The Shaping of Colonial Administrators: The Lower Civil Service Examination in Taiwan under Japanese Rule

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ABSTRACT

This study primarily focuses on the analysis of statistical data on prewar Japan’s Lower Civil Service Examinations in Taiwan under Japanese Rule (1895-1945), and it also attempts to evaluate the bureaucratic system and colonial administration of Japan’s colonial empire. This paper analyzes the complete list of all the available successful candidates of the lower civil service examinations annually held by the Governor-General of Taiwan from 1899 through 1944, highlights the structural changes in terms of the ethnic ratios between Japanese and Taiwanese, and traces and maps the distribution of the Japanese in terms of their birthplaces in Japan proper. I conclude by suggesting that the lower civil service examinations, at least in the case of colonial Taiwan, served only a very limited role in terms of providing a “ladder of success” for the lowest-level government officials or public officials. Indeed, other channels for promotion, such as seniority or evaluation by a professionally appointed committee, offered better alternative routes for “rising in society” in terms of social mobility. Essentially, I argue that while the bureaucratic system based on the organizational law of officials was an important mechanism for Japan’s colonial administration, the crux of its operation in fact lay in the structure outside of the bureaucracy.

The General Civil Service Examination in Taiwan

From 1899 through 1945, the colonial government held forty-six general civil service examinations in Taiwan, according to Ts’ai Chih-wen.¹ Ts’ai’s estimate points to two

¹ Until recently, the only study on the general civil service examination in colonial
major sources of candidates - as well as successful candidates: assistant instructors of
the primary school (kundō) and patrolmen (junsa). Both groups were the lowest-level
of “treatment officials” (hannin taigū 判任待遇), not regular officials. The ratio of
success in the general civil service examination for the whole Japanese included
reveals that only about one-seventh were Taiwanese. As this source constituted only
about 5 per cent of the annual average in terms of the newly recruited officials of the
Government-General of Taiwan, Ts’ai could not but conclude that the general
examination was not the main source for recruitment. In a sample he examined, he
derived the following ratios and figures: 35.5 per cent (100), assistants of general
affairs (zoku); 25.5 per cent (72), police inspector assistants (keibuho 警部補); 23 per
cent (65), secretaries (shoki 書記). This feature, Ts’ai argues, was “unique in Japan’s
colonial empire.” He thus concludes that, at least prior to 1923, the lower civil service
examination provided local functionaries in Tawian a most important channel for
“ladder of success” in the colonial bureaucracy (Ts’ai Chih-wen 1996: 74-8). Ts’ai
estimates that, between 1899 and 1923 three-fourths (75%) of Taiwanese successful
candidates had already entered the colonial administration before taking the
examination (Ts’ai Chih-wen 1996: 80 & 165). Moreover, he observes that quite a few
of Taiwanese sought opportunities out of the establishment. Three alternative careers

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2 Due to the difference in data base available for statistics analysis, Ts’ai Chih-wen
reaches a ratio of 13.8%, whereas mine is about 15%. The actual figure is perhaps a
little bit higher, as both of us do not successfully get access to the complete set of data,
but this divergence in statistics dose not, I believe, affect the conclusion we arrive.
That is, Taiwanese applicants only achieved an average of about one-seventh of the
success rate. For details, see Hui-yu Caroline Ts’ai 2008; Ts’ai Chih-wen 1996:
107-9.

3 Of 393 successful candidates he analyzed, 282 managed to get appointed to become
hanninkan. This he arrived by taking an interval of five years, with regard to those
who had both successfully passed the examination and been appointed to the posts of
hanninkan, for the following eight years: 1901, 1906, 1911, 1916, 1921, 1926, 1931,
were available: 1) to study in Japan; 2) to enter the business world; 3) to participate in the national movement of Taiwan. Not a few were simultaneously active in two or more careers. Essentially, Ts’ai argues that the introduction of the general civil service examination signified that the evaluation system by achievement had been implemented in the colony and, more importantly, that the colonial bureaucracy has begun to be incorporated into the Japanese bureaucracy.

Ts’ai Chih-wen calculates the number of annually appointed new hanninkan for the period between 1899 and 1942, and compares it with the figure of those hanninkan who were appointed to the posts via the examination channel, and points to the fact that no more than 5 per cent of hanninkan entered the colonial government via the channel of examination. This, he concludes, suggests that the lower civil service examination was not the main channel for the appointment of hanninkan (Ts’ai Chih-wen 1996: 157). Ts’ai went further to suggest that the colonial government consistently managed to control the success rate to a level below twenty per cent (Ts’ai Chih-wen 1996: 107-9), and that this policy partly explains why many of the successful Taiwanese candidates, leaders of the Taiwanese nationalistic movement included, chose to turn to other channels than the bureaucracy, mainly, to study in Japan and to go into business. Ts’ai thus concluded by confirming the conventional wisdom that the Government-General of Taiwan was a centralized organization (Ts’ai Chih-wen 1996: 172-3, 181).

With regard to the size of annual appointment for hanninkan, between 1899 and 1942 the Government-General appointed an average number of 1,166 new lowest-ranking officials. Translating into actual figure, the highest figure (3,440) fell in 1920, the year of the most important administrative reform not only in Taiwan but also in Japan’s colonial empire; the lowest figure (345) occurred in 1899, the year when the first examination system was held. Moreover, the second half of Japanese rule witnessed the new posts ranged between 1,000 and 2,000. While the number of new posts rose, especially after 1920, the trend was for successful examination candidates to fall in terms of appointment ratio. The rate was roughly ninety per cent prior to 1910, but it fell to less than forty per cent by 1936. In terms of race, the average rate was 75.6 per cent for Japanese, and 26.5 per cent for Taiwanese. A few factors might have affected the continued decline of new appointment rates via the examination. Other than
individual factors (mostly economic), Ts’ai Chih-wen also cited insufficient material rewards as a major motive for some candidates to drop out of the bureaucratic track and seek career change, especially when market conditions fluctuated. The economic motive worked both for the Taiwanese as well as the Japanese (Ts’ai Chih-wen 1996: 161-5).

Here and elsewhere, Ts’ai Chih-wen clearly conflated “treatment officials” with regular officials. This resulted in his underestimating the significance of “treatment officials,” and his calculation only counted “regular officials.” He also neglected alternative channels of promotion in the colonial bureaucracy, and thus he completely left out the factor of the high turnover rates, in terms of transfers and resignations, in his discussion. Equally important, he left untouched posts set up by local governments within the authority of their delegated power, most of them treatment posts - as well as local functionaries, a dominating majority being honorary. All considered, the appointment rate of regular hanninkan via the channel of the general civil service examination system could have been narrower than what Ts’ai had observed. This suggests that Japan’s colonial administration was far more flexible in structure than what we used to think. It also points to the resilience and the “super-stability” of colonial Taiwan’s extra-bureaucracy - even when Japan’s colonial administration was in crisis during wartime. This said, Ts’ai was correct to point out that the general civil service examination system held by the Government-General of Taiwan was a closed-up system, available mainly for local functionaries in the establishment to seek promotion in the bureaucracy to become regular officials. Both junsa and kundō were lowest-ranking civilian officials, and koin were public officials; all of them fell into the category of what I call the “extra-bureaucracy.” To change career tracks or to change status from the extra-bureaucracy to regular officials, one had to pass the general civil service examination. The 5 per cent appointment rate for successful candidates to ascend the posts of hanninkan offered just this mechanism. Of the three genres of the “extra-bureaucracy,” junsa was the largest group which deserves further analysis.

The General Examination as a Closed System

My research on the examination system in colonial Taiwan, tentative as it is, has
generated a few findings for further articulation and substantiation. First, the flow of talent within the empire, in the case of successful candidates of the upper-ranking civil service examination, was by and large limited to regional flows among the destinations of appointment and Japan proper, and only very selected cadres in the level of decision-making and limited number of technicians with special skills “circulated” within the empire, mostly taking up roles in the frontier of Japan’s expanded empire. Second, for rank-and-file officials and public clerks, the general civil service examination was an insignificant channel for social mobilization; that is, other channels (by seniority or evaluation) existed as major routes for promotion. Third, while the bureaucratic system built in accordance with the Bureaucratic Organization was a crucial point of observation for the operation of Japan’s colonial administration, the crux of the analysis lay in the extra-bureaucracy.

My statistical analysis of the higher civil service examination attempts to compare Japan’s two major colonies, Taiwan and Korea. The findings reveal that, the career pattern of successful candidates in both colonies was highly correlated to their entry-level appointments. With regard to the fluctuation of the size, the peak in Taiwan occurred in 1942, and in Korea, it was 1938. This suggests to us that wartime mobilization in Korea, among other things, was earlier than in Taiwan. Moreover, four patterns of cyclic fluctuation is discernible: the years around Japan’s annexation of Korea (1910), a series of administrative reforms in the early 1920s, the world economic crisis (1929) and the founding of Manchukuo (1932), and the “Pacific War” that began in 1941. The impact of the Pacific war on the “flow of talent” in Japan’s colonial empire demands further analysis, but it is at least clear that Korea was - relative to Taiwan - far more affected by Japan’s annexation and the nation-building of Manchukuo.

Like the higher civil service examination held by the central government of Japan, applicants taking the general civil service examination of the colonial Taiwan varied in size and timing. Two factors, salary and war, stood out: changes in the salary system (1910 and 1920) and movements of the world economy (1914 and 1920). However, I challenge Ts’ai’s conclusion that the “closed-door” feature of the general civil service examination in the early years of Japanese rule in Taiwan was “unique” in the Japanese empire (Ts’ai Chih-wen 1996: 78); and that this mechanism was
primarily “initiated” by the colonial government’s “intention” to “monopolize” the local system of civil service in the colony (Ts’ai Chih-wen 1996: 180). It is one thing to assume that the ruling structure of the Government-General of Taiwan was so centralized as to enable the colonial government to dominate virtually all of the colonial administration, as Ts’ai does. It is another matter, however, to argue - as I do - that the examination system served both as “a means of convenience” for the colonial government in the early years of Japanese rule when the control mechanism had not been well established, as well as “a channel for social mobility,” for the Taiwanese, however symbolical, minimal, and ineffective a role it played. My point here is not to deny the manipulation of the examination system by the Japanese, but to highlight factors embedded in the discourse of colonialism - or in an attempt to “rescue history” from “colonization” (to borrow from Prasenjit Duara 1995). While motivation and colonialism were key factors in this context, they should be used with care in the examination of institutional history. A balanced historical analysis calls for the contextualization of the civil service examination in the Meiji tradition, as well as the de-motivation and de-colonization in the study of the ruling mechanism.

As mentioned above, while the examination system for civilian officials was created in 1893, it was not until 1899 that the system was well established. It was no coincidence that the colonial government held the first general examination in 1899. Four years after Taiwan became Japan’s first colony. The gap in timing between Japan’s takeover and the introduction of the examination system to Taiwan meant that the Government-General of Taiwan had to find a way to “legitimize” those who had already entered the colonial bureaucracy in the early years of takeover. The general civil service examination was just one solution to the problem, and so did a series of “special appointments” (tokubetsu ninmei 特別任命), such as the special track of appointments enacted for the police, served as an alternative means. Most of all, the general civil service examination system not only provided a hard-won opportunity for local functionaries situated at the bottom of the extra-bureaucracy (such as yatoi) to become a regular official, but also allowed those who had already entered the bureaucracy to change careers (for example, from patrolmen to civilian officials). This at least partially explains why the colonial government tended to favor those Japanese who had already been residing or associated with Taiwan in appointment.
My own study echoes the findings of Ts’ai Chih-wen that the Japanese success rate as a whole was as high as 85 per cent, and it also substantiates the prevailing view that “virtually all” of colonial officials in Taiwan were Japanese. This was particularly true with regard to the early years (100%); even until 1922, the ratio was 96 per cent. If one analyzes the background of the successful candidates by breaking Japan into nine regions - plus Taiwan at which the examination was targeted, then prior to 1929 (the last year when the data for family background is available) the top four regions were, in the order of: Kyūshū, 592 (41.1%), Kantō 関東, 161 (11.2%), Chūgoku 中國, 154 (10.7%), Tōhoku 東北, 123 (8.6%); followed by Taiwan, 106 (7.4%).

If Taiwan were a prefecture of Japan proper, we might have argued that the ratio ranked in the middle, but it was not. The fact that it was in Taiwan that the examination was held for civil service inevitably leads one to wonder that the channel of social mobility for Taiwanese was indeed quite narrow under Japanese rule. A look at the ranking by prefecture in Japan further reveals that among the ten top-ranking prefectures. Six were in Kyūshū 九州 region: topped with Kagoshima 鹿兒島, 183; then Kumamoto 熊本, 131; followed by Fukuoka 福岡, 86; and then Saga 佐賀 (58), Ōita 大分 (52), and Nagasaki 長崎 (40). Specifically, Kagoshima accounted for one eighth of the total, whereas the two regions of Kyūshū and Chūgoku 中國 added up over one-half (52%). As I further examine the region of Kyūshū, it is not difficult to notice that three prefectures (ken) alone held about two thirds (68%): Kagoshima, Kumamoto, and Fukuoka. Chūgoku took on a similar pattern of area concentration, with Hiroshima 廣島 and Yamaguchi 山口 accounting for fifty-seven per cent, and other regions show a similar tendency as well, though with lower ratios. These findings confirm what Hata’s observation that the examination favored big prefectures and cities, and that Kyūshū accounted for over forty per cent of the success rate (Hata 1983). While it is too early to conclude the colonial government might have also taken regional networking into consideration, it is reasonable to argue that the annual examination list more or less reflects the annual need of the Government-General of Taiwan for local officials.

As of September 1, 1945, in the immediate wake of Japan’s defeat, the size of the staff
serving in the government-general of Taiwan was 117,231. Of these officials, 110
(0.1%) were chokuninkan; 2,070, sōninkan (1.8%, or 1.9%, if including equivalents);
20,909, hanninkan (17.8%, or 27.1% if including equivalents). The rest were
supporting staff, totaling 83,100, or 70.9 per cent. Race was no doubt a significant
factor in bureaucratic employment. Broken down by race, then only 1 Taiwanese (Du
Cong-ming 杜聰明, or Tu Ts’ung-ming) served as chokuninkan (or 0.9% of the rank);
and 27 Taiwanese as sōninkan (1.3% of the rank), or 51 (15.4%), if including the
equivalents. Even at the lowest official rank where the overwhelming majority of
Taiwanese held their official posts, only 3,673 Taiwanese served as hanninkan, or
17.6 per cent of the rank; if another 5,177 Taiwanese taigūsha 待遇者 who served at
the equivalent level are counted, then the ratio rises to 47.6%. Simply put, the
majority of the Taiwanese worked as supporting clerks.4

After 1920, the extra-bureaucratic system continued to proliferate and expand, as
witnessed in the creation of two systems: the “temporary staff” and the “local
official-treatment staff.” Both groups of officials became a permanent feature
internalized into, and yet officially remaining outside of, the regular bureaucracy.
Meanwhile, the extra-bureaucracy was extended to the basic level of the local
administration, as illustrated in the institutionalization of an array of part-time and
honorary positions (for example, kōri 公吏, kenkan, kenshoku, mukyūshoku 無給職,
and meiyōshoku 名譽職), of which towns and villages deserve particular attention.
Specifically, this mechanism of the “extra-bureaucracy” was gradually built into the
regular bureaucracy to become a support arm for Japan’s war efforts.

THE EXTRA-BUREAUCRACY

4 Taiwan sōtokufu 1945: 8; Kondō 1996: 432. The term, “employees for both
government offices and public organizations” (kankōga shokuin 官公衙職員), refers
not only to civilian officials of four formal ranks of statute (shinninkan, chokuninkan,
sōninkan, and hanninkan) and their equivalents, taigūsha, but also all supporting staff
who worked as clerks (riin), commissioned employees (shokutaku 嘗託), daily-waged
employees (yatoi) and office runners (jimu yatoi 事務雇), and the like.
The term “extra-bureaucracy” refers to an “expanded” bureaucracy - not to the “establishment” outside of the bureaucracy. By focusing my discussion on the “bureaucracy” in this book, and not the “establishment,” I am able to identify at least four major types of government employees as “extra-bureaucracy.”

1) The “temporary staff” (rinji shokuin 臨時職員); 2) “treatment employees” (taigū shokuin 待遇職員), including a special type of “Taiwan local-treatment employees”; 3) public officials of special duties, koin and shokutaku; 4) all other types of local public officials (kōri) or clerks (riin); and 5) a variety of committeemen (iin) and honorary-post holders (meiyoshoku 名譽職), such as most village heads (gaishōchō 街庄長).

From the beginning of Japanese rule in Taiwan, the colonial government commissioned teams of shotakuin, koin, gishi, and gite to the island. The size was small, and the types were few. The 1920 reform was featured by the move to delegate part of the power from the Government-General to the local government. The ordinance regulating the local treatment staff of Taiwan was originally promulgated in September 1921 (chokurei no. 406). It authorized local governments to appoint their “treatment staff.” Along with an array of various types of local functionaries at the bottom of the hierarchical colonial administration in the name of “public officials,” many of their posts honorary, one may argue that this surely was a very stable pyramid structure of ruling mechanism. It was not until after 1920 when the Government-General promulgated the “temporary staff” system that the system was institutionalized. Meanwhile, the 1920 reform delegated part of the power to the local government. The Ordinance of Local Treatment Staff of Taiwan (Taiwan chihō taigū shokuinrei 臺灣地方待遇職員令), issued that year, entrusted the local government to appoint the “treatment staff” (discussed below). Along with an array of various types of local functionaries at the bottom of the hierarchical colonial administration in the name of “public officials,” many of their posts honorary, one may argue that this surely was a very stable pyramid structure of ruling mechanism.

A Special Case of the Bureaucracy: The Temporary Staff

The “temporary staff” system, established in May 1920 was a special case (tokurei 特例) in the government organizational law. It entitled the Government-General to
appoint the supernumerary staff to carry out specifically commissioned assignments as stipulated by the ordinance, with their salary to be paid by the budget of each operation (jigyōhi 事業費) (Setoyama Kaneaki 1926: 3-4). Set up originally to facilitate the affairs of the Government-General of Taiwan, the system was also employed to assist the affiliated institutes of the colonial government and local administration. The former included, for example, such as the Monopoly Bureau and the Central Research Institute (Chūō kenkyūjo 中央研究所), and the latter prefectures and sub-prefectures (shūchō 州廳). The “temporary staff” set up in 1920 for “forest and other land affairs” (rinya seiri jimu rinji shokuin 林野整理事務臨時職員) was a case in point (Taiwan sōtokufu 1898-1944: 1921, Collection I, 62). A look at the Gazette of the Government-General of Taiwan reveals that the quota set for the temporary staff had increased significantly, but the size was by no means large (mostly within the single digits). They were primarily the technical staff (gishi and gite) and assistants for general affairs (zoku), but some were administrative officials (jimukan 事務官, or secretaries). A look at the Roster of the Staff of the Government-General of Taiwan, 1920-1944, reveals that the list of the “temporary staff” was revised virtually every year, and that the expansion of the size during wartime was dramatically rapid. This flexibility no doubt had offered the colonial government a wider degree of operational flexibility in a total war, which came close to an attempt to seek independence from the central control.

Treatment Employees

In prewar Japan, there existed four types of legislation with regard to local treatment employees set up in accordance with: 1) the Government Organizational Law of Treatment Officials (taigū kansei 待遇官制), such as regulations enacted to regulate local government officials (chihōkan kansei), jailors (kangoku kansei 監獄官制), and harbor services (kōmujo kansei 港務所官制); 2) the occupational system (shokusei 職制), such as the ordinance regulating the treatment employees of the local government; 3) ordinances specifically enacted for a certain type of treatment employees, such as the above-mentioned system of local treatment employees specifically enacted for the implementation in Taiwan; 4) hospitality ordinances (yūgūrei 優遇令, chokurei 223 of
1920) for civilian officials at the ranks of sōnin and hannin (Setoyama Kaneaki 1926: 147-50; 1934 [c1933]: 198-201). The case of treatment employees of the local government (and its special kind in Taiwan) was a good example of how prewar Japan’s administrative mechanism worked and in what way it was modified to adjust the needs of the Government-General of Taiwan. “Treatment” refers to the treatment “matching that of government officials and clerks or public employees.” The two tracks of the staff, both regular and treatment, could further be ranked into chokunin, sōnin, and hannin, but the quota for treatment officials was not regulated by the government organizational law, thus offering a convenient means of control for the supervising organization. There was a major difference between treatment employees and regular officials/clerks, however. That is, status protection (bungen 分限) favored officials over treatment employees. The Japanese government did not offer status protection to treatment employees, and it could dismiss, transfer, or demote them against their will.

Taiwan Local-Treatment Employees

In colonial Taiwan, “treatment employees” were hired by local governments. The system featured by a combination of kansei and shokusei. It can be further grouped into the “treatment of higher civil service officials” (kōtōkan taigū 高等官待遇) and the “treatment of lower civil service officials” (hanninkan taigū 判任官待遇) (Setoyama Kaneaki 1926: 23). Like officials and clerks on the ordinary track, treatment employees in Taiwan were subject to the disciplinary regulations of public service (kanri fukumu kiritsu 官吏服務規律). The local government was required, however, to appoint Taiwan treatment employees in accordance with the quota (Article 6) set by the treatment ordinance, regardless of whether they were on the payroll. This ruling inevitably produced a problem of interpretation, especially for those employees who were appointed to non-paid as well as lowest-paid posts.

To deal with unexpected needs or emergency, the Governor-General had from the beginning adopted a supernumerary policy by employing, for instance, technicians and technician assistants. After the local reform of 1920, local governments also began to adopt this practice of appointing the supernumerary staff, and the
Governor-General was held in charge of setting up the quorum. In Taiwan, local treatment employees were of two types: administrative (or *jimu shokuin* 事務職員) and technical (or *gijutsu shokuin* 技術職員), depending on the needs of the local government and paid by its local expenses. Taking the staff in 1942 for an example, local treatment employees comprised the following six categories:

Of the list, a majority were industry technician assistants (a maximum of 360), followed by commodity inspectors (98), sanitation technician assistants (63), industry secretaries (54), architecture technician assistants (48), industry technicians (31); the rest was set at no more than 20 each. Simply put, this category of “Taiwan treatment employees of the local government” was specifically set up to deal with affairs related to local industries, products, and development. The size they represented was arguably small but significant, if one considers the role they played in promoting colonial economy and carrying out colonial policies (Taiwan sōtoku 1942: 58-9). It is important to point out that, from the beginning (1921) the industry staff had constantly been allotted the highest quota; and that a considerable increase in the quorum of social work secretaries after the 1920s reveals that the colonial government had recognized the importance of social education (*shakai kyōka* 社會教化) as a means for wartime mobilization.

**Employees of Special Duties: Koin and Shokutaku**

*Koin* and *shokutaku* were employees of special duties, in terms of their handling affairs or their possession of certain technology. They could be paid or unpaid posts, but more often than not *koin* were hired on a full-time basis, while *shokutaku* had commissioned posts and were more likely only part-time. These two types of government employees were, as mentioned above, hired on the basis of private laws, and thus were not included in the government organizational law. Articles for regulating the two posts would be included into a bylaw or regulation, however, if the local government considered this move necessary. Taiwan, however, was unique in Japan’s colonial empire in enacting an ordinance (*furei* no. 14) in March 1926 regulating the appointments and duties of both *shokutaku* and *koin*. They were treated simply as “constituents of duties,” but by legal definition hired by the government to
“carry out their jobs by taking orders from the superior” (Article 2). And, according to Article 1,

all of the Government-General of Taiwan and its subordinating bureaus, courts, inspection bureaus, prefecture and sub-prefecture offices as well as the subordinating bureaus, government and public schools and local public associations, were entitled to set up shokutakuin and koin. Both were either paid or not paid posts.

(Setoyama Kaneaki, 1934 [c1933]: 212)

Jimu shokutaku were part-time employees charged with specifically commissioned affairs. They enjoyed no status restriction, but were also entitled to no privileges or special treatment either. Shokutaku as a post was task-oriented, existing until the mission was completed, and in principle the staff received no salary but did get an allowance (Setoyama Kaneaki 1926: 154). Kanchō koin were public clerks hired to facilitate office work. Since they were recruited to perform no specific functions, the authority could assign them to do any work. They enjoyed no “better treatment” as kanri, but were eligible for special appointment, a privilege guaranteed by the appointment ordinance, as mentioned earlier. Unlike kanri, koin were not required to have settled residences to which they were assigned. Like them, however, they had to abide the laws and the bylaws of government officials, but were in turn entitled to the status protection extended to them as public servants. This said, however, no salary law was ever specifically enacted for koin, so their salary range varied considerably (Setoyama Kaneaki, 1934 [1933]: 212-3). It is arguable, therefore, that a public clerk was a government official. However, there was no question that: when a public clerk was fulfilling his duty as a representative of a ruling organization, he was looked up as an official; if not, he was not.6

Public Officials (riin or kōri) and Honorary Posts (meiyōshoku)

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5 Shokutaku engaging in teaching were subject to separate regulations, and thus was considered an exception (Setoyama Kaneaki 1926:153).

6 As such, a koin was not permitted to concurrently hold an official title of hannin or the rank above (Setoyama Kaneaki 1934 [1933]:216-8).
Among the many posts created for public officials and honorary posts in colonial Taiwan, one group deserve special attention: Heads of Townships and Villages and Deputy Heads (joyaku 助役). In principle, the posts for public officials were paid, while those for honorary officials were not paid but received allowances. There were exceptions, however. Posts for heads of townships and villages, for example, were a combination of the two. The township/village system in Taiwan was established in 1920, with 1935 a watershed in the structure shift. Prior to 1935, all posts were - in principle - honorary, but in the 1935 local reform towns and villages acquired the legal status as public groups. Thus, offices for towns and villages were - as a rule - converted to paid posts, although from oral sources I conducted, in practice many parts of rural Taiwan continued to honor honorary posts until the end of Japanese rule.

It is important to note that it was around the time of 1935 that Japanese began to rapidly replace Taiwanese in local administration. A commonly held view in Taiwan studies had it that, until 1945 most of the posts for gaishō 街庄 heads had been the holdouts for Taiwanese. But this was not in fact the case (Hui-yu Caroline Ts’ai 2007b). Indeed, in 1920 when the gaishō system was first promulgated, the ratio of Taiwanese versus. Japanese for the post was nine to one. The two posts drew near and on the eve (1936-37) of the Sino-Japanese War drew level. By the end of 1942, this ratio had been completely reversed: it was now one Taiwanese to nine Japanese. The message was clear: the role of war on the re-structuring of colonial administration was significant, but it has also been easily underestimated.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

In colonial Taiwan, as in Japan’s other colonies, the bureaucratic system relied greatly on native leadership and local initiatives for control and mobilization. And yet the number of the bureaucrats in Taiwan at any time during the fifty years of Japanese rule remained very small. This paper shows that the key to the mechanism of Japanese colonial administration in Taiwan lay not in the formal structure but in the extra-bureaucratic setup. This argument is not new, but previous scholars have neglected the nature of this “extra-bureaucracy” in the total empire of which Japan

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7 The term “extra-bureaucracy,” rather than “informal bureaucracy,” is employed here
As in Japan proper, extra-bureaucrats and functionaries thus recruited in colonial Taiwan were responding to practical calls of colonial administration. A key in understanding the operation of the mechanism is to decipher how the administrative law functioned in imperial Japan. An informal mechanism, for example, had been created from the early Meiji to help recruit personnel outside the formal bureaucratic structure (Yamanaka Einosuke 1990; Ishikawa Hisao 1993 [1987]). Another key lay in the circulation of the bureaucrats, in particular the examination system. The examination of Japan’s colonial administration in Taiwan points to the need to further understand the informal bureaucracy. Here the point is that the informal bureaucratic setup contributed to the “creation” of the “local.”

with a broader definition that not only embraces the informal bureaucracy but also extends to a grey area, of which semi-bureaucratic organizations such as the Youth Corps and the hokō were important components. It is important to note that while in the study of modern Japan the term “extra-bureaucracy” often applies to political parties, there was no such mechanism in colonial Taiwan.