbers of those affected by insecurity in Yemen should not be underestimated, the anticipated levels of migration both in and out of the country have not matched common expectations. There may be a number of reasons behind this outcome. Firstly, most Yemenis lack the financial resources and social capital to migrate far from their place of origin. As indicated by the large number of IDPs (around 1 in 10 of the population are internally displaced), many Yemenis chose to flee within Yemen rather than abroad, returning to their place of origin if and when stability was restored. Those that did choose to move further afield, did so to neighbouring countries, where the number of arrivals did not meet the expected influx. Another reason for staying ‘close by’ is the fear of leaving and losing property, as land disputes are common in Yemen (RMMS, 2016). Secondly, large numbers of Ethiopian, Somali and Yemeni migrants may be more disposed to tolerate hardship and risk than is generally assumed, and will therefore be more willing to stay put or move towards danger than expected, particularly if they perceive their place of origin as one of danger or hopelessness. As described earlier in the report, most migrants are aware of the risks and dangers of the journeys and do not regret their decision to move even when they have experienced injury, abuse, indebtedness and severe hardship. Thirdly, many migrants perceive contexts of insecurity and conflict as an advantage rather than a hindrance. Authorities that are distracted or weakened by conflict may be less vigilant or
concerned with irregular migration, giving migrants a better chance of passing through undetected.

In these scenarios, conflict in Yemen has certainly had a significant impact on the movement choices and patterns of different groups of people. Perhaps unexpectedly, however, it has led to large flows of migrants travelling in both directions as, depending on their circumstances, hopes and expectations, migrants are both moving towards and away from insecurity in Yemen, or having little choice but to stay put.

**Unrest in Ethiopia**

Following violent clashes between protesters and state authorities, the Government of Ethiopia declared a six-month State of Emergency in October 2016 granting the authorities the power to restrict opposition activities and impose curfews. The order was renewed in March 2017 for a further six months. In November 2016, the Government announced the arrest of more than 11,000 people, mainly from the Oromia and Amhara regions. In a statement to the European Parliament in October 2016, Human Rights Watch (HRW) accused the Ethiopian security forces of using excessive and unnecessary lethal force and killing at least 500 protestors (Human Rights Watch, 2016). As has been outlined earlier in this report, political factors, in particular the fear of political persecution, were a common driver amongst the Ethiopians interviewed by this research. Furthermore, the proportion of Ethiopian Oromos registered in Yemen by UNHCR and its partners has risen sharply from 64% in 2014 to 95% in 2016 (RMMS, 2016). Oromia was the focal point for many anti-government protests and violent clashes over land, political, economic and cultural rights, and Oromos have been at the centre of arrests and detention by the authorities.

Political unrest in Ethiopia has often been described as a significant underlying factor behind the migration choices and patterns of many Ethiopian nationals. Nevertheless, the relationship between unrest in Ethiopia and patterns of migration is not so straightforward. While some organisations have made the link between recent unrest and increased out-migration, others have used Ethiopia’s current State of Emergency as an explanation for perceived falling rates of migration. The Government of Ethiopia has placed restrictions on movements, and respondents reported that Ethiopian migrants, allegedly Oromos in particular, are being stopped from crossing the border by both Ethiopian and Somali security forces and returned to Ethiopia. A number of Ethiopian interviewees attempting to cross the border with Djibouti, described being detained or narrowly evading arrest, by the Ethiopian forces patrolling the area. Most interviewees in Puntland, Yemen and Djibouti reported a reduction in Ethiopians crossing to Yemen; assertions that are substantiated by available data (see Section 2.1.1.).

While the proportion of Oromos moving through Yemen may have increased significantly in the last three years (according to data collected by UNHCR, DRC and RMMS), the absolute numbers of Ethiopians moving through Yemen in the wake of political unrest has decreased. This could be as a result of a range of policies and events in Ethiopia and the wider region that are encouraging Ethiopians to use alternative routes, stay put in Ethiopia, or to remain in neighbouring countries. It remains unclear which specific factors may be behind the reduction in migrant numbers, but interviews carried out by this and other research point to
a range of possibilities. These include: restrictions on movements of Ethiopians under the ongoing State of Emergency; renewed deportations from Yemen since September 2016 (RMMS, 2017); drought and its erosion of resilience, livelihoods and opportunities for migration (see more on this in the next section); an increase in the costs of the journey as smugglers extend their geographic reach, and borders become harder to cross; worsening conditions of conflict, insecurity, hardship and abuse in Yemen (although, as argued above, this can also serve as a pull factor to migrants who believe this will enable them to transit Yemen undetected); and tighter border controls by Saudi Arabia, including the threat of deportation. It is also possible that constrained access, brought about by conflict and insecurity in Yemen, is affecting the accuracy of data collected on migrant numbers, suggesting that migration levels may in fact be continuing much as before and without a reduction.

**Drought and potential famine in the region**

Severe and consecutive drought across Somalia has reduced water sources, depleted crop harvests and livestock stocks, and undermined local resilience and livelihoods. 6.7 million people (over half of the country’s population) are now acutely food insecure, of which 3.2 million are coping with severe food insecurity (as of May 2017) (FSNAU Somalia, 2017). Furthermore, severe drought, rising prices, continued insecurity and access limitations, and depressed rain forecasts point to the possibility of famine in Somalia in 2017 (UNOCHA, 2017). Southwestern Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya are also suffering the impacts of drought, and an estimated 2.7 million Kenyans and 5.6 million Ethiopians will require food assistance in 2017 (UNOCHA, 2017). Ongoing drought in Djibouti since 2008 and the associated water shortages have affected large sections of the population. Incidents of malnutrition, malaria and diarrheal disease have risen. Pastoralists and those living in rural communities are particularly affected. Livestock has suffered as a result of water shortages, and stocks have reduced, forcing many to move to urban settings. In Yemen, drought has left some 17 million people (nearly 60% of the population) food insecure, and an estimated 462,000 children are suffering from severe acute malnutrition (as of April 2017) (UNHCR, 2017).

Drought and famine are a major driver of migration within the HoA. The 2011 famine was linked to the out-migration of large numbers of Somalis to Yemen (RMMS, 2016). Past and present droughts in Ethiopia have led to similar movements of Ethiopians nationals. Almost all Ethiopian arrivals in Yemen interviewed by UNHCR and its partners cited drought as a reason for migrating (RMMS, 2016). However, this research points to somewhat different findings. Some migrants interviewed as part of this research cited drought as a reason for moving; one Somali said he was planning to travel to Saudi Arabia to help his family after they lost their animals and crops to drought. Overall, however, few migrants linked their migration specifically to drought, suggesting that while drought and potential famine may be one of a number of reasons for migrating to Yemen and beyond, they are not the main driver of movements towards or from Yemen. This is substantiated by the available data which shows an overall downward trend in movements to and from Yemen in recent months, and does not, as yet, suggest a significant rise or spike in out-migration linked to drought and potential famine (refer back to Figures 3 and 5, and Figure 9 below).
Communities affected by drought often lack the resources and ability to engage in long-distance migration, or any movement at all, as their resources and resilience become increasingly depleted. Conflict and the threat of famine in Yemen and the reduction in humanitarian space (due to airstrikes, ground clashes and bureaucratic impediments) may also act as a deterrent to drought-affected communities looking for support and assistance. What’s more, in recent years, the Government of Ethiopia, with support from international partners, has taken proactive steps to plan for and respond to recurring drought in the region by establishing early warning systems, welfare safety nets, food reserves and better infrastructure to improve resilience and, potentially, reduce the need for drought-affected Ethiopians to move abroad (UN, 2017). Viewed from this perspective, drought does not yet appear to be driving larger numbers of Ethiopians and Somalis to Yemen, or vice versa. What is more, drought may even have contributed to a reduction in migration, as would-be migrants and their families, experiencing depleted resilience and resources, no longer have the funds to pay for their journey, and stay put instead of moving.

To be clear, while drought-affected communities may not be moving in large numbers towards Yemen and beyond, this does not mean that drought is not driving migration elsewhere. Those who are able to move are more likely to migrate internally to nearby urban areas within their own country, or to neighbouring countries than to attempt to cross the sea to Yemen and beyond. An estimated 738,600 Somalis and 843,000 Ethiopians have been internally displaced between November 2016 and May 2017 (OCHA, 2017). 5,128 drought-affected Somalis have also crossed into Ethiopia, and a further 2,500 into Kenya (Ibid).
3. To what extent are smuggling and trafficking networks involved in facilitating people’s movements?

The scale and scope of smuggling and trafficking activities have increased in recent years, together with the revenue they earn and the scale and severity of the abuses they inflict on migrants (Human Rights Watch, 2014). These networks have evolved over time to span borders across Ethiopia, Somaliland, Puntland, Djibouti, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and beyond. This shift in scope and professionalism can be attributed to a number of factors.

Firstly, with the increase in migrants travelling along these routes, there has been a significant growth in demand for smugglers’ services. The number of migrants arriving in Yemen from the HoA has risen from approximately 25,000 in 2006 to around 100,000 per year since 2011. Growing demand can also be attributed to the changing profile of migrants. Up until 2008, Somalis constituted the bulk of those crossing from Puntland to Yemen. Smuggling services to facilitate this journey were not in high demand, as Somalis were engaging in legal migration within their own country. Somalis and migrants from the Somali region of Ethiopia are more likely to journey to Bossaso without recourse to smugglers, particularly if they know the route and keep to areas where they have clan ties (UNODC, 2013). Over the past nine years, the number of Ethiopians migrating through Somalia has increased dramatically, and a network of smugglers has emerged in Somaliland, Puntland and beyond, to facilitate their journey as ‘irregular migrants’. Additionally, in an effort to manage migration, states in the region have taken actions to strengthen border control, making it harder for migrants to cross from one country to another. This has worked to the smugglers advantage, as more migrants are obliged to seek their services in order to traverse increasingly difficult and hostile routes.

Secondly, the potential profits linked to smuggling and trafficking are substantial, which has encouraged a growing supply of individuals and groups seeking to offer their services. The maritime crossing to Yemen can only be made with the assistance of smugglers, and therefore serves as a point where clear calculations on cost can be made (UNODC, 2010). According to 2016 figures from UNHCR and partners, 98,638 migrants arrived in Yemen via the Arabian Sea, and an additional 18,457 arrived via the Red Sea. Based on the reported costs, migrants pay $125 and $130 via the Arabian and Red Sea routes respectively. The networks that facilitate these sea crossings, therefore, stand to make a minimum of US$ 14.7 million (US$ 12.3 million across the Arabian Sea and US$ 2.4 million across the Red Sea). There are some costs associated with the boats and fuel, and payments for protection will also be needed. Nevertheless, this amount of revenue represents a sizeable economy and has attracted many to the business of smuggling. Large numbers travel on the boats from Puntland, with sources and imagery indicating that between two and three boats depart each day, each carrying 75 to 110 people, representing large profits for the individuals involved.\(^{32}\) What’s more, the sea crossings represent only a small part of the total journey revenues and it is likely that many more migrants are taking these routes than suggested by official data. This means that the full scale of potential revenue will be

\(^{32}\) When imagery has been available of the boats, it has shown long, open craft with large numbers of people (between 75 and 130) pressed together.
significantly higher when overland routes are also taken into consideration (refer to Table 4 in Section 2.3.3).

Thirdly, smugglers and traffickers appear to operate with relative impunity as a result of a lack of sustained or meaningful response from local or national authorities. In spite of high-level rhetoric and the adoption of international and national smuggling and trafficking legislation, in practice, states have failed to challenge the networks on the ground. According to the US State Department, “Somaliland and Puntland authorities sustained minimal efforts to combat trafficking”, and that, despite possessing functioning legal systems, they demonstrated limited law enforcement capacity when it came to trafficking investigations or prosecutions (US Department of State, 2016). Respondents interviewed as part of this research consistently accused the authorities of not doing enough to combat smuggling and trafficking along these routes, and directly linked this inaction with government corruption and the growth in smuggling and trafficking activities in the region. In Puntland, respondents claimed that members of the networks are well known and easy to find, and yet live without interference. Indeed, the researchers were provided with a list of names and contact numbers of Bossaso smugglers by a government official. Many of the same launching points have been used for years and all respondents were familiar with their names and locations. What’s more, armed militia affiliated with the smugglers continue to control Mareerko, one of the main departure points for Yemen, without obstruction from the government. All of these examples serve to underline the impunity with which criminal networks carry out their business. Smuggling and trafficking networks appear to function with most impunity in Yemen. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), “a multi-million-dollar trafficking and extortion racket has developed in Yemen based on the migrants’ passage” (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The HRW report identifies Haradh (a northern Yemeni border town) as a central location for these networks, and estimates that smuggling and trafficking activities make up 80% of the local economy there.

In spite of the growth and notoriety of these criminal networks, detailed and concrete information around their activities remains limited. Knowledge of the number and structure of trafficking groups is particularly poor, and a lack of prosecutions has limited the availability of public and confirmed information. What’s more, there have been major changes in how and where these networks operate since the escalation of conflict in Yemen, which implies a need to update earlier studies on human smuggling and people trafficking via the country. This section is a starting point in consolidating and re-examining some of these findings, however further extensive and investigative research is recommended to uncover greater detail. The remainder of this section outlines how and where these networks operate, who is involved, and their links to other criminal activities.

“As a member of the police, we are supposed to deal with security issues at the borders, however because of a lack of capacity and funding, we are literally doing nothing to stop the flow of Ethiopian migrants. Some of our force are even facilitating these movements.”
Key informant, Bossaso.

“There are so many smugglers in Bossaso. You just have to search for them in the market.”
Female Somali returnee, Bossaso.
3.1. How does the trade in humans operate?

It is important to differentiate between smuggling and trafficking networks. The main differences between smuggling and trafficking relate to consent and transnationality. Smuggling involves the consent of those being smuggled. In contrast, victims of trafficking have never consented, or an initial consent has been rendered meaningless by the improper means of the traffickers (UNODC, 2009). Smuggling is always a transnational movement, as it involves illegally moving a person across a border into another country, whilst a trafficked person does not necessarily need to move across a border (UNODC, 2009). Levels of exploitation and how offenders generate their income also provide additional differences.

While smuggling was widely reported to and witnessed by the research teams, this project uncovered fewer details on human trafficking. This does not mean that trafficking is not occurring, and it is clear that the opportunities for these groups are very real in the region. Djibouti city has a large port and a major truck route that transports goods from land-locked Ethiopia. Ports and trucking routes are common sites for sex work, and the demand for sex workers is in Djibouti is high, with women involved in this sector typically described as being from Somalia and Ethiopia. Trafficking in persons has also been highlighted as a key risk in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Migrant workers are most vulnerable to trafficking in Saudi Arabia, particularly female domestic workers due to their isolation inside private residences (US Department of State, 2016). In Yemen, conflict and lawlessness have left vulnerable populations, such as migrant workers, women and children, at significant risk of trafficking (US Department of State, 2016).

As indicated by the experiences of migrants in the HoA, the boundaries between smuggling and trafficking can easily become blurred and overlap. For example, a migrant may start off being smuggled, but subsequently be deceived and sold off to traffickers, or be forced to work by the smugglers under exploitative conditions in order to pay additional fees. Furthermore, smuggled and trafficked people are often moved along the same routes, and criminal networks may engage in both smuggling and trafficking activities. Migrants tend to be passed from one criminal group to the next, within a network of actors and groups. Evidence shows that although they may initially contract the services of a smuggler, they may be subsequently passed on to a trafficker and exploited. This blurring of lines explains why the terms smuggling and trafficking are often used inter-changeably, including by the migrants and key informants interviewed by this research.

Migrants’ descriptions of their experience of smuggling suggests that the organised crime groups are carrying out ‘smuggling with aggravated circumstances’, a term whose definition is included in the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants. Smuggling with aggravated circumstances describes circumstances that endanger the life or safety of the people being smuggled, as well as inhumane or degrading treatment (Sahan, 2016). This research identified numerous cases of abuse, torture,
degradation, risk of life and death of migrants at the hands of smugglers. In these scenarios, the migrant-smuggler relationship is no longer based on the definition of a consensual transnational transaction, but one that crosses the line between smuggling and trafficking. Interviewees, including smugglers themselves, describe a deliberate shift in smuggling from facilitating movement to the buying and selling of human beings. The different networks often work in a syndicate selling migrants from one group to the next as they pass from country to country. According to respondents, the Somaliland, Puntland and Yemeni networks typically buy and sell migrants from each other for as little as US$ 50 per person. Migrants’ treatment often depends on the service they can afford, and smugglers and their brokers tend to offer a range of different ‘packages’. Wealthier migrants can purchase a complete package to their destination, and can generally expect to receive a better and safer service than poorer migrants who must rely on a combination of self-reliance and ad hoc services bought en route (UNODC, 2013).

Interviews with key informants suggest that a number of networks operate along these routes, each with their own agents and operatives located at intervals along the routes, who are responsible for recruiting, transporting and receiving migrants at the various stages of their journey. Roles and responsibilities within the networks are clearly defined, with different individuals or groups within the networks responsible for different tasks. For example, some of its members focus on recruitment, others deal with transport and logistics between locations, and others are charged with receiving and securing migrants in transit or coastal locations. While organised internally, it is less clear whether these groups adhere to common structures or modes of operation. For example, some of the groups use their own boats and vehicles to transport migrants, while others rely on public transport or rentals. Likewise, accommodation options range from dedicated camps, rooms in private houses or makeshift shelters. It seems likely that only criminal groups with strong financial backing, through dedicated financiers, would have the means to purchase such assets upfront. These groups are more likely to be the ones to accept ‘leave now, pay later’ payment terms, which require greater cash flow and more significant investment.

“Before two years ago, we used to come to Bossaso without arranging with smugglers. Now they kidnap us and control our movement. We are transported in trucks and locked in rooms, and we can’t complain to the police, because they don’t care.” Migrant, Bossaso.

The process of acquiring smuggling services varies significantly. In many cases, brokers or agents of the smugglers do not actively recruit migrants; rather it is the migrants who approach them, either through word of mouth, or at common transit points. In other instances, migrants are actively recruited by the network. For example, brokers in Somalia commonly target youth in high schools and universities, or offer them tempting ‘leave now, pay later’ deals. Increasingly, however, migrants are actively coerced or forced into using smugglers’ services. It is worth noting that many migrants don’t necessarily want to use smugglers to facilitate their journey, as it can be more expensive and leave migrants with less control. One migrant stated that moving between the border and Bossaso had been relatively easy and cheap in previous years, however on this trip he was required to employ the services of smugglers, and the journey was much more arduous and expensive as a result. Migrants describe being picked up or “captured” by smugglers who oblige them to pay for their services, or risk facing detention or abuse. Another migrant reported being deceived by a broker who locked him in his house, and threatened to hand him over to the authorities
unless he agreed to pay him. The agent beat him with a metal stick, and threatened him with a knife, until he agreed to pay the rates.

Smugglers’ ability to coerce migrants into using their services is linked to the relative impunity under which they operate. In Somaliland and Puntland, for example, it was reported that arrangements exist between the smugglers and corrupt police forces, which leaves migrants in a weak bargaining position. In this context of unequal balance of powers, smugglers were able to extort large fees to cover the costs of transport, food and protection, and migrants struggle to negotiate on prices or appeal to the authorities for help. These descriptions correspond to the definition of smuggling with aggravated circumstances, described earlier.

3.2. Where do they operate?

The geographic reach of smugglers and traffickers has expanded in recent years to include both maritime and overland sections. The maritime crossings from Puntland or Djibouti to Yemen have for some time been made with the assistance of networks, generally from the departure points of Obock and Bossaso. In contrast, until recently, overland movements through Somalia were generally made independently, without assistance. Since 2015, smugglers and traffickers have increasingly extended their reach and control over the overland sections through a network of operatives positioned in Somaliland and Puntland, encouraging migrants to utilise their services much earlier and at various points at the start or along the journey in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti or Yemen. Ethiopian migrants who, over the years, have made repeated attempts to travel along this route reported seeing substantial differences in their experience of these networks over time. Whereas previously they had travelled independently across the overland routes, they were now compelled to use the services of smugglers. Eighty percent of Ethiopian interviewees moving through Somalia used smugglers to facilitate both their overland and sea journeys. In Djibouti, 67% of interviewed migrants reported using smugglers on both overland and maritime sections of their journey. Smugglers were particularly popular for crossing the Ethiopian border, and at various sections of the journey through Djibouti. This included journeys made by vehicle or on foot, as smugglers were essential to guiding migrants safely through off route tracks in isolated and mountainous areas of the country, in order to avoid checkpoints. This expansion of smugglers’ leverage and influence over both overland and maritime routes has reduced migrants’ say over the routes and conditions of their journey. It has also increased the potential profits for the networks, as they are now in control of longer sections of the journey.

Identification of the geographical points from where smugglers and traffickers operate is an important resource in combating these criminal groups, and one that should put pressure on law enforcement to proactively act against the networks. As indicated above, smugglers and traffickers have extended their geographical scope to include overland sections of the journey. In some cases, this extends to migrants’ place of origin, where they are first connected with brokers, often through family, friends and other contacts. Generally,

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33 This corresponds with findings by other studies, which found that 64% of Ethiopian migrants and asylum seekers who crossed into Djibouti on route to Yemen had recruited the services of smugglers (RMMS, 2016)
however, smuggling activities begin when migrants cross an international border and are now moving irregularly through a foreign country. At this stage, migrants are most likely to require smugglers’ services to facilitate their journey, undetected by the authorities and, in many cases, in an unknown terrain and language.

3.2.1 Djibouti

*Image 5: Fishing boats on the shore at Obock. Smugglers often use these sorts of vessels, as well as larger versions, to transfer migrants to Yemen.*

In Djibouti, the smuggling process can start as soon as migrants cross the border from Ethiopia or Somaliland, in places like Galilée or Galafi, Loyada and Balho. However, some migrants choose to walk to larger hubs, such as Ali Sabieh, Dikhil, Djibouti town Ouéa and PK51, before being picked up by smugglers. From the border, migrants are smuggled, or make their own way, through Lac Assal, Tadjourah town and Obock.

Generally speaking, migrants who can afford it, pay one smuggler to take them from Ethiopia/Somaliland to Yemen. A cheaper option is to use smugglers to cross the border into Djibouti, and then walk the remainder of the way to Obock. One Ethiopian migrant described walking by foot from Galafi with a group of 250 other migrants. In some cases, migrants walk independently. However, others described walking and still paying smugglers

34 PK51 is located at the intersection of the roads from Ali Sabieh, Tadjourah and Djibouti.
to facilitate their safe passage past the authorities and checkpoints, and to avoid getting lost. Somalis are more likely to use smugglers and travel by vehicle than Ethiopians, who tend to be poorer and less able to pay. Oromos are the most likely to traverse Djibouti on foot, whereas Tigrayans typically have more funds to pay a smuggler to transport them by truck.

Once migrants reach Obock, they may spend some time waiting in town for a boat to be organised to take them across the Red Sea. Departure points are typically from isolated coastal locations, often to the north of Obock, such as Gueheré, Gorah, Angar and Godoria. The boat journey to Yemen takes between seven and eight hours, although it can be as quick as four.

3.2.2. Somaliland and Puntland

Agents affiliated with the smuggling and trafficking networks are largely based in Jijiga (on the Ethiopian side of the border) and Tog Wajaale (on the Somaliland side). Agents or brokers, reportedly generally Ethiopians, can be easily found in bus stations, cafes and tea shops, and carry out the initial negotiations with migrants. Once a fee is agreed, the broker collects the money and arranges the journey in coordination with smugglers who pick the migrants up at designated collection points along the way, typically in Guumays and Bossaso. The full journey from Tog Wajaale to Bossaso typically takes 3-6 days, and traverses through Hargeisa (where smugglers and their brokers are also reported to be very active), Berbera, Burco and Guumays. Dhahar, a popular transit location for migrants passing from western Puntland to Bossaso, is another smuggling ‘hotspot’, with at least 25 groups identified there by the Puntland Ministry of Interior. Another route identified involved entering Somaliland via Gashamo (a village in Ethiopia), then travelling through Somaliland to Oog, before being transferred to Al Hamdullah in Puntland.

Up until the transit location of Guumays, migrant interviews report travelling largely without difficulties, and they move along the main road by public bus in relative comfort. However, on arrival in Guumays, migrants travelling independently (without smugglers) describe being forced off buses, detained and handed over to smuggling networks by corrupt officials working in collusion with the networks. From Guumays, migrants take two different routes. One route is along the main road via Tukaraq (in Sool region) and is most popular with poorer migrants who may have connections in Garowe or Qardo and opt to travel independently from smugglers, often on foot (Refugee Affairs Division Bossaso, 2016). The second, more expensive and more popular route, is off road and by truck, along rough roads via Derero, Dhahar, Heylaan and Al Hamdullah (just south of Bossaso) in order to avoid checkpoints. According to reports, this route is most popular with female migrants, with up to 90% of female migrants in Puntland travelling along this route (Refugee Affairs Division Bossaso, 2016). Migrant respondents taking this second route described the two-day journey from Guumays to Al Hamdullah as extremely difficult and uncomfortable. Conditions are cramped, with trucks typically carrying between 120 to 150 migrants at a time, and there is no food and little water to sustain them. Once the vehicles approach the

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35 As reported by the September 2016 Entry Monitoring Monthly Updated produced by the Ministry of Interior, Refugee Affairs Division (RAD).
outskirts of Bossaso, migrant interviewees report being told to disembark and walk the rest of the journey off road, in order to avoid the police checkpoint at the entrance to the town.

Some Somalis use agents or brokers to facilitate their journey from their place of origin onwards. This practice is most common with women and children who, for cultural or age reasons, may not be able to travel alone. Somalis migrating from South Central Somalia tend to follow the main road north. This route converges from South Central to Hiran region and then follows the main road through Galgaduud, Galkayo, Garowe and Bossaso. However, most Somalis will travel independently until Bossaso, from where smuggling operations will begin once they are ready to make the sea crossing to Yemen. Known as dulaal, magafi or mukhala in Somali, these agents or brokers are easily located in Bossaso town. The brokers negotiate the price with the migrants, and arrange the journey to Yemen and beyond in coordination with operatives based in Yemen, Sudan and Libya.

While some migrants do cross the sea to Yemen from Somaliland, this option is not as popular as Bossaso due to the presence of a Somaliland military base on the coast between Zeila and Lughaya and the active presence of their coastguard that patrol and detain irregular vessels (Altai Consulting, 2016). The majority of migrants cross to Yemen from Bossaso, where they board boats from particular departure points located in coastal villages of Mareero, Shimbero, Ceelaayo and Laasqoray. Mareero is the most frequently used departure point as it is not under the control of government, and paid, armed militia affiliated with the smugglers protect the area. According to migrants, it is also cheaper than the other options (around US$ 120), and is nearer to town, which means that migrants can walk to the departure point. Ceelaayo is less popular, as the airport and PMPF are located along that road, which makes it difficult for smugglers to transport migrants past these secured areas. It is also more expensive (around US$ 150) and further away from Bossaso team, involving additional transportation by truck. The journey across the Gulf of Aden takes approximately 18 to 24 hours. Migrants usually depart Bossaso at night time.
3.2.3. Yemen

Once migrants arrive in Yemen, Yemeni smugglers wait for them at isolated coastal arrival points. Migrants who can afford it will have purchased packages that include being met by trucks upon arrival at the Yemeni coast and smuggled directly to Saudi Arabia. Others may purchase follow-on packages from the Yemeni smugglers, or, if they cannot afford it, may choose to walk from the coast to major cities (such as Aden and Sana’a) from where smugglers operate, or even as far as the Saudi border.

Boats from Obock typically land in towns in Taiz and Lahj governorates. Following the Saudi-led takeover of Bab Al Mandeb, the maritime route has shifted somewhat and most boats now arrive in Lahj, rather than Mokha. Migrants arriving in Taiz and Al Hodeidah governorates generally move north to Al Hodeidah city. From there, some will continue northwards to Haradh and onto border crossings to Saudi Arabia, although this route has reportedly been cut off in recent months. Others report moving towards Sana’a, and then up to Saudi Arabia through Sa’dah. In other cases, migrants land or pass through Aden, Rada’a and Marib. Crossing points into Saudi Arabia are often made from Midi, Baqim and Albuqa’a.

Boats from Bossaso arrive along the governorates of Shabwa and Hadhramout, between Al Mukalla and Ahwar, and even as far as Shokra. Around Al Mukalla, these arrival points include Ba’ir Ali, Ololka, Hassa, Stiin, Mayfa’ah, Ash Shihir, Heybellaj, Jalal, Shugerat, Al-Qubaya and Sharj-Ben-Taleb. Ba’ir Ali has become a popular arrival point in recent years, as
security is generally considered to be better there. In contrast, coastal points along Abuan governorate have reportedly become less popular. Other respondents indicated that migrants travel by sea from Bossaso to Al-Kharaz, possibly attracted to the refugee camp located there. Somali migrants hoping to reach Europe travel overland to the Red Sea coast, typically to Mokha, from where they take a second boat to Sudan. From there, they travel overland through Sudan, to either Libya or Egypt, and then on to Europe. A large number of Somalis who undertake this journey first register as refugees with UNHCR in Yemen, before continuing their journey.

3.3. Who is involved?

Smuggling and trafficking networks are made up of a range of different people, with different levels of involvement and responsibility within the organisation. In terms of nationality, smugglers and traffickers originate from a range of different countries, including Somalia, Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti and Saudi Arabia. In Djibouti, the majority of smugglers are reportedly Djiboutian Afars, typically between 18 to 25 years, and Ethiopians. Somalis and Ethiopians dominate the Somaliland and Puntland routes. Given the large number of Ethiopians on the move, brokers are often Ethiopian, whereas the transporters are Somalis, as they are better placed to negotiate checkpoints and the authorities. Once the vessels reach the coast of Yemen, Yemeni smugglers take over. Although respondents suggest that, in the case of Djibouti, Yemeni boat crews may also control the Red Sea crossing. A significant number of migrants crossing the Bab al-Mandab strait from Djibouti cited a notorious group called Abdul Qawi, which they accused of abduction, abuse, extortion and rape. However, it would seem that groups across the Yemeni coast are referred to by this name, suggesting that this is the name of a large hostage-taking network, or that the term has become synonymous with hostage taking in general (RMMS, 2012).

In terms of vocational background, interviews suggest that many of the smugglers and traffickers are former pirates who engaged in smuggling when the profitability of piracy declined. Individuals and businesses that provide services, whether transportation, food, communications and accommodation, are also directly and indirectly involved in smuggling and trafficking networks. These include boat owners, boat crews, restaurant and café owners, telephone centre owners, policeman, businessmen, truck owners and landlords (Mixed Migration Taskforce Somalia, 2008). According to key informants in Puntland, local businessmen are known to invest in smuggling activities by financing the costs of transportation, and then later splitting the profits with the network itself. Companies that provide money transfer services are widely used by all those involved in migration. They play a beneficial role to migrants and their families looking to send and receive money. Due to the high incidence of theft along migratory routes, migrants reported preferring to send and receive money by transfer, rather than by cash. However, money transfer systems also facilitate and equip the criminal activities of transnational smuggling and trafficking networks, who increasingly prefer to operate using cash transfers rather than hard cash. What’s more, the process for sending and receiving payments is often informal, making it difficult for authorities to trace payments for criminal investigations. Any response to control and regulate these systems should carefully consider both these positive and negative outcomes.
Numerous interviews highlighted the involvement of government officials from Somalia, Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia in these networks. These include officials from the police, military and intelligence services, as well as border, coast guards and customs authorities. Allegations against state actors range from turning a blind eye to irregular migration in exchange for bribes, to active involvement in facilitating smuggling and trafficking, and even participation in trafficking, abuse and torture of victims. Migrant respondents reported widespread collusion between Somaliland and Puntland police and security officers and the smuggling networks, particularly in migration ‘hotspots’ such as Guumays. Respondents from the Ministry of Security and the police themselves also confirmed these allegations to the research team. Interviews further indicated that some of the boats used to transport migrants from Bossaso are owned by government officials, suggesting that collusion is also taking place amongst the higher ranks. In Yemen, migrant interviewees describe similar levels of collusion between state and smugglers. Authorities at a checkpoint in Issa Salem (Taiz governorate) reportedly arrest and sell migrants to smugglers and traffickers. Security officials also demand bribes from migrants at checkpoints. Those who pay are allowed to continue their journey, and those who do not are arrested and handed over to the police. One interviewee described having to make these payments at every checkpoint along the route to Saudi Arabia.

Concerns that local authorities are implicated in the smuggling and trafficking networks are reinforced by the reluctance of some local government officials to fight trafficking and smuggling or target the transit and departure points frequented by the networks. As indicated earlier, smugglers, their whereabouts, and areas of operation are widely known to the authorities, and yet are rarely targeted by the police or security sectors. When arrests do occur, they appear to be of lower level members, who are often subsequently released without charge or trial. Community respondents complained that, in some cases, it is the Puntland officials themselves who have lobbied for the release of suspected smugglers. However, it is not always clear whether the failure to prosecute is brought about by weak capacity and a lack of resources, or networks of protection. In Yemen, state knowledge and active complicity of smuggling and trafficking was documented in a 2014 investigation by Human Rights Watch (HRW). Government officials in Haradh were able to provide HRW with a list of those running migrant camps in the vicinity, and the evidence suggested that officials themselves held migrants in custody before turning them over to smugglers and traffickers for money (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

While the actions of traffickers can in no way be justified, it should not be assumed that all those associated with smuggling are necessarily exploitative or abusive. Those operating at the lower levels are likely to have less comprehensive oversight or complicity than the high-level decision makers. While it is true that a great many smugglers carry out or threaten to carry out violent acts of abuse on migrants, others may offer much needed support. For example, one female migrant who found herself stranded without money to pay for her journey and at risk of abuse and exploitation, said that she was lent the money by a smuggler she had met on the Ethiopian-Somali border. Furthermore, for Yemeni refugees and Somali returnees, smugglers may ultimately offer a vital lifeline to those wanting to flee conflict and instability in Yemen. In this context, smugglers are not universally viewed in a

36 This was reportedly the case with the unexplained release of a prominent Ethiopian smuggler called Mohamed Dheere.
negative light, in particular amongst migrants and local communities from where they operate. Migrants interviewed differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ smugglers. They reported spending time looking for ‘trustworthy’ smugglers, and also looked to share details and information about ‘safe’ smugglers within migrant networks. In Obock and certain neighbourhoods of Djibouti town, there is a common perception that smugglers are not organised criminals per se, but are normal people responding to economic opportunities. This perception can, however, be dangerous, as it undermines attempts to tackle the activities, especially at the community level. It is particularly problematic when such perceptions extend to law enforcement, as it encourages agents of the law to turn a blind eye to these activities, and may make them more amendable to corruption and participation.

3.4. Links to other criminal activities

The networks that smuggle and traffic people are also accused of involvement in the illegal smuggling of goods, such as weapons and ammunition, food, medical supplies, drugs, fuel and oil, exotic animals, cultural property and other commodities. Concerns have also been raised that the routes, and even migrants themselves, may have links to extremist groups in the region, although such connections are not substantiated and are very difficult to prove.

Yemen has traditionally imported around 90% of its food staples; however, the supply chain has broken down as critical infrastructure has been damaged, populations displaced, and rebels have sought to control or block supplies. The port of Al Hodeidah has been particularly targeted by airstrikes by the Saudi-led coalition, reducing the number of ships and imports, and limiting the flow of commodities and food staples, medical supplies, and other goods into that part of the country. This situation, coupled with a general breakdown in law and order, opens a significant space for the illegal smuggling of much-needed, high demand goods and commodities.

Weapons smuggling on maritime routes to Yemen has also been considerable, and a number of key informants from governmental and security institutions in Bossaso claim that the boats smuggling migrants from Bossaso into Yemen ferry small caches of weapons and ammunition on the journey back to Puntland. The research team saw photographic evidence of stores of weapons and ammunitions purportedly seized in Bossaso. What is less clear is who these weapons are destined for. According to a number of sources, the weapons are supplied to militant groups affiliated with Islamic State (IS) and Al Shabaab (AS) based in Puntland, although no evidence was provided to substantiate this claim. Allegedly, the boats drop the weapon supplies bound for Al Shabaab in two coastal locations; Shuwra and Hiir Yare. Weapon supplies bound for IS-affiliated groups are delivered to Dikad Rahman, also in Puntland. This information should be treated with caution until it is confirmed by actual seizures of weapons. However, a large quantity of homemade bomb-making equipment was discovered and seized by the Puntland authorities in May 2017.

While there may be some connection between extremist groups and smuggling networks, it is less clear whether these groups have sought benefit from the migrants themselves, as has been the case in other contexts. In Libya, IS targeted Ethiopian and Eritrean migrants, releasing several execution videos. The maritime routes from Turkey to Greece also gained
notoriety when a number of IS operatives posing as migrants and refugees used the routes in order to enter Europe undetected. So far, there are no confirmed reports that the HoA-Yemen routes have been used by extremist fighters. However, as migrants’ routes often coincide geographically with the locations of these groups, there is potential for crossover even though no tangible evidence of this was uncovered by the research. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Ansar al Sharia operate on Yemen’s southern coastline, particularly to the west of Al Mukalla.\footnote{The port city of Al Mukalla was used as the centre of AQAP operations for more than a year from early 2015, with the group holding open rallies in the city in 2016 to protest against US drone strikes. In April 2016, the coalition reportedly regained control of the city, however risk intelligence reports released to the media in March 2017 indicate that AQAP continues to hold coastal territory to the west of Al Mukalla.} Islamic State (IS) has announced group presence in Puntland and a number of Yemeni governorates (see text box below). Many of these areas coincide with the Arabian Sea departure and arrival points used by migrants crossing between Puntland and Yemen, particularly to the west of Al Mukalla. It will be important to conduct ongoing mapping of this issue, in order to monitor the potential threat of nexuses or interactions between migrants and extremist groups.

In addition to extremist groups using migrants’ routes to their own advantage, there is also a risk of migrants being recruited as fighters to their cause. In Yemen, Resistance Forces, and possibly also pro-government militias, are known to recruit migrants and even Yemeni IDPs, and it is alleged that extremist groups are doing the same (Al Qalisi, 2015). Community respondents in Puntland recounted how a young Somali migrant was captured by an IS-affiliated group in Yemen, and only released after his father travelled to Yemen and paid a ransom. Others have suggested that Ethiopian Oromos are proactively recruited as they are considered to be good fighters, inexpensive to hire, and relatively easy to recruit (RMMS, 2017). Within Puntland, respondents from the Puntland Intelligence Agency (PIA) accuse smugglers and traffickers of exchanging migrants (particularly those who have been unable to pay ransom) for cash with militias and, to a lesser extent, with Al Shabaab and an IS-affiliated group based in Puntland IS. The same sources report that up to 20 Oromo migrants have been recruited to work as paid fighters by ISIS, reportedly earning up to US$100 per month. These claims are backed up by other research, which also found evidence of Oromos being recruited as IS fighters in Puntland (Sahan, 2017). Given the poverty and hardship experienced by most Ethiopian and Somali migrants, it may not be surprising that they are tempted, or coerced, to take up paid employment opportunities with extremist groups in Puntland and Yemen. Nevertheless, the connection is still not proven, and respondents typically gave a range of answers, sometimes conflicting, suggesting that further investigation and testimony is required before any firm conclusions can be reached.
4. What is the impact of these movements on the lives of migrants?

Irregular migration between the HoA and Yemen is dangerous, involving contact with criminal groups, risky sea crossings and exposure to the elements, and significant hardship along the journey. As discussed above, migrants between the HoA and Yemen face a wide range of risks at all stages of the migration process. Some migrants never reach their intended destination due to forced or voluntary return, permanent settlement in transit locations, and death during the journey. Other migrants, who are still en route or arrived at their destination, regret their decision to migrate as a result of their negative experiences along the journey. One migrant interviewed in Bossaso had suffered from malaria, was severely weakened and in debt, and wanted to go back to Ethiopia. A female interviewee, left traumatised by her experience with smugglers and now destitute in Bossaso, also wished to return home. Another female migrant who had been kidnapped and raped by traffickers, and was then injured in a road accident, also regretted her decision to migrate and wished to return to Ethiopia. A number of migrants interviewed in prisons in Yemen, and living in deplorable and uncertain conditions, also expressed a desire to return back to their country of origin.

“I don’t know what I am going to face on the rest of my journey, and I wish to go back home to Ethiopia.” Ethiopian migrant, Bossaso.

“I didn’t know things were that terrible and hard. If I had known this, I wouldn’t have left my home town. And if I was capable of paying my way back, I would go back.” Ethiopian female migrant, Bossaso.

“Migrants living conditions are horrible, inhuman. Theirs rights are not respected. During deportations, they’re mistreated”. Community respondent, Obock.
However, in spite of the abuse and hardships, most migrants do not regret their decision to migrate (although it is worth highlighting that many of the migrants interviewed are still in transit, have not yet reached their intended destination, and may still regret their decision later on in their journey or once they reach their intended destination). One Ethiopian respondent reported that his legs had been beaten and injured by smugglers who restricted his movements and freedom, that he had lost money and was in debt, was sick but could not access health services, and had nowhere to sleep and no sanitation facilities in Bossaso. Nevertheless, when asked whether he was better off after moving than he would have been had he stayed in Ethiopia, he replied that he was. Not only do these examples highlight migrants’ determination to move, no matter what the consequences, they also call into question the effectiveness of campaigns that seek to deter them from moving by raising awareness of the risks, dangers and difficulties. As discussed in Section 2.3.3., many migrants are already aware of these risks and are prepared to make the journey regardless, making it unlikely that such campaigns will be very effective.

Resilience to abuse and hardship can also be explained in a number of ways. Firstly, migration is often an important means of protection in itself, particularly in contexts of conflict and persecution where people may feel their safety can be best assured by moving elsewhere either temporarily or permanently. In these scenarios, return (whether forced or voluntary) can bring about substantial and greater risks than migration. Most Oromos reported fear of arrest, detention and torture by the Ethiopian authorities as a reason for moving, and a return to Ethiopia could put them in very real danger. However, many of the migrants detained in Puntland, Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia are deported without adequate time for proper refugee status determination (RSD), meaning that genuine asylum seekers are likely to be included in the numbers of returnees. Economic reasons are a second factor behind people’s resilience. Migrants who return to their country of origin before succeeding in reaching their intended destination face a real risk of economic hardship for themselves and their families, who may have sold assets and taken out loans in order to pay for the journey costs. Thirdly, a number of migrant respondents expressed migration decisions and consequences as being out of their control and in the hands of God. To a certain degree, these sentiments remove migrants’ agency, and make them more likely to accept their circumstances, even if the outcome is not positive.

4.1. Protection risks and abuse

Cases of abuse are widely documented by a number of reports, studies, institutions and the media. These include incidents of murder, theft, sexual violence, economic exploitation, abandonment, prostitution, and so on. For example, following a terrorist attack in Djibouti in May 2014, the government has increased monitoring, detentions, and deportations of migrants without the benefit of refugee status determination (Green & Snyder, 2017).

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“This is God’s will and it is determined by Him. I have nothing to do with this matter. I travelled at a certain time because God wanted that to happen at that time.” Ethiopian migrant, Sana’a.

“If the benefit of migration is measured by the simple amounts that migrants make as income, transfer, and save, then they have benefitted. If we measure the bad treatment against them, then there is no benefit because it has caused them deep harm.” Key informant, Sana’a.
trafficking, arbitrary detention and refoulement (Mixed Migration Taskforce Somalia, 2008). Migrants interviewed as part of this research reported experiencing many of these abuses, or of knowing of incidents affecting other migrants. Reports also indicate that the prevalence and severity of risks and abuses has increased in recent years: 80% of Ethiopian migrants hoping or planning to leave Ethiopia, and 92% of returnees believed this to be the case in a 2014 study (RMMS, 2014).

Yemen appears to be a focal point for much of the abuse that is occurring, in particular during sea crossings and disembarkation, and during transit through the country. There have been cases of migrants being beaten, stabbed, shot, burned, asphyxiated, suffocated, dehydrated and thrown overboard during the crossings to Yemen. Migrant respondents reported being forced to disembark several hundred metres from the shore and then made to swim to land, which has led to a number of deaths of those unable to swim. Upon arrival in Yemen, groups of kidnappers are often waiting to pick up migrants as they disembark from boats, particularly along the Red Sea coast (Human Rights Watch, 2014). They may be working in coordination with the smugglers, or may pick up migrants as they travel through Yemen. In many cases, they pay the boat crews for the migrants, and then demand a fee from the migrants themselves. Those unable or unwilling to pay are kidnapped, taken to isolated camps in Yemen and, in many cases, tortured until they or their families pay the ransom fee (Human Rights Watch, 2014). A number of migrant interviewees had either experienced this for themselves, or heard of other migrants who had. In 2015, it was reported that 6,093 migrants were abducted upon arrival in Yemen (RMMS, 2017). Figures captured in the same year indicate that as many as 34% of migrants who came to IOM for urgent assistance had been kidnapped and extorted (IOM, 2016). In a fairly new phenomenon, migrants are being kidnapped and held for ransom not just on arrival, but numerous times while transiting through Yemen; in addition to the other risks to migrants, this depletes their and their families’ resources and savings, making it harder to secure their release.

A number of factors are behind the increased levels of abuse in Yemen. Firstly, it is much harder for asylum seekers and refugees to access international protection in Yemen. UNHCR acknowledges that they are often unable to register migrants’ asylum applications or have their presence documented by the Yemeni authorities (UNHCR, 2016). Other development and humanitarian organisations have seen their operations and activities significantly curtailed by conflict and violence, thereby cutting off another channel of assistance for vulnerable migrants. Secondly, smuggling and trafficking networks appear to function with the most impunity in Yemen, and many of the protection risks and abuses are associated with these networks. As highlighted earlier in this report, the escalation of conflict in Yemen has led to the breakdown of state institutions and subsequent lack of policy and control. In this context, smuggling and trafficking networks have become firmly established, and are able to exploit and, in many cases, abuse migrants with little reaction from state actors.

Abuse of migrants typically occurs in migration ‘hot spots’ located along the main migratory corridors. In Somaliland and Puntland, a number of migrants reported suffering abuse in the key transit locations of Tog Wajaale, Guumays and Bossaso. In Yemen, locations like al Bahr, Raas Al Arah, Atta (Al Jawf governorate), Shafar and Haradh (Hajja governorate), Al Thabet Warqo (Sa’dah governorate) and Issa Salem were highlighted as high risk zones for migrants. In Djibouti, a number of migrants reported being held hostage by smugglers in Tadjourah,
who demanded additional payments not previously agreed. Those unable to pay were threatened with torture, and families were contacted to make the payments on the migrants’ behalf. All migrants travelling to Obock must pass through Tadjourah at some point along their journey, regardless of their border crossing, and so it is not surprising that the town has become a place where abuse is common. Boat crossings and zones where migrants disembark from boats are also considered to be risky. Specific threats aboard vessels include a lack of safety equipment, overloading, and placing people in confined spaces next to engines where they are at risk of carbon monoxide poisoning. A further risk point occurs when migrants are forced overboard by smugglers near the surf line in Yemen, as organised crime groups avoid landing on shore, where the likelihood of interception by the authorities is higher.

A range of individuals are reportedly involved in committing human rights and protection abuses against migrants. These include smugglers and traffickers, who are widely implicated as perpetrators of abuse of migrants under their charge. During interviews, migrants reported being physically assaulted and attacked, enduring degrading or humiliating treatment, being threatened with rape, or actually raped. However, it is worth noting, that migrants interviewed did differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ smugglers, and looked to share details and information of ‘safe’ smugglers within migrant networks. This suggests that there are economic incentives for smugglers to treat migrants well, as those known for having a bad reputation within migrant networks are less likely to attract as many potential clients. Other criminal actors such as militias, bandits and thieves, have also been accused of assaulting, abusing and robbing migrants. A migrant moving through Puntland described eight armed men stopping their vehicle, shooting and wounding the migrants, and killing a female Ethiopian who was among his group. In Obock, interviewees described being robbed of their money and phones, sometimes at knife point in places like Lac Assal, with Afar smugglers and residents often being accused of being behind these attacks. Finally, migrants themselves have been known to carry out incidents of abuse against fellow migrants. In Puntland, community respondents reported occasional violent clashes between Oromo and Tigrayan migrants in Bossaso. In Yemen, migrant interviewees described tensions and physical violence between Ethiopian and Somali migrants, reportedly brought about by cultural differences. Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and domestic violence can also occur within groups of migrants, often exacerbated by the stress and limited livelihood opportunities (Altai Consulting, 2016).

State authorities also play a role; in particular, the police, military and even government officials. In Yemen, Ethiopian migrants are routinely and arbitrarily picked up and detained by security forces, without recourse to protection mechanisms or the chance to seek asylum. This project interviewed a number of Ethiopian and Somali migrants in detention in Al Hodeidah, who reported deplorable conditions, with little food, water, medical care or electricity, and no idea of how or when they would be released. Between 2,000 and 3,000 Ethiopian migrants are thought to be held in prisons across Yemen, and it is not clear when they will be released, or what will happen to them (RMMS, 2016). According to the Eritrean Migrants’ Community in Yemen, some 150 Eritreans have been held in detention for over a year, with little sign of release. Once deported, it is common practice for the Yemeni authorities to force the migrants to disembark at isolated sections of the Djiboutian coastline, often at some distance from shore. The migrants must then make their own way by foot back to Obock or other locations, often suffering from dehydration and a lack of
food. IOM estimates that at least 24 migrants died due to deportation conditions during October and November 2016, a statement confirmed by the Djiboutian authorities. In other incidents, five Ethiopian migrants drowned in October 2016 after being forced to disembark off shore from Obock, and six migrants died from hunger and thirst after being deported by the Yemeni authorities and having to walk two days back to Obock (RMMS, 2016).

In Puntland, migrants held in state detention facilities also describe appalling conditions with a lack of food, water and sanitation. Two Ethiopians allegedly died in custody in Puntland during the field research, as a result of ill treatment and a lack of food. Elsewhere, the Djiboutian military has been accused of carrying out SGBV against migrants travelling between Loyada and Obock (Altai Consulting, 2016). HRW has accused the Saudi authorities of detaining and deporting migrants and refugees under deplorable conditions. In 2014, Saudi Arabia expelled 12,000 Somalis without allowing them to make refugee claims and holding them in detention in crowded and poorly serviced detention centres, with some reporting being beaten by security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2014). When the Saudi authorities expelled more than 160,000 Ethiopians between November 2013 and March 2014, they were accused of serious abuses during the process of detention and deportation, including attacks by security forces and private citizens, inadequate detention conditions, and abuse in detention prior to deportation (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

4.2. Hardship

Migrants also face a range of hardships during their journey, including a lack of access to food and water, basic services, shelter and livelihoods, as well as challenges of security and climate. Whereas the above-mentioned protection risks and abuse are propagated upon migrants by individuals or groups, hardships are associated with the general conditions of journey, in particular the social, political, economic, security and environmental structures along the different routes. In Yemen, conflict and insecurity has worsened conditions for migrants, as their access to basic services, livelihoods, and support mechanisms have been severely undermined. As shall be explored in more detail in Section 6, there are few development or humanitarian initiatives that specifically target migrants, which leaves them exposed to these hardships without adequate support or assistance. In this context, many migrants are living under extremely difficult conditions and may be forced into precarious activities or behaviours, such as begging, sleeping rough and sex work.

Unsustainable levels of hardship are perhaps best captured by the situation of Yemeni refugees and Somali returnees who fled Yemen. Acute living conditions faced in Djibouti and Somalia have forced growing numbers to return to Yemen in spite of the dangers, and before security conditions have sufficiently improved. All refugees and returnees interviewed by this project describe extremely difficult living conditions, such as inadequate food, income, shelter and livelihoods, and reported receiving little support. 39 Two female Somali returnees said they planned on returning to Al Kharas town in Yemen in the hope of accessing the camp and getting support from UNHCR. Conflict and insecurity, and the

39 When they first returned to Somalia, they received food rations, registration cards (for those who had been registered as refugees in Yemen), as well as some money (US$ 120 per person) to return to their hometown. However, following this initial package of support respondents reported receiving no additional assistance.
accompanying economic decline in Yemen have significantly undermined already difficult living conditions in Yemen. Services and means of support provided by governmental and international organisations have been rolled back, health and educational facilities have been undermined and targeted by airstrikes, and livelihood opportunities have been significantly reduced. In this context, returnees are likely to suffer ongoing hardships, with reports showing that many returnees are not able to return ‘home’, but find themselves internally displaced in isolated coastal villages in Yemen, becoming IDPs within their country (RMMS, 2016).

4.2.1. Poor Access to Basic services

Given the difficult conditions and circumstances of migrants’ journeys, many of those interviewed were suffering, or had suffered from, serious health issues. These included malaria, fatigue, and injuries sustained from car accidents or beatings. A number of female respondents were pregnant, and needed rest and medical support, such as ultrasound scans and medication. Nevertheless, a key problem for migrants is a lack of access to health services. Refugees and those registered with UNHCR and the government generally fare marginally better than irregular migrants, whose access to medical services is more complicated and expensive.

In Puntland, new arrivals from Yemen who register with UNHCR and government authorities can access a number of health and protection services at the two reception centres in Bossaso (IOM, 2015).\(^{40}\) Food and water, sanitation facilities and family tracing services are also provided. Unregistered migrants can visit the MRCs in Obock and Bossaso for emergency medical assistance. However, services and funding are limited and, in many cases, already over-stretched. Migrants are able to use public health centres, but many choose not to for fear of being identified and deported by the authorities, or because of a lack of funds.\(^{41}\) In any case, most of the health facilities in Puntland are privately owned, and migrants who use them must pay for consultations and treatment. Migrants complained that purchasing medicines is expensive, and many had fallen into debt when trying to treat an illness. Language was also a potential barrier for migrants unable to describe their symptoms or needs to medical staff.

In Djibouti, refugees residing in camps have access to health facilities, although respondents lamented that these often comprised of unventilated tents, rather than solid structures, and that the services provided were minimal. One Yemeni interviewed in Markazi camp complained that she was suffering considerably from kidney and respiratory diseases due to a lack of adequate medical attention. Unregistered migrants in Djibouti cannot access these services and, to improve the situation, some key informants advocated expanding public health coverage to migrants. The President of Djibouti recently alluded to the possibility of including migrants within universal health care insurance (knowns as the AMU), which is currently only available to Djiboutians.

\(^{40}\) This includes medical assistance when necessary, vaccinations, screening for some diseases, fitness for travel assessment, referral services, refreshments, protection assessment and psychosocial support.

\(^{41}\) The Bossaso public hospital supports referred migrants with free services, and, in Garowe, they can also receive medical treatment at the General Hospital and Gambool clinic, through funding provided by IOM.
Young migrants’ access to education services is also limited, particularly for unaccompanied migrant children, without documentation or guardians, who find themselves excluded from a range of basic services, including education, health and protection. Some organisations provide educational programmes to fill this gap, however there are not enough to meet the needs of all migrant children. Registered refugee children may fair better and, in Djibouti, Yemeni refugees interviewed in Markazi camp reported being able to continue with their studies.

4.2.2. Lack of Shelter

Shelter is another issue faced by migrants moving through Djibouti, Puntland and Yemen. In rural settings, migrants sleep outside in mountains, forests or on beaches. In urban areas, migrants commonly reported sleeping out in the open, either in open compounds or on the streets, and in vacant and dilapidated buildings. This leaves them vulnerable to attack, robbery and abuse, especially women and children.

In Bossaso and Garowe, Ethiopians tend to live in open and overcrowded settlements either in Sawiti neighbourhood near to the port, or in Kawda Lulyo neighbourhood, to the north west of the city. For Ethiopians travelling with smugglers, their accommodation is generally arranged and controlled by the networks, and is of a very poor quality. They do not sleep in rooms, but out in the open, sometimes on verandas, or in poorly built wooden shelters. Those travelling independently may sleep in the open, as they cannot or do not want to spend the money on renting a room or a house. A number of Ethiopian migrants are also known to take shelter in the IDP camps in Garowe and Bossaso. Somali migrants and returnees tend to fare better than their Ethiopian counterparts, using clan affiliations to find accommodation amongst the local community or in town until their departure to Yemen is finalised. New arrivals from Yemen can apply for temporary shelter for up to three nights at the reception centres (IOM, 2015), however they have struggled to find affordable, longer term accommodation, and interviewees complained of cramped and poor quality accommodation options. Many Yemeni refugees congregate in the town of Qardo, in designated residential areas owned by Mabruk Group Company or in residential areas located to the west of the town.

In Djibouti, Markazi camp, not far from Obock, was established by the Djiboutian authorities to shelter Yemeni refugees, in part due to its relative proximity to Yemen. Somali and, to a lesser extent, Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees tend to be located in the southern camps of Holl Holl and Ali Addeh. A large number of refugees also reside in urban settings in Obock and Djibouti. After initially adopting a policy of encampment towards Yemeni refugees, the Government of Djibouti extended refugee registration to urban areas, although assistance is only provided to refugees residing in the camps and, according to those interviewed, refugees wishing to leave Obock must first secure a written authorisation from ONARS. Respondents described life in Markazi camp as extremely difficult, with one Yemeni refugee likening it to a prison. According to respondents, conditions were better when they first arrived, but have since worsened each year. Respondents describe living in unventilated tents in spite of the soaring temperatures, the food rations they receive do not last them until the end of the month, and the water available is salty. Electricity in Markazi is limited
to around three hours a day, and the camp becomes very dark at night time. That said, Yemeni refugees in Markazi describe the camp as safe and secure, with good security.

*Image 7: Make-shift shelters occupied by Ethiopian migrants in Sawiti, Bossaso.*

### 4.2.3. Limited Livelihood Opportunities

Livelihood and employment opportunities are a major concern for migrants. Many do not have sufficient money to fund their entire journey, and are obliged to work and earn in transit in order to pay for the next stage of the route. Furthermore, migrants reported being forced to pay additional and unexpected fees to smugglers, leaving them without sufficient money and in debt. Others were robbed, or had to spend part of their savings on medicine when they became sick or injured along their journey. For migrants looking to stay, such as refugees and returnees, the need to find meaningful work and employment is equally pressing to sustain living conditions and supplement official assistance received.

Opportunities for migrants to engage in livelihood activities are limited in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen. Irregular status, language, low skills level, and limited employment market were key barriers to securing employment. Some interviewed migrants reported finding work in cafes and restaurants, or engaging in manual labour on construction sites, cleaning and garbage collection, and domestic work in people’s homes. However, the available jobs are typically in the informal sector, and migrants complain of low pay and long hours (Altai Consulting, 2016). In Yemen, Ethiopian migrants have succeeded in working in qat plantations in places like Al-Baydha, Dhamar and Ibb governorates, or carry out low-skilled work, such as washing cars, grazing animals, guarding or cleaning streets. According to key informants, migrants are also recruited as cleaners by hospitals, as they represent a cheaper labour force than local Yemenis. While unregistered migrants’ work opportunities are limited by their irregular status, refugees may be permitted to work in some contexts. In Djibouti, for example, documented refugees with a work permit are allowed to work, and many opt to move to Djibouti town. Nevertheless, high unemployment rates and living costs (accommodation, food and water) limit this option to those with the savings or connections to sustain themselves in the city. Generally speaking, the majority are not able to find work,

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42 A maid in Garowe typically earns US$ 50 per month (equivalent to US$ 1.65 per day); a farmer in Bossaso can expect to earn US$ 50-60 per month; and a cleaner or cook in a Bossaso restaurant will earn on average US$ 50 per month (Altai Consulting, 2016).
and are forced to rely on humanitarian projects, community generosity and their own savings in order to survive (IOM, 2015).

A number of NGO key informants suggested income generation or skills development programmes to enable migrants to utilise or develop their skills, and put them to use in transit locations in order to sustain themselves during their journey. Many migrants possess farming and manufacturing skills that could be used to benefit local economies. There is a risk, however, that these kinds of initiatives could undermine the competitiveness and earning potential of local residents, who already complain that migrants undercut their wages and job opportunities (see Section 5.1). Any income generation or skills development programmes would therefore need to include both migrants and the communities that host them. Another issue is the legal obstacles associated with offering livelihood support to irregular migrants, who are not officially allowed to work, meaning that any vocational training programmes are likely to face political and legal challenges. While livelihood schemes may be beneficial to refugees or migrants likely to remain in a particular area or country for some time, they may be less relevant to the large numbers of migrants in transit who are generally looking to move on with their journey as quickly as possible.

4.2.4. Insecurity

Insecurity represents a significant hardship for irregular migrants caught up in conflict and instability. In Yemen, migrants’ security has been significantly undermined by ongoing conflict in the country. Coastal areas controlled by the Houthis are vulnerable to airstrikes, which have undermined security at migrant arrival points in Taiz governorate, in particular Dhubab and Mokha. The governorates of Sa’adah, Hajjah Marib, Sana’a, Amran, Al Jawf and Al Hodeidah have also been affected by airstrikes, artillery and fighting, undermining access and security to migrants passing through these areas. A number of migrant respondents witnessed airstrikes whilst transiting through Yemen, and reported seeing their friends and other migrants killed as a result. On 16 March 2017, 42 Somalis travelling from Al Hodeidah to Sudan died when the boat they were travelling in was attacked by an Apache helicopter near the Bab al-Mandeb strait (Reuters, 2017). A number of migrants interviewed by this project in Al Hodeidah prison reported being attacked by helicopters when travelling by boat to Sudan, and it is possible that they were involved in this incident. Sa’adah governorate in north-west Yemen is a common crossing point for migrants wanting to reach Saudi Arabia, but is also a zone of conflict and insecurity. A number of respondents described treading on landmines while trying to cross the Yemeni-Saudi border in Sa’adah, and being left badly injured and, in some cases, with amputated limbs.

In Djibouti, the security situation is more stable, and migrant respondents reported no security problems. In Puntland, there has been a surge in violent attacks carried out by Al Shabaab and IS-affiliated groups, with seven incidents occurring in Bossaso alone between January and February 2016.43 Most recently, Al Shabaab raided a military base, located

43 On 17 January 2017, gunmen reportedly killed two military soldiers at a checkpoint. On 25 January 2017, armed gunmen shot and wounded a prominent elder (Muse Haji Farah) who was the brother of Puntland Minister of Planning and International Cooperation. On 27 January 2017, gunmen attacked a local businessman. On 8 February 2017, militants affiliated with IS attempted to storm ‘Village Hotel’, a popular hotel frequented by foreign nationals and government officials. On 24 February 2017, attackers launched
60km south west of Bossaso, killing up to 30 people and taking control of the military’s weapons and ammunition (Garowe Online, 2017). While Al Shabaab attacks generally target government officials, security agencies and NGOs, they are also directed at hotels, restaurants, banks and checkpoints, where migrants are likely to congregate. What’s more, a number of government buildings are located in Sawiti neighbourhood, near to where Ethiopian migrants often reside. Given the large numbers of migrants passing through, they may be caught in the cross fire when attacks do occur.

4.2.5. Extreme Climatic Conditions

Climatic conditions in Djibouti, Puntland and Yemen are extremely harsh. During the summer months in Obock (June to September) temperatures average 41 degrees Celsius, although have been known to rise as high as 51 degrees. Strong winds and violent sand storms known as ‘khamsin’ occur from May to July. Puntland also has a hot desert climate, with temperatures peaking from June to September to an average of 39 to 41 degrees. Temperatures in Yemen are generally also very high, particularly in the coastal regions and Temperatures are generally very high in Yemen, particularly in the coastal regions and during summer months.

Migrants travelling between the HoA and Yemen endure long journeys, much of this on foot, leaving them exposed to the harsh elements. At the same time, access to food and water along the journey is a key challenge, and migrants interviewed in Djibouti, Puntland and Yemen consistently reported suffering from thirst and hunger, and complained that smugglers provide them with little sustenance during long journeys. During the 18 to 24-hour boat crossing from Puntland to Yemen, smugglers often forbid migrants from carrying any food or water on-board as there are no washroom facilities. Migrants may be able to seek some reprise in urban areas or at transit locations along the journey, where support or facilities, albeit limited, may be offered. However, when travelling along roads and in isolated off-track areas, they are particularly vulnerable to the elements. In Djibouti, where conditions are particularly difficult and movements on foot most common, nearly all migrants interviewed complained of heat, fatigue, hunger and thirst as the main challenges during their journey. Journeys on foot can take days, with one migrant describing spending seven days on the road from the border to Obock. Under these circumstances, death caused by thirst and exhaustion is common, and the Gendarmerie estimates that between two and five migrants transiting through the desert areas in Afar region of Ethiopia and Lac Assal in Djibouti die every week (Altai Consulting, 2016). This has led to a number of organisations calling for mobile support units to be funded and made available to migrants in order to provide much-needed support under harsh climatic conditions.

“I’m really exhausted with the hunger but I will continue my journey.” Ethiopian migrant, Obock

“We walked long hours without water nor food, with the heat, and lack of means”. Ethiopian migrant, Obock

grenades at a branch of Central Bank. On 27 February 2017, attackers launched grenades at a military checkpoint, near to a popular restaurant located in Netco area. On 4 March 2017, attackers launched grenades at the main court building.
4.3. Unfinished journeys

Due to the above-mentioned risks, abuse and hardships, a large number of migrants never complete their journeys or reach their intended destination. They may be forcibly or voluntarily returned to their place of origin, deported to another country, prefer to settle permanently in a transit location, or die during the journey.

IOM provides assistance to stranded migrants who seek assistance for their voluntary return to their country of origin. In 2016, IOM evacuated over 3,000 Ethiopian migrants by boat from Al Hodeidah to Djibouti, and over 500 migrants by air (Veerassamy, 2017). According to interviews with its staff, the organisation receives 15 to 20 requests per week from migrants in Djibouti wishing to return to their country of origin. Recently, IOM, UNHCR and the Federal Government of Somalia have been working together to facilitate the return of Somali refugees from Yemen to Somalia. 127 Somali refugees were repatriated in late 2016, followed by another 106 Somalis returned by plane to Mogadishu on 27 February (Hiiraan Online, 2017). It is expected that more repatriations will follow. Other migrants have been forcibly detained and then deported (generally to neighbouring countries, not necessarily their country of origin) by the Yemeni, Djiboutian and Puntland authorities, often under deplorable conditions (refer to Section 4.1. for more on this).

An unknown number of migrants also choose to settle either permanently or indefinitely in transit locations. Researchers interviewed a number of these people in Puntland, and discovered that many had married Somalis and established local businesses. Very often these migrants provided much-needed support to other migrants passing through, in the form of shelter, food and loans. Establishing a sustainable livelihood was a main reason behind decisions to stay, and some interviewees reported that they would choose to stay in the transit areas should they secure long-term employment. Not all incidents of settlement are positive, however, and in many cases, migrants who stayed did so through a lack of choice. The researchers interviewed a number of migrants who had become stranded, without sufficient funds or assistance to either continue their journey or return to their country of origin. For this group, their living conditions and prospects are extremely bleak, and they require immediate humanitarian assistance. In one example, a female migrant from Ethiopia had been forced to pay extra fees to the smugglers who transported her to Bossaso, leaving her in debt and destitute, and without the funds to continue her journey or return home.

A third group of migrants never complete their journey due to death along the route, both overland and maritime sections. Migrants are known to die of thirst, exhaustion, abuse and drowning. Given the large numbers of migrants journeying between the HoA and Yemen and the range of significant and real dangers they face, it is perhaps surprising that the number of recorded deaths is not higher (see Figure 9). However, official figures represent only a small proportion of the overall migrant deaths as a significant, though undocumented, number of deaths are never officially reported or recorded. Considerable numbers of these deaths are thought to occur on sea crossings, and monthly data from 2014

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Numbers represent only deaths that are reported by government authorities, media, the UN or NGOs, so these are the minimum of the actual numbers.
to 2015 suggests migrant deaths are more likely to occur between October and March (see Figure 10).

*Figure 9: Recorded migrant deaths in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea 2006-2015 (IOM, 2016) (IOM, 2017)*

*Figure 10: Monthly trends in migrant deaths in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea compared across 2014, 2015 and 2016.*
4.4. Who is most at risk?

Some groups of migrants may be more vulnerable to abuse and hardship than others. It is widely believed that migrants who have recruited the services of smugglers find themselves more vulnerable to abuse and hardship. Smuggling and trafficking networks have been widely accused of carrying out abuse and exploitation of migrants, and migrants under their supervision may therefore be at greater risk. Furthermore, migrants are often in a position of weakness vis-à-vis smugglers and traffickers. They may be forced to rely on them for food, accommodation and communications. Their activities and movements may also be monitored by armed guards, putting them at greater risk of abuse, as many of these guards have been accused of looting, sexual abuse and murder (Mixed Migration Taskforce Somalia, 2008). Given the relative impunity under which the networks operate, and their alliance with corrupted officials, migrants can expect limited assistance from the authorities, not least because their own status is generally irregular.

While the findings of this research substantiate claims that much of the abuse is carried out by smugglers, it is not clear that migrants who have recruited their services are necessarily the most vulnerable. For example, migrants travelling independently from smugglers may be more vulnerable to abuse from state officials, as they cannot rely on smugglers to bribe them to turn a blind eye, allow them onward passage, or release them if detained. Likewise, migrants who choose to travel independently may be subsequently picked up by other smuggling or trafficking groups and suffer worse treatment. According to one community key informant in Bossaso, “migrants must negotiate with agents in Ethiopia to arrange their travel to Bossaso and Yemen, as otherwise they will be captured and tortured by the trafficking groups to get money out of them.” Similarly, another migrant interviewed in Obock stated: “smugglers informed us, and it went well, and we suffered less inconveniences from police or thieves.” Given the growing tendency of smugglers to coerce migrants, through threat or force, into accepting their services, migrants who resist these efforts may place themselves at even greater risk of abuse. In addition, migrants who travel independently from smugglers often do so on foot, leaving them extremely vulnerable to harsh climatic conditions in Djibouti, Yemen and Puntland, along whose routes many migrants are known to die. Finally, levels and risk of abuse at the hands of smugglers are higher in contexts like Yemen, than Puntland or Djibouti, meaning that risk of abuse may rise and fall as the journey progresses. While this report in no way seeks to exonerate smuggling networks, these examples do point to the need for a more nuanced approach when it comes to evaluating their impacts on migrant vulnerabilities.

Migrants that do not register with governmental or non-governmental humanitarian agencies may also more susceptible to abuse and hardship. However, no direct connections of this were uncovered by this research, and there are limitations to this assumption. By not registering, they may be excluded from support and assistance provided by these institutions, as many NGOs only provide support to migrants in possession of refugee cards or official identification. This being said, as shall be explored in Section 6, support to migrants is extremely limited, and even when migrants do register, it is not clear whether they will receive sufficient or any support. In any case, some groups are more likely to register than others: Somalis have prima facie refugee status in Djibouti and Yemen, and are therefore more likely to register than Ethiopians, who do not gain refugee status as easily.
and are generally intending to move on to Saudi Arabia as soon as possible. Migrants that register at the MRCs can receive much-needed support and assistance, however many do not approach them either because they are not aware of them, or are suspicious that the centres are connected in some way with government agencies, who may subsequently move to detain and deport them.

Gender is another important consideration. Female migrants are more vulnerable to abuse, in particular rape and sexual assault, especially from smugglers. A number of Ethiopian female migrants reported being held hostage and repeatedly raped by smugglers in Yemen for six months. One of the migrants was only released when they discovered that she was pregnant. Another female migrant described how smugglers tried to separate her from the rest of the migrants after she was unable to pay them an additional fee. The other migrants intervened and lent her the money, without which she was sure she would have been abused and raped by the smugglers. Interviews with irregular migrants and their relatives highlighted how female migrants in Yemen are being forced into prostitution, particularly those trapped by fighting. In support of these claims, some smugglers are known to routinely distribute condoms to everyone working within their network, on the assumption that they will try to rape female migrants in their charge (RMMS, 2015). Data collected by DRC between April to December 2013 highlighted protection violations against female migrants in Yemen (RMMS, 2014). Kidnap was the most common violation with 58% of those interviewed claiming to be either a victim or a witness to a kidnapping. This was followed by physical assault (17%); sexual and gender based violence (12%); shooting and robbery/ extortion at (6%); interception at sea (4%); and ransom paid, detention and forced landing (2%) (RMMS, 2014). However, it should be noted that men are also vulnerable to sexual and other forms of abuse during migration. In support of this claim, a number of interviewees indicated that rape was a risk for both sexes, particularly as a form of abuse for extracting payment for ransoms from migrants being held hostage by criminal groups.

Age is another factor, and children, especially unaccompanied migrant children, are very vulnerable to protection risks and hardship. Child migrants, particularly those travelling without guardians or documentation, struggle to access education or health services, or claim welfare rights. In Djibouti, sources report migrant children being subjected to severe hardship and abuse, including being excluded from schools, sleeping on the streets, and engaging in risky activities, such as drugs taking, prostitution and begging. Others sustain injuries after falling from trucks during their journey. They are also more susceptible to abuse and SGBV at the hands of smugglers, criminal groups and the authorities. Both women and children are at greater risk of being trafficked. Groups in Djibouti have been accused of kidnapping women and children, holding them to ransom to pay extremely high rents and forcing them into prostitution or domestic servitude in order to make the payments (US Department of State, 2016). In Puntland, the Ministry for Women and Social Affairs reported preventing 42 young girls between the ages of seven and 13 from being trafficked to Yemen and Saudi Arabia for the purpose of domestic work and prostitution. In spite of this, it is worth noting that migrant women and children are not always passive victims to migration, but may have taken an active and conscious decision to migrate for reasons of their own. When asked why these children are migrating, respondents in Djibouti

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45 NB: Somalilanders are no longer granted prima facie refugee status in Djibouti, and their cases for refugee status are assessed individually.
indicated that some are thrown out of home, while others choose to leave of their own accord. Many migrant children do not use smugglers, but travel independently via road or rail using similar routes to adults, demonstrating a certain level of agency and determination. Indeed, according to one interviewee, of a group of 13 children repatriated back to Ethiopia, five returned back to Djibouti, bringing more unaccompanied child migrants with them.

Nationality and ethnicity can also play role in the levels of abuse experienced by migrants. Migrants coming from countries, or parts of countries, that share cultural, language or religious similarities with the hosting community are more likely to receive greater protection and support than those from different backgrounds. For example, Ethiopians in Puntland are generally exposed to greater abuse than Somali migrants, who can often rely on support from clan and family for accommodation and employment opportunities. Incidents of abuse are much less common amongst Somali returnees migrating to and through Puntland, than Ethiopians travelling in the opposite direction. Ethnic affiliations, and links with clan and family can serve as an important means of protection and reprieve in a context where humanitarian assistance and other support is limited. Socioeconomic background and migrants’ access to financial and social capital can also go some way to alleviating these risks. Wealthier migrants can purchase a complete package to their destination, and can generally expect to receive a better and safer service. At the same time, however, evidence suggests that some traffickers target Somali migrants, perceived as wealthier than Ethiopians and with better connections, for kidnapping and extortion.

To sum up, it is problematic to reach any firm conclusions on which migrants are most at risk of protection risks, abuse and hardship. It is clear that all migrants are at risk, but that much will depend on their individual circumstances, gender, age and means of travel, as well as the social and financial networks they can rely on. Furthermore, it should not be assumed that women and children are necessarily passive victims, as many have actively chosen to migrate for reasons of their own, and live through positive experiences and outcomes as a result.

5. What is the impact of these movements on local communities and wider society?

In addition to understanding the impact of migration on the lives of migrants, this report is also concerned with its impact on local communities and wider society. The analysis will focus on the transit locations of Obock and Bossaso, which are a case in point due to small populations and persistent under-development. Migrants and local communities suffer many of the same hardships, as poverty, unemployment, vulnerability and drought are a feature of both contexts, and the influx of large numbers of additional people is putting further pressure on already
overstretched social services, natural resources and livelihoods. Acknowledging the challenges and difficulties faced by communities serves as an important reminder of the need to implement policy and programmes that benefit both migrants and hosting communities. Failure to do so can create tensions and discrimination, and has the potential to undermine already strained relations between these two groups.

Obock’s population size is relatively small, especially when taking into account the relatively large numbers of migrants passing through. It can be assumed that the impact of migration on these populations will be felt more keenly than in larger and more populous settings with greater absorption capacity. Djibouti is a small country of less than 900,000 inhabitants and 1,000 square km of arable land. While data on migrants is difficult to confirm, some estimate that migrants made up over 12% of the entire population in 2015, with an estimated 400 migrants transiting Djibouti each day (Green & Snyder, 2017). Around 70% of the population live in the country’s capital, Djibouti Ville, whose population is estimated to be 624,000. While Bossaso’s population size is not as small as Obock, given the large numbers of migrants crossing the Arabian Sea every year, the impact of migration on the city and its population is likely to be substantial.46 The Puntland Ministry of Interior has described Bossaso city as “the biggest transit and destination point of mixed migration across the HoA” (Refugee Affairs Division Bossaso, 2016).

In addition to small population sizes, Obock and Puntland are characterised by high levels of poverty and under-development, meaning that already-strained resources and services may be stretched further by the influx of large numbers of migrants. In spite of economic growth (about 6.5% in 2015-2016), Djibouti remains a poor country with 23% of the population living in extreme poverty and in rural areas, 96.5% of the rural population lives below the poverty line (The World Bank, 2017). With limited natural resources (such as arable land and water) and an underdeveloped agricultural and industrial sector, livelihood and employment opportunities are limited, and the country is reliant on imports to meet food requirements. Its economy largely depends on foreign financing, Foreign Direct Investments, rents from foreign countries’ military bases, and port services (World Bank, 2016). In Djibouti, over 60% of households do not have access to improved water sources and women in rural areas often walk four to five hours per day transporting water (FAO, 2017). In Obock Region almost 60 percent of households are food insecure and acute malnutrition rates are above 25% (ibid). Likewise, in Puntland, poverty remains widespread, with rudimentary and fragmented institutions, and a lack of basic infrastructure. Drought, mentioned earlier in this report, has undermined resilience and weakened the resilience of local communities, leaving them extremely vulnerable to shocks.

46 Bossaso’s population is estimated to be between 600,000 and 700,000, including IDPs located in 27 temporary camps surrounding the city.
In this context of limited absorption capacity and underlying poverty and under-development, it is not surprising that some members of the community feel resentment towards migrants, and expressed concerns about many of the same issues relating to local economy, health and local values. Generally speaking, however, community respondents voiced mixed feelings towards migrants, recognising that migration brought about both positive and negative impacts on their community. The most commonly reported positive impacts related to economic opportunities associated with the opening of new restaurants, shops and businesses. This raises the question of whether the local economy would suffer if migration was reduced or prevented. On the other hand, frequently cited complaints centred around poor sanitation, the spread of disease, competition over jobs, cultural differences, and inter-ethnic clashes between Ethiopian migrants. It is worth noting that some members of the community are bound to be more positively inclined towards migrants than others, in particular those who stand to benefit from their presence. Migrants may also be used as scapegoats for common grievances that have little to do with migration, such as a lack of jobs and livelihoods, and limited basic services.

When considering the impact of migration on these locations, it is important to bear in mind several

“We can say the presence of migrants has both positive and negative impacts on the community. It is good for the shops and businesses in the area, but social, behavioural and cultural differences are seen as negative.” Community key informant, Bossaso.

“Migrants have caused some neighbourhoods to become overcrowded and dirty, and they engage in drug abuse and inappropriate behaviour. But at the same time, as a shop owner I have benefited from their presence, as they buy stuff from my shop.” Community respondent, Bossaso.
points. Firstly, the majority of migrants are in transit, and most will pass through Puntland and Djibouti within a matter of days or weeks. According to one migrant interviewed in Obock: “We do not have impacts because we’re just passing through without staying for one day in any given place”. Whilst the numbers may be significant, their short-term presence may constrain the real or long-lasting impacts of migration, both positive and negative. While migrants moving from the HoA to Yemen may stay for a short period only, and have limited interaction with host communities, migrants travelling in the opposite direction, refugees and returnees, may have a very different impact. Refugee and returnee respondents generally report staying for significantly longer periods of time, have better access to basic services, such as health and education facilities, and, depending on government policy, may be granted permission to work, thereby putting pressure on local labour market. Secondly, levels of interaction and contact between migrants and the community as a whole are likely to be limited. Migrants (in particular Ethiopians) tend to live together in particular neighbourhoods or in designated lodgings. In Bossaso, for example, Ethiopian migrants live in Kawda Lulyo or Sawiti neighborhoods, and Yemeni refugees tend to congregate in dedicated settlements in Qardo. Smugglers may restrict their movements beyond these areas, and language differences represent a major barrier to communications. While migrants are no doubt a visible presence in places like Obock and Bossaso, the extent to which they impact on the daily lives and routines of local communities may be less significant than commonly assumed. Thirdly, different members or groups of the community are impacted both positively and negatively, and to greater and lesser extents, depending on a range of factors, including levels of interaction, socioeconomic status, and personal experience. For example, wealthier business owners interviewed by this project tended to be more positive about migration than poorer communities located near to migrant dwellings and who found themselves in competition with migrants over job opportunities.47 Finally, community perceptions of migration may shift over time. A number of community respondents in Obock described how migration has economically benefitted their community in the past, but that now the situation is no longer sustainable as services and resources have been placed under too much pressure.

Overall, however, in spite of the pressures faced by local communities, this report documents many acts of generosity and kindness towards migrants transiting through Bossaso and Obock. During FGDs in Bossaso, participants from the local community suggested that Ethiopia was hosting large numbers of Somali refugees, and that the Somali community should show the same level of support to Ethiopian migrants. What’s more, migrants did not report any significant difficulties in living alongside local communities. One Ethiopian interviewee described that while feeling like a burden on the community of Obock, he had had no problems with the community while living there. This contrasted to the experience of migrants in Somaliland who reported an increase in xenophobic attacks, particularly against Oromos (Altai Consulting, 2016). These examples point to the potential for a relatively harmonious relationship between migrants and local communities, and policy and programmes should seek to build on this. In this context, this section will argue that migration represents both an opportunity and a challenge to the communities of Obock and Bossaso, particularly when it comes to the local economy and labour markets, health,

47 In Bossaso, Ethiopian Oromo migrants typically live in Kawda Lulyo neighborhood, located north-west the city. Ethiopian migrants from Amhara and Tigray ethnic groups tend to live in Sawiti neighborhood near the Port in the north of Bossaso town.
security, and local values. These topics were consistently raised by community, governmental and civil society respondents during interviews and FGDs, and discussion around these will take up the rest of this section.

5.1. Local economy and labour market

Migrants transiting through Obock and Bossaso undoubtedly stimulate the local economy. What is less clear, however, is the extent of this economic stimulus, and which individuals or groups stand to gain financially from their presence. As indicated in the earlier section on costs, smuggling in migrants between the HoA and Yemen represents a multi-million dollar industry. As two of the main gateways along these routes, Obock and Bossaso are in a prime position to benefit financially from this trade. However, in many cases, it is the people involved in this industry who stand to gain, rather than the wider community as a whole. The individuals coordinating the trade at the higher levels maintain the majority of the profits. One smuggler interviewed in Bossaso reported having 20 fibre glass boats, each of which carried between 100 to 130 migrants to Yemen twice a month; equivalent to between 4,000 and 5,200 migrants per month paying a total of between US$ 480,000 to US$ 624,000. To what extent do these revenues filter down to the rest of society? Those operating at the lower levels of the smuggling networks, such as agents, brokers, middle men, boat owners, crews, landlords and currency exchangers, certainly benefit from the trade in migrants. According to one boat owner, of the US$ 120 paid to cross the Arabian Sea, US$ 60 was kept by the agent and the other half by him. The boat owner made two trips per month, transporting 140 migrants on each trip, which would mean a monthly income of around US$ 14,000.

However, these individuals represent a minority of the overall population, and it is not clear whether the wider economy stands to gain. Due to its small size and population, economic and livelihood opportunities in Obock are extremely limited, and the smuggling industry represents the major source of employment and income. According to community respondents: “the community lives because of the smuggling” and “the communities and migrants need each other.” Many of those involved in smuggling are young and unemployed, whose livelihoods are totally reliant on smuggling. At the outskirts of Obock, migrants describe having to pay ‘entry fees of around US$ 23 to groups of young people in order to enter the town. In Bossaso, the community as a whole seem less reliant on smuggling for economic and financial stimulus, perhaps because of its larger size and population. Most community respondents in Puntland suggested that, in their experience, the presence of migrants had little impact on the local economy. It is true that migrants represent a potential market for local businesses, however the majority are poor with little disposable income, and the amount they spend in transit is likely to be minimal. Furthermore, in places like Bossaso, smugglers tend to keep migrants away from the local community by lodging them in separate housing units and providing their own food. Migrants’ movements are often limited, and they are sometimes kept under armed guard, which reduces their potential to contribute to the economy. Reportedly, the groups prevent migrants from purchasing mobile phones and credit, as they are concerned that this may encourage the migrants to run away. This further reduces migrants’ impact on the local economy, as they are less likely to be able to use local services or make local purchases.
As described in Section 4.2.3., some migrants take up employment or livelihood opportunities, often in an attempt to raise funds needed to continue their journey. Others have settled to temporarily or permanently, and established their own businesses. In Obock, reports suggest that the influx of Yemen refugees and migrants may be boosting local economies by generating and supporting small businesses, such as restaurants, communications and transport (Secorun, 2016). Likewise, some Ethiopian and Yemeni migrants have settled in Bossaso, Garowe and Qardo, and established tea shops, restaurants, barber shops and other small businesses, mainly near to the port where Ethiopian migrants tend to congregate. The economic benefits of working migrants have not gone unnoticed by governments in the region, with the Government of Djibouti recently moving forward with new legislation to allow refugees to work in the country. Typically, wage-seeking migrants find work in farms, warehouses, cafes, restaurants or as domestic workers or carry out menial work as cleaners and porters. However, their impact on the labour market is mixed, and perceptions varied depending on who was asked and how they were affected. Respondents from the private sector and a number of institutions recognised the potential benefits of migration to the labour market. They asserted that migrants bring new skills, which can benefit local businesses and the economy. For example, Ethiopian migrants from rural backgrounds bring new farming skills and techniques that benefitted the agricultural sector, and have succeeded in finding work in farms. Likewise, Yemeni refugees have brought new catering, bakery and construction skills to places like Qardo, where many have settled. In contrast, community respondents tended to see migrants’ contribution to labour markets as less positive, as it had a more direct impact on their own livelihoods and wellbeing, and placed additional strain on already high levels of unemployment. They complained that the influx of migrants has pushed down local wages, due to increased competition and irregular migrants’ acceptance to work for lower wages.

“Shops and restaurants in areas like Sawaiti neighbourhood have economically benefited from the presence of large numbers of Ethiopian migrants.” Community respondent, Bossaso.

“I don’t think these immigrants have any effect on the local economy. They are poor with little money. The only beneficiaries are smugglers and small shops near to where they stay in Bossaso.”
Key informant, government, Bossaso.

“Migration is positive for the community. Little shops have been created, and it increases economic life”. Community respondent, Obock

48 In Djibouti, unemployment remains widespread reaching 39% in 2015 (according to official estimates), although this figure is higher amongst women (49%) and in rural areas (59%) (The World Bank, 2017).
5.2. Health

There are assumptions that the influx of migrants places a significant strain on basic local services, in particular health facilities. In Djibouti, the Ministry of Health has appealed for help, claiming that 40% of patients at health facilities are migrants (although these figures cannot be confirmed). In Bossaso, local communities complained that migrants use the General Hospital for medical treatment and services. In Yemen, health sector respondents described migrants as a burden on their services as, due to conflict and depleted infrastructures, health facilities are already under enormous pressure. A doctor interviewed in Obock reported attending to 10 to 20 migrants on a daily basis, and reported a shortage of medicines, space and equipment (Altai Consulting, 2016). Likewise, some community respondents in Djibouti complained that medical and other public services were being occupied by migrants. Nevertheless, in general, most migrants do not use public health facilities for fear of being reported to the authorities, due to a lack of funds to pay for treatments and medicines, and because they may be able to access alternative services offered by humanitarian agencies. What’s more, in Puntland, the majority of health facilities are privately owned, meaning that migrants pay and contribute to clinics when they use them, challenging the assumption that they are a ‘drain on the system’.

In addition to public health facilities, community and government respondents interviewed by this project commonly complained about the poor hygiene and sanitation conditions in migrant areas. Community respondents in Djibouti feared the spread of disease by migrants, and an

“Our neighbourhoods have become overcrowded and cause huge sanitation problems. There are concerns from the local people regarding the behaviours of some migrants, in particular drug abuse, opening shisha spots, and engaging in prostitution.”
Community informant, Bossaso.

“Migrants do nothing wrong, except that they create waste, pollute our water sources, and bring diarrhoea and cholera.”
Community informant, Obock.

49 Note that educational facilities have not been included in this section due to the relatively low numbers of children travelling from the HoA to Yemen, and the fact that most migrants are moving in transit, and therefore unlikely to enroll in schools.
outbreak of cholera in Obock during September and October 2016 led to a number of deaths, and was attributed to the influx of migrants.\textsuperscript{50} They also feared that migrants had contaminated their water sources and were responsible for poor hygiene. In Bossaso, areas frequented by migrants are described by interviewees as dirty and unhygienic due to a lack of toilets and sanitation facilities, and local communities fear the spread of disease and infection as a result of open defecation. The port area, in particular, where most Ethiopians reside, was described as very dirty. Respondents also linked migrants to sexually transmitted infections and diseases. They complained that migrants were not ‘medically screened’ and engaged in sexual activities with local youth. Many of these statements were anecdotal, and linked to community members’ perceptions about migrant behaviours and customs. The team did not come across any evidence or data to substantiate claims that migrants have led to an increase in rates of HIV.

5.3. Security

Security issues were reported by some community and governmental respondents as a negative impact of migration. In Puntland and Obock, residents complained that Ethiopian migrants engage in inter-clan fighting. In mid-2016, violent clashes broke out between Oromo and Tigrayan migrants in Bossaso, which resulted in the death of one migrant and undermined security in the local area. As a consequence, Oromo migrants reportedly now live in separate areas to the Amharas and Tigrayans. In Obock, community respondents suggested that while migrants themselves did not cause problems, their presence does create conflict between groups of smugglers. Some respondents speculated over the link between migrants and extremist groups, however, as indicated in Section 3.4., any connections are, as yet, unsubstantiated. Overall, however, community respondents did not associate migrants with security incidents, admitting that they did not cause any security concerns for the community, and viewed them as relatively peaceful. This finding is perhaps surprising as irregular migrants have typically been characterised as a security threat in popular rhetoric and reporting.

In contrast to communities, government respondents were more likely to link migrants with insecurity, and viewed high levels of uncontrolled migration as a significant challenge to local and regional security. In Puntland, representatives of the Ministry of Security are concerned that Somali migrants passing through Bossaso are aligned with Al Shabaab, and have adopted a policy of stopping Somali migrants at control points, and forcing them to turn back. They were less concerned with Ethiopian migrants, although acknowledge that there may be criminals among them, who could seek to undermine local security. Likewise,

\textsuperscript{50} The incident led to between 4-50 suspected deaths in Obock, and the hospitalization of a further 150 people (RMMS, 2016).
the Djiboutian authorities have raised security concerns about the Somali and Yemeni migrant population, although are less preoccupied about the much larger numbers of Ethiopians transiting through the country (RMMS, 2017).

Government respondents were particularly concerned with the growing presence of criminal groups involved in smuggling and trafficking, and their links with an influx of weapons and connections with extremist groups. In these scenarios, insecurity has more to do with the smuggling and trafficking networks than the migrants themselves. These criminal groups are often armed and dangerous, and are known to control strategic areas of the towns and coastal areas. In January 2016, a bus carrying Ethiopian migrants was stopped near a police checkpoint at the entrance to Bossaso. The smugglers controlling the bus engaged in a gun battle with the security forces, which left one Ethiopian migrant dead and two injured. It has also been suggested that Somaliland and Puntland officials are concerned that smugglers’ relationships with certain clans and militias could upset the delicate balance of cooperation and power that the authorities have built up over time to collect and share intelligence to govern their territory (RMMS, 2017).

5.4. Local values

The impact of migration on local traditions and values was a key topic voiced by community respondents during interviews and FGDs in Puntland. Respondents raised concerns about the cultural and religious differences between Ethiopians and Somalis, and complained that Ethiopian migrants did not respect their traditional customs. For instance, they were accused of taking and selling drugs and alcohol, smoking shisha, wearing non-conservative clothes and engaging in inappropriate behaviour, such as kissing in public. The local community feared that their youth were being influenced by these practices and therefore at risk. Community respondents in Obock also tended associated migrants with alcohol and drugs, although many also admitted that it was generally the smugglers who carried out these activities. They also complained that young people were leaving school at a very young age to take up work opportunities in the smuggling industry, which was undermining their education and potential, and creating conflict between parents and their children.

As well as the impact of in-migration on local customs and traditions, a large number of Puntland residents voiced concerns about the impact of out-migration, particularly of young people, on local values. In a relatively new phenomenon, growing numbers of young Somalis are migrating without informing their parents or relatives, thereby bypassing traditional family structures. Community respondents described smugglers ‘brainwashing’ their children, and fear that an exodus of young people will undermine traditions and values. In Somaliland and Puntland, smuggling has gained increasingly negative connotations amongst society, with some declaring it a national disaster and governments seeking to find ways to prevent young people from departing (Ali, 2016). In response, families are engaging in a
number of strategies to reduce out-migration. These include "hooyo ha tahiibin"\textsuperscript{51}, whereby parents purchase taxis for their children in an attempt to get them to stay and find a source of local income, or sending their children to universities in neighbouring countries (Osman, 2017).

6. What are the existing policy and programme responses to this migration?

This section describes the existing policy and programme responses towards migration in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen. These range from responses by states, UN agencies, NGOs and Migrant Response Centres (MRCs), as well as local-level or grassroots responses provided by host communities and migrants. A summary of the different mechanisms for coordination on migration is also given at the level of governments, as well as in response to dedicated task forces, secretariats or offices that deal specifically with migration. For a full overview of the specific governmental ministries/departments, UN agencies, international and national/local NGOs that work on migration, refer to Annexes 3 and 4.

6.1. State Response

Quantifying state responses to migration can be complex. Policy is often unclear or not properly or consistently implemented. For example, the Puntland authorities have taken an inconsistent approach to dealing with national Somali migrants. There have been numerous cases of Somali migrants and IDPs from other parts of Somalia being rounded up and deported by the Puntland authorities under the accusation that they are attempting to cross to Yemen illegally, or join Al-Shabaab or IS factions in Puntland.\textsuperscript{52} This contravenes the Somali constitution and customary laws, which stipulate that Somalis, regardless of individual clan affiliations, can travel within and reside in any part of Somalia. Furthermore, when it comes to dealing with refugees in Puntland, Article 19 of the Constitution prohibits non-voluntary repatriation and outlines the rights afforded to refugees and asylum seekers. Nevertheless, the authorities have been criticised for deporting large numbers of Ethiopian migrants without allowing adequate time for proper refugee status determination (RSD) to ascertain whether there are genuine asylum-seekers among those being deported (IRIN, 2006). There are, however, signs of progress, as a new bill on refugee protection has been temporarily approved by the Puntland Permanent Committee (although at the time of writing, not yet by Parliament), which stipulates that asylum seekers and refugees cannot be deported, unless they pose a danger to national security, have committed a serious crime, or can seek reprieve in another country where they also have nationality. Overall, however, these examples highlight a wider issue of state-sponsored distrust towards migration, whereby state officials tend to view migrants as a security threat or burden to the local

\textsuperscript{51} Loosely translated as mothers begging their sons to not migrate illegally.

\textsuperscript{52} In February 2017, local media sources reported that Puntland authorities arrested, detained and then forcefully deported a number of Somali migrants from South Central Somalia journeying to Bossaso. http://puntlandi.com/sawirro-dowladda-puntland-oo-dib-u-celisay-tahiibayaal-ka-yimid-koonfurta-soomaaliya-oo-dhawaan-lagu-qabtay-garowe-oo-ka-yimid-koonfurta-soomaaliya/
community, even when this may not be the case. As described in Section 5, this viewpoint often contrasts sharply with local communities, who recognised the positives, as well as the negatives, of migration on the community, and did not typically see migrants as a security threat.

The above-mentioned examples also highlight the need to differentiate between state policy and practice when analysing state responses to migration. In many instances, even when states have signed up to and ratified international legislation relating to refugees, smuggling and trafficking and human rights, and developed and enacted legislation of their own, the implementation of corresponding on the ground responses remains limited and, at times, non-existent.\textsuperscript{53} For example, in 2016, the Djiboutian Government passed Law No. 133 On the Fight Against Trafficking in Persons and Illicit Smuggling of Migrants (2016), which followed a similar law (Act No. 210/AN/07/5éme) passed in 2007.\textsuperscript{54} In spite of these two national laws (and Djibouti being a signatory of the Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons and the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime) little progress has been made in arresting the perpetrators or providing adequate protection and support to the victims. While the passing of the new anti-trafficking law has been seen as a positive step, the authorities have previously failed to prosecute any traffickers or complicit government officials, or provide protection to any victims of trafficking between April 2015 and March 2016, and only a handful of arrests have been made since then, leading Djibouti to be classified as Tier 3 (the lowest of the four available rankings) by the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report.\textsuperscript{55} (US Department of State, 2016). A similar scenario can be seen in Puntland, where interviewees were extremely critical of a weak judiciary and its failure to impose harsh penalties on those found guilty of smuggling and trafficking. Boat owners and smugglers detained by the PMPF and transferred to the police station are reportedly released soon after without due punishment or imprisonment.

Discrepancies between official policy and actual practice highlight the need to differentiate between governmental levels and departments, and to take into account their contrasting perceptions, responses and capacities vis à vis migration. While those at the top may be willing to sign up to policy and deliver corresponding rhetoric, those at the bottom may be unaware, unwilling or unable to enact these on their behalf. Deterred by the scale and scope of migration, and lacking in capacity, resources and support, local authorities in the research locations have tended to turn a blind eye to these movements, particularly when they occur along transit lines.

\textsuperscript{53} For a full overview of the national and international legislation relating to the different countries involved in this study, refer to Annex 5.

\textsuperscript{54} Law No. 133 prohibits all forms of trafficking and distinguishes between trafficking and smuggling, and Act No. 210/AN/07/5éme applied to victims of trafficking, with a focus on vulnerable groups, including children, women and physically or mentally disabled.

\textsuperscript{55} Tier 3 is the lowest of the four rankings, and describes “countries whose governments do not fully meet the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so.” (US Department of State, 2016)
routes or in more remote areas. The authorities are most active in the capitals and at designated checkpoints at the entrance to major towns, from where the majority of arrests and deportations tend to occur. As a consequence, the smuggling and trafficking networks have been able to operate with relative impunity. A lack of funds and capacity to deal with migration management or respond to the protection needs of vulnerable migrants was consistently raised by respondents during interviews and FGDs. In many instances, the authorities are reluctant to detain migrants as they lack sufficient resources to either detain, deport or protect them. In Djibouti, interviews suggest that the authorities carry out more arrests of migrants and smugglers than in Puntland. Nevertheless, many respondents describe being arrested by the authorities, often on multiple occasions, but then subsequently released without charge. When the Puntland Maritime Police Forces (PMPF) intercept illegal boats carrying migrants, it releases them back into Bossaso town as it is unable to provide them with shelter, food or support. Similarly, in Yemen, it was reported that the authorities used to detain migrants before the war, but now they cannot do so, as they lack the resources to support or deport them. This may also go some way to explaining why the authorities are reluctant to carry out raids on well-known migrant holding houses, and the coastal launch sites controlled by smugglers.

In this context of limited funding and capacity, states have tended to focus on ‘quick fix’ responses, with limited impact and sustainability. The Puntland Ministry of Security imposed fines on vehicles transporting migrants. However, rather than reduce smuggling, the policy has encouraged smugglers to drive vehicles on rough, off road tracks, and make migrants walk around checkpoints. The Djiboutian authorities reportedly burn the boats used by smugglers, however many of these also function as fishing boats and are owned by local residents, suggesting that local livelihoods may be undermined at the same time. The authorities in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen have established checkpoints at key entry, transit and exit points; however, it is not clear how effective these are. Migrants typically disembark from vehicles to circumvent these checkpoints by foot. Ethiopian migrants reported being deported by the Saudi authorities during previous attempts to cross into Saudi Arabia. However, this had not deterred them from repeating the journey in a second or third attempt to reach Saudi Arabia. According to a migrant interviewed in Obock: “After I was deported from Saudi Arabia, I immediately wanted to go back, and restarted the journey without waiting.” After being deported, some migrants reported waiting just one or two weeks before reattempting the journey, and others admitted to undertaking up to seven repeat journeys. As well as being ineffectual, short-term policies can have unintended effects for migrants’ protection and security. For instance, in response to the Yemeni security forces’ efforts to intercept boats arriving on the coast, smugglers adopted the practice of forcing migrants to disembark at some distance from the coast, in spite of the risk of migrant drownings. In order to reduce the risk of interception and confiscation of boats, smugglers also shift landing points to increasingly remote areas, where migrants may be more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.
Coordination between government ministries is a major challenge when it comes to dealing with migration. A range of ministries and departments are impacted by migration, and should be in a position to contribute to high level discussions and policy (these have been outlined in detail in Annex 4). In practice, however, migration issues tend to be dominated by the ministries of interior or security, typically because states have tended to perceive migrants primarily as a threat to law and order, and security. Government bodies dealing with other sectors, such as justice, health, education, human rights, trade, labour, women and children, generally have less input on migration matters. To improve matters, some sources have suggested establishing a dedicated ministry for migration, with its own budget. While such a ministry would certainly raise awareness and attention towards migration, it would not necessarily resolve issues of coordination and, unless generously funded, may not be very effective. Furthermore, its presence may deter other, ‘non-traditional’ ministries from getting involved in migration issues, under the assumption that migration issues were now being fully addressed, thereby undermining efforts to encourage a more holistic response to migration.

It is clear that the necessary structures are not always in place to ensure proper communication and collaboration across the government. In Puntland, the PMPF frequently lamented a lack of support from the police, judiciary and other government agencies when it comes to maritime tackling of smuggling and trafficking, which undermined their efforts. This may be a result of overlapping responsibilities between different government departments and a subsequent lack of clarity of their respective jurisdictions. For example, the Ministries of Security, Interior, Justice, and Women and Family Affairs are all tasked to respond to human smuggling and trafficking in some way through their various departments and agencies, although in practice the Security and Interior sectors have the strongest mandate, and are the most active. In Djibouti, there are signs that the government is attempting to improve coordination efforts, through the establishment of a coordinating national committee on migration and trafficking, whose membership includes the Ministries
of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice, security services, and the international community. A similar body was set up in Yemen through the establishment of the inter-ministerial National Technical Committee for Combating Trafficking, which includes representatives from the ministries of interior, human rights and justice, among others. Nevertheless, these structures are often undermined by competition between different ministries over funding and supplies made available by international donors to tackle migration. In Yemen, roles and responsibilities often overlap between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with both vying to be seen as the main point of reference when it comes to migration.

Moving beyond national-level coordination, harmonisation at the regional and international level is also important given both the transnational nature of migration and the enormous challenges faced by governments in responding to this issue. However, countries in the region interpret migration in different ways, depending on whether they are sending, transit and/or destination countries (or indeed a mix of all of these), and the associated benefits of migration they stand to gain. This can complicate efforts to respond to migration in a coordinated way. As a country of transit, questions have been raised about whether responding to migration is a primary security or economic concern or the Government of Djibouti (RMMS, 2017). Most of the Ethiopian migrants are not looking to stay in Djibouti, and their impact will be less consequential than for countries of origin or destination. The same can be said for Puntland and Yemen, although both are also places of origin and destination for migrants.

Nevertheless, there are signs that governments in the region are increasingly looking to respond to migration in a more meaningful, systematic and coordinated way. Firstly, in November 2013, a regional conference on Asylum and Migration from the HoA was hosted in Yemen, and attended by representatives from Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Gulf states. The conference led to the Sana’a Declaration, which set out a series of recommendations on how to manage complex migration flows across the region. Secondly, some steps have been taken to improve regional coordination and cooperation on smuggling and trafficking. For example, IGAD’s adoption of Conventions on Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition, which would enable smugglers and traffickers to be arrested in another country from where they committed their crime. However, progress has been slow as few member states have signed up to and ratified these Conventions. Finally, key informants reported that until recently there has been a lack of political will to address migration by governments who tended to view the topic as taboo. Governments in the region were often unwilling to raise difficult questions with their neighbours about the extent and drivers of migration, as well as the involvement of the authorities not only in facilitating irregular movements, but also in abuse and mistreatment of migrants. In recent years, the governments of Ethiopia and Djibouti have become more open to discussing and responding to migration, perhaps in response to the increase in initiatives and funding centred around this issue. For example, in 2016, migrants were classified as beneficiaries in

56 These recommendations included: Addressing the root causes of asylum and migration; Strengthening law enforcement in cases concerning irregular migration; Increasing support for irregular migrant return programs; Enhancing cooperation in the employment opportunities field; Raising-awareness campaigns on the risk of irregular migration; Enhancing protection systems in asylum issues; Regional and international cooperation on addressing asylum and migration issues; and Collecting and analysing data on refugees and migrants as well as follow-up mechanisms.
the Djibouti Humanitarian Response Plan for the first time. The Government of Djibouti has also stepped up controls at the border with Ethiopia, and increased patrols along the routes and areas commonly frequented by migrants.

6.2. UN and NGO Response

A number of UN agencies and local and international NGOs work with migrants in the study areas, many of which were interviewed by this project. (Refer to Annex 3 for a full description of each of these organisations.) Due to the peripheral setting of some of the research areas, and the security risks associated with these locations, the impact and scope of these organisations remains limited. In Yemen, in particular, humanitarian access has been severely restricted since the escalation of conflict, and UN agencies and NGOs have either limited their activities to certain governorates, or withdrawn their presence altogether. In Puntland, repeated attacks by armed groups and militias in Bossaso and Garowe have also restricted humanitarian and development activities. In addition to insecurity, a lack of funding has also undermined UN and NGO responses, and interviewed organisations consistently expressed concern about funding gaps and short-term programming. This was particularly the case for many of the local organisations which, due to irregular and limited funding, work on a project-specific basis, meaning that they are only operational at times when dedicated funding is available.

Some entities work specifically with migrants, although the focus is often on particular groups, such as refugees, IDPs, UMCs or victims of trafficking, as opposed to irregular migrants in general. Indeed, many organisations admitted that their assistance was only available to registered asylum seekers and refugees, and acknowledged that this left the majority of irregular migrants without access to any support. In Puntland, for example, the only facility offering support to irregular migrants is the Migrant Response Centre (MRC). Typically, government policy has made it easier for development and humanitarian agencies to support registered refugees and asylum seekers than irregular migrants. For example, the Puntland authorities have welcomed Yemeni refugees and Somali returnees (who had been living as refugees in Yemen for many years), and has collaborated with UN agencies and NGOs to provide these groups with assistance and support. It is not clear whether similar state-level support would be offered to programmes that target irregular migrants, who have entered the country illegally and are generally seen as a social, economic and security threat by government. For the most part, however, projects and programmes are not migrant-specific, and those that do exist tend to focus on local development targeting local communities. As a consequence, few migrants interviewed by this project reported receiving support from projects or initiatives run by development or humanitarian actors. Likewise, few key respondents were able to give details when asked to elaborate on development and humanitarian projects and programmes in their area. A typical response was, “as far as I know, there are no programmes.” When migrants do report receiving

57 In April 2015, a UNICEF vehicle was targeted by an Al Shabaab improvised explosive device, leaving aid workers dead (Hassan, 2015).
support, these tend to be Yemeni refugees, however even they complained that assistance was not consistent or sufficient to meet their daily needs.58

As has been described earlier in the report, migrants and communities encounter many of the same difficulties and challenges, relating to general poverty, a lack of sustainable livelihoods and limited access to quality basic services. This represents an opportunity to expand programmes to include both migrants and their hosts. Indeed, initiatives that target migrants alone are likely to generate resentment amongst hosting communities, who feel excluded from humanitarian and development opportunities. At the same time, however, migrants’ needs can be quite specific, especially when it comes to offering targeted support to stranded migrants who want to return home, or those who have suffered from abuse and/or trafficking and require specialised counselling and psychosocial support. In this context, trained personnel with dedicated funding are required.

6.3. Migrant Response Centres59

Migrant Response Centres (MRCs) are located along migratory routes and have been established by IOM and partners to provide support and assistance to migrants along their journey. Key activities can include registration and screening, provision of food and non-food items, advice, information and counselling, medical assistance, awareness raising and assistance to return.

- The MRC in Obock was established in 2011 to address security and protection issues faced by migrants in Djibouti. Managed by IOM, it provides assistance to 5,000 migrants annually that choose to return to their country of origin, as well as food, water, accommodation and medical services. Most of the migrants that access its services are Yemeni refugees; of the 35,253 migrant beneficiaries between March 2015 and April 2016, 56% (19,653) were Yemeni (Altai Consulting, 2016).

- The MRC in Bossaso was established in 2009 to provide support and assistance to the large numbers of migrants travelling along this route. It carries out registration and screening of migrants, refugees and returnees, as well as medical referrals (in serious cases), awareness programmes, counselling and advocacy. Contrary to the other MRCs in the region, the Bossaso MRC does not directly provide assistance to return, but it refers migrants willing to return to the IOM office in Bossaso, in charge of AVR (Altai Consulting, 2016).

- In Yemen, IOM manages Migrant Response Points (MRPs) in Aden and Al Hodeidah to address the immediate needs of vulnerable migrants. These are similar to MRCs, and provide migrants with medical care, non-food items, and temporary shelter.

58 Yemeni refugees are entitled to US$ 150 per month, free education for their children, and some food support. However, in the previous year, welfare support was suspended for five months, leaving many refugees in debt up to US$ 2,000 with local businesses, shops and landlords.

59 Also known as Migration Response Centres.
MRCs collect limited data and information about migrants passing through their facilities. Due to their strategic location along the main migratory routes, and their established connections with government, UN and NGO stakeholders, this role could be maximised to improve data collection more generally. IOM has recently developed an ‘MRC Data Collection System,’ a smart phone-based application collects data on migrant profiles and protection needs at a regional level, which can also help to improve data collection on irregular migration (RMMS, 2017).

The main weakness of the MRCs is that the majority of migrants do not make use of their services, either because they are not aware of them, or because migrants’ irregular status makes them reluctant to approach the MRCs for fear of registration or deportation. At the same time, migrants may be reluctant to approach MRCs as they are aware that they will be offered AVR packages, which they are not interested in receiving. According to IOM Djibouti, between 3 and 5% of all migrants stop at the MRC in Obock, equating to an average of between 10-15 migrants per day. MRCs have also been criticised by some for their close alignment with governments, with implications for their impartiality and the risk that they become migrant ‘holding centres’. According to interviews with IOM key informants, IOM policy looks to actively strengthen government oversight and management of these centres, which raises questions about their future independence and places doubt on the likelihood that they will be able to attract larger numbers of migrants in the near future.

Furthermore, there have been concerns about the conditions of the facilities. According to a November statement released by IOM, the Obock reception centre is over-stretched, resulting in insanitary conditions that are a health risk for migrants (IOM, 2016). The Obock MRC has the capacity to support about 100 migrants but, as of October 2016, was hosting 600-700 Ethiopian migrants (Schlein, 2016). Likewise, in a detailed evaluation, Altai Consulting described the facilities at Obock as rudimentary and in need of improvements, with shelter and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities in poor condition, and men, women and children sleeping together under basic outdoor structures (Altai Consulting, 2016). This suggests that even if MRCs did manage to attract larger numbers of migrants, they would struggle to meet their needs due to structural limitations. Since the evaluation was released, the Government of Japan has funded new premises including shelters for women UMCs, as well as WASH facilities (IOM, 2017). The Altai Consulting assessment also recommended the following priority areas for improvement at the Bossaso MRC: increased awareness about the centre; staff training to disseminate information, counselling and legal issues; development of protection issues; and development of synergies with local NGOs (Altai Consulting, 2016).
6.4. Community-level responses

Support provided to migrants at the community level is also important. While pressures between communities and migrants exist, this research has identified a number of cases where local residents provide life changing support to migrants in danger or distress. Community interviewees reported giving migrants food, clothes, medical assistance, and sometimes money. In Djibouti, food and water were the most common form of assistance provided to migrants along the route, and in transit towns. Some respondents also intervened when migrants were being harassed by the authorities, assisted with translations, and guided migrants to particular places or offices where they could access support and assistance. Acts of kindness and charity were particularly common during the month of Ramadan. To corroborate these statements, a number of migrants and refugees described local communities in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen as kind or nice people, who welcomed and helped them. One migrant who had made it as far as Yemen described the communities there as being the most supportive; providing him with food, clothes and money. Another reported that a local Yemeni had saved his life by taking him to the hospital when he had been badly injured after stepping on a landmine. It should be stated, however, that these acts of kindness do not occur on a regular basis and, generally, levels of interaction between migrants and local residents are somewhat limited.

“The Djiboutian citizens we have met have been generous. We are all Muslims, and sometimes people don’t hesitate to give us water and food”. Ethiopian migrant, Obock

“I share my food with migrants every time they knock at my door.” Community respondent, Obock
In addition to local communities, assistance and support from other migrants can also function as a social security net for migrants in trouble or distress. Long-established migrants in Puntland provide shelter and support to new arrivals, particularly those from the same ethnic background. In Puntland, Ethiopian nationals who have resided for some years in Bossaso, reported giving food, accommodation, translation assistance, transport and loans to migrants in need. One had a restaurant, from which she regularly provided free meals to destitute migrants, or those in poor health. In Yemen, migrants from particular countries or regions have set up community-based organisations that provide support to migrants from similar backgrounds. These include an Ethiopian Somali Regional State community centre, an Eritrean Migrants Community (which provides advice and support to Eritreans in detention in Sana’a), and a Somali Youth Committee (which runs awareness campaigns, human rights training, and livelihoods projects for Somali migrants). Migrants ‘on the move’ may also pool their funds to lend money to fellow migrants in need. For example, when a female migrant was in danger of being raped by smugglers, the other migrants in her group intervened and loaned her the money she needed to pay off the smugglers and avoid abuse.

In a context of limited official assistance from governments, UN agencies and NGOs, community-level support provided by host communities and migrants plays a vital role in filling gaps. Due to their irregular status, migrants may be wary of approaching official channels of support, for fear of being registered, arrested or deported, and may be more likely to seek assistance from informal community-based structures. What’s more, they be unaware of official mechanisms for support, or experience language or cultural barriers in accessing these. In this context, policy and programmes should seek to strengthen and build upon grassroots structures of support through funding and capacity building.

6.5. Mechanisms for coordination

A wide range of mechanisms are in place to address migration in a more coordinated and effective way. These include regional and national structures established by both governmental and non-governmental mechanisms. In spite of these, coordination on migration remains a major challenge, suggesting that these kinds of mechanisms require re-thinking of strengthening, if they are to meaningfully bring together the actors and their responses to migration.

- **Mixed migration task forces (MMTF)** have been created through coordination with governments and civil society in Djibouti, Yemen and Puntland. Their purpose is

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60 In Djibouti, the MMTF is co-chaired by UNHCR and IOM and its members include the Djiboutian Red Cross, DRC, European Union, FAO, Germany Embassy, GIZ, ICRC, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNDP, l’Union Nationale de Femmes Djiboutiennes (UNFD), University of Djibouti, UNOPS and the US Embassy. The following government institutions are also represented: Ministry of Interior, ONARS, police, gendarmerie and coast guard, amongst others.

61 In Yemen, the MMTF is jointly chaired by UNHCR and IOM. DRC holds the secretariat for the group. INTERSOS, the Society for Humanitarian Solidarity (SHS), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), Save the Children Sweden, the Yemen Red Crescent, Care International and
to reinforce cooperation, share information and coordinate responses to mixed migration.

- **IGAD** has adopted a Regional Migration Policy Framework to address the challenges related to migration governance in the IGAD region, with the ultimate objective of protecting migrants and realizing the development potential of migration. IGAD’s five-year Migration Action Plan (2015-2020) prioritises labour migration management, mobility of pastoralist communities, building national data systems, and free movement of people in the IGAD region. Since 2008, a Regional Consultative Process has been set up to promote dialogue and cooperation on the various issues related to migration. Through this process, IGAD Member States search for a common rationale on how to manage mobility of people and to reduce irregular migration.

- **IGAD’s Regional Secretariat on Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration** was recently established with support from the World Bank. It aims to promote dialogue on migration between member states, provide technical assistance to government, harmonize policy, conduct research in the region, and improve data collection and migration tracking.

- The **AU**'s approach to regulating migration is informed by the vision of African economic integration outlined in the 1994 Abuja Treaty, which aims to “achieve progressively the free movement of persons, and to ensure the enjoyment of the right of residence and the right of establishment by their nationals within [the African Economic] Community.” (Achiume & Landau, 2015). Efforts against trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants are guided by the African Union Migration Policy Framework for Africa, the Ouagadougou Action Plan, and the AU Commission Initiative against Trafficking. It has established a number of initiatives and platforms relevant to migration. These include the African Union Horn of Africa Initiative against Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants, and the AU Permanent Representative Committee Sub-Committee on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.

- The **Khartoum Process** launched at the end of 2014 is a high-level, inter-continental political process that seeks to harmonize existing AU and EU-led components. It aims to establish a continuous dialogue for enhanced cooperation on migration and mobility, while identifying and implementing concrete projects to address trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of migrants and thus giving new impetus to the regional collaboration between countries of origin, transit and destination in the Horn of Africa and the European Union.
• The **Office of the Special Envoy for Children’s and Migrants Rights** was established in 2015 in Somalia, and sits within the Office of the Prime Minister. Its role is to advocate for the rights of Somali migrants abroad; raise awareness about migration issues and advise the Federal Government of Somalia on these issues; support coordination among the different ministries on migration management, and help them to develop migration policy; and act as a focal point to the AU and IGAD.

• The Federal Government of Somalia has created three country task forces to respond to migration management. These include:
  - **High-Level Task Force on Migration Management** (led by the Ministry of Internal Security), which is responsible for policy and legislation.
  - **Technical Task Force on Human Smuggling and Trafficking** (led by the Ministries of Internal Security, and Justice and Judicial Affairs), which is responsible for strategy and programming.
  - **Technical Task Force on Return and Readmission** (led by the Ministry of Internal Security), which is responsible for coordinating returns and readmissions.

• In 2015, an inter-agency **Somalia Task Force on Yemen Situation** was established to improve coordination. Co-led by UNHCR and IOM, it includes all relevant UN agencies and NGOs involved in humanitarian activities. It is responsible for coordinating the following activities: monitoring and rescue at sea, reception, registration, assistance and response upon arrival, provision of onward transportation assistance to areas of return (for Somali returnees) and areas of refuge (for refugees) (IOM, 2015).

• **A Child Protection Working Sub-Group** has been established in Bossaso, with membership from international and local NGOs, and provides support to victims of trafficking. It works under the umbrella of the Somali Protection Cluster and the National Child Protection Working Group (CPWG) and is chaired by UNHCR. It is a forum through which other child protection programmes in Puntland can coordinate interventions, create partnerships and linkages for better prioritization of available resources and consensus on issues, to better prioritize protection and commitment with an overall goal of enhancing the protection of children.

• The **Somalia NGO Consortium** is a voluntary coordination mechanism for NGOs operating in the country, which carries out advocacy, information sharing, coordination and representation activities.

• The **Task Force for Population Movement (TFPM)**, co-led by IOM and UNHCR is a Technical Working Group of the Yemen Protection Cluster. The TFPM implements an information management tool that gathers data on the status and location of displaced persons across Yemen.
7. What are the Gaps and Opportunities for Future Policy and Programming?

As outlined in the introductory section of this report, the purpose of this research is to contribute to the identification of areas of effective policy interventions by achieving the following objectives:

1. To provide a rigorous, research-based analysis that improves understanding of the causes and consequences of dangerous and exploitative migration between the HoA and Yemen;
2. To understand the actual and potential role of policy interventions in mitigating the impacts of this migration in areas of origin and transit in the HoA.

Based on the analysis provided in the earlier sections, this section responds to Objective 2 and the actual and potential role of policy interventions. This part of the report does not attempt to describe detailed or specific proposals for intervention. Rather it identifies gaps and opportunities for future policy and programming, which can be used as a platform for elaborating more detailed and extensive plans for implementation.

The gaps and opportunities detailed below are an overview of the recommendations that emerged from stakeholder consultations (with migrants, government, NGOs, civil society and communities) during the research project. They relate to the range of beneficiaries and targets, including migrants, host communities, local organisations, and government institutions. Likewise, the thematic areas of intervention are also intentionally varied, in relation to the wide scope of factors and dynamics linked to migration along these routes.

It is worth noting that gaps and opportunities will be shaped by underlying socioeconomic and political structures, such as government policy, national and regional capacity, and available funding. In this regard, some suggestions may be more relevant in some contexts than others. Furthermore, given the transnational nature of migration, successful interventions may involve multiple geographies, including places of origin, transit and departure. Finally, the routes along which migrants move are often located in peripheral and remote areas, which implies the need to engage with stakeholders at multiple levels, including central and local, when it comes to implementation.

7.1. Provide greater protection and assistance to migrants

Where are the gaps?

Section 4 describes how migrants suffer from a range of protection risks and abuses (including physical and sexual abuse, robbery, interception, detention, exploitation and death), as well as hardships associated with the general conditions of the journey (a lack of access to food and water, basic services, shelter and livelihoods, and challenges of security and climate). These challenges occur in Djibouti and Puntland and, especially, in Yemen, where a breakdown in law and order has allowed criminal groups to operate with the most impunity. At the same time, due to the peripheral setting of migratory routes, the security risks associated with these locations, funding shortages, and a general lack of capacity
among state institutions, the protection and assistance mechanisms available to migrants are extremely limited. Support and funding is often restricted to recognised migrants or particular groups, such as registered refugees, IDPs, or women and children. However, the majority of people on the move are young, male, non-registered migrants, who have little or no recourse to support in spite of demonstrating significant vulnerabilities and needs. Furthermore, even those migrants that do receive funding and assistance continue to live under extremely difficult conditions. This has driven increasing numbers of Somali returnees and Yemeni refugees in Puntland and Djibouti to risk returning to Yemen before conditions are safe.

**What are the opportunities?**

In this context, expanding the net of protection and assistance to include all migrants, regardless of their status, is a key gap to be filled by policy makers and programmers. This could be provided through a number of avenues:

1. **Strengthen Migrant Response Centres**: MRCs are an existing and functioning structure, with funding, government buy-in and strategic locations along the main migration routes. In this capacity, they represent a viable and attractive channel of protection and assistance to migrants. Nevertheless, their reach is restricted by insufficient infrastructural and staff investment and low migrant attendance (due to a combination of fear, suspicion and lack of awareness on the part of migrants). In particular, MRCs need to build awareness about the support they can offer, and overcome migrants’ fears around government links and possible involvement in deportations. This implies strengthening the independence and impartiality of the MRCs, possibly through the structure seen in Bossaso, where the facility is managed by an independent NGO and all returns are processed in a separate office managed by IOM. Some respondents also recommend putting in place more systematic referral systems so that migrants with particular needs or concerns can more quickly receive the specialised support they require.

2. **Support Mobile Response Units**: Migratory journeys are often long, dangerous and pass through remote and isolated areas. Many migrants die due to heat, thirst and exhaustion, or are subjected to abuse and protection risks. Given limited funding and capacity, the authorities tend to congregate around particular check points, at the entrance to towns or in urban areas, leaving large sections of the routes unpatrolled and unmonitored. Similarly, the existing MRCs in Obock and Bossaso are located on a small part of a much longer route. Mobile response units would go some way to responding to these issues, by providing migrants in isolated areas with basic support (food, water, medical assistance), protection, documentation and other forms of assistance. WHO, IOM and DRC are reportedly looking into this option, the need for which has been identified by a number of key informants. ICRC in Djibouti is also planning to provide an ambulance service along the migration corridors, pending government approval.

3. **Engage community-level groups and structures**: In a context of limited assistance from government and NGOs, the support provided to migrants at the community level by residents, local committees, and civil society groups is especially important.
A number of these are founded and run by long-established migrants, making them particularly popular with migrants who may be suspicious of official mechanisms of support. These grassroots structures offer much-needed and practical support to migrants on the ground, and should be engaged with and strengthened by policy and programmes. This could be achieved through greater funding and capacity building, and greater opportunities for partnership and collaboration with implementing partners. To reduce the risk of hostility and tensions, initiatives that target migrants with assistance should also include support for host communities.

4. **Promote greater coordination between stakeholders**: Sources lamented a lack of coordination between government departments, implementing partners and donors. Likewise, as indicated earlier, many migrants are unaware of the support structures that are available to them. Given limited funding and growing needs, available resources should be maximised through partnership and coordination to avoid duplication and waste, and build capacity. As highlighted in Section 6.5, a number of mechanisms for coordination already exist in all the research locations, and these should be strengthened and utilised as far as possible to build consensus, share information and maximise impact. The fact that a range of such mechanisms already exist, and yet coordination remains a challenge, suggests there may be deeper, more structural issues at play (such as state policy or high-level vested interests), which may be more difficult to overcome.

5. **Provide specialised support for vulnerable migrants**: Sources and evidence suggest that women and children (often unaccompanied) make up a sizeable proportion of migrants travelling to Yemen, possible between 20-30 per cent each. Statistics show that women and children are more vulnerable than men to being trafficked, and to suffering abuse at the hands of unscrupulous smugglers. Unaccompanied and unregistered migrant children also face a lack of access to welfare rights, education, and health services. While this report advocates for greater assistance and protection for all migrants, regardless of their legal status and sex, it should be recognised that some groups are particularly vulnerable and may require specialised support, which is currently rarely available. Careful and considerate assisted voluntary return should be offered to this group, as well as counselling, psychosocial support and legal assistance both in transit and in their country of origin should they choose to return.

6. **Expand the net of support to migrants through ‘non-traditional’ sectors**: Efforts to manage migration should be complimented with specific health, education, and other ‘non-traditional’ migration management sectors. This could be coupled with awareness raising directed at government line departments (in particular agriculture, industry, trade, education, health and employment) to demonstrate to them how migration affects their area of work, so that it is not seen as purely a matter for security and immigration authorities.
7.2. Adopt a more holistic approach to smuggling and trafficking

Where are the gaps?

Section 3 highlights how human smuggling and, to a lesser extent, trafficking, are widespread between the HoA and Yemen. Responding to increased demand and in a context of relative impunity, criminal groups have developed extensive and sophisticated transnational networks, and are seeking new routes and destinations, including expanding their reach to overland sections of the journey, and increasingly facilitating journeys from Puntland to Europe via Yemen. A number of donors and organisations implement anti-smuggling and trafficking interventions typically centred around training, capacity building, policy development and awareness raising (refer to Annex 3). International and national legislation has been signed and ratified, and dedicated departments, agencies, task forces and coordination mechanisms have also been established in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen to specifically respond to these issues (see Annexes 4 and 5). Nevertheless, efforts to respond to the criminal networks involved in smuggling and trafficking have, so far, had limited impact, and the scale and scope of smuggling and trafficking activities has increased in recent years.

What are the opportunities?

The research findings raise doubts about the effectiveness of some of the more heavy-handed law enforcement efforts employed to crack down on smuggling and trafficking networks. There is certainly a place for law and security enforcement efforts. However successful initiatives to manage migration should also assume a wider, more holistic approach that seeks to understand why people move in the way they do and put in place sustainable alternatives. For example, while the actions of traffickers can in no way be justified, it should not be assumed that all those associated with smuggling are necessarily exploitative or abusive. In many cases, they offer a much-needed service to migrants who, with the curtailment of regular channels of migration, have few other means to move. Placing additional limitations on their movements may be counter-productive, as this is likely to compel more migrants to seek smugglers’ services, thereby pushing up prices and subsequent profits for the criminal groups. Crackdowns also drive migrants and smugglers to engage in more dangerous movements in increasingly remote areas, making migrants more vulnerable to abuse. In this context, responses must be wide-ranging and capable of significantly reducing demand for people to undertake irregular migration. While this report does not offer a fail-safe solution to a highly complex issue, it does provide a set of general recommendations and insights based on feedback from stakeholders and research on the ground.

1. **Gather and make available more detailed and extensive information and evidence:**
   Concrete information remains limited on the organised crime groups operating along the HoA-Yemen routes, and represents a research gap, as most surveys have tended to focus on the number of irregular migrants, push and pull factors, and threats along the routes. Furthermore, the civil war in Yemen and the reverse flow of people towards the HoA potentially calls into question studies that were carried out prior to 2015 when conditions were very different. Where information is available on the identity of human smugglers or corrupt officials, it appears that mainly those operating at the lower levels are being successfully targeted. Directed, sustained and
in-depth research, with a focus on investigative enquiry, is required to assess and document the activities and operations of the organized crime groups at the highest levels. This should include the names and details of those involved at the top, information about financial transactions and destinations, and detailed intelligence on allegations into corruption and collusion of state authorities, among others. These findings would help to uncover the full extent of smuggling and trafficking in the region, and provide the evidence needed for successful criminal investigations against perpetrators.

2. **Facilitate greater coordination between stakeholders at national and international levels**: Government sources commonly complained of a lack of coordination and communication among the different national stakeholders involved in responses to smuggling and trafficking. A range of ministries and departments in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen are officially involved in responses to smuggling and trafficking, which has led to confusion and duplication of roles and responsibilities. In some cases, this may suit vested interests as different ministries compete to control migration funding, rhetoric and space. In this context, roles and responsibilities should be clarified, coordination bodies made accountable, and local administrations strengthened to coordinate migration responses at the local levels. Beyond the national level, greater government coordination at regional and international levels is also required if states are to respond effectively to the transnational nature of these networks. This needs to be coupled with serious political commitment at the highest levels. Regional bodies such as IGAD and the AU should be supported in their efforts to bring together different states and find common ground and consensus.63 More could also be done in the areas of cross-border operations, better sharing of intelligence across agencies, and the development of regional or transnational policy in order to improve both security and protection mechanisms for migrants and communities in isolated border areas.

3. **Support effective implementation of anti-smuggling and trafficking legislation**: Even when states have signed up to and ratified international legislation relating to smuggling and trafficking, and developed and enacted legislation of their own, the implementation of concrete and practical responses by state actors remains limited and, at times, non-existent. Deterred by the scale and scope of migration, and lacking in capacity, resources and support, authorities have tended to turn a blind eye to these movements. The authorities in Puntland, Djibouti and (as far as possible) Yemen should be encouraged to follow up on these commitments through targeted sustainable and long-term funding, training and incentives that includes a range of different departments (security, justice, health, education, maritime, internal and foreign affairs) at both central and local levels. This and other research has mapped migration routes and ‘hotspots’, which already helps to provide a geographic starting point for preventive efforts.

4. **Strengthen the police and judiciary**: It is widely accepted that police and security officers turn a blind eye to, and are even involved with smugglers, allowing them to

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63 Within IGAD, the Transnational Organised Crime pillar within the Security Sector Program (ISSP) and the newly formed Regional Secretariat on Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration may be particularly relevant.
operate with near impunity. When arrests do occur, cases are often overturned, not followed through, or the perpetrators are released without explanation. This may be due to insufficient evidence, resources and space in detention facilities, but also suggests the workings of high-level protection mechanisms. Successful punishment and confiscation of smuggling property and equipment (where legally allowed) are a strong deterrent to those involved in the networks. To bring this about, there is a need to link-up the actions of the coastal or local police forces with prosecution authorities. Furthermore, transparent and independent oversight of cases is important to ensure that cases are followed through, and also to identify opportunities for investigating higher levels of the organised crime groups.

5. **Provide viable economic alternatives for those involved in smuggling:** For those working at the bottom of the network (such as boat owners, crews, drivers and brokers) the provision of alternative livelihood and economic opportunities, could help to discourage them from engaging in smuggling activities. This could include vocational training, support to local industries and the provision of small loans to establish new businesses. That said, the profits from alternative local enterprises are unlikely match those of smuggling, meaning that these kinds of initiatives need to be coupled with law enforcement efforts highlighted above.

6. **Raise awareness more effectively:** Awareness campaigns that seek to deter migrants from moving by warning them of the dangers and risks of irregular migration are common. However, most migrants are already aware of the risks and choose to move nonetheless, which calls into question the effectiveness of these campaigns. Furthermore, smugglers are reportedly using awareness activities of their own to counter this discourse, by showing them photos of rescues at sea, and propagating the positive experiences of ‘successful’ migrants who reach their intended destination. In this light, there is a need to focus on other types of awareness campaigns, away from those that seek to deter migration. IOM Ethiopia is planning to conduct a baseline assessment into the impact of awareness campaigns to better inform future programming in this area. Alternative awareness campaigns could include protection campaigns that improve knowledge of support and assistance mechanisms to migrants in need. There is also a space for campaigns that disseminate information around the opportunities and costs of regular migration channels. Awareness campaigns that seek to reduce migrant-community tensions by disseminating information about the reasons behind migrants’ movements and the challenges and dangers they face have also proven effective in the past. Grassroots dissemination of these messages via local community groups that are trusted and known to migrants and communities may be more effective than high-level national campaigns. It is possible that campaigns that focus on social networks and mobile text messaging may be less useful, as many migrants do not carry mobile phones (Altai Consulting, 2016). According to respondents, migrants do not always purchase SIM cards for the country they are transiting, and prefer not to carry anything of value (such as phones and other valuables) for fear of robbery during the journey.
7.3. Expand opportunities for regular migration

Where are the gaps?

State policy in the HoA has tended to focus on restricting movements through mechanisms such as check points, border controls, deportations, and arrest and detention of irregular migrants. The continued growth in the number of migrants moving along these routes suggests that restrictive policies, at least on their own, are not effective in reducing irregular migration. As has been explored in this report, movements are influenced by a range of strong push and pull factors, as well as resilient cultures of migration, which are not easy to challenge. What’s more, the increased criminalisation of migration (and accompanying impunity for the smugglers and traffickers) pushes migrants to engage in riskier and more dangerous journeys, and at a higher financial and personal cost, in an effort to avoid detection from the authorities and reach their intended destination. In this context, a number of individuals and organisations have called for the expansion of opportunities for regular migration as a more effective and humane approach to managing migration. This applies to the Horn of Africa and Middle East, but also to Europe. Labour migration has been chosen as one of the four key policy areas of the African Union Commission (AUC)’s Ouagadougou + 10 Declaration and Plan of Action on Employment, Poverty Eradication and Inclusive Development. Likewise, IGAD’s five-year Migration Action Plan (2015-2020) prioritises labour migration management, mobility of pastoralist communities, building national data systems, and free movement of people in the IGAD region. These examples suggest that there is an appetite amongst states for opening up legal channels for migration within the HoA, which should be pursued and encouraged through dialogue, incentives and regional consensus.

What are the opportunities?

1. **Create better awareness of the legal avenues for migration:** Opportunities for regular migration exist. For example, the Government of Ethiopia has conducted bilateral labour agreements with Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan. Likewise, Uganda has reached bilateral labour agreements with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar, and is exploring additional partnerships with Bahrain, UAE and Turkey, among others. However, migrants may not be aware of or eligible to apply for these legal avenues, or have inaccurate or missing information about how to access them. Policy and programmes should seek to expand awareness and knowledge of these legal avenues, so that larger numbers of migrants apply.

2. **Increase opportunities and make them more inclusive:** While opportunities for regular migration do exist, there are not enough to meet demand and, in many cases, they are not open to all migrants. For example, young men, who represent the majority of migrants, cannot benefit from agreements on domestic labour migration, which make up the bulk of bilateral agreements. Furthermore, application processes remain centralised in capital cities, excluding would-be migrants from rural areas who cannot afford to come to the city to apply, or who do not possess the necessary literacy skills to do so. Policy and programmes should look to expand legal avenues for labour by: promoting bilateral, regional and sub-regional agreements between countries; encouraging circular and temporary migration schemes; expanding
scholarship and study schemes; and increasing resettlement quotas and humanitarian visas. This applies not only to countries within the HoA and the Middle East, but also to Europe where, at the recent Malta Summit, IOM’s Regional Director for Europe urged the EU to open up currently non-existent legal avenues for African migrants (Rankin, 2017).

3. **Clarify the costs of regular migration:** Opportunities for regular migration are often perceived to be more expensive, and therefore less attractive than irregular means. Many recruitment agencies and/or public employment agencies in Ethiopia charge fees of between US$ 200-800 to migrants using their services (RMMS, 2015). These costs are on par with those associated with irregular movements and, depending on the destination and means of travel, may even be cheaper than the service offered by smugglers. Cost was identified as a key factor in migrants’ decision-making, and financial incentives can be an effective way of encouraging migrants to pursue regular migration channels. To achieve this, steps should be taken to better regulate these organisations to ensure that fees remain competitive, and only include legitimate costs (travel, visa and insurance costs are supposed to be paid by the employer and not the migrant). Efforts should also be made to inform migrants of the actual costs of regular migration (possibly through awareness campaigns) and provide financing options for poorer migrants. Finally, recruitment agencies should be encouraged to open up their services to more male migrants and their skills, as most typically focus on domestic work opportunities that favour women.

4. **Make regular migration safer:** Regular migration channels are also associated with risk and danger, and efforts should be made to improve on this. Saudi Arabia’s officially recognised ‘kafala’ or visa sponsorship system has been criticised for tying female domestic workers’ legal residency to their employers, thereby granting employers’ excessive power over workers and facilitating physical, sexual and emotional abuse (Human Rights Watch, 2015). Reforms have been made to improve the system, but domestic workers are broadly excluded from the Labour Law, and abuse continues, including forced labour, trafficking, or slavery-like conditions (ibid). Sending countries also have a role to play, and should take steps to: better regulate recruitment and employment agencies; provide greater oversight and implementation of bilateral and other agreements; generate better awareness and strengthening of protection mechanisms in place for migrants through pre-departure training and dissemination; establish embassies and deploy additional labour attachés to improve protection services offered abroad; and support and assist migrants who have been deported or suffered abuse whilst abroad.

7.4. Support local communities affected by migration

**Where are the gaps?**

Migrants and local communities suffer many of the same hardships. Both Obock and Bossaso are struggling to absorb the influx of migrants and refugees, and living conditions remain difficult for both local residents and migrants. Poverty, unemployment, vulnerability
and drought are a feature of both contexts, and the influx of large numbers of additional people is putting further pressure on already overstretched social services, natural resources and livelihoods. This underlines the importance for policy makers and programmers to implement initiatives that take into account both migrants and residents. Failure to do so can create tensions and discrimination, and has the potential to undermine already strained relations between these two groups.

What are the opportunities?

1. **Expand livelihood and employment opportunities:** Community respondents complained of a lack of livelihood and employment opportunities, compounded by competition from job-seeking migrants willing to work at lower wages. Policy and programmes should seek to generate new and sustainable opportunities for local communities. Where possible, these should take advantage of the influx of migrants, by building on the new skills and investments they can bring, and seeking to tap into this potential market. Another option would be to establish employment schemes that include both hosts and migrants; however, this would only likely extend to migrants that have been registered or recognised by the state, such as particular groups of refugees.

2. **Make improvements to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH):** Poor hygiene and sanitation, and a lack of clean water supplies in the neighbourhoods frequented by migrants, were a key concern amongst host communities. Policy and programmes should seek to expand and improve WASH facilities in these areas, and provide training and behavioural change awareness in areas where open defecation is common.

3. **Organise awareness and solidarity campaigns for communities and migrants:** Community-level perceptions that migrants pose a threat to traditional values and culture could be alleviated through initiatives that seek to bridge cultural divides and promote a better understanding of the experiences of both migrants and communities. These could increase awareness of local cultures and traditions, as well as the drivers and realities of irregular migration. In a context of limited official assistance from governments, UN agencies and NGOs, community-level support fills a vital gap, and efforts to improve understanding and solidarity between communities and migrants would give further strength to such initiatives.

4. **Support resilience programmes:** Communities in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen have been severely affected by drought, which has reduced water sources, depleted crop harvests and livestock stocks, undermined local resilience and livelihoods, and displaced communities. Policy makers and programmers should respond to these immediate needs, and build resilience in the long term.
7.5. Improve data collection and monitoring

Where are the gaps?

Obtaining accurate data on migration between the HoA and Yemen is a challenge. The most reliable data is that collected by UNHCR and partners through monitoring patrol teams positioned along the coastal roads of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea, and compiled by RMMS into monthly summary reports and maps. However, there are significant gaps in this data, and it is likely that the actual numbers of migrants are much higher. Data on migration is also collected by other sources (both governmental and non-governmental); however, much of this has been undermined by inaccuracies, bias and inconsistencies. Furthermore, data is not always widely shared or coordinated and, due to different methodologies and systems, cannot easily be used to make national or regional comparisons with other data sources. Many of these shortfalls are attributed to a lack of dedicated training, capacity, funding and equipment, and a reluctance on the part of government institutions to share sensitive or restricted information. Furthermore, as a number of different entities are simultaneously collecting data, a formal and structured system of coordination has often been lacking.

What are the opportunities?

- **Build on data collected by UNHCR and partners:** As highlighted above, access is a key obstacle to data collection, and insecurity and conflict in Yemen have limited the activities of the monitoring patrols located there. Establishing additional patrols within Puntland and Djibouti could contribute useful and additional data and insight, not least because these locations allow for better access and security. According to RMMS, current funding shortfalls could undermine existing data collection activities in Yemen, and policy and programmes could look to provide financial support to maintain these.

- **Improve data collection by governmental departments:** State agencies in Djibouti and Puntland are in a strong position to contribute to filling of gaps in data collection. However, in general, they lack coordination, capacity, resources and equipment, and could be provided with the necessary financial and logistical support to streamline and improve their data collection efforts.

- **Support MRCs and mobile units to collect more data:** MRCs in Obock, Bossaso and Yemen are strategically placed to contribute to data collection and, in many instances, are already accumulating information on migrants and their routes. However, the main weakness to the MRCs is their reach; in Obock, only 3-5% of all migrants stop at the MRC. This could be improved by taking steps to encourage more migrants to utilise their services (outlined above) and extending data collection activities to mobile units positioned along the main migratory routes.
8. Conclusions

Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen has been taking place for many years for the purposes of trade, livelihoods, family reunification, religious pilgrimage, educational opportunities and in times of emergency. It involves a range of migrants, including so-called economic migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, victims of trafficking and unaccompanied migrant children, from Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen and, to a lesser extent, from other countries in the region. In this sense, this migration can be described as mixed, both in terms of who is migrating, but also in terms of their motivations and drivers. Furthermore, a significant, if unknown proportion of people moving to and from Yemen have protection needs that would classify them as refugees, even if they are not official recognised as so.

Data collected over the last ten years shows an upward trajectory in arrivals from the HoA to Yemen, with record numbers arriving in 2016. However, there is a perception amongst local respondents in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen that there has been a reduction in Ethiopians migrating to Yemen in the last year; a claim which is substantiated by available data. A number of factors may be behind this recent reduction in migrant numbers, including: restrictions on movements of Ethiopians under the ongoing state of emergency; drought and its erosion of resilience, livelihoods and opportunities for migration; an increase in the costs of the journey as smugglers extend their geographic reach, and borders become harder to cross; worsening conditions of conflict, insecurity, hardship and abuse in Yemen (although, contrastingly, this can also serve as a pull factor to migrants who believe this will enable them to transit Yemen undetected); and tighter border controls by transit and destination countries.

Young men from primarily Ethiopia, but also Somalia, represent the majority of those making the crossing to Yemen. However, a sizeable and growing number of female migrants are also on the move, estimated to be between 20-30%, and attracted by the considerable demand for domestic workers in the Gulf states. Data on child migrants is limited, though key informants describe growing numbers of children travelling along these routes, and indicate that unaccompanied migrant children could make up as much as 20-30% of migrant flows towards Yemen. While some migrants stay in Yemen, the majority are hoping to make it to Saudi Arabia. Large numbers of mainly Yemeni and Somali migrants also move in the opposite direction from Yemen to the HoA, for the most part towards Djibouti and Somalia. Among this group, the male-female and adult-child balance is more evenly split, and arrivals from Yemen were 52% male and 48% female, with 46% are under 18 years (UNHCR, 2016).

A growing minority of mainly Somali migrants are also choosing to migrate along a relatively new route to Europe via Yemen, across multiple sea crossings through Puntland, Yemen, Sudan, Libya or Egypt. It is not yet clear why people are migrating to Europe along this route, rather than the cheaper and more popular alternative through Ethiopia and Sudan. The smuggling networks, support structures, and information and knowledge that facilitate movements along this route have strengthened, making it easier to move along this route than before. Tempting ‘leave now-pay later’ schemes are also being offered to would-be migrants by smugglers operating in Puntland to encourage them to migrate to Europe through Yemen. Furthermore, the strengthening of border controls in Sudan and Ethiopia
(particularly in the wake of the State of Emergency in Ethiopia) has made it more difficult and dangerous for migrants to transit through these countries.

As in many contexts, the reasons or drivers for migration between the HoA and Yemen are multiple, overlapping and change over time. Economic factors (in particular a shortage of employment or livelihood opportunities, low salaries and land scarcity) were a principle reason for moving for many Ethiopian and Somali migrants. 45% of Ethiopian respondents, particularly Oromos, identified fear of persecution by the Government of Ethiopia as another key factor. All Yemeni refugees and Somali returnees identified war, conflict and insecurity as the principle driver for their moving from Yemen to Somalia and Djibouti. However, the relationship between insecurity and migration is complicated by insecurity in multiple places of origin, transit and destination, meaning that migrants cannot necessarily exchange a place of insecurity for one of security through movement alone. What’s more, while insecurity may be a push factor for migrants looking to flee insecure contexts, it can also be a pull factor for irregular migrants looking to take advantage of the breakdown of law and order in places like Yemen to pass through the country undetected by the authorities. Family pressures and long-standing cultures of migration also drive many to migrate, often along the same routes and using the same brokers and agents as friends and relatives before them. However, there is growing evidence that migrants are choosing to migrate independently and without the approval of family members. The ‘leave now, pay later’ scheme increasingly adopted by smugglers to entice would-be migrants negates the need to involve family members in the decision to migrate, whilst also implicating them later on in the associated costs.

Yemen, Ethiopia and Somalia have all experienced a deterioration of conditions in recent years for reasons of conflict, political unrest, and drought and food shortages. Such conditions have often given rise to greater levels of migration, and many analysts and observers have attributed the year-on-year growth in migration between the HoA and Yemen to these factors. While the deterioration of conditions in the region has had a significant impact on the movement choices and patterns of different groups of people, it is less clear whether these have been a key driver of migration through Yemen. For instance, unrest in Ethiopia and drought and food shortages in the region do not seem to have resulted in a spike in out-migration towards Yemen and beyond. Likewise, conflict and insecurity in Yemen have not led to a fall in migrants moving to and through the country. This suggests that the relationship between the deterioration of conditions in the region and migration remains complex, and underpinned by a range of other factors. Communities affected by deteriorating conditions often lack the resources and ability to engage in long-distance migration, or any movement at all, as their resources and resilience become increasingly depleted. Those who are able to move may be more likely to migrate internally to nearby urban areas within their own country, or to neighbouring countries than to attempt sea crossings to and from Yemen, and beyond.

Smuggling has certainly contributed to migration patterns between the HoA and Yemen, and there has been an expansion of smuggling activities particularly over land routes, brought about by a combination of growing migrant numbers, substantial profits, and an operating environment of relative impunity. Collusion between smugglers and state officials (including the police, military, intelligence services, border, coast guards and customs authorities) is common, and extends from turning a blind eye in exchange for bribes, to
active involvement in facilitating smuggling and trafficking, and even participation in trafficking, abuse and torture of victims. Organised crime groups are carrying out smuggling with aggravated circumstances, and respondents describe a deliberate shift from facilitating movement to the buying and selling of human beings. In this context, migrants are increasingly coerced or forced into using smugglers’ services. That said, not all smugglers are exploitative or abusive, and migrants differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ smugglers. Furthermore, in a context of limited regular channels of migration and strengthened borders, smugglers can offer a much-needed service to migrants who have few other legal means to move. Viewed from this perspective, heavy-handed law enforcement and crackdowns are likely to drive migrants and smugglers to engage in even more dangerous movements in increasingly remote areas, making migrants more vulnerable to abuse.

Migration between the HoA and Yemen is dangerous, and migrants face a range of protection risks and abuses (including physical and sexual abuse, robbery, interception, detention, exploitation and death), as well as hardships associated with the general conditions of the journey (a lack of access to food and water, basic services, shelter and livelihoods, and challenges of security and climate). Under these conditions, migrants live in deplorable conditions and experience extreme suffering, with very little assistance from official channels. In spite of this, most do not regret their decision to migrate, and were generally aware of these risks before or during their journey. While danger and risk were certainly taken into account, migrants’ resilience and determination to reach their intended destination ‘at any cost’ means that, while they might make some adjustment to their journey, these factors are generally not enough to deter them from continuing along their chosen route. Fear of return can increase migrants’ tolerance of abuse and hardship along their journey, as can the risk of economic destitution that they and their families could face if they are not successful in reaching their intended destination, as many will have sold assets and taken out loans in order to pay for the journey. Religion and the feeling that their fate is ‘out of their hands’, or predetermined by God can also explain why migrants continue with their journey in spite of the risks.

Local communities and wider society are also impacted by migration, in particular transit communities such as Obock and Bossaso, which are characterised by limited absorption capacity and underlying poverty and under-development. Migrants and these communities suffer many of the same hardships. Poverty, unemployment, vulnerability and drought are a feature of both contexts, and the influx of large numbers of additional people is putting further pressure on already overstretched social services, natural resources and livelihoods. It is not therefore surprising that some members of the community express resentment towards migrants, and raise concerns about issues such as poor sanitation, the spread of disease, competition over jobs, cultural differences, and inter-ethnic clashes between migrants. Perhaps surprisingly, given the securitisation of migration in popular discourse and rhetoric, community respondents did not associate migrants with insecurity, but instead viewed them as ‘harmless’ and relatively peaceful. In general, community respondents voice mixed feelings towards migrants, recognising that migration can bring about both positive and negative impacts, particularly with regards to the local economy. This somewhat nuanced response can be attributed to the fact that most migrants are in transit and levels of interaction with communities is limited by language barriers, camp residency, or the actions of smugglers that seek to curtail their movements. Furthermore, migration affects different members of the community in different ways (depending on
levels of interaction, socioeconomic status and personal experience) and perceptions may shift and change over time. Overall, however, the research documented many acts of generosity and kindness towards migrants, suggesting the potential for a relatively harmonious relationship between migrants and local communities, and policy and programmes should seek to build on this.

A range of governmental and non-governmental organisations are involved in responses to migration. Grassroots support provided by community structures and groups composed of local residents, migrants and civil society organisations also play an important role in meeting immediate needs. Positive steps and progress have been made, and the focus on and interest in migration has increased in recent years. Nevertheless, efforts have continued to be undermined by a lack of coordination, limited funding and capacity, inconsistencies in policy and practice, and difficulties of accessing remote and sometimes dangerous migration locations. These challenges have been compounded by the sheer scope and scale of migration, the growing professionalism of smuggling activities, and the significant needs of migrants and host communities along these routes.

In this context, a number of gaps and opportunities for programme and policy emerged from stakeholder consultations. Firstly, policy makers and programmers should provide greater protection and assistance to all migrants, regardless of their status, through: strengthening MRCs; supporting mobile response units; engaging local community groups and structures; providing specialised support for vulnerable migrants; and expanding the net of support to migrants through ‘non-traditional’ sectors. Secondly, a more holistic approach to smuggling and trafficking should be adopted, which includes: gathering and making available more detailed and extensive information and evidence; facilitating greater coordination between stakeholders at national and international levels; supporting effective implementation of anti-smuggling and trafficking legislation; strengthening the police and judiciary; providing viable economic alternatives for those involved in smuggling; and raising awareness more effectively. Thirdly, opportunities for regular migration should be expanded by: creating better awareness of the legal avenues for migration; increasing opportunities and making them more inclusive; clarifying the costs of regular migration; and making regular channels safer. Fourthly, policy makers and programmers should support local communities affected by migration through: greater livelihood and employment opportunities; improvements to water, sanitation and hygiene; awareness and solidarity campaigns for communities and migrants; and resilience programmes. Finally, efforts should be made to improve data collection and monitoring by: building on the data collected by UNHCR and partners; improving data collection by governmental departments; and supporting MRCs and mobile units to collect more data.
Annex 1: Overview of the different respondents and groups engaged as part of this research through interviews or focus group discussions.

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<th>Puntland</th>
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<th>Non-governmental Institutions</th>
<th>Community Representatives</th>
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<td>• Army</td>
<td>• Danish Refugee Council (DRC)</td>
<td>• Boat crew</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Bossaso City Council</td>
<td>• GRT Somalia</td>
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<td>• Bossaso Municipality</td>
<td>• IOM Somalia</td>
<td>• Business people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Bossaso Port Immigration</td>
<td>• Migrant Response Centre (MRC)</td>
<td>• Community activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Department of Immigration</td>
<td>• Save the Children</td>
<td>• Community elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Department of Refugees, Returnees and Mixed Migrants</td>
<td>• Somafal Development Organisation</td>
<td>• Dhabshiil representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ministry of Finance</td>
<td>• UNHCR Somalia</td>
<td>• Doctors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ministry of Interior</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Hotel owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ministry of Justice</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Neighbourhood council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ministry of Security</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Oromo Community Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ministry of Women and Family Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Restaurant owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Office of the Special Envoy for Children’s and Migrants Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Somtel Telecommunications</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Puntland Intelligence Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Smugglers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Puntland Maritime Police Forces (PMPF)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Puntland Police Force</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Traders and shop owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Agence Djiboutienne de Développement Social (ADDS)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• University students</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coast Guards</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Women activists</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conseil Régional d’ Obock</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Gendarmerie</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• IGAD</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Ministry of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National Committee against Smuggling and Trafficking</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Office Française de Protection de Réfugiés et Apatrides</td>
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<td>• ONARS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Action Plus Obock</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Association pour la Promotion et la Protection des Droits des Enfants Mineurs (APPDEM)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Caritas</td>
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<td>• DRC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Expertise France</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• FAO Djibouti</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• IOM Djibouti</td>
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<td>• SOS Sahel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Institutions</td>
<td>Non-governmental Institutions</td>
<td>Community Representatives</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Prefet of Obock</td>
<td>• UNFPA Djibouti</td>
<td>• Doctors</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Union Nationale des femmes Djiboutiennes (UNFD)</td>
<td>• UNICEF Djibouti</td>
<td>• Eritrean Migrants’ Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>• US Embassy</td>
<td>• University of Djibouti</td>
<td>• Human rights worker</td>
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<td>• WFP</td>
<td>• Medical worker</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• WHO Djibouti</td>
<td>• Ogaden Community Group</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
<td>• Authority of Migration and Passports</td>
<td>• Oromo Community Group</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Department of Tourist Police</td>
<td>• Shopkeepers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Ministry of Human Rights</td>
<td>• Somalia Youth Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• National Organization for Combating Human Trafficking</td>
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<td>• Police Force</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• ADRA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Al-Takaful Social Association</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• IOM Yemen</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Society for Humanitarian Solidarity (SHS)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Somali Refugee Commission</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Sustainable Development Foundation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• UNHCR Yemen</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia, Kenya and elsewhere</td>
<td>• Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• IGAD Regional Secretariat on Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Altai Consulting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• IOM Ethiopia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• NGO Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• UNHCR Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Researcher at the University of Amsterdam</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• UNODC Eastern Africa</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• UNODC HQ</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2: Bibliography


DRC. (2016). Study on the Onward Movement of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers from Ethiopia. UNHCR.


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RMMS. (2016). *Shifting Tides: The changing nature of mixed migration crossings to Yemen*.

RMMS. (2016). Young and on the Move: Children and Youth in Mixed Migration Flows within and from the Horn of Africa.


RMMS. (2017). Regional mixed migration summary for April 2017 covering mixed migration events, trends and data for Djibouti, Eritrea, South Sudan, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Puntland, Somalia, Somaliland and Yemen.


Annex 3: Overview of UN agencies, international and national/local NGOs working with migrants in the study areas.

Table 6: Detail on some of the main organisations working with migrants across the region.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Main activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danish Refugee Council (DRC)</td>
<td>DRC and partners implemented a 27-month (December 2013-March 2016) project funded by the EU called ‘Strengthening Protection for Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Migrants in the Horn of Africa’ in Djibouti, Somalia and Yemen. The aim of this project was to aid and assist refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants in the HoA and Yemen by: preventing and documenting rights violations against migrants; raising awareness about the risks of irregular migration; reducing onward or repeat migration.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| European Union (EU)                   | In addition to other projects referenced in this table, the EU is supporting a number of projects in the region though the Trust Fund facility. These include:  
  - RE-INTEG: which aims to support a sustainable and durable reintegration of refugees, returnees from Yemen, Kenya, Europe and other areas of departure and IDPs in Somalia, and to anchor populations within Somalia.  
  - ‘Facility on Sustainable and Dignified Return and Reintegration in support of the Khartoum Process’, which aims to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration management through the development and implementation of sustainable return and reintegration policies and processes.  
  - ‘Towards Free Movement of Persons and Transhumance in the IGAD region’, which aims to facilitate the free movement of persons in the IGAD region in order to enhance regional economic integration and development.  
  - ‘Collaboration in Cross-Border Areas’, which aims to address the drivers of instability, irregular migration and displacement, initially in cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
| Expertise France, IOM, DRC and RMMS   | Expertise France and partners are implementing an EU-funded programme called ‘Addressing mixed migration flows in Eastern Africa’, which aims to support countries in Eastern Africa/Horn of Africa in addressing mixed migration flows and to strengthen the link between refugees/forced displacement and development. Specifically, the programme will:  
  - Assist national authorities in the setting-up or the strengthening of safe and rights-respectful reception offices for migrants.  
  - Support and facilitate the fight against criminal networks by capacity building and assistance to partner countries in developing evidence-based policies and conducting criminal investigations.  
  - Support local authorities and NGOs in the provision of livelihoods and self-reliance opportunities for displaced persons and host communities.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| GIZ, UNODC and IOM                    | GIZ and partners are implementing a €40 million EU funded project called Better Migration Management. This project aims to improve migration management in the region, and in particular to curb the trafficking of human beings and the smuggling of migrants within and from the Horn. It will provide:  
  - Capacity building in the form of training and technical assistance and the provision of appropriate equipment.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Focus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Human Rights Initiative and Global Food Security Project (Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)) | - Support for policy development and implementation for better migration and border management.  
  - Support to the identification, assistance and protection of people in need.  
  - Awareness-raising about the dangers of irregular migration and the benefits of alternative options. |
| CSIS is carrying out research into the linkages among human rights, food security, migration, and displacement with a focus on the HoA and Yemen. In particular, it is looking to investigate the degree to which food security is a factor in migration and displacement and how migrants and refugees cope with food insecurity, physical insecurity, and other challenges while on the move. |
| HRW | HRW is engaged in research and advocacy work on a number of related topics, including: the closure of Dadaab; internal displacement in Somalia in the context of drought and famine, and the closure of routes to Kenya; the plight of Ethiopian migrants in Kenya; and conditions for migrants in Libya, and along the routes to Europe. |
| ILO | ILO is implementing the project: “Development of a Tripartite Framework for the Support and Protection of Ethiopian Women Domestic Migrant Workers to the GCC States, Lebanon and Sudan.” The project also aims at making regular migration more accessible in order to curb irregular migration and ensure safety and rights for the migrants. It provides support to the Ethiopian government on migration governance and the development of bilateral agreements. Due to the number of Ethiopians being sent back to Ethiopia from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia over the past months, the project focus has partly shifted to support to reintegration measures. |
| IOM | IOM works with migrants in Djibouti, Puntland and Yemen through the following activities:  
  - Assisted voluntary return and reintegration  
  - Behaviour change communication interventions  
  - Livelihoods support for potential migrants through training, business loans and job placements.  
  - Capacity building and training for government authorities in migration management and border management  
  - Provision of basic protection needs (food, health and non-food items) |
| Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) | ReDSS was created in March 2014 with the goal of improving programming and policy through advocacy in support of durable solutions for displacement affected communities in East and Horn of Africa. Its four central pillars are: research and information management; capacity development; advocacy and policy; and coordination. |
| Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMMS) | RMMMS is a regional hub aiming to provide: information and data management; synthesis, analysis and research; support to policy development and dialogue; and support and coordination. It collects data, conducts research and provides analysis on mixed migration flows from East Africa and Yemen. |
| UNHCR | UNHCR works with refugees in Djibouti, Puntland and Yemen. It offers access to basic supplies and services, including health and education, carries out refugee status determination, and manages refugee camps. It engages with governments and donors to |
UNHCR works to raise awareness on migration risks, and on February 2017 launched a regional video and music campaign involving musicians from the region. In 2007, the organisation issued a 10 point plan of action on refugee protection and mixed migration, and in 2013 developed a regional strategy and plan of action on smuggling and trafficking in the East and HoA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNODC</th>
<th>UNODC is mandated to assist Member States in combatting illicit drugs, crime and terrorism. In this respect, it is the lead UN agency tackling human smuggling and trafficking, and the criminal networks involved in these activities.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>The World Bank has made available $175 million in financing to help mitigate the impact of forced displacement on refugee-hosting communities in the Horn of Africa. This includes loans of US$ 100 million to Ethiopia, US$ 50 million to Uganda and US$ 20 million to Djibouti, and a $5 million grant to IGAD. The Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP) aims to improve access to basic social services, expand economic opportunities, and enhance environmental management for communities hosting refugees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Table 7: Detail on some of the organisations working with migrants in Puntland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Main activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa Action Help International, (AAHI)</td>
<td>AAHI supports urban refugees from Yemen to access basic education through cash-based interventions in order to promote self-employment and business opportunities through grants, as well as peace and co-existence within local communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAL</td>
<td>Implements WASH and food security programs in IDP camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE Somalia</td>
<td>CARE is operational in Somaliland and Puntland, and implements projects in water and sanitation, sustainable pastoralist activities, civil society and media development, small-scale enterprise development, primary school education, teacher training, adult literacy and vocational training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish Refugee Council (DRC)</td>
<td>DRC mainly works with IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers in Puntland, however it also provides emergency medical assistance to Ethiopian migrants, as well as emergency food rations for those in prison or hospital. In the past, it conducted awareness programmes between Ethiopian migrants and host community, and about the risks of migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRT Somalia</td>
<td>In partnership with UNHCR, GRT arranges medical referrals for asylum seekers and refugees in Garowe, Bossaso and Qardo. It also implements livelihoods, health, nutrition and education programmes, and gender based violence assistance and counselling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>IOM leads on migration management of migrants, refugees and returnees in Puntland, in collaboration with UNHCR. It provides medical assistance, supports assisted voluntary return (AVR), and has conducted awareness campaigns with migrants and local communities. Much of its support is channelled through the MRCs in Bossaso and Obock, to which it provides funding. It works with local government to build capacity through training and funding. With EU funding, IOM is providing human trafficking and gender-based violence (GBV) training to police and immigration offices in Puntland and Somaliland. It has also run similar training workshops with the Puntland Counter Trafficking Board, a group of Puntland prosecutors and the Child Protection Working Group. With funding from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) it recently completed a 17-month project called ‘Improvement of Immigration Border Management through Capacity Building for Migration Management.’ In coordination with UN-Habitat, IOM is also implementing a two-year project called Achieving Local Solutions to Displacement Crises in Somalia, which aims to improve social cohesion (Altai Consulting, 2017). With funding from the Government of Norway, IOM is supporting construction of the immigration headquarters for Puntland’s Ministry for Security and Disarmament, Mobilization and Reintegration in Garowe, with the aim of improving immigration and border management services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAALO Organisation</td>
<td>KAALO provides legal assistance and protection services to refugees and asylum seekers. KAALO’s work centres around relief, rehabilitation, development and peace-building programs. They also work on SGBV prevention, and provide assistance to IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laas-Qoray Concern</td>
<td>Provides food distributions for migrants, with support from WFP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maarso Relief Society (MAARSO)</td>
<td>Implements child protection programmes for IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicins du Monde</td>
<td>Implements health programs for IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers in Puntland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Main activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)</td>
<td>NRC implements programmes for IDPs, refugees, and asylum seekers, including livelihoods, job creation, emergency assistance, education, health, food security and shelter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland Legal Aid Centre (PLAC)</td>
<td>Provides legal representation and counselling to irregular migrants, with funding from UNDP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland Elders Network (PEN)</td>
<td>PEN works with UNHCR to assist Somali returnees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland Non-State Actors Association (PUNSA)</td>
<td>PUNSAA brings together a range of NGOs and civil society actors. Through advocacy and lobbying, it works to connect these organisations with national authorities and international policy-makers in order to ensure that policy and programming are relevant and responsive to people’s needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland Students Association (PSA)</td>
<td>With support from UNICEF and DRC, PSA provides food distributions to IDPs, refugees and returnees. It also conducts awareness programs for young people on the risks of irregular migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Ergo</td>
<td>Raises awareness about the dangers of irregular migration through radio dramas, talk shows and messages, in collaboration with IOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea Fishing Organization (RESFO)</td>
<td>With support from IOM, RESFO trained 240 migrants and local fishermen on how to fish, how to manage the production and distributed fishing equipment. This project is no longer ongoing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESTORE – Building Resilience in Northern Somalia</td>
<td>This EU-funded project aims to address the adverse effects of El Niño on the resilience of already vulnerable communities of Northern Somalia, and reduce the effects of forced displacement and irregular migration in the region. The geographical cover focuses on Puntland (Bossaso, Bari, Nugaal, Sanaag and Sool districts) and Somaliland (Awdal, Togdheer and Waqooyi Galbeed districts). The project aims to contribute to enhancing Somali institutional stakeholders’ capacity to effectively coordinate, programme, manage and monitor resilience interventions; to improve access to drinkable, affordable and adequate water service delivery in Bossaso and to sustainably improve food security and livelihoods; and to build resilience through effective safety nets, among vulnerable households and their communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>Implements health, nutrition, protection and education programmes for IDPs and child refugees, returnees and asylum seekers. In Qardo, it implements education programmes for Somali returnees and Yemeni refugees to enable them to enrol in local schools, through funding by UNICEF. Support includes provision of learning materials and school uniforms, and payment of school fees and costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somafal Development Organisation</td>
<td>Somafal provides humanitarian support to refugees and migrants in Bossaso and Garowe, often through funds provided by local people and businesses. In 2015 and 2016, it provided food, water and aid to assist migrants in the port area. Somafal also provided Yemeni refugees with shelter in Garowe for over six months, and assisted them in securing employment and livelihood opportunities in Puntland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Main activities</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia Society Women Forum (SSWF)</td>
<td>Implements health, human rights and education programs for female IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadamun Social Society (TASS)</td>
<td>TASS works with victims of trafficking to provide them with psychosocial, legal, medical and reintegration support, through funding from IOM. It also provides food, family tracing, protection and health support to refugees, returnees and IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talo Rehabilitation and Development Organization (TARDO)</td>
<td>TARDO aims to create opportunities for refugees, IDPs, returnees while conducting awareness campaigns targeting host communities to promote integration of returnees, refugees and IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UNHCR conducts asylum and migration programmes for Ethiopian asylum seekers and refugees, Somali returnees, IDPs and Yemeni refugees in Puntland. These include financial support, protection, legal counselling, health and education. For example, it supports Yemeni and other refugees with monthly welfare contribution, medical care, education, food rations (provided through WFP), and livelihood support. UNHCR has two reception centres in Bossaso, which provide migrants with information about return, a temporary place to stay, and basic supplies and rations. UNHCR also supported the development of the Refugee Bill, which aims to clarify the procedure for RSD in Puntland (Altai Consulting, 2017).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UNICEF’s programmes in Somalia cover health and nutrition, water supply, sanitation and hygiene, and basic education. In addition, the communication, protection, and participation programme has activities that cut across all programme areas including: child protection, HIV/AIDS and youth development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>UNODC is working with the Bossaso Port Police on a three-year project called the Global Maritime Crime Programme, which aims to build local government capacity through training, mentoring and provision of equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We Are Women Activists (WAWA)</td>
<td>A network of women’s organisations, WAWA supports female IDPs and victims of SGBV in Puntland with food, counselling and medical assistance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: many of the local organisations listed above carry out activities on a project basis, meaning that the projects they implement depend on availability of funds, and when funding is not available, they are not always operational.
### Table 8: Detail on some of the organisations working with migrants in Djibouti

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Main activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al Rahma</strong></td>
<td>With support from UNICEF, Al Rahma provides professional and vocational training for migrant children in Djibouti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Association pour la Promotion et la Protection des Droits des Enfants Mineurs (APPDEM)</strong></td>
<td>APPDEM provides psychosocial and legal assistance to children in difficulties, such as those who have been sexually abused or are in conflict with the law. They conduct sensitization workshops on the rights of children, and train law enforcement officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Caritas</strong></td>
<td>Caritas works in Djibouti city, Obock, Tadjoura, Ali Sabieh, Dikhil and Arta. It provides food, medical care, shelter, counselling and education for hundreds of migrants each year, supports family returns, and carries out advocacy work for migrants. The project ‘Lire, Ecrire, Compter’ provides literacy centres in Ali Sabieh, Arta, Obock and Tadjourah for migrant children from Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen. The organisation also supports return of unaccompanied migrant children to their country of origin, and has recently signed a new agreement with UNICEF to provide professional and vocational training for migrant children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DRC</strong></td>
<td>DRC works with refugees in Ali Sabieh and in Obock, with a focus on livelihoods and protection. There is a dedicated team working on mixed migrants, which provides protection monitoring and awareness around migrants’ rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FAO</strong></td>
<td>FAO supports food and agricultural projects in refugee camps and among hosting communities. These include micro-gardening, support to local fisherman, and water and sanitation through the drilling of wells and boreholes (8 in 2013, 7 in 2014, and 5 in 2015).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government of Japan</strong></td>
<td>The Government of Japan is implementing a one year project called ‘Strengthening security in Djibouti and safety of migrants through counter-trafficking, marine safety and emergency assistance.’ The project includes, among others, activities for the rehabilitation and capacity building of the MRC, the capacity building of the National Police, Gendarmerie and Coast Guard. The main beneficiaries are the National Police, the Gendarmerie Nationale, the Coast Guard and the vulnerable migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC)</strong></td>
<td>ICRC works with refugees in Holl Holl and Ali Adeh camps, and provides support to the Obock MRC. Main activities include: family reunification; distribution of clothes; and assistance to migrants and others in detention. ICRC is also planning to provide an ambulance service along the migratory routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IOM</strong></td>
<td>IOM is the lead agency working with migrants. It provides support through the Obock MRC, carries out AVR, and conducts sensitization campaigns. As part of efforts to better identify the flows of migrants entering and transiting through Djibouti and to understand the migratory reality of the country, IOM is launching flow monitoring, a component of its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). Data in Djibouti will be analysed jointly with the results of similar exercises to be carried out in the region (Yemen, Ethiopia, Somalia, Saudi Arabia and Kenya) and will provide an overview of migration and population mobility in the Horn of Africa and Arab Peninsula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Main activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)</td>
<td>With funding from the EU, NRC is supporting long-term and new refugees in Ali Addeh, Holl Holl and Markazi camps with shelter, essential non-food items, water and sanitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>While UNFPA does not directly implement projects for migrants, it supports IOM and UNHCR in the distribution of dignity kits and emergency kits, and in reinforcing health services in the obstetrics ward.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UNICEF conducts sensitization campaigns on solidarity and conflict resolution with host communities, and refers young migrants to the MRC. The organisation works in coordination with Caritas and Al Rahma to support street children, including UMCs. UNICEF and IOM also work together on a project called child’s best interest (“dispositif supérieur de l’enfant”).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>The ‘Strengthening Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants in Ethiopia and Djibouti’ was an EU-funded project that aimed to achieve legislative reform, through a consultative process resulting in a comprehensive legislative framework to combat and prevent human trafficking and to promote safe labour migration ready to adoption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’Union Nationale de Femmes Djiboutiennes (UNFD)</td>
<td>Created in 1977, UNFD works for the empowerment of women and the protection of maternal and child health through advocacy and policy work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Embassy in Djibouti</td>
<td>Carries out advocacy work on migration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>The World Bank is providing funding to host communities in places like Obock to better deal with the influx of migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Food Programme (WFP)</td>
<td>With funding from the EU, WFP is providing cash for refugees who have recently arrived from Yemen and settled in Markazi camp. This follows a similar initiative for longer-term refugees in Ali-Sabieh and Hol Hol camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Health Organisation (WHO)</td>
<td>WHO does not directly implement programmes in Djibouti, but provides indirect assistance to migrants through its support to the Ministry of Health, such as provision of medicine and equipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Main activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA)</td>
<td>ADRA works with refugees and IDPs in eight governorates in Yemen. It implements health and nutrition projects for those living in camps. The organisation carries out protection and human rights-based projects, with a focus on improving relations between displaced and host communities. It supports urban refugees through vocational and human rights training, often with a focus on women (saving and loans scheme and day care centres) and youths (internships).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Takaful Social Association</td>
<td>Works with DRC, INTERSOS and UNHCR to support asylum seekers with basic services (food, health and transportation) and refugee registration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>DRC implements a mixed migration programme. Its protection teams patrol the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden coastlines to meet and register new arrivals, process their data, provides non-food items, and refer persons of concern to UNHCR or IOM. Its operations include protection assistance, food security, livelihoods, and water and sanitation hygiene (WASH) assistance to children, vulnerable households, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and host communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERSOS</td>
<td>INTERSOS supports internally displaced Yemenis as well as refugees and asylum seekers from the HoA with medical care, food, protection, psychological support, protection and economic support. It has also launched a programme to identify and support victims of trafficking in human beings in Aden, Kharaz and in the reception center of Mayfa. Since March 2015, it has expanded its activities to include conflict-affected populations (IDPs, returnees and host communities). The organization is operational in Sana’a, Aden, Al Mukalla, Taiz, Ibb and Kharaz/Lahj.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>IOM works with the Ministry of Expatriate Affairs on Yemeni migrant communities abroad and/or returning to Yemen. It also provides transportation assistance to migrants stranded in Yemen and victims of trafficking in conjunction with the Immigration authorities. IOM has an office in Sana’a, and two sub-offices in Aden and Al Hodeidah, where it runs Migrant Response Points to address the immediate needs of vulnerable migrants. These include humanitarian assistance (food, water, medical assistance, basic clothing and hygiene items) shelter, medical referrals to local hospitals, and psychosocial support. The organisation also has mobile teams, which patrol the southern coast of Yemen, and provide food and water to newly arrived migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM and DRC</td>
<td>IOM and DRC are implementing a DFID-funded project called: ‘Strengthening the protection of vulnerable migrants in Yemen through humanitarian assistance, capacity building and better migration information management’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society for Humanitarian Solidarity (SHS)</td>
<td>Provides health and food assistance to refugees and migrants, and supports registration process in coordination with UNHCR, DRC and INTERSOS. With support from UNHCR, SHS also conducts coastal patrols along the Gulf of Aden to provide food, water, first aid, transportation and protection to migrants. Together with DRC and INTERSPS, the organisation is also involved in a number of refugee reception centres located along the Gulf of Aden in Shabwa, Hadramout and Abyan governorates, specifically in Mayfa’a, Ahwar and Kiada.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Main activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable Development Foundation (Sana’a, Yemen)</td>
<td>Supports refugees with shelter, schooling, health and employment opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UNHCR works with IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers in Yemen, in particular through the provision of protection, shelter and non-food items and psycho-social support. UNHCR collects and disseminates data on migrant numbers and profiles, and is joint lead on the Task Force on Population Movement (TFPM), together with IOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen Organization for Combating Human Trafficking (YOCHT)</td>
<td>YOCHT works to combat trafficking in Yemen through partnerships and awareness raising, and the provision of support and legal aid to victims of trafficking. It also trains law enforcement officials and works with the police to free people being trafficked.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 4: Overview of the governmental ministries and departments involved in migration in Puntland, Djibouti and Yemen

**Table 10: Governmental ministries and departments involved in migration in Puntland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry/Department</th>
<th>Main Activities/ Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior, Local Government and Rural Development</td>
<td>This is the mandated industry for dealing with migration, including refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, returnees and irregular migrants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Refugees, Returnees and Mixed Migrants (within Ministry of Interior)</td>
<td>Sitting within the Ministry of Interior, this is the designated department for coordinating migration issues within Puntland, in particular monitoring the flow of migrants through the region. It has a number of ‘mixed movement monitors’ in place to track and record data on migrants passing through Puntland, reportedly located in Tukaraq, Alxamudulilah, Dhahar and Bossaso. The Department releases monthly reports on the data and findings collected by these monitors, most of which are available online via the Ministry of Interior website. Nevertheless, Government authorities in Puntland have been described as lacking the capacity to collect, analyse, or share data on migrant smuggling and human trafficking networks (RMMS, 2017).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Affairs Division (RAD) (within Ministry of Interior)</td>
<td>RAD is mandated to protect and promote the rights of refugees in Puntland. It registers and screens asylum seekers and passes their data onto UNHCR for refugee status determination (RSD). In coordination with international organisations, RAD implements a number of programmes for Yemeni refugees in Puntland. It is also tasked with improving coordination between the different ministries involved in migration management through a Refugee Affairs Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Management Agency (DMA) (within Ministry of Interior)</td>
<td>DMA is the focal point for humanitarian partners in Somalia, and works with UNHCR and IOM to register Somali returnees from Yemen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Security</td>
<td>Responsible for managing security at the borders, and works with the armed forces to control irregular immigration flows, with a particular focus on human trafficking and smuggling, for which it is the lead ministry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) (within Ministry of Security)</td>
<td>Established in 2010 with support from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It is primarily aimed at preventing piracy, illegal fishing, and other illicit activity off the coast of Somalia. It has around 1,200 soldiers and 90 support staff located in four bases: Bosaso headquarters (located near Qaw on the western outskirts of Bossaso town), and front bases in Iskushuban, Bargal, Hafun and Eyl. Due to a lack of governmental support and coordination, UAE took the decision to reduce PMPF’s anti-smuggling and trafficking activities, and focus instead on piracy. According to sources, this decision followed a...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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65 [http://www.moipuntland.com](http://www.moipuntland.com)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry/Department</th>
<th>Main Activities/ Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>number of occasions where PMPF arrested suspected smugglers and traffickers, and handed them over to the Puntland authorities, who did not sentence them adequately and often released them back into the community. Nevertheless, smuggling sources interviewed admitted that they do view PMPF as a threat to their operations, as the force has intercepted and confiscated a number of boats, and detained the crew and boat owners.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Police Forces</td>
<td>Responsible for border control, public safety and controlling irregular migrants. In Garowe, a Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was established to conduct criminal investigations into human smuggling and trafficking. However, this unit is yet to show a meaningful response, and is said to lack proper training (US Department of State, 2016).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland Intelligence Agency</td>
<td>Collects security-related information, including on smuggling, trafficking, extremist activities and organised crime, and shares these with the relevant ministries and departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>The Ministry if working with UNODC to draft a new Smuggling and Trafficking Act (Altai Consulting, 2017).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Women and Family Affairs</td>
<td>Oversees trafficking efforts and provides assistance to female and child migrants who have suffered sexual and other forms of abuse during their journey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Human Rights Defender</td>
<td>Mandated to promote human rights among government and civil society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry/Department</td>
<td>Main Activities/ Responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior (MOI)</td>
<td>Responsible, amongst other things, for the protection of refugees and for verifying information on migrants departing from Djibouti to Yemen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation National d'Assistance aux Réfugiés et Sinistrés (ONARS) (Sits within MOI)</td>
<td>ONARS is the main government institution responsible for refugee protection and the management of refugee camps. It has three main tasks: (i) Register refugees and asylum-seekers’ (ii) conduct sensitization activities for migrants; (iii) provide assistance (food and transport). It also has responsibility for Djibouti’s refugee camps. They provide limited support to IOM with AVR and sensitization activities. While mixed migration is not within ONARS’ mandate, the organization is evolving and is interested in developing humanitarian, protection and legal assistance activities for vulnerable migrants and IDPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police (sits within MOI)</td>
<td>The National Police is responsible for security within Djibouti City and has primary control over immigration and customs procedures for land border-crossing points in coordination with the Army. It is also involved in migrant deportations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Gendarmerie (sit within Ministry of Defence)</td>
<td>The National Gendarmerie is responsible for all security outside of Djibouti City but also has the responsibility of protecting critical infrastructure within the city, such as at the international airport. With regards to migrants, the Gendarmerie is supposed to provide initial assistance (food, water, first aid), manage deportations and intercept smugglers and traffickers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army (sits within MOI)</td>
<td>The army is responsible for defence of the national borders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard (sits within MOI)</td>
<td>Responsible for maritime security and patrolling territorial waters. It is mandated to rescue migrants crossing the Red Sea, and intercept smugglers and traffickers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Eligibility Commission (sits within MOI)</td>
<td>Consists of staff from UNHCR and ONARS, and is mandated to find solutions to challenges on security matters, malnutrition and other humanitarian concerns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission Nationale d’Éligibilité des Refugiés (CNE)</td>
<td>Conducts RSD under the auspices of UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
<td>The Ministry hosts an Executive Secretariat on preventing trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
<td>Responsible for migrants’ medical needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agence Djiboutienne de Développement Social (ADDS)</td>
<td>With funding from the African Development Bank, ADDS has implemented an emergency project for Yemeni Refugees (January 2016 to June 2016). With funding from the World Bank, it is now implementing a US$ 20 million project to support host communities living near refugee camps. The objective is to improve the resilience of these communities through improved natural resource management.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 5: Overview of National and International Legislation Relating to Migration

Table 12: Overview of national and international legislation relating to migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>International Law</th>
<th>National Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>• 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 protocol</td>
<td>• 1961 Immigration Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1969 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
<td>• Somali Provisional Refugees and Asylum Act, Presidential Decree, 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1969 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
<td>• Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic Article 71 guarantees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial</td>
<td>security and freedom of movement of people, goods and services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>• Child Protection Act, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>• 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 protocol</td>
<td>• Act No. 201/AN/07/Séme was adopted in 2007 by the National Assembly and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial</td>
<td>sets the conditions for entry and residence in the Republic of Djibouti. The</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>Act made irregular migration a crime, and all migrants should be able to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa</td>
<td>demonstrate a valid travel document and sufficient resources to live.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)</td>
<td>• Law No. 133 On the Fight Against Trafficking in Persons and Illicit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
<td>Smuggling of Migrants (2016), which prohibits all forms of trafficking and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>distinguishes between trafficking and smuggling.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66 The 2016 law repeals Act No. 210/AN/07/Séme, which applied to victims of trafficking, with a focus on vulnerable groups, including children, women and physically or mentally disabled.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Law</th>
<th>National Law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 1987 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2003 Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2003 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2004 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ordinance No.77-053/PR/AE (1997) is the primary law on refugees.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yemen</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• 1930 International Labour Organization (ILO) Forced Labour Convention (No. 29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 protocol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1976 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1987 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Yemen Penal Code Article 248, which relates to human smuggling and trafficking.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Child Rights Act Article 161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 6: Glossary of Key Terms

Asylum seeker: “Persons seeking to be admitted into a country as refugees and awaiting decision on their application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments.” IOM. (2004). International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration

 Internally displaced person: “Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.” United Nations, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 22 July 1998, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2

Migrant: Given the mixed nature of migration along this route, the term migrant shall refer to a range of people including economic migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, unaccompanied migrant children (UMCs), returnees, victims of trafficking, environmental migrants and stateless persons. Pastoralists, traders and visitors are also moving along these routes. Within these categories, migrants’ movements may be linear, circular and/or repeated, and their journeys and duration of stay can span days, weeks and years.

Mixed migration: “The principal characteristics of mixed migration flows include the irregular nature of and the multiplicity of factors driving such movements, and the differentiated needs and profiles of the persons involved. Mixed flows have been defined as ‘complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants’. Unaccompanied minors, environmental migrants, smuggled persons, victims of trafficking and stranded migrants, among others, may also form part of a mixed flow” (IOM).

Organized criminal group: “A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000

Refugee: A person who “owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951)

Returnee: “Is the term used by the international community to identify a person who was a refugee, but who has recently returned to his/her country of origin. Defining a returnee is thus applicable on a person’s prior refugee status.” (OHCHR, 2001)

Smuggling of migrants: “Shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident” (Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 2000).
Smuggling under aggravated circumstances: “Circumstances (a) That endanger, or are likely to endanger, the lives or safety of the migrants concerned; or (b) That entail inhuman or degrading treatment, including for exploitation, of such migrants.” (Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 2000).

Stateless person: “A stateless person is someone who is not a citizen of any country. Citizenship is the legal bond between a government and an individual, and allows for certain political, economic, social and other rights of the individual, as well as the responsibilities of both government and citizen. A person can become stateless due to a variety of reasons, including sovereign, legal, technical or administrative decisions or oversights.” (UNHCR)

Trafficking in persons: “Shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.67 A victim need not be physically transported from one location to another, or cross an international border, for the crime to fall within these definitions.” (UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 2000)

Unaccompanied migrant child: “A child who has been separated from both parents and other relatives and is not being cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so.” (1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child)

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67 [http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx)
### Annex 7: List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAHI</td>
<td>Africa Action Help International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADDS</td>
<td>Agence Djiboutienne de Développement Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPDEM</td>
<td>Association pour la Promotion et la Protection des Droits des Enfants Mineurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARRA</td>
<td>Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVR</td>
<td>Assisted Voluntary Return</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPWG</td>
<td>Child Protection Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRDIP</td>
<td>Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTM</td>
<td>Displacement Tracking Matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUTF</td>
<td>European Union Trust Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSNAU</td>
<td>Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>German Society for International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Convention on Civil and Political Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IOM  International Organisation for Migration
IS  Islamic State
ISSP  IGAD Security Sector Program
KAP  Knowledge, attitudes and practices
MDM  Medecins Du Monde
MMTF  Mixed migration task force
MOI  Ministry of Interior
MRC  Migrant Response Centre (also known as Migration Response Centre)
MRPs  Migrant Response Points
NRC  Norwegian Refugee Council
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR  The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
ONARS  Organisation National d’Assistance aux Réfugiés et Sinistrés
PEN  Puntland Elders Network
PIA  Puntland Intelligence Agency
PLAC  Puntland Legal Aid Centre
PMPF  Puntland Maritime Police Forces
PSA  Puntland Students Association
PUNSAA  Puntland Non-State Actors Association
RAD  Refugee Affairs Division
ReDDS  Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat
REF  Research and Evidence Facility
RESFO  Red Sea Fishing Organisation
RMMMS  Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat
RSD  Refugee Status Determination
SDC  Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SGBV  Sexual and gender-based violence
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHS</td>
<td>Society for Humanitarian Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNNPR</td>
<td>Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSWF</td>
<td>Somalia Society Women Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARDO</td>
<td>Talo Rehabilitation and Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASS</td>
<td>Tadamun Social Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFPM</td>
<td>Task Force for Population Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Trafficking in Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMC</td>
<td>Unaccompanied migrant child</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNFD</td>
<td>l’Union Nationale de Femmes Djiboutiennes</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAWA</td>
<td>We Are Women Activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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</table>