Success and Failure of New Parties in Taiwanese Elections

1. New Parties in Multi-Party Taiwan

Although the ruling Kuomintang (國民黨 KMT) allowed competitive local elections for most of Taiwan’s forty-year martial law period, it effectively ran the island as a one party state. Parties such as the China Youth Party (中國青年黨) and the China Democratic Socialist Party (中國民主社會黨) were only permitted to exist in to support the pretence that Taiwan was a multi-party democracy. Not surprisingly, these parties gained the nickname “flower vase parties” (花瓶政黨). When dissidents attempted to form genuine political parties in 1960 and 1979, the KMT reacted harshly, arresting the movements’ leading figures. Taiwan did not have its first multi-party election until 1986, when the three months old and technically illegal the Democratic Progressive Party (民主進步黨 DPP) contested its first election. In 1986 the KMT and DPP shared over 90 percent of the vote and seat share in the legislative elections. In the subsequent eighteen years Taiwanese party politics has shown much continuity, as even in the December 2004 legislative election the DPP and the KMT remained the dominant forces, winning a combined total of almost 70 percent of the votes and three quarters of the seats. However, since the late 1980s new political parties have repeatedly challenged this electoral hegemony.

This paper seeks to examine the development of these new political actors. By 2004 there were 102 officially registered political parties in Taiwan.¹ These new parties have had a considerable impact, as elections have shown there is often space for third parties. Although most attempts to break the domination of the KMT and DPP have been electoral flops, there have been some successes, as the proportion of votes received by third parties has gradually increased, reaching a peak of almost 30 percent in 2001. In the mid 1990s the New Party (新黨NP) was a major political player and since 2000 two new significant parties, the People First Party (親民黨PFP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union

¹ See ROC 2004 Yearbook at http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/P073.htm#1
(台灣團結聯盟 TSU), have emerged. Between 2000 and 2003 the PFP appeared to have the potential to even replace the KMT as the largest opposition party. Nevertheless, after initial success, these new parties appear to have hit bottlenecks, and often slid into decline.

To gain a better understanding of the development of new political parties in Taiwan this paper attempts to answer the following questions:

1. How should Taiwan’s new parties be classified?
2. What types of parties have been the most successful?
3. What kind of political package do these parties need to bring electoral success?
4. What kind of resources do these challenger parties require?
5. What kind of political environment offers new parties the greatest chance of electoral success?

After introducing and classifying the main significant attempts to create viable third parties since the late 1980s, their respective election records are outlined. Next, the paper shows how the new parties’ success or failure can be explained by the following explanatory variables: (1) their political project or platform; (2) their human and financial resources; and (3) their political opportunity structure or electoral environment. The Taiwan case reveals that as in mature democracies, new parties must overcome a host of barriers before they can qualify to become a significant political actor. Firstly, for a new party to succeed it requires a distinct party appeal, that addresses salient political issues. It also appears that there is greater scope for Taiwanese parties focusing on older ideologies that have been diluted or neglected by the established parties than parties offering new ideologies. Since elections campaigns in Taiwan are so expensive, new parties must have sufficient human, financial, organizational, and media resources. Finally, to make an impact, new parties must be able to take advantage of their electoral environment. In other words, there is greatest scope for new party success in multiple member district elections, when the established parties are weak and changing their policy priorities, and at times of national security crises.
2. Framework for Analysing New Parties

The study of new political parties has been a growing sub-field since the 1980s. This literature has focused on the rise of environmental and new right parties in Western Europe. However, the majority of this work examines new parties in older democracies, while little has been done on the rise of new parties in the developed world. Taiwanese political analysts have also given little attention to the non-mainstream parties. In fact to date only one journal article has been published in English on Taiwan’s minor parties, and this was published back in 1993. Therefore this paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature.

In this study the established or mainstream parties are taken to be the two political parties that contested Taiwan’s first multi-party election in 1986 and dominated every subsequent election since, the KMT and the DPP. The actual cut off date for what should be viewed as a new political party is quite straightforward in the Taiwan case as under martial law no opposition parties were permitted. Therefore I term new political parties any party formed after the termination of martial law in 1987.

The actual size threshold for qualification as a new political party is a hotly debated issue among the party scholars. Kenneth Janda suggests any legal party gaining over 5 percent

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in a parliamentary election, while Thomas Rochon’s threshold is any party that has held at least one parliamentary seat. At the other extreme Robert Harmel and John Robertson argue against using these limited thresholds and prefer any registered party. Other authors prefer to restrict their analysis to those parties promoting “new issues,” such as the ecology parties. In this study I come in between these definitions. An examination of all 102 registered parties would leave little space for in-depth analysis, and overly restrictive thresholds on electoral performance and issue focus would disqualify too many significant new parties. Therefore, the parties examined in this study are those that have gained at least 1 percent of the national vote in parliamentary elections. I have also excluded political alliances such as the Non Partisan Alliance (無黨籍聯盟), as these alliances lack a party policy platform, party organization and mass membership structure. As a result this paper examines the fortunes of seven new parties: these are the Taiwan Independence Party (建國黨 TIP), the TSU, NP, PFP, Labour Party (工黨LP), Green Party (綠黨GP), and Chinese Social Democratic Party (中華社民黨CSDP). Their respective electoral performances are outlined in Tables 1-8.

Naturally few of Taiwan’s political parties fit into the common new party families of Western Europe, such as New Right, New Left, Green or communist. A number of authors have distinguished new parties according to their political project. Parties that base their appeal on a new ideology are termed as “prophetic” parties by Paul Lucardie and “mobilizers” by Thomas Rochan. In contrast, parties that focus on ideology that has been neglected by established parties are called “purifiers” by Lucardie and “challengers” by Rochan. Since national identity issues rather than a socio-economic cleavage separate Taiwanese political parties, when Taiwanese analysts talk of a left and right, the left wing means independence from China and Taiwanese identity, and the right wing means unification with China and Chinese identity. Therefore, in the Taiwan case we can

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5 Rochan, “Mobilizers versus Challengers: Towards a Theory of New Party Success,” 421
6 Harmel and Robertson, “Formation and Success of New Parties,” 508.
8 Although the Labour Party fell just short of my threshold with 0.92% of the vote in 1989, I have chosen to add it to my analysis, as it is close enough to be worthy of attention.
9 Lucardie, “Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors,” 177; Rochan, “Mobilizers versus Challengers,” 421
10 Lucardie, “Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors,” 177; Rochan, “Mobilizers versus Challengers,” 421
make a further sub-classification of the purifiers by dividing them according to whether they are located to the right or left of the establishment parties on the core political cleavage of unification (right) versus independence (left). In other words, the NP and PFP are termed right wing purifiers, while the TIP and TSU are left wing purifiers.

The party literature offers a variety of variables to explain the failure and success of new parties. A common approach has been to stress institutional factors, particularly the election system and rules on party formation. For instance, proportional representation systems are viewed as being more beneficial to newer parties.11 A second argument stresses a range of sociological factors, which may affect the new parties’ fate. Green party success is often linked to high levels of prosperity and post materialist values, while the new right is linked to high unemployment and the salience of the immigration issue.12 Another approach is to stress the importance of the party type. Rochan and Lucardie argue that in the Dutch case prophets are likely to have a better electoral fate than purifiers,13 while Harmel and Robertson found that while centrist parties performed best, communist parties were the least successful.14 In 2000 Paul Lucardie proposed a comprehensive framework in which new party success or failure can be explained by three factors: (1) a political project that addresses problems considered important by much of the electorate, (2) sufficient resources, and (3) the political opportunity structure.15 Therefore in this study I follow the basic framework suggested by Lucardie to explain the electoral fortunes of Taiwan’s new parties. In other words, new party success depends on their ability to propagate a clear and distinct party appeal that addresses salient political issues; their human, financial, organizational, and media resources; and the ability to take advantage of their electoral environment. Next I examine the new parties’ electoral record.

13 Lucardie, “Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors,” 177; Rochan, “Mobilizers versus Challengers,” 421
15 Lucardie, “Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors,” 175-185
3. The Electoral Fortunes of Taiwan’s Rising Parties

Tables 1 and 2 show how the balance between the established parties and new parties has developed since the outset of multi-party elections in the late 1980s. The new parties clearly played a very marginal role in these early elections, which were dominated by the established parties with between 84 and 95 percent of the vote. Even independents were able to gain a greater vote share and number of successful candidates than the new parties. In fact, prior to 1995 the new parties had only won one seat in a national parliamentary election. The turning point for the new parties came in the mid 1990s when the new parties were able to gain over 10 percent of the votes and significant seat numbers in legislative and National Assembly elections. These advances came at the expense of voters disenchanted with the ruling KMT. Although the new parties did experience a dip in support in 1998, they recovered in 2001 to receive a record vote share of 29.7 percent and number of seats. Since 2001, neither of the established parties has held an overall majority in the Legislative Yuan, giving the new parties the power to determine which established party can control the parliament.

Next I will examine how the individual new parties have fared in Taiwan’s electoral politics. I will carry out this analysis by looking at the prophet and purifier parties in three time periods: 1989-1992, 1993-2000, and 2001-2004. This makes sense as though there is some overlap, in each of these stages a distinct set of political actors have represented the new parties. Tables 3-8 show the new parties record in national parliamentary, single member district, and city council elections.

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16 This was won by Chu Kao-cheng (朱高正) for the Chinese Social Democratic Party in 1992. This figure does not include Wang Yi-hsiung (王義雄), the founder of the Labour Party and Chu Kao-cheng’s term in the Legislative Yuan from 1989-1992. As Wang was elected as a DPP candidate, and Chu was elected as an independent.
The first stage of new parties: 1989-1992

Following the ending of martial law, there was an explosion in the number of registered parties, exceeding eighty by the end of the 1980s. Most new parties either did not participate in elections or only nominated a handful of candidates with no prospect of election. The former martial law era “flower vase parties” also failed to adjust well to competitive multi-party elections, and though they nominated candidates in 1989, none came close to getting elected. The only cases of attempts to create serious challenges to the DPP and KMT electoral dominance in this period came from the Labour Party (LP) and the Chinese Social Democratic Party (CSDP).

Wang Yi-hsiung (王義雄) formed the LP in 1987. Wang had originally been elected a DPP legislator in 1986, thus on forming the LP, became the party’s first and ultimately only ever legislator. Wang had rapidly become disillusioned by the DPP’s lack of attention to labour issues. The LP was almost immediately divided ideologically, and a Marxist faction led by Vice Chairman Luo Mei-wen broke away to form the Workers Party (勞動黨) in early 1989. Tables 3 and 7 show that the LP reached its peak in its first election in 1989, when it had a number of viable candidates, almost reached 1 percent of the national vote, and won a seat in the Kaohsiung city council. However, the incumbent legislator and party chair Wang failed to win re-election. The party soon became electorally irrelevant, performing poorly in the 1991 National Assembly election. By 1992 the party had become a laughing stock. Although its sole candidate Hsu Hsiao-tan (許曉丹) failed narrowly to win election, it is highly likely that she gained

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18 Although the Workers Party nominated candidates for more elections than the LP, its highest vote share was only 0.21 percent in 1991. The only time any of its candidates came close to winning election was in 1991 when its founder Luo Mei-wen was just 3.2 percent short of winning election in Hsinchu City. I am grateful for correspondence from Christian Schafferer regarding the electoral record of the socialist parties.
more votes from stripping at campaign rallies than a socialist party platform. Although the LP remains in existence, since 1992 it has ceased to contest elections.\textsuperscript{19}

Chu Kao-cheng (朱高正) formed Taiwan’s second significant prophetic party, the Chinese Social Democratic Party (CSDP) in 1990. Chu had been a legislator and founding member of the DPP, but had left the party due to the DPP’s increasingly radical positions regarding Taiwan independence. The CSDP was more ambitious in its challenge to the dominant parties than the LP as it nominated 58 candidates in 1991’s National Assembly election and 25 in the 1992 legislative campaign. In 1991 Chu set the party a target of gaining 12 percent of the vote. Moreover, the CSDP attempted to create a distinct party image by arranging all its candidates and party workers to wear uniforms of yellow suits and red ties.\textsuperscript{20} From Table 3 and 4 it is apparent that like the LP, the CSDP failed miserably on the electoral stage. Out of its 83 candidates in two elections, only its party leader, Chu succeeded in gaining election in 1992.\textsuperscript{21} The first phase for new parties came to an end in August 1993 when a group of KMT politicians from the New KMT Alliance faction became so dissatisfied with the direction the party was taking under Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) that they formed the New Party (NP). Moreover, after the CSDP’s two disastrous campaigns, Chu was ready to throw in the towel, and so in November 1993 Chu entered into negotiations to merge the CSDP with the NP.\textsuperscript{22}

(Table 7 about here)

(Table 8 about here)

\textbf{Second Phase: Era of the NP 1993-2000}

In contrast to the prophetic messages of the CSDP and LP, the NP’s attacks on the KMT for betraying party orthodoxy made it Taiwan’s first major purifier party. Although the NP had little impact in its initial election in the 1993 local executive contest, it became a

\textsuperscript{19} For the LP’s full electoral record see Schafferer, \textit{The Power of the Ballot Box}, 70.


\textsuperscript{21} For the LP’s full electoral record see Schafferer, \textit{The Power of the Ballot Box}, 70.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{China Times}, November 13, 1993, 2.
significant political actor in the mid 1990s elections. The party had greatest success in northern Taiwan, especially in the greater Taipei region. In 1994 the NP candidate came second in the Taipei city mayoral election, beating the incumbent KMT mayor into third place. Moreover, Tables 7 and 8 reveal that the party also did very well in the Taipei city council election as 11 of its 14 candidates won election, with over 20 percent of the overall vote in 1994. At the national level the party reached its peak in the 1995 and 1996 parliamentary elections, winning significant numbers of seats and approximately 13 percent of seats and votes. The NP was so successful in 1995 that it was viewed as the principal winner of the election, as the DPP showed little growth and KMT voters switched to the NP. By 1995 the NP had become Taiwan’s first significant third party.

Even at its peak, the NP was struggling to break out of its northern heartland, as in 1995 and 1996 only six of its 70 successful candidates were elected in the southern half of the island. The NP began a gradual decline from 1997 as the party increasingly suffered from bitter factional and policy divisions. Table 5 and 6 show how it failed in subsequent single member districts for local executive posts, and president in 1997, 1998 and 2000. Similarly, Table 3 reveals how its parliamentary representation fell from 21 legislators in 1995, to eleven in 1998, and a mere one since 2001. Things had become so bad that the KMT Secretary General Chang Hsiao-yen (章孝嚴) described the NP as a “bubble party.” (泡沫政黨)

The two low points for the NP were its 0.1 percent in the 2000 presidential election and winning just one legislative seat out of its 42 nominated candidates in 2001. The party has been able to create a mini revival in 2002, as five of its six candidates were successful in the Taipei city council. However, the party appears to be reverting towards its original form as a KMT faction rather than an independent political party. In the 2004 legislative election a number of NP politicians were able to win election by registering as KMT candidates. Moreover, since 2003 the party has been a driving force in calls for a merger of all the Pan KMT parties.

The first attempt to create a purifier party to the left of the DPP was the Taiwan

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23 I take the counties south of Taichung city as constituting southern Taiwan. In 1995 the NP won two seats in Kaohsiung city and one in Kaohsiung county. In 1996 the party won three seats in Kaohsiung city.
Independence Party (TIP). This was formed by a group of intellectuals dissatisfied with the DPP’s lack of enthusiasm over promoting Taiwanese independence since the 1996 presidential election. Like the NP, the TIP first contested local executive elections, with little success in 1997. The party was particularly ambitious in 1998, nominating a total of 20 candidates, with at least one in over half the constituencies. However, Tables 3 and 4 reveal the party only got 1.5 percent of the vote and just one candidate was elected. Although the party achieved a slightly higher vote share in the 1998 Kaohsiung city council election, all five of its candidates failed to win. The party never recovered from this initial setback. Although it continues to nominate candidates in parliamentary elections, it has become irrelevant, never again coming even close to winning a seat.

The final attempt to form a significant prophetic party was the Green Party (GP). The party was founded by Kao Cheng-yan, an anti nuclear activist who had grown impatient with the DPP’s half-hearted treatment of ecological issues. In the 1996 National Assembly elections the party nominated 16 candidates, and managed to win one seat in Yunlin (雲林) county and a national total of 1.1 percent of the vote. However, the party has not been able to maintain its initial success. It has nominated no more than a handful of candidates in the subsequent elections, and none has again been even close to gaining election.

The Third Phase 2000-present: The Heyday of New Parties?
The third and most recent stage of third party politics arose in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election, as two new purifier parties emerged to take replace the failing parties to the left and right of the established parties. Soong Chu-yu (宋楚瑜) and his supporters formed the People First Party (PFP) soon after he narrowly failed to win the presidential election in 2000. Since most of the PFP’s leading politicians and supporters formerly were from either Soong’s faction in the KMT or the NP, the party has some of the characteristics of a purifier party.

The PFP was able to build upon the momentum created by Soong Chu-yu’s presidential bid in its first national parliamentary test in 2001. Tables 3 and 4 reveal that the PFP was
able to achieve the highest ever vote share or seat number by a new political party, gaining over 20 percent of the vote and double the number of legislative seats won by the NP at its peak. After 2001 it was clear that not only had the PFP replaced the NP as the third party in Taiwanese politics, it also looked possible that the PFP might be able to supplant the KMT as the dominant party on the right of Taiwanese politics.

The other new challenger party was the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). This party emerged following Lee Teng-hui’s departure from the KMT party headquarters in 2000. The majority of the party’s leading politicians were from Lee’s faction within the KMT that were unhappy with the direction of the party since Lien Chan (連戰) replaced Lee as KMT party chair. It soon became clear that the TSU was replacing the TIP on the left of Taiwanese politics, playing the role of supporting the ruling DPP and criticizing it when it appears to be moving too far away from its party ideals. The party performed very well in its first electoral test in the 2001 legislative elections, winning 13 seats and 8.5 percent of the vote. Similarly, it was able to make a breakthrough in the Kaohsiung city council election, becoming the first left wing purifier to win seats in a city council in 2002.

Two years later, however, both the new purifier parties experienced electoral setbacks in the 2004 legislative elections. The PFP is widely seen as the biggest loser in 2004. Despite conservative nomination and a degree of cooperation with the KMT, the PFP lost almost 7 percent of the vote and 12 seats. Similarly, despite high expectations of expanding its parliamentary representation, the TSU fell well short of its target of 30 seats. Nevertheless both the TSU and PFP remain significant forces in parliament with 12 and 34 seats respectively.

4. Explaining New Party Success and Failure
The above review has shown the basic trends in the electoral fortunes of Taiwan’s new parties since 1989. Next we need to explain the following patterns. Firstly, why did the prophetic parties all fail so miserably? Secondly, why did the purifier parties on the right performed better than those on the left? How can we explain the rise and subsequent fall of the NP? Why did the TSU succeed while the TIP failed? Similarly, why did the PFP
perform better than the NP? And finally, why have the PFP and TSU either stopped growing or begun a gradual decline? The next section attempts to explain these trends in terms of the parties’ espousal of a relevant political project, their resources, and how they have exploited their political opportunity structure.

**Relevant Political Project**

Paul Lucardie has argued that a prerequisite for a new party to succeed is that it has a political project which “addresses social problems considered urgent by a significant number of voters.”[^25] A number of studies have found that the most influential electoral issues in Taiwan have been (1) national identity, (2) national security, (3) political corruption, and (4) social welfare.[^26] Surveys have also found that most Taiwanese voters do have distinct images of both the established and new parties, and are able to locate them on the core issue spectrums.[^27] Therefore, even if the new party is able to place new issues on the electoral agenda, it must also take a distinct position on the most salient issues.

**The political projects of the prophetic parties**

All three prophetic parties in this study did offer voters comprehensive party platforms. These were often more detailed and complete than the established parties, which routinely issued perfunctory manifestoes at election time.[^28] In fact, according to the political scientist Lin Shen-ching (林深靖), “the CSDP’s party charter is the most progressive and complete party charter ever issued by all of Taiwan’s parties.”[^29] However, the new parties’ propaganda message did not have the desired effect due to their inability to address the critical issues in a convincing and distinctive manner.

Despite the high numbers of blue-collar workers in Taiwan, the social democratic appeal

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[^25]: Lucardie, “Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors,” 176
[^26]: Dafydd Fell, *Party Politics in Taiwan* (London: Routledge, 2005), Table 3.2.
[^27]: For instance in 2000 over 50 percent of respondents to an Election Study Center survey could locate all four major parties (KMT, DPP, PFP and NP) on a unification versus independence spectrum.
of the LP and CSDP made little impression on Taiwan’s working classes. Throughout the 
martial law era socialism was associated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and 
as the CCP’s crackdown on the Tiananmen student movement in 1989 was fresh in the 
public’s minds, the market for socialist appeals was limited. Like social democratic 
parties worldwide the CSDP called for the introduction of an extensive social security 
system. This issue had the potential to be a huge vote winner, for as late as 1994 Taiwan 
still had a highly inequitable welfare system, with over 40 percent of the population 
without medical insurance. However, the CSDP failed to gain ownership of the issue, as 
it was undercut by the major parties. In the 1980s and 1990s both established parties 
promoted a massive expansion of Taiwan’s social welfare provisions. As early as 1989 
the ruling KMT promised to introduce a universal national health insurance scheme, 
which came into operation in 1995. Similarly, after vigorously campaigning for old age 
pensions and its 1992 slogan of a “Welfare State” (福利國), surveys showed the DPP had 
an even more pro-welfare party image.32

The CSDP’s manifesto was a highly comprehensive document, offering a combination of 
liberalism and social democracy. The party platform included calls for a more equitable 
distribution of wealth, a cabinet rather than presidential system, a Chinese federation, 
women’s liberation, human rights, and world peace.33 Clearly, the CSDP appeal did 
address a number of salient issues of concern to Taiwanese voters; however, it is 
questionable whether the party was actually able to get its message across. As so much of 
the party’s propaganda was highly intellectual and abstract in tone, it would have failed to 
catch the attention of the floating voter.34 This was evident from the comments of a CSDP 
party spokesman that the party platform drew its inspiration from the philosophy of

Conference on Transitional Societies in Comparison: East Central Europe vs Taiwan, held at Charles 
University, Prague, Czech Republic, May 1999, 12.
32 For a detailed discussion of the politics of welfare issues in Taiwanese election campaigns see Fell, Party 
Politics in Taiwan, chapter 4.
33 John F Copper, Taiwan’s 1991 and 1992 Non Supplementary Elections: Reaching a Higher State of 
Democracy (Lanham: East Asia Research Institute, 1994), 30-31
34 The DPP also made a similar mistake in its promotion of Taiwanese independence in 1991, when instead 
of catchy slogans in its newspaper campaign ads it issued a series of academic style ads that few floating 
voters would have the patience to take in.
Confucius, Mencius and Kant. Moreover, though the CSDP did criticize both major parties, and argued that Taiwan’s democracy needed a strong third party, it failed to create a sufficiently distinctive party image. Its stress on social stability, call for unification under a Chinese federation, and strong opposition to both Taiwanese independence and to revising the constitution made the CSDP appear little different from the KMT.

The limited impact of the Green Party in Taiwan shows similarities to its counterpart in the Netherlands. In both cases voters show a high degree of environmental consciousness, but green parties were slow to develop, and struggled to make inroads once they did appear on the electoral stage. The DPP, like a number of Dutch established parties had claimed ownership of the environmental issue long before the Green Party emerged. The DPP was at the forefront of opposition to the construction of new nuclear power stations and proposed phasing out all Taiwan’s existing nuclear power stations within ten years. More importantly, though voters do regard environmental protection as an important issue, it is not one of the critical issues that can determine voting behaviour in Taiwan. As though the DPP has employed green issues in a number of local elections, they have never been central election issues at the national level.

The political project of the purifier parties
Surveys on national identity show that a large minority of Taiwanese hold extreme positions in favour of unification or independence, offering a market for parties to the right and left of the established parties. Therefore as Taiwan’s established parties moved towards the centre of this spectrum, purifier parties emerged to fill this gap.

The NP was an unashamedly programmatic party, setting a new precedent of issuing detailed manifesto style newspaper ads. The principal components of the NP’s initial appeal were Chinese identity and the pledge to defend the Republic of China from

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35 Copper, Taiwan’s 1991 and 1992 Non Supplementary Elections, 30-31.
38 Fell, Party Politics in Taiwan, Table 6.1.
Taiwanese independence. These issues enabled the NP to gain core supporters disappointed with the KMT’s move towards the centre. If the NP had just stuck to these appeals it would have had a very limited voter base of less than 10 percent. However, a critical factor in the NP’s success in the mid 1990s was its use of other social issues that appealed to sections of the urban middle class. For instance, its 1994 newspaper manifesto ad carried the slogan “First Rate Beef: Chao Shao-kang’s 42 Public Policies” (上好牛肉 42 項趙少康的公共政策). The NP was able to benefit from a number of catchy slogans, such as a five-day working week, the party of the ordinary city dweller (小市民政黨) and a hung parliament. Similarly, it gained support by joining the DPP in attacking KMT political corruption.

Changes in the party’s policy positions and issue emphasis contributed to the NP’s subsequent decline. After the 1998 election setback, the NP increasingly became a single-issue party, dropping its espousal of social issues and focusing solely on identity issues. Under the leadership of radical Chinese nationalists such as Hsieh Chi-ta (謝啟大), it took progressively extremist positions. For instance, in 2001 the NP proposed unification under a system similar to that used for Hong Kong titled, “One Country Three Systems.” The NP was moving to the right at a time when public support for Chinese identity and unification were on the decline. Moreover, surveys show that the public were also aware of its shift to the extreme right. According to former NP heavyweight Yao Li-ming (姚立明) along with inner party divisions, the critical cause of the party’s demise was its post 1998 “policy line.”

The PFP platform clearly shows that it was attempting to learn from the policy mistakes of the NP. Although it has been highly critical of the DPP and Lee Teng-hui, it was much vaguer than the NP on its own positions. Instead, it has preferred to focus on its own leader’s record of good governance while provincial governor. In addition, in contrast to the NP’s exclusive Chinese identity appeals, the PFP has attempted to portray itself as a

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39 *China Times*, November 25, 1994, 12.
41 Fell, *Party Politics in Taiwan*, Figure 6.4
42 Yao Li-ming, interview by author, Kaohsiung, December 3, 2004.
more inclusive party by tapping into the growing Taiwanese identity on the island. For instance, in the 2000 presidential election its campaign group was titled the “New Taiwanese Service Team Group” (新台灣人服務團隊). As a result, the PFP was able to win seats in 2001 in areas that the NP never managed to, such as Yilan (宜蘭) or Tainan (台南) county.

The TIP was the first attempt to create a purifier on the left of Taiwanese politics. The TIP hoped to benefit from disappointment with the DPP’s failure to fight for the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan. Although the TIP did discuss other issues, in reality the party was viewed as a single-issue party, with the solitary goal of Taiwan independence. However, the party appeared on the electoral stage too early to be able to exploit the DPP’s shift towards the centre. Surveys show the 1996 DPP presidential election had actually reinforced the party’s radical image. Therefore the TIP’s accusations of DPP moderation were less convincing in 1997 and 1998. It was not until Chen Shui-bian’s presidential bid got off the ground in 1999 that there was greater awareness of the DPP’s shift to the centre. By the time there really was a market for the TIP’s appeals, the party was already a spent force. In contrast, the TSU was able to take advantage of voters dissatisfied with the DPP’s moderation after it became the ruling party. Just as the PFP tried to learn from the NP’s errors, the TSU has been able to portray a far more moderate image than the TIP. Moreover, the TSU has employed a broader approach by adding greater emphasis to the electorally more popular appeal of Taiwanese identity.

Although the purifier parties have had a significant impact on Taiwanese elections, they have failed to live up to the expectations created by their initial electoral success. The political project of the purifiers has contained two critical weaknesses that have contributed to their decline. Firstly, all have made increasingly extreme election appeals. However, the Taiwanese electorate has a tradition of punishing extremist parties. For instance, the PFP’s adoption of violence as a method to protest against the result of the

43 China Times, March 10, 2000, 10.
44 Fell, Party Politics in Taiwan, Figure 6.4
45 For instance, numerous DPP politicians the author interviewed in 2001 blamed the party’s promotion of the Republic of Taiwan in its 1991 National Assembly campaign for its electoral defeat.
The 2004 presidential election meant that the party lost its centrist image, and is one factor in its poor electoral performance in the 2004 parliamentary elections. Secondly, the purifiers (and prophetic parties) have failed to create a party identity that is distinct enough from the established parties. As a result even symbolic changes on the part of the major parties can lead to both supporters and politicians returning to the fold. Therefore, when the KMT nominated a candidate for Taipei mayor in 1998 that had a similar image to the NP, many former NP supporters switched their allegiance back to the KMT.

When we analyse the actual breakdown of public opinion, it would appear to offer greater scope for third parties on the left, as there has been a gradual shift away from Chinese identity and support for unification, and towards support for Taiwan independence and Taiwanese identity. However, since 1995 the purifiers of the right consistently outperformed those of the left. Therefore, we must also look to other variables to explain the greater success of right purifiers. Next, I look at the effect the parties’ contrasting resources have had on their electoral fates.

**Political resources**

Throughout the world new parties struggle to find the necessary financial resources to run election campaigns to challenge the established parties. This is especially troubling for new parties in Taiwan as campaigns on the island are undoubtedly among the most expensive in the world. Financially there is not a level playing field for new parties in Taiwan as the former ruling party, the KMT, has a huge business and property empire. Being the richest political party in the world, the KMT can always outspend any political party. Candidates and parties must spend huge amounts on newspaper and television election ads, campaign rallies, posters, leaflets, and sometimes even vote buying. Estimates for the campaign spending for a successful parliamentary candidate in the mid 1990s range from US$2 to 4 million. Although there are maximum campaign spending limits, the spending figures which candidates submit to the Central Election Commission

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bear little connection to actual spending.

Changes in the campaign media have made it harder and more expensive for the challenger parties to get their message across to voters, raising the barriers for new party entry. In the early 1990s new parties had greater opportunities to get public exposure with free television advertising and government run policy forums. In 1991 and 1992 parties could not buy television time for their campaign ads, instead they were allotted free slots on terrestrial stations according to the number of candidates nominated. Therefore, in 1991 the CSDP was able to get over 12 minutes for its party political broadcasts, compared to 21 minutes for the DPP. Similarly, the government run policy forums gave candidates of all parties equal time to present their policies to the voters. However, since the rise of cable television in Taiwan in the mid 1990s, there has been a US style free market for TV ads, in which parties can buy as much advertising time as they can afford and the TV stations can offer. Therefore, in 1998 the KMT and DPP were able to purchase 6185 and 4588 minutes of TV ad time respectively, compared to the NP’s 2049 minutes and the TIP’s 183 minutes.\(^48\) In addition, the government run policy forums were ended in 1998.\(^49\) These changes naturally favour the superior financial resources of the existing parties over the cash strapped new parties.

Taiwan’s prophetic parties have had greater difficulties in attracting sufficient campaign funds than the purifiers. Political backers are far more likely to fund campaigns for purifier politicians, as they often have a proven track record of electoral experience in their former political parties. This partly explains why the LP, CSDP, GP all suffered from a severe lack of funds. Although the TIP was a purifier party, very few of its leaders had election campaign records, making fund raising also a very tough proposition. In contrast, the NP, PFP and TSU have all found fundraising easier due to their better human resources, as they have politicians not only with experience as elected politicians, and party leaders while with the established parties, but also they have a number of politicians

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\(^48\) Cheng Tzu-long (鄭自隆) Election Campaign Communication in Taiwan (競選傳播與台灣社會), (Taipei: Yangchi, 2003), 198.

\(^49\) The former CSDP leader Chu Kao-cheng blamed this factor on his own election defeat in December 1998. Interview by author.
with either central or provincial level government experience. As a result they have the necessary business links to gain the funding for national level campaigns.

The importance of having sufficient human resources extends beyond fundraising, as new parties also require skilful party administrators, and even more importantly politicians that have the mass appeal to be elected. Since Taiwanese public party identification is lower than in mature democracies, many more voters vote for candidates rather than parties. Therefore a new party needs a pool of electable candidates with the reputation, support organizations, and financial resources to win election. However, new parties struggle to attract electable politicians, as such people are far less likely to join a party that lacks the resources to support their campaign. The lack of electable candidates was again a critical weakness for not only the prophetic parties but also the TIP. With Chu Kao-cheng as its party leader, the CSDP was the only prophetic party with a nationally renowned figure. However, a party also cannot rely solely on one well-known politician to win many seats. This was the dilemma faced by the CSDP, as apart from Chu, almost none of its fifty one candidates were well known. Here lies a key factor in the greater electoral success of the NP, PFP, and TSU. All three had a strong pool of politicians that were electable due to their reputations, election, government and party administrative experience. However, a factor in the decline of the NP was that after 2000 the PFP began to poach popular NP politicians, severely reducing its pool of electable candidates.

Increasingly Taiwanese political analysts have also talked of the importance of political stars, known as the heavenly kings (天王) in winning elections. 50 There are never more than half a dozen such figures at any point in time. Since 2000 the heavenly kings have been the president Chen Shui-bian, the ex president Lee Teng-hui, the former provincial governor and chairman of the PFP, Soong Chu-yu, KMT party chair Lien Chan (連戰), and Taipei mayor Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九). A fatal weakness for the prophet parties was that they lacked such nationally well-known personalities to attract media attention or

rally audiences and to project their fame on their fellow partisans. Though the NP did have a group of well-known middle ranking politicians, it lacked a political star. Therefore, when the PFP appeared with Soong Chu-yu as its leader, many NP politicians and supporters deserted their party. The importance of the Soong Chu–yu for the PFP can be seen in the comment of its Kaohsiung city branch chief in 2004, “No one in the PFP has a support level that reaches half his (Soong) level, not even a third.”

The TSU is also highly reliant on the active support of former president Lee Teng-hui. Without which the party might well have had a similar impact to the TIP. However, when parties are overly reliant on one political star, they can be affected by adverse swings in the public mood. For instance, the decline in popularity of Soong and Lee in recent years has been a factor in the PFP and TSU’s recent disappointing election results.

Although the role of party members has been reduced by the rise of modern media centred campaign methods, party members still have critical roles to play in terms of funds from membership fees, proselytising the party message to the general public, and as unpaid campaign workers. All the new parties have suffered severely from a shortage of party members; this is particularly the case for the prophet parties and also the TIP. For instance, on the eve of its first election campaign in 1989 the LP was reported to only have about 1,000 members. The purifier parties have tended to have looser membership structures than the established parties. As Huang Peng-hsiao of the PFP explained, “Many of our members are also KMT or NP members. We do not insist that if you join the PFP you must give up membership of other parties.”

However, this kind of membership arrangement, and the ambiguous relationship between the purifiers and their original parties means members are often susceptible to returning back to the established party.

As the use of modern campaign methods increased in the mid 1990s the importance of media resources to propagate party messages has risen. Here again the new parties were

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51 Huang Peng-hsiao, interview by author, Kaohsiung, 4 September, 2004.
52 In a 2004 TVBS survey Soong and Lee came bottom of a poll of the top ten politicians on Taiwan. Close behind in seventh place was the KMT party chair, Lien Chan. For details see www.tvbs.com.tw/news/poll_center/default.asp
53 Copper, “The Role of Minor Political Parties in Taiwan,” 100.
at a severe disadvantage, particularly the prophetic parties. At the time the CSDP and LP appeared in the early 1990s the KMT directly or indirectly controlled almost all the TV and radio stations, and most of the main newspapers. The liberalisation of the electronic media in the mid 1990s has resulted in a more balanced media structure, which the new purifier parties have been able to exploit. The NP was more successful at getting its message across as it received favourable coverage from the United Daily News (聯合報), a leading national newspaper that had been unhappy with the KMT’s changed policy priorities in the 1990s. Also the NP was able to open up underground radio stations, and later one of its key political figures founded one of the most popular commercial radio stations, Radio UFO (飛碟電台). The TSU, NP, and PFP also made use of the rise of daily TV politics talk shows on cable TV. As these shows tend to invite one politician from each significant party, this is a forum in which the smaller parties are able to get equal exposure to the established parties. As these shows make their money from advertising revenues, they tend to invite well-known and often controversial politicians. Therefore, politicians from prophetic parties stand little chance of being invited. The existing new parties such as the TSU, PFP and NP have all attempted to break the established parties’ domination of the media by investing heavily in high tech party websites to appeal directly to voters. However, at this time it is unclear whether these websites have had much impact on their target audience.

Most of the new parties have suffered from a lack of organizational resources. As in Japan, candidate support organizations are critical to consistently winning elections in Taiwan. A factor in Taiwan’s social democratic parties’ limited impact was their failure to follow the model of their counterparts in Western Europe of creating strong links to the labour unions. Although the NP was able to achieve stunning electoral results in the mid 1990s, many of these parliamentarians failed to win re-election three years later as they had not created strong local support organizations. As early as 1995 the NP’s Yang Tai-shun (楊泰順) warned of this danger, “If the NP is unable to use its newly elected offices to create grassroots organizations and an image of party service, it is doubtful that the party will still be able to win votes with the appeal of highly educated candidates and
anti money politics."\textsuperscript{55} In contrast, both PFP and TSU incumbents had greater success in winning re-election in their second legislative election in 2004, as most had established strong candidate support organizations.

**Political opportunity structure**

Even if the new party has a convincing political platform and sufficient resources to run campaigns, it is not guaranteed electoral success. Whether or not the party can take advantage of its electoral environment or what Lucardie calls the “political opportunity structure” will determine the party’s impact.\textsuperscript{56} In this section I focus upon four aspects of the political opportunity structure: (1) the institutional set-up, particularly the election system, (2) the state of the party politics, (3) the economic conditions (4) external national security threat.

Previous studies have found that although the election system does not have a direct impact on the formation of new parties, it does affect their subsequent electoral success.\textsuperscript{57} Proportional representation systems tend to be most favourable to new parties as these have a lower threshold for party entrance, while single member first past the post systems favour established parties. Since Taiwan operates a mixed electoral system, with single non-transferable vote in multiple member districts for assembly elections and single member districts for local executive and presidential elections, we would expect that new parties would perform better in multiple member district elections.

This hypothesis is clearly supported out when we compare Tables 3 and 5. These show that new parties have been far more successful at gaining seats in multiple member district elections. In fact, the new parties did not actually win a single member district election seat until 2001. It must be pointed out that these overall figures do disguise quite strong showings for some individual new party candidates in single member districts. For instance, in 1994 the NP’s Chao Shao-kang came second in the Taipei mayoral election with over 30 percent of the vote. Another area with multiple member districts that new...

\textsuperscript{55} *China Times*, December 3, 1995, 11. 
\textsuperscript{56} Lucardie, “Prophets, Purifiers and Prolocutors,” 179-182. 
\textsuperscript{57} Harmel and Robertson, “Success of New Parties,” 516-517.
parties do have opportunities to win seats is Taipei and Kaohsiung city council elections. Tables 7 and 8 show how new parties have had greater success in these city councils than national level elections. However, there is also much variation according to party type and between the two cities. New parties have had greater impact in Taipei than Kaohsiung, and purifier parties on the right have been far more successful than prophets or left purifiers. For instance, in 1994, 1998 and 2002 the NP performed far better in Taipei city council elections than in the equivalent national parliamentary contests of 1995, 1998 and 2001, but it had little success in Kaohsiung. In contrast, no left wing purifier won a seat until the TSU’s two seats in 2002, and neither the TSU nor TIP has won any seats in Taipei city council.

One trend that is clear from Table 5 is that there has been a reduction in new party involvement in local executive single member district elections since the peak year of 1997. During the 1990s the new parties faced a dilemma over these contests, as contesting these hopeless elections would waste precious resources, but if they did not stand their supporters would drift back to the established parties. As the former NP chair Chou Yang-shan (周陽山) explained, “Standing for city and county executive elections was to gain exposure…For example, when (the NP’s) Wang Chien-hsuan stood for Taipei mayor he told everyone to vote for Ma Ying-jeou (for mayor), but to support the NP’s city councillors.”

Since 2001 it has become increasingly common for the new parties of the left or right to reach cooperative agreements with the established parties over the single member district elections. Such a model was attempted in 2001 for Taipei county magistrate, when the PFP, KMT did not nominate a candidate and supported the NP candidate, who only narrowly lost to the DPP. This practice was again repeated in the 2002 mayoral and 2004 presidential elections. In that presidential election, the TSU supported the DPP team, while the NP backed a joint ticket team with a KMT presidential and PFP vice presidential candidate. These cooperative arrangements offer the new parties media

58 Shu Ya-wen, “Survival and Development of Issue Parties: A Study with the Green Party of Germany and New Party of Taiwan as Examples,” MA dissertation Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Sun Yat Sen University (2003), 120
exposure, access to established party resources, and greater prospect of winning single member contests. Therefore, we can expect to see similar models in future executive elections.

A problem that almost all the rising parties have faced is how to best employ their limited resources in electoral campaigns. This has been the area where most strategic mistakes have been committed. Overly optimistic nomination was a critical factor in the electoral setbacks of a number of new parties. For instance, in 1991 the CSDP nominated 55 candidates, often with more than one candidate in one district, as a result it split its votes and did not have a single successful candidate. The NP and TIP also suffered similar mistakes when they nominated ambitiously in 1998, and 2001 despite a decreasing support base, human and financial resources.

Changes in the economic and national security environment can offer space for new parties to make an elections breakthrough. Previous studies have shown how unemployment was a factor in the rise of Social Credit in Canada at the expense of established parties in Quebec.⁵⁹ Even in the first decade of multi-party elections Taiwan’s economic growth rate growth rate remained high, making the economic issue of little value to the early social democratic parties. However, since the change in ruling parties, Taiwan experienced its first case of negative growth and recession in 2001, and had record levels of unemployment reaching 5.17 percent in 2002.⁶⁰ Although the TSU and PFP rose at the same time as this economic recession there is not a clear link between the two phenomenons. Neither the TSU nor the PFP have succeeded in staking ownership of economic issues. Moreover, most of these new party votes have come at the expense of the KMT and the NP, while despite the economic setbacks the ruling DPP actually increased its vote and seat share significantly.

The link between national security concerns and new party success is more convincing.

The PRC military threats were at their greatest from 1995-1996. In 1995-1996 the PRC conducted a series of missile tests close to Taiwan in an attempt to intimidate voters prior to the presidential and legislative campaigns. It is often argued in Taiwan that the PRC threats backfired, with the victory of Lee Teng-hui in 1996, however, this is an oversimplification. PRC pressure appears to have had a more positive impact on the its favoured party 1995-6 parliamentary elections. If we examine Table 4 and 5 we can compare the NP’s record in the 1995 and 1996 parliamentary elections under national security threats with its performance in 1998 when the PRC did not attempt to directly threaten Taiwanese voters. In short, national security concerns appear to benefit new parties on the right, but not benefit the new parties of the left, instead the established party of the left can gain support.

We would expect the new parties to have greatest scope for development when established parties are weak and divided, and when they are adjusting core party positions. For instance, the LP and CSDP both faced a daunting challenge to break the dominance of the established parties in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as at the time the DPP was growing rapidly and though the KMT did have internal divisions its electoral machine remained strong. As the former CSDP leader Chu Kao-cheng lamented, “At the time the DPP was heading towards its peak, so it was hard for the CSDP to make much impact.” By 1993 there was an open power struggle in the KMT, offering the NP space to develop to the right of the KMT. However, after Lee Teng-hui won the 1996 presidential election and completely consolidated his power within the KMT, the flood of KMT supporters and politicians to the NP was stemmed. And in 1998 the KMT appeared more united than at any time in the decade, thus limiting the space for the NP.

Since 2000 the state of party politics has also affected the electoral opportunities for the new parties. Both the appearance of a centre right competitor in the PFP and the KMT’s return to many orthodox party policies that Lee had disowned in the 1990s have also cost the NP votes. The PFP has been able to flourish because since Lee left the KMT, the KMT has lacked strong leadership and once again is racked by factional conflict. As the

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61 Chu Kao-cheng, interview by author, Kaohsiung, October 9, 2001.
PFP legislator Chou Hsi-wei (周錫偉) explained, “The KMT isn’t good enough, neither is Lien Chan. He’s a weak leader and does not have the necessary ability.”

Although the DPP has also moved away from core party principles in its desire to win elections, there has clearly been less scope for new parties to develop on the left of Taiwanese politics. This is because the DPP has been more adept at resolving inner party conflicts and maintaining party unity. Therefore, despite disagreements over party moderation, almost no major DPP politicians joined the TIP in the late 1990s. It was not until the DPP became the ruling party and was forced to make more policy compromises that there was space for the TSU to develop. However, the DPP remains united, and though some DPP supporters may have switched allegiance to the TSU, again no major DPP figures have defected to the TSU. Instead the TSU has been forced to recruit from KMT politicians dissatisfied with the party after Lee left.

5. Conclusion: A Future for New Parties?
The year 2004 is one that new party leaders will be glad to forget. All the new parties performed poorly in the December legislative elections, and if introduced, the plans to scrap the multiple member electoral system in favour of single member districts will further reduce the space for third parties. However, the prospects for new parties are not as bleak as it appeared in late 2004. Both the TSU and PFP have since stressed their independence from the established parties, and the plan for a merger between the KMT and PFP is definitely no longer on the agenda. As in the 1990s there appears to be greater scope for new parties on the right of Taiwanese politics, as KMT divisions over selection of its party chair and 2008 presidential candidate could once again see the party splitting. The reduction in voter turnout rate reveals a widespread disillusionment with the existing parties and their traditional campaign appeals, offering the chance for political entrepreneurs to create a new political force. As this study has shown, if a new party has a convincing political platform, sufficient resources, and can exploit its electoral environment, it can win seats in multi-party Taiwan.

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<td>76</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Parties</td>
<td>0.92%</td>
<td>2.21%</td>
<td>1.95%</td>
<td>12.95</td>
<td>14.76</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>21.81</td>
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<tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>7.82</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.64</td>
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Note 1: This table shows the vote share received by established and new parties in national parliamentary elections. Note 2: The established parties refer to the KMT and DPP. Note 3: New parties refer to any challenger party that has received a minimum of 1% of the vote in a national parliamentary election. However, I have allowed a small amount of leeway by including the LP in this analysis, as with 0.92% in 1989 it is close enough to the threshold to warrant attention. Note 4: 1989 is for the supplementary Legislative Yuan election, 1991 and 1996 the National Assembly elections, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 are the Legislative Yuan elections. Note 5: New parties in 1989 include LP (0.92); in 1991 the CSDP (2.12) and the LP (0.09); in 1992 the LP (0.4) and CSDP (1.55); in 1995 the NP (12.95); in 1996 the NP (13.67) and GP (1.09); in 1998 the NP (7.1), GP (0.1) and TIP (1.5); in 2001 the NP (2.6), PFP (18.6), TSU (8.5) TIP (0) and GP (0); and in 2004 the NP (0.12), TSU (7.79) and PFP (13.9). Sources: National Taiwan Chengchi University, Election Study Center website [http://vote.nccu.edu.tw/engcec/vote4.asp](http://vote.nccu.edu.tw/engcec/vote4.asp), Dafydd Fell, *Party Politics in Taiwan* (London: Routledge, 2005), Christian Schaferrer, *The Power of the Ballot Box* (London: Lexington, 2003).
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<td>146</td>
<td>139</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Seats available for election</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>225</td>
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Note 1: This table shows the number of seats won by established and new parties in national parliamentary elections. Note 2: The established parties refer to the KMT and DPP. Note 3: New parties refer to any challenger party that has received a minimum of 1% of the vote in a national parliamentary election. However, I have allowed a small amount of leeway by including the LP in this analysis, as with 0.92% in 1989 it is close enough to the threshold to warrant attention. Note 4: 1989 is for the supplementary Legislative Yuan election, 1991 and 1996 the National Assembly elections, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004 are the Legislative Yuan elections. Note 5: New parties winning seats in 1992 were CSDP (1); in 1995 the NP (21); in 1996 the NP (49) and GP (1); in 1998 the NP (11), and TIP (1); in 2001 the NP (1), PFP (46), TSU (13); and in 2004 the NP (1), TSU (12) and PFP (34). Sources: National Taiwan Chengchi University, Election Study Center website [http://vote.nccu.edu.tw/engcec/vote4.asp](http://vote.nccu.edu.tw/engcec/vote4.asp), Dafydd Fell, *Party Politics in Taiwan* (London: Routledge, 2005), Christian Schafer, *The Power of the Ballot Box* (London: Lexington, 2003).
Table 3 Candidates Nominated and Elected by New Parties in national parliamentary elections in National Parliamentary Elections

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<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45 (21)</td>
<td>83 (49)</td>
<td>51 (11)</td>
<td>42 (1)</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>89 (46)</td>
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<td>65 (34)</td>
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<td>TIP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 (0)</td>
<td>4 (0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55 (13)</td>
<td>40 (12)</td>
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<td>LP</td>
<td>8 (0)</td>
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<td>1 (0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>58 (0)</td>
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<td>GP</td>
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<td>1 (0)</td>
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Note 1: This table shows the number of candidates nominated and elected by new parties in national parliamentary elections.
Note 2: Candidates elected are shown in parenthesis.
Table 4: The Vote and Seat share for New Parties in National Parliamentary Elections

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<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13.7 (14.7)</td>
<td>7.1 (4.9)</td>
<td>2.9 (0.4)</td>
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<td>PFP</td>
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<td>20.3 (20.4)</td>
<td>13.9 (15.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5 (0.4)</td>
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<td>TSU</td>
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<td>8.5 (5.8)</td>
<td>7.8 (5.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>0.92 (0)</td>
<td>0.1 (0)</td>
<td>0.4 (0)</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
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<td>GP</td>
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<td>1.1 (0.3)</td>
<td>0.1 (0)</td>
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Note 1: This table shows the vote share and seta share for new parties in national parliamentary elections.
Note 2: Seat Shares are shown in parenthesis
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<td>(0)</td>
<td>3 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>7 (0)</td>
<td>2 (0)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>2 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 (0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total seats available</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: This table shows the number of candidates nominated and elected for new parties in single member district elections.
Note 2: Candidates elected are shown in parenthesis.
Note 4: In 1996 the NP officially supported an independent candidate.
Note 5: The PFP figures for 2000 is the vote share gained by independent candidates James Soong, who founded the PFP months after this election.
Note 6: Figures have not been shown for the 2004 presidential election as the new parties did not nominate their own candidates, instead the KMT and PFP ran a campaign with their chairmen standing for President and Vice President respectively, the NP also supported this ticket. The TSU supported the DPP candidate.

Table 6 Vote and Seat share for New Parties in Single Member District Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>3.1 (0)</td>
<td>12.64 (0)</td>
<td>14.9 (0)</td>
<td>1.4 (0)</td>
<td>1.9 (0)</td>
<td>0.1 (0)</td>
<td>9.9 (4.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36.8 (0)</td>
<td>2.4 (8.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2 (0)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0 (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: This table shows the vote and seat shares received by new political parties in single member district elections.
Note 2: The seat shares are shown in parenthesis.
Note 4: In 1996 the NP officially supported an independent candidate.
Note 5: The PFP figures for 2000 is actually the vote share gained by independent candidates James Soong, who founded the PFP months after this election.

Table 7 Candidates Nominated and Elected for New Parties in Kaohsiung (KH) and Taipei (TP) City Councils

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 (2)</td>
<td>14 (11)</td>
<td>6 (1)</td>
<td>16 (9)</td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
<td>6 (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>17 (8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7 (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5 (0)</td>
<td>4 (0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Seats</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: This table shows the number of candidates nominated and elected by new parties in Kaohsiung and Taipei City council elections.
Note 2: The number of candidates elected are shown in parenthesis.
Note 3: Data is missing for the Labor Party’s (LP) number of candidates in 1989.
Table 8 Vote and Seat Share for New Parties in Taipei and Kaohsiung City Council Elections

<table>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.8 (4.6)</td>
<td>21.7 (21.2)</td>
<td>3.8 (2.3)</td>
<td>18.6 (17.3)</td>
<td>0.6 (0)</td>
<td>9.0 (9.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.9 (15.9)</td>
<td>17.6 (15.7)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
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<td>6.7 (4.6)</td>
<td>3.7 (0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.5 (0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
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<td>1.9 (0)</td>
<td>0.7 (0)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>(2.3)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: This table shows the vote and seat share received by new parties in Kaohsiung and Taipei City Council elections.
Note 2: The seat shares are shown in parenthesis.
Note 3: Data is missing for the Labor Party’s (LP) vote share in 1989.