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Jaina Logic

Book of Abstracts

Anekāntavāda, the Central Philosophy of Ājīvikism?

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Ājīvikism, a vanished Indian religion, has been admirably studied by A. L. Basham in his 1951 monograph. Since then, a renewed study of the existing evidence has led to an improved understanding of this religion. New evidence, moreover, has shown that this religion remained intellectually active and influential at least until the end of the first millennium CE. This paper will discuss other evidence again, also from the end of the first millennium, which appears to show that Ājīvikism shared the *anekāntavāda* with Jainism, but not only that. Like Jainism, it used the *anekāntavāda* to solve a problem that did not arise until many centuries after the time of Mahāvīra. It follows that Jainism and Ājīvikism remained closely in close contact with each other for at least half a millennium since their beginning, perhaps longer, and shared some crucial intellectual developments.

Arthanayas and Śabdanayas: A Structural Analysis

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It is well-known that the doctrine of viewpoints (*nayavāda*) is a cornerstone of the Jaina philosophy of multilateralism inasmuch as the truth of an utterance does not imply that any other utterance is false. The usual distinction between substantial viewpoints (*dravyanaya*) and modal viewpoints (*paryāyanaya*), which relies on one of the most fundamental ontological tenets of Jainism, i.e. the necessary coexistence of permanence and change in every existent thing (cf. Umāsvāmin's *Tattvārthasūtra* V.29), contributes to bringing to the fore this multilateral approach. Another division among the seven viewpoints is based on the difference between the statements which directly consist in an ontological description, "the object-bound viewpoints" (*arthanaya*), and those which are firstly endowed with a meta-linguistical value since they consider to which extent a word is appropriate for expressing a particular thing, "the word-bound viewpoints" (*śabdanaya*). In spite of its being an inheritance from the most ancient philosophical texts, this second dichotomy is generally left aside by scholars dealing with the seven *nayas* from a structural perspective. In contradistinction to this usual trend, the present paper aims at drawing parallelisms between the three word-bound viewpoints (the *śabdanaya*, *samabhirūḍhanaya* and *evambhūtanaya*) and three of the object-bound viewpoints (the *saṅgrahanaya*, *vyavahāranaya* and *ṛjusūtranaya* respectively), so as to establish an underlying structural pattern.

Prolegomena to a Phenomenology of Jaina Time-Consciousness

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Jain perspectivist logic is predicated on the alternation of viewpoints in time. The paper will explore in which ways Jain conceptions of time and logic are interrelated. A phenomenological approach will be proposed to reconstruct the evolution of Jain perspectivist philosophy of logic.

Origin and Value of Saptabhaṅgī

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Saptabhaṅgī or a statement with seven sentences sometimes represents the whole Jaina philosophical doctrine and logical thoughts. In this paper, first its relationship with *anekāntavāda* or the Jaina theory of multi-face of a reality will be explored following some Jain philosophers opinions. Secondly its original form in two traditions of Jainism will be studied. In the Śvetāmbara tradition we will take up canonical texts while Samantabhadra's work is the main source from the Digambaras. Finally we shall check the logical value of the *Saptabhaṅgī*.

Jain Theory of Inference in the Parīkṣāmukham

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Late Jain treatises about theory of knowledge essentially deal with the following question: how to gain new knowledge ? In the field of argumentation, this task is generally handled by an inference (*anumāna*), the means by which one might gain a piece of knowledge of the form 'x is A' from both knowledge of 'x is B' and knowledge about the relation of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) between A and B.

Now, while Buddhist and Naiyāyika theories of inference are well documented, Jain ones still call for further explanations. In his *Parīkṣāmukham*, Introduction to philosophical investigation, the Digambara master Māṇikyanandi (eight century AD) grants five main types of universal concomitance, namely inherence, co-presence, causality, succession and essence. Since the answer to the question 'given an epistemic situation and a universal concomitance, is one justified to draw an inference?' differs for each type of universal concomitance, Māṇikyanandi offers for each type an extensive picture of the situations from which a correct inference is to be drawn. From a study of Māṇikyanandi's text, the objective of this talk is to understand some specificities of late Jain theories of inference and to compare them with Buddhist ones, especially the ones developed in the tradition of Dharmakīrti.

An Appraisal of Jaina Epistemology and Logic

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Into the panorama of Indian Epistemology and Logic Jain philosophers entered later than Naiyāyikas and Buddhists, but they have contributed a lot by developing a new definition of *pramāṇa* (organ of valid cognition), types of indirect *pramāṇas*, nature of *hetu* (probans) and its kinds, etc. Jaina logicians developed their epistemological doctrines on the basis of five types of knowledge found in the canonical literature. Umāsvāti or Umāsvāmin (2nd century CE) propounds two types of *pramāṇa* as *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *parokṣa* (indirect cognition). He kept *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* in the category of *parokṣa pramāṇa* and rest three knowledges (*avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevalajñāna*) into *pratyakṣa* category. Siddhasena Divākara (5th century CE) or (in the view of Piotr Balcerowicz) Siddhasena Mahāmāti (8th century CE) considered *parokṣa pramāṇa* as twofold - *anumāna* (inference) and *āgama* (testimony). Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka (720-780 CE) developed and systematized the epistemological doctrines. He classified *pratyakṣa* into two types - (i) *sāmvyavahārika* (sensual) and (ii) *pāramārthika* (transcendental), and *parokṣa* into five kinds - (i) *smṛti* (recollection) (ii) *pratyabhijñāna* (recognition) (iii) *tarka* (inductive reasoning) (iv) *anumāna* (inference) and (v) *āgama* (testimony). After Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka Vidyānanda (775-840 CE), Anantavīrya (950-990 CE), Māṅikyanandin (993-1053 CE), Vādirāja (1025 CE), Abhayadevasūri (10th century CE), Prabhācandra (980-1065CE), Vādidēvasūri (1086-1169 CE) Hemcandrasūri (1088-1173 CE), Ratnaprabhasūri (11th -12th century CE), Abhinavadharmabhūṣaṇa (14th -15th century CE), Malliṣeṇasūri (1293 CE), Guṇaratnasūri (1343-1418 CE), Vimaladāsa, Yaśovijaya (17th century CE) are the main contributors to Jain epistemological literature and tenets. They refuted the other Indian systems and established the Jain doctrines cogently. The main contributions of the Jaina logicians may be summed up in the following points-

1. They established the definitive nature of *pramāṇa* illuminating itself and the object.
2. They cogently established recollection, recognition, and inductive reasoning as independent *pramāṇas*.
3. They are very precise in defining the *hetu* (probans) but they have elaborately conceived kinds and sub-kinds of it.

The Logic of Legitimation of Jain Lay Life in Sūyagaḍaṃga 2.2 and the Uvavāiṃya

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This paper discusses the logic of argumentation in passages relating to the laity in Sūyagaḍaṃga 2.2 as well as in the section on the hierarchy of beings at the end of the Uvavāiṃya. In Sūyagaḍaṃga 2.2 the compiler has creatively reworked a passage that

juxtaposed the praiseworthy conduct of the Jain ascetic with the censured behavior of everyone else. He creates an intermediate category, occupied by the lay Jain, that is spoken of in a positive light. The virtue of the lay Jain resides in the ability to approximate the conduct of a monastic, at least temporarily. Legitimizing lay life in this manner is inconsistent with the attacks on non-Jain mendicants that also occur in Sūyagaḍaṅga 2.2. Non-Jain renunciants can also behave like Jain monastics, and it is not clear why one group of those who are sometimes similar to Jain monastics, the Jain laity, is praised, while another, the non-Jain renunciants, is criticized.

I argue that the compiler of the Uvavāīya has copied the passages on the layman from Sūyagaḍaṅga 2.2. The compiler of the Uvavāīya avoids the inconsistency seen in Sūyagaḍaṅga 2.2 by not engaging in the condemnation of all non-Jain ascetics.

Haribhadrasūri on Sāṃkhya: Jain Criticism of Sāṃkhya Epistemology

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This paper deals with the Jain portrayal and critique of Sāṃkhya epistemology as expressed in Haribhadrasūri's *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* and *Yogabindu*. These texts provide us with a series of hypothetical, but in all probability historically anchored, debates concerning the notion of a passive, contentless Self (*puruṣa/ātman*); and, the question of how that contentless Self comes to know. In doing so, they highlight several points of divergence between Jain and Sāṃkhya systems of thought, as well as provide us with knowledge of Sāṃkhya epistemology which hitherto have been unknown due to the paucity of sources that directly pertain to this period in the history of Sāṃkhya philosophy.

Jaina's naya-vāda as presupposition analysis

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In a recent paper on Siddharṣiṅgaṇi's *Handbook of Logic* penned by Gorisse, Clerbout and Rahman (2011, *JPL*), one finds the idea that the viewpoint-knowledge of the Jain gnoseology is an implicit epistemic context that bounds the assertion of statements, not an operator that extends the set of logical constants. Moreover, each viewpoint represents a type of epistemic access to objects of the domain of discourse.

A reconstruction within the frame of dialogical logic is then given, according to which the epistemic contribution of each viewpoint amounts to the acceptance of specific norms for the use of singular terms, quantifiers, identity statements, and

assertions. During a debate that takes place within a fixed viewpoint the Opponent settles the predicates.

The present paper aims at providing further explanations about the role of the quantifiers in a modern reconstruction of the logical structure of the *naya-vâda*. We propose to explore as a possible interpretation of the theory of the multiplexity of reality that it bears on the existential presuppositions (eps) carried by the terms involved in predication. As we would say in the conceptual framework of modern semantics, the domain in which the eps are to be interpreted is *many-sorted*.

In his argument against a paraconsistent understanding of the *syâd-vâda*, Balcerowicz remarks that when we take into consideration all relevant contextual parameters, identical sentences at the verbal level may well prove to be just homonymic. That is why the seemingly contradictory statement one may justify according to the Jains are not, after all, contradictory.

But in that case, it seems plausible that the so-called pragmatic inferences, by which speakers retrieve the intended meaning of an utterance, play an architectonic role in the *syâd-vâda*, as an analysis modes of assertion. As Flügel notes, "philosophical perspectivism (*anekânta-vâda*, *syâd-vâda*, *nikṣepa*, *naya* etc.), [...] is seen as an analytic instrument for disambiguation". Consequently, we propose to look at the way the points of view are exposed e.g. in Prabhâcandra's *Prameya-kamala-mârtanda* to locate the elements of a pragmatic theory of disambiguation, where existential presuppositions are made explicit in a refined way.

A One-valued Logic for Non-One-Sidedness

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Jainism is part and parcel of what has been depicted under the name of "dialectical logics", or "Indian logics". What do these logical systems consist in? A special emphasis will be made about formal semantics, given that the Jain theory of sevenfold predication or *saptabhangi* has been currently viewed as a seven-valued logic. I'll attempt to show why this is a wrong view. After making a brief remainder of modern logic, Frege's truth-values are revisited into a family of many-valued semantics. The logical values I'll call for are non-Fregean values, i.e. ordered answers to initial questions about a sentence. Then a common logic of acceptance and rejection is suggested as a common framework for two ancient Indian logics, namely: *saptabhangi*, and *catuskoti* (or tetralemma); in both cases, the main value of dialogue has a soteriological (rather than scientific) feature and accounts for a non-objectual approach to logical values. The final result is a description of dialectical systems as

one-valued sub-logics, while their logicity is seriously questioned by the absence of consequence relations and the special sort of sentences in it.

Prabhācandra's Status in and Contribution to the History of Jaina Philosophical Speculation

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In dealing with the history of Jaina philosophical speculation after the age of the Āgamas, K. K. Dixit in his now well-known work *Jaina Ontology* (pp. 88–163) conveniently divides the speculations into three stages which he calls the 'Ages of Logic'. The 'Ages of Logic' can be understood as the logic of the arguments by Jaina thinkers in different periods, namely their arguments both against non-Jaina views as well as arguments in presenting their own standpoints. The thinkers of the first stage are Siddhasena (especially his *Sanmatitarka*), Mallavādin (*Nayacakra*), Jinabhadra (*Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*), Kundkunda with his three *Sāras* and Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*. Representatives of the second stage are Haribhadra, Akalaṅka and Vidyānandin. The third stage being made up by Abhayadeva, Prabhācandra, Vādideva and Yaśovijaya. Dixit's statements about Prabhācandra are not quite consistent. On the one hand, he says on p. 103 'that the range of Prabhācandra's enquiry 'was less comprehensive than that of Vidyānandin and his treatment of topics less advanced than that of the latter'. And on the other hand, on p. 156 he says that Prabhācandra 'had made it a point to introduce in his commentaries an exhaustive and systematic discussion of the major philosophical issues of his times (even including aspects not found in his predecessors, e.g. theories of error). This paper will attempt to bring out Prabhācandra's status or position in the history of Jaina philosophical speculation and his contribution as an important Digambara thinker in his own right.

***Kathañcit* and other Key Terms of Jain Perspectivism in Vidyānandin's Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā**

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In the *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā* Vidyānandin frequently uses *kathañcit*, *sarvathā*, *anekānta* and *ekānta* to demonstrate the supremacy of the Jain's ontology to the ontological theories of other schools of thought. The paper examines in which contexts these terms are used and how they are related to Vidyānandin's version of the Jain's pluralistic epistemological model.

***Nikṣepa* in Akalaṅka's Works**

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In Jaina texts, there were several methods to investigate the words in sacred scriptures (Āgama). Using these methods, commentators of the scriptures were able to investigate the words and transmit their exact meanings for posterity. These methods are collectively called *anuyogadvāra*, which are further divided into various sets. Among them, one of the most important is called *nikṣepa*. *Nikṣepa* plays an important role, not only in the Jaina Agamas, but also in the following age of logic. It is regarded as a way of perception, similar to *prama.as* and *nayas*. The relationship between *nikṣepa* and *nayas* is particularly focused by logicians of Jaina thought. According to Jaina Ontology, by K. K. Dixt, *nikṣepa* in the age of logic starts from Tattvārthādhigamasūtra (TAAS). Akalaṅka, who annotated TAAS, payed special attention to *nikṣepa* and tried to treat it with as much importance as *prama.as* and *nayas* in his own works. It is generally agreed that the system of Jaina logic was completed by Akalaṅka, so *nikṣepa* included in his system is also settled in his works. In this presentation, we will survey the concept of *nikṣepa*, and then investigate that concept in detail and compare each definition among Akalaṅka's works.