

HARIBHADRA ON PROPERTY OWNERSHIP OF BUDDHIST MONKS

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[0.1] It is a well-known fact that one of the qualities expected of renouncers in ancient India was to have freedom from attachment to worldly concerns. The Jains have treated attachment and *ārambha*, which means “intentional activity” or rather “violence,” as two of the most fundamental sins.¹ They have listed *aparigraha* “non-attachment” as one of the five *mahā- / aṇu-vratas*.² Although the word *aparigraha* itself can denote “renouncing any material possessions,” we read in *Dasaveyāliya* VI 20-21, which is regarded as one of the “seniors” of the Śvetāmbara Jain scriptures:³

Garment, bowl, woolen cloth, or broom — [the Jain mendicants] keep and carry such goods for [their] restraint and the sense of shame. Nāyaputta the savior said that such [a garment etc.] is not *parigraha*. The great sage said that *parigraha* means infatuation (*mūrcchā*).⁴

This psychological interpretation was inherited by the famous definition of Umāsvāti’s *Tattvārthadhigamasūtra* VII 12: “*mūrcchā parigrahaḥ*”. This definition is regarded as authoritative to the present day.

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¹ On this point, see Dixit 1978: 5, who also argues: “Taken as a whole *parigraha* signifies attachment for things worldly - where ‘things’ include both the material goods and the social relative and *ārambha* the acts injurious to others undertaken with a view to satisfying the demands of this attachment” (pp. 18f.).

² On the five *mahā-* and *aṇu-vratas* found in the Śvetāmbara Jain scriptures, see Schubring 1935: 187f. (*aṇu-vratas*) and pp. 189-91 (*mahā-vratas*).

³ Except for the translation of the *Suttanipāta*, the translations given in this paper are the author’s.

⁴ *jaṃ pi vatthaṃ va pāyaṃ vā kambalaṃ pāyapunchaṇaṃ /
taṃ pi saṃjama-lajjaṭṭhā dhārenti parihaṃanti ya // 20//
na so pariggaho vutto nāyaputteṇa tāṇā /
'mucchā pariggaho vutto ii vuttaṃ mahesiṇā // 21//*

[0.2] To my knowledge, Indian Buddhism has neither used *aparigraha* as a technical term as Jainism did, nor included the practice of *aparigraha* into the five or ten *śīlas*. But using the very word *pariggaha* (Skt. *parigraha*), the Buddha himself is believed to stress the importance of the freedom from attachment.⁵ For example, in the *Suttanipāta*, one of the oldest parts of Pāli Buddhist scriptures, we can find the following verses:⁶

Now on the other hand I shall tell you the way of life of a householder, [and] how acting he becomes a good disciple. For the entire *bhikkhu* practice cannot be carried out by one of who has possessions (*pariggaha*).⁷

People grieve for their cherished things, for no possessions (*pariggaha*) are permanent. Seeing that this separation truly exists, one should not live the household life.⁸

[0.3] However, while Jainism basically has maintained such an ideal of non-attachment which has made the Jain monks and nuns keep the lifestyle of poverty and itinerancy till today, scholars showed that Indian Buddhism gradually accepted sedentary life, and that Buddhist monks, living in monasteries permanently, received large donations from laity and accumulated various kinds of properties.⁹

The *Dhammasaṅgahaṇi*, which was reportedly composed by the eminent Śvetāmbara monk Haribhadra Yākinīputra (8th or 9th century¹⁰), tells us of such a situation in Buddhist monastic life. It also delineates the grounds for the possession of properties that the Buddhist monks themselves are said to have insisted on. In the following, I shall explore how Haribhadra criticizes his opponent's claims and how his opponent argues back against Haribhadra in order to defend property ownership of Buddhist monks.

⁵ On the concept of (*a-*)*pariggaha* in Theravāda Buddhism, see Inaba 2011.

⁶ Translation by Norman 2001. Pāli words in the brackets are added by the author.

⁷ *gahaṭṭhavattaṃ pana vo vadāmi yathākaro sāvako sādhu hoti / na h' eso labbhā sapaṛiggahena phassetuṃ yo kevalo bhikkhudhammo //393//*

⁸ *socanti janā mamāyite na hi santi niccā pariggahā / vinābhāvasantam ev' idaṃ iti disvā nāgāram āvāse //805//*

⁹ See, for example, Schopen 2004, Tasaki 1990, and Yamagiwa 2002.

¹⁰ This Haribhadra has been regarded as a person of 8th century (for example, see Williams 1965). However, Qvarnström 1999 suggests that Haribhadra in his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* extracted a verse from Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī*, viz., that Haribhadra flourished in the 9th century. On this issue, see also the recent study about Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, Marui 2014: 38-40 which basically approves of Qvarnström's view.

[1] *Dhammasaṃgahaṇi* 986 says that some “fools” think that even the possession of properties in villages and so forth¹¹ is faultless because it is the cause of the growth of “three jewels”.¹² Since the verse 987 states that the “three jewels” are Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha,¹³ it is doubtless that these “fools” are the Buddhists. Haribhadra refutes their views in the following way:

But the possession [of properties] in villages and so forth is neither beneficial to, nor gives pleasant results to these [three jewels]. You should understand that [the possession of properties in villages etc.] is harmful, for [such a possession] brings forth the intentional activity (*ārambha*).¹⁴

The point of Haribhadra’s assertion is that the possession of properties sets off the intentional activity, which inevitably conduces to the violence. In other words, Haribhadra’s criticism is based on the ethos of non-violence.

[2] But the Buddhist opponent argues back that a monk who commits *ārambha* is faultless if he fulfills a certain requirement. “When, being free from possessiveness (*mamattarahia* / Skt. *mamatvarahita*), one engages in intentional activity only for the sake of the three jewels, one

¹¹ The definition of *apariggaha* in *Dhammasaṃgahaṇi* 860 “avoiding of small and large [amount of the properties] in villages and so on” (*gāmādisu appabahuvivajjanam*) seems to indicate that *gāmādipariggaha*- of verse 986 is a locative-tatpuruṣa compound to be translated as “the possession [of properties] in villages and so on”. However, as we will see at the section [7], in vv. 1007-9 the Buddhist opponent and Haribhadra dispute about the possession of 960 million villages by the universal emperor Bharata. This dispute suggests that the expression *gāmādipariggaha*- implies the possession of villages themselves. We know that villages had been donated to the Indian Buddhist Saṅgha (this does not mean that the Buddhist monks themselves owned villages individually). To cite a case, the Korean Buddhist monk of 8th century Hyecho (慧超) reported in his travelogue of five Indic regions *Wǎng wǔ Tiānzhúguó zhuàn* (往五天竺國傳) that Indian kings and queens donated villages and their inhabitants to the Buddhist Saṅgha at the same time when they donated temples. On this report, see Kuwayama 1992: 36. On further traces about the possession of villages and lands by the Buddhist Saṅgha recorded in the *Vinayas* and the inscriptions, see Tasaki 1990. I would like to thank professor Fumio Enomoto (Osaka University) who kindly told me about Hyecho’s report.

¹² *anne niddosaṃ ciya gāmādipariggahaṃ pi mannaṃti / rayaṇatigavuddhihetuttaṇeṇa parithūrabuddhīyā //986//*

¹³ *rayaṇatigaṃ iha buddho dhammo saṅgho ya*. According to Haribhadra, Buddha is a fruit of the “perfections” (*pāramitā*), Dharma is the *Āgama* or the infallible words of the Buddha, and Saṅgha is the group of persons who practice the Buddhist asceticism (*dhūtaguṇa*): *buddho pāramiyāphalam aṇaghaṃ tavvayaṇam āgamo dhammo / dhūtaguṇāṇuṭṭhāt sattāṇaṃ samudayo saṅgho //988//*

¹⁴ *na ya etes’ uvayāro gāmādipariggaho suhapphalado / ārambhapavittīo avi avayāro muṇeyavvo //989//*

should be regarded as faultless - even if [one is] a Buddhist monk (*bhikkhu* / Skt. *bhikṣu*).”¹⁵

The point we should notice here is that the Buddhist opponent refers to “being free from possessiveness”¹⁶ and “only for the sake of the three jewels.” Whether or not a monk really possesses properties does not mean much. What is intrinsically important is that his mind is free from possessiveness and that the purpose of his acquisition of possessions and of *ārambha* is only the support of the “three jewels.” These two requirements are essential to make the property ownership of Buddhist monks and the subsequent *ārambha* faultless.

Haribhadra denies this claim in the following manner¹⁷:

Having stopped meat[-eating], one [names meat] *daṃtikkaga*¹⁸ and enjoys [meat-eating] on the ground of the difference of the word. Having abandoned intentional activity, a fool practices [the very intentional activity] on the ground of the different expression.¹⁹ When [an act] is essentially sinful, it is prohibited absolutely [to do it] even if [one expresses it in] a different sound [which does not represent its true nature]. For instance, even if [one names a poison] a sweet [, it never becomes harmless], or even if [one names hot water] a cold [, it burns his skin²⁰] in this world.²¹

This criticism reminds me of a traditional byname of alcoholic beverages in Japan.²² While

¹⁵ *siya jo mamattarahio rayaṇatigaṃ ciya paḍucca āraṃbhe / vaṭṭai bhikkhū vi tao niddoso ceva vinneo //990//*

¹⁶ On the importance of the freedom from *mamatta* in Pāli Buddhism, see Inaba 2014.

¹⁷ The following two verses appear in *Pañcavathuga* 1.99-100 of Haribhadra (Virahāṅka?) too.

¹⁸ The etymon of *daṃtikkaga* is not clear for me. Is it Skt. **dāntīkyaka* which is derived from *danta* “tooth” and means like “food which should be masticated by one’s teeth,” or a pure *deśya* word?

¹⁹ *mamsanivattiṃ kāuṃ sevai daṃtikkagaṃ ti dhaṇibhedā / iya caiūṇāraṃbhaṃ paravavaesā kuṇai bālo //991//*

²⁰ Cf. Malayagiri’s commentary on 992: *kim iva punaḥ śabdabhede ’pi sati viruddham ity ata āha mahurety-ādi loke madhurakaśītalikādivat, nahi viṣaṃ madhuram ity uktaṃ sat na vyāpādayati sphaṭikā vā śītalikety uktā satī na tudati, tathāraṃbho ’pi kriyamāṇaḥ parārtham ity ucyamāno ’pi prakṛtyā sāvadyatvāt paralokaṃ bādha eveti.*

²¹ *payāte sāvajjaṃ saṃtaṃ ṇaṇu savvahā viruddhaṃ tu / dhaṇibhedammi vi mahuragasītaligādi vva logammi //992//*

²² I do not discuss the history of prohibition and permission of drinking alcohol in Japanese Buddhism here. I hope that the readers who are interested in this issue will refer to Fujiwara 1933 and Michibata 1970: 214-348.

generally in Buddhism drinking alcoholic beverages has been prohibited, some Japanese Buddhist mendicants and laypersons have called them “*han-nya-tō*” which literally means “hot water for wisdom (*prajñā*).” They justified drinking them with the argument that “what we are drinking is not alcoholic beverages but *han-nya-tō*.” It is needless to say that no alcoholic beverages transmute into non-alcoholic beverages even if one gives a new and different name to them. After all, one who drinks what is named as *han-nya-tō* transgresses the Buddhist precept which prohibits the consumption of alcoholic beverages.

Quite similarly, even if the Buddhists give new names to their possessions and the intentional activity, they cannot avoid committing faults originating from them.

[3] The Buddhist opponent further argues that the possession of properties is beneficial because it enables even the children to render the respectful service²³ for the Buddhist monks (993: *bālādīṇaṃ veyāvaccam to hoi*).

But in Haribhadra’s opinion, a virtuous monk should engage only in such a service that is unblamable in the first place. The possession of properties is a reprehensible activity and spoils one’s virtue.²⁴ Having taken account of the merit and the demerit of oneself and others, one should engage in respectful service. Or one may fall into the doctrine that accepts respectful service as an absolutely fruitful activity under any circumstances²⁵ (*veṇaiyavāda* / Skt. *vainayikavāda*).²⁶

[4] After this criticism, the Buddhist opponent insists that the Buddha does not allow the possession of properties in villages by the Buddhist monks and that the generous givers (*dāṇavati* / Skt. *dānapati*) themselves allow to do so²⁷ for the sake of their roots of well-being (*kusalamūla* / Skt. *kuśalamūla*).²⁸

²³ On *veyāvacca*, see Caillat 1975: 112-5 and Silk 2008: 39-73.

²⁴ *niravajjemaṃ vihiṇā guṇajuttāṇaṃ tayaṃ pi kāyavvaṃ / sāvajjo ya imo khalu tesiṃ pi ya kuṇai guṇahāṇiṃ //994//*

²⁵ Using the word *veṇaiyavāda*, Haribhadra seems to deliver his criticism to the thought that any kind of services (for example, the donation to the Buddhist monks) always can bring merit, even if such services involve some kind of de-meritorious actions (for example, a donation entailing the killing of animate beings).

²⁶ *purisaṃ tassuvayāraṃ avayāraṃ c’ appaṇo ya nāūṇaṃ / kujjā veyāvāḍiyam iharā veṇaiyavādo ṇu //995//*

²⁷ What the Buddhist opponent says here seems to be that the owners of properties in the real sense are not the Buddhist monks but always laypersons. Therefore the former do not commit any transgressions which are derived from the possession of properties.

²⁸ *siya ṇāṇumao eso buddheṇaṃ kiṃtu appaṇā ceva / dāṇavatīhiṃ sammaṃ pavattio kusalamūlatthaṃ //996//*

On this claim, Haribhadra's question is simple: even so, why could both the generous givers and the monks be free from pain in yonder world when they commit a deed which the Buddha does not allow to commit?²⁹

[5] Then the Buddhist opponent modifies his argument as follows: while the generous givers are given approval to possess properties in villages by the Buddha, he allows the Buddhist monks to receive the outcome (*phala*) from such possessions only when their mental condition is pure. So why should they suffer pain in yonder world?³⁰

On this argument, Haribhadra questions the definition of "monk" (*bhikkhu*). He says that conventionally *bhikkhu* is called *bhikkhu* because he is free from expectation, makes it a habit to beg alms, and shuns three kinds of evil in three ways.³¹

Although no comment is given by Haribhadra himself, it is evident that the two triplets (*tivihaṃ tivihenaṃ*) derive from the older passage like "in three ways, viz. with mind, speech, and body, [I abandon] threefold [action]: I do not perform [any evil acts], nor I cause [another person] to perform [them], nor I allow another person who performs [them]" of *Dasaveyāliya* IV 1.³² In the light of these two triplets, the Buddhist *bhikkhus* cannot be true *bhikkhus* because they allow the givers to possess properties. Haribhadra argues as follows: when the monks enjoy their alms and so on which are brought to completion through intentional activity, it is unreasonable that they are endowed with the quality of *bhikkhu* (*bhikkhuttaṇa* / Skt. *bhikṣutva*), because they "allow".³³

[6] According to the Buddhist opponent, one who dedicates oneself to Buddhist asceticism (*dhūtaguṇa*) is regarded as a true *bhikkhu* in principle (*ussagga* / Skt. *utsarga*). But there is an exceptional case (*avavāda* / Skt. *apavāda*) that he is regarded as a true *bhikkhu* even if he

²⁹ *evaṃ pi haṃta doṇha vi buddheṇāṇaṇumayammi vatthummi / kaha ṇa payaṭṭamaṭāṇaṃ paralogavirāhaṇā hoi //997//*

³⁰ *dāṇavatīṇaṃ aṇumato aha bhikkhūṇaṃ pi suddhabhāvāṇaṃ / tapphalaparibhogo iya paralogavirāhaṇā kiha ṇu //998//*

³¹ *tivihaṃ tivihenaṃ jao pāvamaṃ pariharati jo nirāsaṃso / bhikkhaṇasīlo ya tao bhikkhu tti nidarisio samae //1000//*

³² *tivihaṃ tivihenaṃ maṇeṇaṃ vāyāe kāeṇaṃ na karemi na kārāvemi kareṇtaṃ pi annaṃ na samaṇujāṇāmi.*

³³ *āraṃbhaniṭṭhiyaṃ piṃda-m-ādi bhūṃjaṃtagāṇa bhikkhūṇaṃ / tattha pavittīḍa aṇumatīḍa bhikkhuttaṇaṃ ajuttaṃ //999//*

consumes what is brought completion through intentional activity.³⁴ If a deed does not destroy “*caraṇapariṇāṃabīja*”, which may be translated as “the seed for the change / shift into good conduct”, this deed should be understood as an exception.³⁵ This assertion indicates that the Buddhist opponent envisages the property ownership of Buddhist monks as a deed which exceptionally does not destroy their *caraṇapariṇāṃabījas*. Based on such a view, it is natural for the Buddhists that a monk who possesses properties is exceptionally regarded as a true *bhikkhu*.

Haribhadra denies this claim because the allowance of such an exception inevitably produces an unwarrantable stretch of a principle (*aippasaṃga* / Skt. *atiprasaṅga*) by laypersons (1003: *tabbhāve vi gihīhiṃ aippasaṃgo dhuvo hoi*). Based on the commentary of Malayagiri,³⁶ what *aippasaṃga* here means seems to be as follows: the Buddhist opponent must admit that a layperson who possesses properties is exceptionally regarded as a *bhikkhu* if a Buddhist monk who possesses properties is regarded as a *bhikkhu*. It is because there is no difference between the layperson and the monk in that both of them possess properties.

Furthermore, Haribhadra does not accept the view that the possession of properties does not destroy one’s *caraṇapariṇāṃabīja*. It is because “from the possession [of properties] in villages an activity [originates], and from that [activity] a mental defilement (*parikilesa* / Skt. *parikleśa*) inevitably [arises] in the mind [of one who acts], and that [mental defilement] causes the disappearance of the seed for the change into good conduct”.³⁷ Such a comportment of the Buddhist monks are like that of a king. “Even when such an exception is applied, it is unreasonable that [the Buddhist monks] who imitate the king’s semblance and stray from the way to liberation are endowed with the quality of *bhikkhu*.”³⁸

[7] The Buddhist opponent does not agree with Haribhadra’s refutation because one can find

³⁴ *aha ussaggeṇ’ eso dhūtaguṇāsevaṇekkatanniṭṭho / avavādeṇa u āraṃbhaniṭṭhitam ceva sevaṃto //1001//*

³⁵ *caraṇapariṇāṃabīyaṃ jaṃ na viṇāsei kajjamāṇaṃ pi / tam aṇuṭṭhāṇaṃ sammaṃ avavādapadaṃ muṇetavvaṃ //1002//*

³⁶ Malayagiri’s commentary on 1003: *tabbhāve ity-ādi caraṇapariṇāṃabījavināśabhāve pi yady anuṣṭhānam apavādapadaviṣayam iṣyate tato gṛhibhiḥ gṛhasthair atiprasaṅgo dhruvaḥ prāpnoti, teṣāṃ api dhanadhānyakanakagrāmādipariagrahavatā kanakādipariagrahasya^apavādapadaviṣayatva^abhyupagamena bhikṣutvaprasakter iti.*

³⁷ *gāmādipariggahao tadvāvāro tao ya cittassa / niyameṇa parikilesa tao ya caraṇassa nāso u //1004//*

³⁸ *iya avavādapadeṇa vi nariṃdalīlaṃ vilambamāṇāṇaṃ / maggacuyāṇaṃ viduse paḍucca bhikkhuttaṇaṃ ajuttaṃ //1005//*

an episode in the writings of the Jains that the property ownership of a person did not destroy his *caraṇapariṇāmbīja*. “Well, when Bharata the owner of 960 million villages was in the pure mental state, he attained omniscience thanks to [the seed for] the change into good conduct.³⁹ [Therefore] Both [I and you must] admit that the possession [of properties] in villages does not destroy the seed for the change into good conduct. Why don’t you realize it?”⁴⁰

Bharata in this context is surely the character who appears in the so-called “Universal History”⁴¹ of Jainism. He is believed to be the eldest son of the first Tīrthānkara Rṣabha and the first universal emperor (*cakravartin*) of this world era. The Śvetāmbara tradition is said to have maintained that he attained omniscience without having renounced the household life,⁴² viz., the Śvetāmbara Jains have thought that the possession of 960 million villages by Bharata never destroyed his *caraṇapariṇāmbīja* which was the trigger of his attaining omniscience. Therefore, Haribhadra must admit the opinion of his opponent if he accepts the Jain Universal History as historically true one.

Based on the Jain definition of *aparigraha* which is mentioned in [0.1], Haribhadra insists on the validity of his assertion. He says, “on that occasion, [the seed for] the change into good conduct surely existed when Bharata’s infatuation (*mucchā* / Skt. *mūrcchā*) went away. And he did not act at all for that [possession of villages].⁴³ But your infatuation does not go away because you act such and such [for the possession of properties]...”⁴⁴ Although Bharata owned 960 million villages, he was not infatuated with his villages. That is, from the viewpoint of Haribhadra, he possessed no villages in the real sense and did nothing for the possession of properties. Namely, he did not commit any *ārambhas*.

At first glance, the concept of “being free from infatuation (*mūrcchā*)” of Jainism seems to be almost identical to that of “being free from possessiveness (*mamatva*)” of Buddhism,

³⁹ *channauigāmaḥpaiṇo bharahassa suddhabhāvassa / caraṇapariṇāmao bhe kevalanāṇaṃ samuppannaṃ //1006//*

⁴⁰ *caraṇapariṇāmbīyaṃ gāmādipariggaho ṇa ṇāsei / iya doṇha vi amhāṇaṃ siddham iṇaṃ kin na lakkhesi //1007//*

⁴¹ On this term, see Wiley 2006: 223.

⁴² See Wiley 2006: 54.

⁴³ *bharahassa tattha mucchāvīgame ṇaṇu āsi caraṇapariṇāmo / ṇa ya tammi teṇa tahiyaṃ kāci pavittī kayā āsi //1008//*

⁴⁴ *ṇa ya iya mucchāvīgamo tumhāṇaṃ tattha tahapavittī / patteyabuddhaṇātaṃ evaṃ ajuttaṃ muṇeyavvaṃ //1009//*

which is referred to in [2].⁴⁵ But it should be noted that there is a key difference between them. In Haribhadra's view, one who is free from infatuation cannot commit *ārambha* at all. Therefore, there cannot be any violence which is originated by him. On the contrary, the Buddhist opponent allows the possibility that one who is free from possessiveness can act intentionally on account of, for example, the "three jewels". By the same token, he can cause someone to commit *ārambha* or allow someone who commits it even if he is free from possessiveness. This is why Haribhadra criticizes the property ownership of the Buddhist monks. For Haribhadra, the Buddhist concept of "being free from possessiveness" is quite far from the real state of non-attachment.

[8] The Buddhist opponent argues that this practice of possession of properties in villages is a prescribed and therefore a faultless one which is authorized by the Buddhist treatises⁴⁶ (*sattha* / Skt. *śāstra*) in this case, just like the practices such as *caityavandana* are authorized by the Jain treatises.⁴⁷ Haribhadra questions: "why can such one be [regarded as] a [true] treatise if it prescribes a practice which is the seed for impure change? This [your argumentation] is a spurious insertion [of an improper understanding of the treatises] (*pakkheva* / Skt. *prakṣepa*)⁴⁸."⁴⁹

⁴⁵ The Jains themselves sometimes use *mamatva* as a synonym of *parigraha*. To give an example, Umāsvāti uses *mamatva* instead of *parigraha* in his *Praśamaratiprakaraṇa* 60 when he refers to the five *vratas*:

*prāṇivadhānṛtabhāṣaṇaparadhanamaithunamamatvaviratasya /
navakoṭyudgamaśuddhoñchamātrayātrādhikārasya //*

Similarly, as Inaba 2014 pointed out, in the Pāli scriptures the derivatives from *mama-* (*mamatta*, *mamāyita*, etc.) and *pariggaha* are sometimes used synonymously. For instance, *Suttanipāta* 805 runs:

*socanti janā mamāyite na hi santi niccā pariggahā /
vinābhāvasantam ev' idaṃ iti disvā nāgāram āvase //*

"People grieve for their cherished things (*mamāyita*), for no possessions (*pariggaha*) are permanent. Seeing that this separation truly exists, one should not live the household life" (Translation by Norman 2001).

⁴⁶ I understand that *satthaṃ* is used as a collective noun here, since it is unlikely that only one Buddhist text prescribes the possession of properties. Jain *caityavandana* is prescribed by many Jain treatises, especially the so-called *śrāvakācāra*-texts (Williams 1963: 187-98).

⁴⁷ *siya vihiyāṇuṭṭhāṇaṃ eyaṃ amhāṇa tā na doso u / satthaṃ ettha pamāṇaṃ jaheva citivaṃdanādīsū //1010//*

⁴⁸ In this context *pakkheva* seems to have a specific meaning, which is not entirely clear to me. Malayagiri does not explain the word at all. See also the entry of *pakkheva* of Sheth 1928 / 1989: 504 "*śāstra meṃ pīche se kiśi ke dvārā ḍālā yā milāyā huā vākya*".

⁴⁹ *asuhapariṇāmabījaṃ jam aṇuṭṭhāṇaṃ vihei taṃ kiha ṇu / satthaṃ ti ato eso pakkhevo hoi nāyavvo //1011//*

[9] Even if only the lay followers keep up a vigil at the possession of properties in villages and the Buddhist monks never do so, they are sinful because they enjoy the products which are prepared especially for them (*āhākamma / ādhākarman*⁵⁰).⁵¹

[10] Finally, the Buddhist opponent says that such a practice is not regarded as a fault since it is due to the bad era. But Haribhadra questions: why can one be faultless when he commits a sinful activity which he can remove even in the bad era?⁵²

[11] While this dispute recorded in the *Dhammasaṅgahaṇi* seems to reflect some historical facts of Buddhist monasteries in the mediaeval period, I cannot say for certain whether or not such a dispute actually happened between Haribhadra and the Buddhists. At this point, I am not sure about the name of Buddhist sect or school which Haribhadra criticized. As a future task, whether or not Haribhadra correctly tells about the Buddhist opinion must be judged. It is imperative to fully collect the accounts found in the (Hīnayāna / Mahāyāna) Buddhist texts or inscriptions which depict the possession of properties by the Buddhist monks and try to identify each passage with the relevant record of the *Dhammasaṅgahaṇi*.

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⁵⁰ On the meaning of this term, see Deo 1956: 283-4, 287-90.

⁵¹ *siya tassuvāsaga cciya kareṃti paḍiyaggaṇaṃ na bhikkhu tti / tapphalaparibhogo vi hu āhākammaṃ ti to duṭṭho //1013//*

⁵² *kālaparihāṇidosā eddahamitte ṇa ce havati doso / sakkaparihārasāvajjasevaṇe kaham adoso tu //1014//*

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