

**Islamic Nationalism VS Islamic Ummatism/ *al-Ummatya*:**

Conceptualizing Political Islam

**(Ummatism/ *al-Ummatya*) (Ummatist/ *Ummatawee*)**

**(Ummatists / *Ummatawyon*)**

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## *Abstract*

The problem with the term Political Islam is its failure to differentiate between trans-national and national Islamic movements. This article will answer the question of how can we conceptualize Political Islam to accurately reflect the ideological differences that divide trans-national and national Islamic movements in the Muslim world. I will introduce the notion of *Islamic Ummatism* to reflect the ideology associated with trans-national Muslim movements, and the term Islamic Nationalism will reflect ethno-national Islamic movements. I will also explore the history of the ideological development of those two strains of Islamic movements by discussing the thought of the two figures whose thought influenced the development of these two schools of Islamic politics.

## I. Introduction

This paper will demonstrate that the term Political Islam is inadequate to reflect the ideological divide that exists between Islamic political groups. To better differentiate between Islamic trans-nationalism and nationalism, I will introduce the notion of Islamic Ummatism as an adequate representative of the Islamic trans-nationalist ideology for Muslim groups, and Islamic Nationalism as an adequate representative of ethno-Islamic nationalist ideology. I will also shed light on the difference in the ideological development of those two ideological strains, and discuss the nature of their relationship with each other.

In accordance with Aristotle's thought regarding the establishment of a moral society, trans-national and national Islamic groups aim to establish an ethical Islamic society that is based on Islamic moral laws-Sharia. They believe that their secular societies are unethical and must be changed. However, they differ in their approach to achieve such a change. Trans-nationalist groups intend the change to be dramatic and extraordinary. They want to uproot every characteristic that defines their ethnic societies and re-produce it in a purer Islamic fashion. Every ethnic, economic and socio-political character that defined the old society will be uprooted and replaced with a purer Islamic socio-political culture.

Trans-nationalists intend to replace the cultural-based ethnicity with a religious-based one. The utilization of religion as an ethnic marker is not a novel approach. In the period preceding the eighteenth century, ethnicity was largely based on religion. Colin Kidd in his work, *British Identities before Nationalism Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600-1800*, investigated the state of British ethnic identity in 'the centuries which immediately preceded the rise of nationalism and racialism'.<sup>1</sup> Kidd observed that 'ethnic matters pertained by definition to the province of religion'<sup>2</sup> preceding the eighteenth century Europe. He qualified his observation by an etymological study of the word ethnic. He

discovered that ‘the entry for Ethnik in the Glossographia (1656) compiled by Thomas Blount (1618-79) ran as follows: heathenish, ungodly, irreligious. And may be used substantively for a heathen or gentile. A century later, Johnson’s Dictionary (1755) defined Ethnik in broadly similar fashion: heathen; pagan; not Jewish; not Christian’.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, he adds that ‘the term ethnic theology was in fact used in this era to refer to pagan religion’.<sup>4</sup>

Islamic Nationalist groups, on the other hand, are ethno-centric religious organizations that have an ethnically oriented religious agenda. These types of groups want to effect a change gradually from within their ethnic societies, while maintaining the ethnic, economic and sociopolitical character of their society. Egyptian ethnicity, for instance, will remain a powerful uniting factor for the Muslim Brotherhood in defining their society. Islamic Nationalists will utilize Islamic doctrine only as a source for revitalizing their society while emphasizing their ethnic heritage and identity. Change will be a slow process that will be balanced by other political forces from within the society.

Both of these groups believe that the secular laws of the contemporary State-system of government in the Muslim world are unethical, and are the cause for all the misfortunes the Muslim world has suffered. Their world-view places them in opposition to secular nationalist ideologies in the Muslim world, such as Arab nationalism. However, they differ from one another in the goals, degree and manner they want to effect change upon the global State-system. Trans-nationalist groups want to effect radical changes upon the global system as whole, and not only upon their respective societies. They want to re-make the world’s political order of States-system. Islamic Nationalist groups, however, want to effect moderate changes upon their respective societies and States by revitalizing the role Islam plays in their ethnic societies and in the global political order of State-system. These Islamic nationalist groups recognize the global political order of the State-system, and want to be part of it. This

is evident in the fact that they recognize political borders, treaties, and most important the ethnic divisions that divide the different ethnic nations that are part of this global political order of States.

Bassam Tibi,<sup>5</sup> author of *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*, describes Political Islamists as ‘Muslim fundamentalists...[who]...challenge secular nationalism as an alien ideology, and the existing nation-states as imposed institutions implanted in their countries’.<sup>6</sup> However, his use of the term “fundamentalists” as representative of both Islamic Nationalists and Islamic Trans-Nationalists is equally problematic to the use of the term Political Islam because it suggests that Islamic political actors are somewhat irrational religious fanatics who lack a rational political sense in understanding their political environment.

This contradicts the statement made by Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the *Muslim Brotherhood*, when he said at the fifth conference of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo that

Some people think of us as a group of preachers, concerned only to call people to virtues and abstain from sins. Others believe it is a mystical trend. We are not any of those, we call to return for true Islam, which is a belief and application, a home and a nationality, a religion and state, a spirit and body, and a Qur’an and Sword.<sup>7</sup>

This statement demonstrates that Islamic Nationalists believe themselves as national Islamic politicians rather than Islamic religious fundamentalists as Tibi suggests.

Islamic Nationalists tend to subscribe to an ethnic identity that is shrouded with a religious character, exactly as the Iranians did after the revolution to Iranian identity. They shrouded the Iranian identity and society with their own exclusive version of Islam that could not be re-produced again in non-Iranian communities such as the Arab Muslim communities in the Middle East. For instance, in a speech by the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in October of 2010, he stated “there are many interpretations of Islam, but [the] basis for our

practice is the Iranian interpretation. The historical experience proves that the Iranian interpretation of the truth is the closest one to the truth”.<sup>8</sup>

## **II. Islamic Ummatism vs Islamic Nationalism**

The notion that Islam’s political ideologies were not monolithic was supported by *Ali Hillal Dessouki*, editor of the book *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*. He explained that Islamic resurgence was ‘not a monolithic phenomenon but, rather, socially and historically conditioned’.<sup>9</sup> This section will explore the difference between those two strains by discussing the main historical figures whose thought influenced these types of strains.

In the study of Islamic groups and their politics, it is necessary to recognize that there exist two main strains of political ideologies in Islamic politics. The first is the Islamic Ummatist school of thought, through which Islamic groups project themselves as trans-national entities (a characteristic reflected in their makeup), and who emphasize primarily their pan-religious political identity over their ethnic one. The second is the Islamic Nationalist school of thought, through which Islamic groups project themselves as national (a characteristic also reflected in their makeup), and who emphasize primarily their ethno-religious political identity over their pan-religious one.

These two Islamic ideologies are at odds with secular ideologies, in addition to being at odds with one another. This hostility is best described by the relationship that exists between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, where Islamic Ummatists believe them-selves to represent the orthodoxy, while branding Islamic Nationalists as the heterodoxy.

## **The Origination:**

The Islamo-Ummatist and Islamo-Nationalist ideologies are different in their origination. They differ in the figures whose thought influenced these schools. They differ in their makeup and in the ends they seek to achieve. In short, they are not one and the same, although both use Islam as the source to legitimize their politics.

Peter Mandaville, author of *Global Political Islam*, and Olivier Roy, author of *Globalized Islam*, approached the history of Political Islam as a monolithic movement that emerged from the establishment of the ethnic Nation-State system in the Muslim world that began in the 20<sup>th</sup> century without discussing the influence of Islamic nineteenth century thought on these two strains of thought. In many ways, their approach presented Political Islam as an illegitimate phenomenon that was alien to the political thought in the Muslim world.

The Pan-Islamism of the nineteenth century established the basis upon which the ideological strains of Islam developed to what became known as Political Islam in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. There were Muslim thinkers that supported this phenomenon of Pan-Islamism and other thinkers opposed it in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

The emergence of Political Islam was the result of a process that found its origins in Pan-Islamism before the rise of the Nation-State in the Muslim world. In fact, Pan-Islamism influenced the Islamic Ummatist and Islamic Nationalist ideologies differently. The difference between both was that the Islamic Nationalist ideology was one strain that emerged to accommodate the Nation-State system in the Muslim world, while the Islamic Ummatist ideology emerged to prevent the Nation-State system from establishing roots in the Muslim world. Both of these ideologies look at the failure of Pan-Islamism in the nineteenth century to materialize as the cause of their varied political responses. In other-words, Islamic

Nationalism intended to keep Islam relevant in the public sphere. It is no coincidence, for instance, that the Muslim Brotherhood emerged in 1928, six years after Egypt's independence from Imperial Britain on the 28<sup>th</sup> of February 1922, and four years after the Ataturk abolished the Caliphate system in Turkey in 1924.

As for the Islamic Ummatist ideology, Ummatists believe it to represent a continuation of Pan-Islamic thought which they consider the Orthodoxy of Islamic Politics, while they consider Islamic Nationalism to represent the heterodoxy of Islamic politics. This explains the conflict that exists between the groups that adhere to one of these two types of ideologies whenever any of these groups meet. The Islamic Ummatists believe that they are the legitimate response for the dismemberment of the Caliphate after 1918, and its subsequent abolishment in 1924. It was no coincidence, for instance, that the Caliphate Movement of 1919 emerged a year after the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate under the European occupation of Constantinople in 1918. The Islamic groups that carry an Islamic Ummatist ideology, like al-Qaeda, believe themselves to be ideologically connected to the Pan-Islamist history of the nineteenth century. However, the modern formation of the Islamic Ummatist ideology was crystallized after the failure of the Caliphate Movement to protect the Caliphate from abolishment in 1924 by *Sayyid Abu 'Ala al-Maududi*.<sup>10</sup>

Peter Mandaville noted that academics point to the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928 as the beginning for Political Islam. He especially points to *Hassan al-Banna* (1906-1949) and *Sayyid Abu 'Ala Maududi* (1903-1979) as the two seminal figures instigating the phenomenon of Political Islam. He attempted to justify his argument by stating that Hassan al-Banna founded the Islamic political group *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt in 1928; and Maududi founded *Jama'ati Islami* party in Lahore, India in 1941 before moving it to the newly partitioned State of Pakistan.

Mandaville believed that ‘in the aftermath of the establishment of nation-states in the Muslim world that we can begin to speak of the emergence of Islamism as a distinctive form of Muslim politics’.<sup>11</sup>

However, Mandaville and Roy fail to notice the difference between Hassan al-Banna and Abu Alaa al-Maududi, which contributed to the confusion in understanding the phenomenon of Political Islam. Hassan al-Banna advocated for an Islamic Nationalist ideology that focused on the Egyptian political experience; while Maududi advocated for an Islamic Ummatist ideology that aimed for restoring the Caliphate.

### **The Intellectual Divide:**

#### **1- Sayyid Abu ‘Ala Maududi: Islamic Ummatism**

Hamid Naseem Rafiabadi, author of *Challenges to religions and Islam*,<sup>12</sup> observed that ‘Maududi’s religio-political vision was shaped by the social decline and political frustrations that the Muslims of India had been suffering since 1857. These had become more pronounced after the Khilafat movement collapsed in 1924. In fact, his ideas were in part the result of the failure of the Khilafat movement to unite India’s Muslims’.<sup>13</sup>

The difference between Banna and Maududi was reflected in the type of organizations with whom they were affiliated. For instance, Maududi, was an active member of the Pan-Islamic Khilafat Movement of 1919.<sup>14</sup> The Khilafat Movement (1919-1924),<sup>15</sup> was a Pan-Islamic political movement that emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War in 1918. Its ideology was constructed out of Jamal din al-Afghani’s writings. In an article titled *Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Jamal din al-Afghani and Muslim India*, Aziz Ahmad notes that ‘al-afghani’s articles in *al-Urwat al-Wuthqa*, one finds those basic

ideas which were later developed by the leaders of the Indian Khilafat movement'.<sup>16</sup> He adds that 'al-Afghani...deplored the division of Dar al-Islam into petty states, leading decadent lives, ruled by petty rulers propped on their thrones by the strategy or rivalry of European Powers, and seeking aid from them to keep their own people in bondage'.<sup>17</sup> Afghani was in fact 'more actively occupied in the search for a political centre, a universal Muslim Khilafat'.<sup>18</sup>

The Khilafat Movement's objective was to preserve Islam's role in global politics by maintaining the Ottoman Caliphate. The author, M. Naseem Qureshi, believed that this movement represented a Pan-Islamic phenomenon well into the twentieth century. Maududi was a strong advocate for the Khilafat Movement where he utilized his work in journalism from 1920 to 1928 to advocate for the principles of Pan-Islamism, and defend the agenda of the Khilafat Movement.

Maududi was an experienced political editor who edited numerous political Islamic journals such as 'the Madeena Bajnour, the Taj Jabal Pur and organ of Jamiat Ulma Hind—Al Jamiat from Dehli'.<sup>19</sup> His thought on Islam was that "the Shari'ah be applied to the whole human race",<sup>20</sup> which was evidence to his Islamic Ummatist ideology. Ragiabadi observes that Maududi presented Islam as 'an absolute and self-sufficient ideology, completely distinct from and opposed to both the Western way of life and its Eastern socialist equivalents'.<sup>21</sup> His Ummatist ideology made him 'admired by Muslim radicals from Egypt to Malaysia. He is one of the very few non-Arab writers on Islam to have been widely translated into Arabic'.<sup>22</sup> He was an "ideologue of contemporary Islamic revivalism",<sup>23</sup> and 'the Mujjadid who revived the notion of Khilafat in the context of modern times'.<sup>24</sup>

Rafiabadi also observed that Maududi initially rejected Islamic Nationalism in the form of establishing Pakistan, but Rafiabadi believes that after the fact, Maududi became one

of the ‘leading voices in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’.<sup>25</sup> This, however, was inconsistent with Rafiabadi’s observation that Maududi and the ‘Jamaat leaders confronted the government from time to time and were imprisoned for their activities’<sup>26</sup> which indicates that the Jamaat leaders and Maududi did not believe the Islamic Nationalism of Pakistan was acceptable.

In addition, Mushrul Hasan, a historian on Islam in South Asia, notes that Abul-Ala-Maududi, whom he refers to with the Islamic Jihadist title of Amir, rejected “nationalism and democracy... [and]...that Islam and nationalism were poles apart, and that the Muslim’s loyalties, which is religious, cannot be given to an entity such as the nation”.<sup>27</sup> Maududi commented on the ideological primacy of Islam as an ideology that “Islam has not lost its intrinsic values and it is as dynamic today as it was yesterday. Only, the people have lost the understanding of Islam, and they are not conscious of its superiority over other ideologies”.<sup>28</sup>

This ideology is an Islamic Ummatist ideology, where ethnic and racial factors are rejected as markers of identity. This trans-national sentiment exists in the present time, and has eager followers that can be found in Jihadist groups such al-Qaeda. Maududi rejected Islamic Nationalism and Secular Nationalism and any notion of an ethnic or racial based nation. He stated that loyalty cannot be given to the idea of nation because it was defined by characters other than Islam; while the Ummah was the identity that Ummatists were obligated to give their loyalty to and sacrifice their lives for its safety.

Maududi continued to adopt the Pan-Islamist cause through the creation of his new Islamic Ummatist group. On many occasions, he expressed his rejection of the nationalist ideology as opposed to his support of the Ummatist one. At one point, when the ‘Jamiat Ulma-e-Hind entered into alliance, with Congress in 1925, Syed Maududi resigned in protest as Editor of the Al Jamiat...for he opposed the concept of one Nation theory’.<sup>29</sup>

It is quite difficult to claim that Maududi supported any type of nationalism, whether secular or religious. He was influenced by the Pan-Islamist ideology of the Khilafat Movement, which was influenced in turn by the writings of Jamal din al-Afghani.<sup>30</sup> In fact, it could be argued that the Khilafat Movement prompted Maududi to establish his Islamic political group to promote an Ummatist ideology. He was very much involved in Pan-Islamic politics during the time of the Khilafat Movement, as demonstrated in his participation in this Pan-Islamic movement.<sup>31</sup> Maududi believed his Islamic political party was a continuation of the Pan-Islamist agenda with a minor adjustment to the goals of the Khilafat Movement and Pan-Islamism as a whole.

The difference between Islamic Ummatism and Pan-Islamism was their focus. The Islamic Ummatist ideology shifted the focus from the Ottoman Caliph to the Muslim Ummah. The Islamic Ummatists do not advocate for the union of the Ummah under the rule of an Ottoman Sultan; instead they call for the political union of the Ummah under the Shari'a, and the re-establishment of the Caliphate system under a descendent of the Prophet's daughter Fatima and his nephew Ali. This is a significant difference between the Pan-Islamism that was characterizes with Ottomanism and the Islamic Ummatism of the twentieth century. Also, Pan-Islamism was an Ottoman attempt to counter the Pan-Slavism ideology of the 19<sup>th</sup> century instigated by Czarist Russia. Therefore, the essence of Pan-Islamism was Ottomanism represented by the Ottoman Caliph Abdul Hamid II.

## **2- Hassan al-Banna: Islamic Egyptianism**

As for Hassan al-Banna, he was the father of Islamic Nationalist thought in Arab world in the twentieth century. However, he followed in the footsteps of Sayyid Ahmad Khan who truly was the spiritual father of the notion of Islamic Nationalism which began in the nineteenth century. Khan opposed Pan-Islamism and the Caliphate and instead ethnacized Islam with the Indian ethnicity. He argued that Indian Muslims were not part of the Ottoman Caliphate and that the Caliph had no authority over them. He stated that Indian Muslims were “not the subjects of Sultan ‘Abdul Hamid II”,<sup>32</sup> and that the Sultan did not have “any spiritual jurisdiction over us [Indian Muslims] as Khalifa. His title of Khalifa is effective only in his own land and only over the Muslims under his sway”.<sup>33</sup> Sayyid Ahmad Khan inspired the Islamic Nationalist thought of Mohammad Iqbal who at the annual Rabita al-Islamiya party conference in 1930 called for the partitioning of India to create a Muslim State which came to be known as Pakistan.<sup>34</sup>

Hassan al-Banna followed in the example of Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s political thought. Al-Banna was a student of al-Azhar university in Cairo, the foremost Islamic intellectual institution in the Muslim world. During the time of al-Banna, there were Indian Muslim followers of Sayyid Ahmad Khan studying in al-Azhar university. W.H.T. Gairdner, in an article published in 1911 titled *Notes on Present Day Movements in the Moslem World*, he referred to the followers of Sayyid Ahmad Khan as “modernists”.<sup>35</sup> Gairdner, noted that in 1911 the secular movements in Egypt did not appear to derive their inspiration from India; however, he did observe that ‘in a recent visit to El-Azhar...[he] found only four Indian students’<sup>36</sup> in the al-Azhar university that followed Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s thought, which he referred to as modernists. Although he is very much critical of Islam in general in his article, his statement indicates that during the time of Hassan al-Banna, the thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan did reach al-Azhar university where al-Banna studied. The thought of these four Indian

Muslim “modernists” would at least had some influence on the other students and educators whose thought would have filtered to reach Hassan al-Banna, especially when we consider that Al-Azhar University was an Islamic academic institution.

Al-Banna went to establish the first Islamic Nationalist party that focused on its own ethnic group. Hassan al-Banna saw the Muslim Brotherhood as an ethnically Egyptian movement made up primarily of Egyptians who accepted Muslim fellows from other nationalities. The role of ethnic politics influenced his interpretation of Islamic doctrine and his view of the Muslim world.

This was evident in his speeches which he gave to the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood during his life time. In a speech he gave at the *Fifth Muslim Brotherhood Conference* in 1938, al-Banna described the Muslim Brotherhood as an exclusive Egyptian reformist party that aimed for fighting the corruption embedded in Egyptian society.<sup>37</sup> In this conference, he also stated that the relationship of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood with other nationalist branches was an equal fellowship. He also declared that other nationalities of the Muslim Brotherhoods were independent and labored to benefit their own respective societies, and that all their properties were their own, and did not belong to the Egyptian Brotherhood that was located in Egypt.<sup>38</sup>

In the Sixth Conference of the Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, that took place in January 1941, Hassan al-Banna stated that the Muslim Brotherhood’s relationship with other Egyptian political parties was defined by their sacrifices for the cause of Egypt. He stated that although his group did not agree with some of the secular politics of other Egyptian parties, his party agreed that many of the members of the secular parties labored for the Egyptian political cause, and participated in the jihad for the cause of Egypt, which the Muslim Brotherhood recognized.<sup>39</sup> He concluded his lecture on the nature of the relationship that

bound the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular Egyptian parties. He stated that the differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptian parties are minor and artificial.<sup>40</sup> He added that if the Egyptian parties decided to follow the true path of patriotism, they will find themselves adopting the methods of the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>41</sup>

He also emphasized in the Sixth Conference in 1941 that the nature of the relationship with other Islamic groups was one of fellowship, loyalty and collaboration; and that he accepted them with all their ideological differences.<sup>42</sup> This indicates that Hassan al-Banna's thought was focused on Egypt, and did not see other Islamic Nationalist groups as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt beyond a fellowship. It is clear that his interpretation of unity was more of a loose confederacy of Muslim States, if any, than a tight federacy under the Caliphate system.

Hassan al-Banna did not see the Ummah as a united political and ethnic entity, nor did he seek to achieve this unity under a Caliph. In fact, his vision of the Muslim world was that of ethnically divided nationalities, which had the right to their own national independence. This was evident in his speech to the Muslim Brotherhood's sector leadership on 11<sup>th</sup> of September 1945, where he clearly stated that Muslim countries have to be liberated and become independent in order to protect themselves from oppression.<sup>43</sup>

Al-Banna believed that there should be economic and political collaboration among Muslim groups, while each maintained their independence from the each other. He concluded his speech in the 1945 conference by informing the leadership of the Brotherhood that he will call for an Arab Islamic conference in an effort to synchronize and rejuvenate the efforts of the peoples and governments for the cause of Islamic patriotism.<sup>44</sup>

Al-Banna Islamized the secular terms of nation, country, patriotism, citizenship and nationalism in his speeches. On several occasions he would use these political terms in an

Islamic modern context. In the fifth conference, for instance, he stated that Islam was an aqeeda, in addition to a country, a citizenship, a religion and a State.<sup>45</sup> Al-Banna initiated an Islamic Nationalist school of thought which he believed provided a modernized interpretation of Islam, and presented an alternative to the secular nationalism that permeated in Egyptian society during that time.

Islamic Nationalists such as the Muslim Brotherhood were concerned primarily with Islamizing national politics. This was demonstrated by al-Banna's statement at the Fifth Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, where he said:

Some people think of us as a group of preachers, concerned only to call people to virtues and abstain from sins. Others believe it is a mystical trend. We are not any of those, we call to return for true Islam, which is a belief and application, a home and a nationality, a religion and state, a spirit and body, and a Qur'an and Sword.<sup>46</sup>

The most significant difference between al-Banna and al-Maududi was the manner they understood the significance of Jihad in Muslim society. Maududi, for instance, believed that Jihad was "an obligation (Fard), [while] Banna usually regarded it as a lesser duty or a communal obligation (fard kifaya)".<sup>47</sup> On many occasions, Hassan al-Banna claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood's Jihad was an internal reformist one. However, al-Banna opposed the militant revolutionary option against the Egyptian State because he believed that revolutions did not produce the expected results they were supposed to produce.<sup>48</sup> A sentiment he emphasized in his speech at the Fifth Conference in 1938.

### **III. Conclusion**

What differentiates Islamic Ummatists from Islamic Nationalists is the manner they mobilized aspects of Islam to represent themselves in the public domain. The Islamic Ummatists utilize Islam as a trans-national marker in which the world is divided on the basis of al-Aqeeda (religious conviction). Ethnic and cultural markers are invalidated, in fact; they are believed to be anti-Islamic because such divisions oppose the Qur'anic divisions of mankind who are divided between believing and non-believing societies. These groups do not recognize the global State system, or the international treaties that bind the global system of States together.

As for Islamic nationalist, they utilize Islam as a national marker by ethno-sizing Islam. They shroud their respective ethnic customs in a religious Islamic garb. The ethnic factor plays a significant role in the interpretation of Islamic Sharia' and the execution of its politics. This created what Mohammad Ayoob termed as *The Many Faces of Political Islam*.<sup>49</sup>

Islamic Ummatist groups labor to weaken the strength of the ethnic divide in the communities they control, while Islamic Nationalists do the exact opposite. This was evident in al-Qaeda's activities in the villages which they controlled in Iraq. Al-Qaeda weakened the strength of the Iraqi ethnic identity through marriage. There was a deliberate policy of intermarriages between foreign members of al-Qaeda and Iraqi women to achieve this objective.

The *Middle East Online News*, operating out of London, published on the 27th of April 2010, on its Arabic webpage an article titled, 'Iraqi Women Forced to Marry al-Qaeda Members', which sheds light on al-Qaeda policy regarding marriage. This article reported that a new generation of Iraqi children were facing difficulties in being recognized as legitimate Iraqis by the Iraqi government because their fathers (non-Iraqi al-Qaeda members)

did not register their marriages with any official government office.<sup>50</sup> However, what one finds significant in this article is that it provides an eyewitness account of al-Qaeda's policy in weakening ethnic national identity using marriage. The article quotes an interview conducted by *al-Quds Press* with a wife of one al-Qaeda member by the name of *Um Abd al-Rahman*. The wife, who lived in a village near the *Diallah* province north of Baghdad that was controlled by *al-Qaeda*, stated that their village hosted Arab fighters from a variety of nationalities such as Tunis, Algeria and other countries. She added that the Emir (Prince) of al-Qaeda battalion requested that the village dwellers marry their daughters to the fighters of al-Qaeda to show their loyalty and goodwill towards al-Qaeda.

In this manner, an Islamic Ummatist culture was created in which the half Iraqi and half Syrian, Tunisian or Jordanian children of these marriages would be brought up. This was a repetition of al-Qaeda's policy of intermarriage between the Arab mujahdeen and Afghani women in Afghanistan, and vice-versa. The purpose of this strategy is to dilute and weaken any ethnic loyalties that community might hold. A Muslim ethnic culture would be created that propagated an Islamic Ummatist culture that was trans-national in its character.

As for the Islamic Nationalists, they are ethno-religious groups that labor for the cause of their national interests. These types of Islamic groups believe that religion may be used as a political tool to achievement national political objectives. For that end, different aspects of religion are utilized politically to legitimize their national goals and ethnic character. They are national religious groups bound by an ethnically accommodating religion, which is why scholars such as Mohammed Ayoob, author of *The Many Faces of Political Islam*, believe that a variety of (Islams) exist in the Muslim world.<sup>51</sup> Islamic Nationalists identify with their ethnic identity, which significantly influences their interpretation of religion as demonstrated by the Islamic Iranian regime in Iran.

The *Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement* known as Hamas in the Palestinian territories is a good example for an Islamic nationalist group. It is a group that identifies with a Palestinian political identity before an Egyptian or a Jordanian one. Their identity is defined by their ethnic politics and not by their religious affiliations. For instance, the relationship between *Hamas* and its sister organization in Jordan, the *Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood*, is a very volatile relationship. In May of 2010, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood broke off relations with Hamas as a result of the political tensions existing between the Jordanian government and Hamas. In fact, there was an affiliation break between both of these two sister Islamic Nationalists group.<sup>52</sup> This shows that the ethnic political culture in Jordan determined the politics of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and its relationship with its fellow organization Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Islamic nationalists are at odds with trans-national Islamic Ummatist groups such as al-Qaeda and Jund-Ansar-Allah. The fact that the Islamic nationalists identify with their ethnic heritage first; while Islamic Ummatists identify primarily with their religion first, led to several bloody confrontations between them whenever they met. This was evident in *Hamas's* bloody confrontation with *Jund-Ansar-Allah* in Gaza,<sup>53</sup> which left *Jund-Ansar-Allah* (an Ummatist group that followed al-Qaeda) utterly decimated.

The term Political Islam does not reflect the distinctions between both of these Islamic ideologies. It is unable to reflect this divide that differentiates between these two types of Muslim groups. It does not clarify the ideological differences in the objectives of these groups, nor does it reflect the differences in the methods and philosophies they follow to effect change. Scholars on Political Islam will be better suited to understand the phenomenon of Political Islam by using terms that differentiate between trans-national and ethno-national Islamic ideologies.

Political Islam could be better understood by first separating those advocating for a religiously shrouded nationalism from those advocating for a religiously shrouded trans-nationalism. However, contemporary scholarship present the term of ‘Political Islam’ as a unified political phenomenon.<sup>54</sup> It refers to both trans-national and national Islamic groups as one and the same, which does not reflect the reality on the ground.

It is necessary to reconsider using the term of Political Islam because of its inability to differentiate between Islamic Ummatism and Islamic Nationalism. Our objective should not aim to liberalize Muslim political groups but to moderate them by channeling their goals and their focus unto the politics of their own ethnic identities. The strategic aim for fighting the phenomenon of *al-Ummatawaya* or Islamic Ummatism should begin with differentiating between those who aim to bring down the global State-system from those who want to be a part of it.

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Bassam Tibi, "Bassam Tibi Curriculum Vitae," (Göttingen).

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<sup>7</sup> Alie Hillal Dessouki, *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*, Publication of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University (N Y: Praeger, 1982), p.18.

<sup>8</sup> Mehdi Khalaji, "A Marriage of Convenience," *Op-Eds & Articles*(2010),

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<sup>9</sup> Dessouki, *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*, p.14.

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<sup>14</sup> Jamaat-e-Islami, "Founder of Jamaat-E-Islami," <<http://jamaat.org/beta/site/page/3>>. [24/05/2010]

<sup>15</sup> Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics : A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924*.

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- <sup>22</sup> Ibid., p.83.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., p.84.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., p.85.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., p.118.
- <sup>29</sup> Jamaat-e-Islami, "Founder of Jamaat-E-Islami." <<http://jamaat.org/beta/site/page/3>>. [25/05/2010]
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- <sup>31</sup> Jamaat-e-Islami, "Founder of Jamaat-E-Islami." <<http://jamaat.org/beta/site/page/3>>. [25/05/2010]
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- <sup>40</sup> Ibid., p.93.

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p.30.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p.34.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p.41.

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