Democratization, Liberalization and the Modernization of Election Communication in Taiwan

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1. Introduction
This research examines the development of election communication in a “Third Wave” Asian democracy, Taiwan. Taiwan’s four decades long Martial Law (1947-1987) imposed tight restrictions on all forms of political communication. With the print and electronic media dominated by Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang (KMT_____) party, there were few avenues for opposition politicians to get their message across. However, as Taiwan democratized and liberalized in the late 1980s and early 1990s there has been an increase in the quality and quantity of political communication employed in election campaigns. Taiwan’s parties have successfully adopted many modern campaign methods, such as television advertising, the Internet and the use of campaign consultants. Campaigning has been adjusted in response to the island’s changing media and political system, and political culture. However, there has also been considerable continuity in electioneering, as parties still need to find the right balance between traditional and new campaign methods. Although Taiwan’s election communication has become as technically sophisticated as the United States, it should not be viewed as a carbon copy of the American model, instead the island has developed its own unique style of electioneering.

1.1 Overview
Following this brief introduction, in section 2 we explain why we have employed the “modern model of campaigning” rather than an Americanization of election communication. Section 3 introduces the development of political communication during Taiwan’s authoritarian Martial Law and democratic transition periods. Next, section 4 examines the degree that Taiwanese electioneering follows the pattern of the “modern model of campaigning” since the advent of full national elections and 24-hour cable television. In the conclusion we review the main findings and implications of this study.
2. Americanization or a Modernization of Political Communication?

2.1 Americanization?

Since the 1950s, the United States has had a huge political, economic, and cultural influence over Taiwan. At first glance, “Americanization” appears an appropriate way to conceptualize the changes in campaign methods in Taiwan over the last two decades. Many of the campaign technologies that were first developed in the United States feature prominently in Taiwanese campaigns. In addition, most of Taiwan’s government ministers have lived in the US and this may partly explain their preference for a presidential rather than parliamentary system of governance. The Taiwanese media reports in detail on American presidential races and there is clearly much borrowing of techniques and slogans. For instance, in 2001 a New Party (NP) newspaper advertisement revised Bill Clinton’s slogan “It’s the economy, stupid!” to “Idiot, the problem is the economy.” (__, ____)¹

The Americanization of election campaigns implies that “the nature of campaigning in democracies around the world is becoming more and more Americanised as candidates, political parties, and news media take cues from their counterparts in the United States.”² However, the theoretical and empirical paucity of Americanization undermines a concentrated understanding of election campaigning in specific political systems. It deals only with the superficial aspects of elections and rarely delves below the surface to consider political forces and processes that characterize particular societies, or the structural and technological factors that transform elections. As the system evolves and the consolidation of democracy proceeds, political culture demonstrates a remarkable tenacity to survive and even strengthen. It does not whither away; rather social forces resist domination or displacement by foreign influences, so that democratisation adapts to and accommodates the characteristics of the existing political culture.

¹ Point made by NP Chair Xie Qida (___), interview by author, Gaoxiong (___), September 7, 2001.
Americanization has difficulty in appreciating the cross-pollination of ideas and influences that goes beyond the “export” of American ideas and influences around the world. In should be recalled that the US has at times been an importer of European election consultants. For instance, the George Bush election campaigns of 1988 and 1992 sought advise from the British Conservative Party. Similarly, the exchange of wisdom between the British Labour Party and the American Democratic Party transported the “Special Relationship” to a new level during the Clinton-Blair administrations. In addition, other centres of election consulting have developed in Europe. French political consultant Jacques Seguela has been advising many states in Eastern Europe, while London based Saatchi and Saatchi advised everyone from Boris Yeltsin in Russia to Ernesto Pérez Balladares in Panama. Taiwanese parties have also been involved in two-way exchanges of campaign techniques that are not solely centred on the US. For instance, in the 2004 presidential election the keynote election rallies were modelled on European precedents. Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) held a rally involving a human chain linking the far north to the far south of Taiwan, a self-conscious attempt to copy the human chain conducted in the Baltic States’ 1989 push for independence from the Soviet Union. While the focal point of the KMT’s largest rally was its candidates’ kissing of the ground to prove their true love for Taiwan. Clearly, this was inspired by the Pope’s practice of kissing the airport tarmac on his overseas visits. Similarly, as Taiwan is the first Chinese democracy, its campaigns are closely followed in other Chinese communities throughout the world. As a result Taiwanese campaign methods have been influential on the limited elections held in Hong Kong. They present a picture of what elections may look like on the Chinese Mainland in the distant future. In short, we can see the rise of regional flows of ideas, information and influences, in Asia

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3 See Shaun Bowler and David M. Farrell, ‘The Internationalization of Campaign Consultancy’, in Thurber & Nelson (2000). They structure a significant proportion of their chapter around the use of American political consultants abroad. It is interesting that the only Asian country that materialises in their Table of ‘Variations in Election Campaign "Environments" in Thirty-two Countries' (pp.160-61) is Japan. To their credit, however, Table 9.2, ‘Survey Respondents and the Location of their Overseas Work’ (p.164), does provide basic evidence that a process of cross-pollination is taking place, and that not all influences on election campaigns are American in origin.

and elsewhere that then become indigenised so the original source is disguised, in fact irrelevant.  

Perhaps the most problematic and distasteful feature of Americanization is its inherent ethnocentric, one might almost conclude “Orientalist” (in the Edward Said sense of the term) approach to election politics. Americanization implies an innate sense of superiority; that “we” do things better than “they” because “we” are progressive, dynamic and undaunted by the prospect of change. If only other political systems would follow these models of modernity, then they too would be enlightened and could embrace the future. In reality it is possible that other societies will adapt American campaign technologies and create significantly improved products. For instance, Taiwanese advertising scholar Hong Yahui (___) claims that, “In ten short years the quality of Taiwan’s TV election ads has overtaken the US.” In typical Orientalist fashion Americanisation imposes its own vocabulary on the discourse of election campaigning as a way of measuring the modernity of the political culture: Thus we slide effortlessly into using such terminology as “sound-bites,” “photo-opportunities,” and “spin doctors” without devoting sufficient attention to their relevance in particular societies and political cultures. It is far preferable to ask: Why not treat each political culture as unique? Why not observe Taiwan’s election campaigns as a reflection of the political and social culture there without recourse to the clumsy baggage of Americanization?

So rather than trying to pinpoint the origin of electoral practices, it is more valuable to track the changes in Taiwan’s election campaigns. Only then will we be able to theorise why these changes have taken place. Taiwan’s election culture has not changed beyond

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6 Hong Yahui, interview by author, Taipei, June 18, 2001.

7 See Laurence Whitehead, ‘The Democratization of Taiwan: A Comparative Perspective’, in Tsang & Tien
recognition, and the defining characteristics of the pre-democratization campaign environment have survived the transition process. The entire organizational framework of Taiwan’s political culture has clearly structured the variety of vertical and horizontal methods of communication that has existed in Chinese society for many centuries and has influenced Taiwan’s election experience. This reinforces the denial of a comprehensive Americanization and allows for a more intelligible and sympathetic understanding of election communication in Taiwan. Those who look to discover Americanization will find it if they examine only the process; a more focused approach that considers the “essence,” the political culture, will reach very different conclusions.

2.2 “Modern Model of Campaigning”
Instead of Americanization, we prefer Swanson and Mancini’s concept of a “modern model of campaigning.” Their definition of the term is a “personalization of politics; adapting campaign practices to media logic and priorities; and employing technical experts to advise parties on public relations, opinion polling, and marketing strategies.”

Another feature these authors include is reduced public participation in campaigns, “casting citizens in the role of spectators.” Similarly, Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha list the principal attributes of modern campaign communication as “(1) the prevailing role of television among the different campaign channels, (2) the predominance of images instead of issues going hand in hand with a personalization in the presentation of the political process, and (3) as a consequence of increased media orientation, a professionalization of political actors in the development of their media strategies.” In addition, the most recent of the modern campaigning techniques has been the use of the Internet, which Pippa Norris argues is part of an even more advanced “Post-Modern Campaign.”

(1999).

9 Swanson and Mancini, “Patterns of Modern Electoral Campaigning and Their Consequences,” 249.
10 Lynda Lee Kaid and Christina Holtz-Bacha, 8.
The idea of a “modern model of campaigning” corresponds closely to what Taiwanese political analysts refer to as “the propaganda battle” (___), and is centred on media orientated campaign communication. This is then distinguished from traditional campaigning (___), direct action, blatant government propaganda, and the “organization battle” (___). Traditional campaigning refers to forms of political communication adopted during Martial Law, such as placing candidate flags throughout the constituency, setting off firecrackers, attending weddings and funerals, and handshake visits to street markets. The direct action methods are campaign tactics begun during period of democratic transition, and include street protests, small political rallies, and limited use of violence. Government propaganda refers to the biased messages from the ruling party controlled media. The organization battle is the least visible campaigning method, but even today has a significant impact on Taiwanese elections. This encompasses clientelistic methods, such as the work of vote brokers (___), vote buying, mobilization of support groups, vote allocation, and the provision of constituency services.

3. The Development of Political Communication in Taiwan

In this section we outline the evolution of political communication methods in Taiwan before the first full national elections of 1991. The development of Taiwan’s campaign methods can be divided into three stages: (1) Martial Law era, (2) Democratic Transition, (3) Campaigning in the Cable television era. In each stage there have been shifts in the dominant forms of communication. Initially, the organizational battle, traditional campaign methods and government propaganda were the most effective. With the advent of democratic elections and media liberalization, the Martial Law era campaign methods have declined in effectiveness and modern campaign technologies have taken root. However, even today parties and candidates must get the right balance between traditional and modern campaign methods.

3.1 Political Communication in Martial Law Taiwan

Although Taiwan was under Martial Law until 1987, it held regular local elections
throughout this period. Opposition parties were not permitted, though competition between the ruling KMT’s rival factions ensured these elections were intensely fought. Since the Republic of China claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all China, it justified postponing full national elections until it could recover the Chinese Mainland. So the national parliaments were filled with politicians elected on the Chinese Mainland in 1947, who were frozen in office with indefinite terms of office. Only a limited number of seats in the two national parliaments were opened up for direct election after 1969. However, these elections were far short of democratic. Only short campaign periods were permitted, and there were numerous restrictions both on the content of propaganda and the forms of campaign activities. For instance, both large candidate rallies and campaign advertising were banned. If candidates touched upon politically taboo subjects such as criticizing the president, advocating independence for Taiwan or communism they were liable to receive long jail sentences.12

During Martial Law political communication in campaigns was dominated by the ruling KMT’s propaganda, traditional campaign methods and organizational battle. Both the print and electronic media were controlled by the ruling KMT, making it hard for opposition politicians to gain media exposure or propagate alternative political ideals. Instead the media was awash with the ruling party’s political ritual. The state ceremonies such as National Day and Retrocession Day were broadcast live on television and presided over solely by KMT politicians.13 Similarly, at election time the focus of the television and radio news was the activities of KMT government officials and its election candidates, while any news items regarding the opposition would invariably show them in a negative light.

Despite the numerous campaign restrictions, Taiwan’s limited elections were highly colorful and noisy events. As there was little scope for policy debate and there was no opposition party allowed, elections were naturally candidate centered. To make

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13 National Day is on October 10, and commemorates the outbreak of the rebellion that led to the founding of the Republic of China in 1911. Retrocession Day is on October 25, and commemorates the ending of
themselves known candidates would place campaign flags reminiscent of ancient Chinese battle banners throughout their constituency. Each flag has the candidates’ name, and sometimes a small slogan or party badge. Every street and paddy field is lined with these flags, often creating traffic chaos when they cover up traffic lights. A number of practices gave elections a festival atmosphere. While firecrackers are set off at Chinese New Year, to scare off evil spirits, election candidates stand on an open campaign vehicle and set off firecrackers. Similarly, wealthy candidates competed to see who could provide constituents with the largest election banquets. In addition, personal contact was very effective, therefore candidates had to attend endless weddings, funeral and religious ceremonies, and shake hands at local markets.

While the government propaganda and traditional campaign methods are the visible public face of the campaign, the organizational battle is the private face the campaign. Only the ruling KMT had the financial and organizational strengths to run such coordinated campaigns. As Taiwan has Single Non Transferable Vote in multi-member districts electoral system, the ability to divide votes evenly between candidates is essential for electoral success. The party would divide up a constituency into responsibility zones, so that its candidates would not compete against each other. The ruling party could rely on the block votes of pro KMT groups such as trade unions, the farmers associations, and civil servants. These votes could be used to prop up weaker candidates. In addition the party had its membership of over two million, or 16% of the population to spread its campaign message. Another critical organizational tool was the vote brokers. These would be issued with lists of voters in their responsibility zone, and they would be rewarded for the number of votes gained. They use a mixture of persuasion and presents to convince voters to chose their preferred candidate. Finally, it was essential for candidates to show that they would work hard for their constituency, thus they had to show that they would give their constituencies service. This includes things like legal advise, help with cancelling parking tickets or the police. Campaigning restrictions

Japanese rule over Taiwan in 1945.

ensured that during the Martial Law era the organizational battle had a far greater impact on electoral success or failure.\textsuperscript{15} Election results were often determined months before voting day. Since only the KMT had the finance and organization to coordinate election campaigns, getting nominated as a party candidate virtually guaranteed election victory. For instance, between 1954 and 1989 an average of 85.86% of KMT candidates for the Provincial Assembly were elected.\textsuperscript{16}

3.2 Political Communication During the Democratic Transition 1980-1991

During the last decade of Martial Law there was a limited loosening of campaign restrictions and a semi-organized opposition movement began to coalesce around a group of democracy activists. The opposition movement frequently tested the KMT’s limits of toleration in both its issue demands and campaign methods. Dissidents were able to make use of the relative freedom of expression during the short campaign periods, which became known as “democratic holidays” (____). The formally dull Central Election Commission run policy forums were reinvigorated, as dissidents used them as a stage to get their message across. Although new newspapers were banned, the opposition tried to spread its message using political magazines. These magazines rarely published more than two or three issues before they were shut down by the Martial Law authorities, but soon reinvented themselves under a new title. However, the KMT was still prepared to crack down if the opposition movement grew too strong. When in 1979 the opposition attempted to organize a large-scale human rights march, the KMT rounded up almost the entire opposition leadership and put them on military trial.\textsuperscript{17}

After almost 40 years Martial Law was finally ended in July 1987, sweeping away many of the pre-existing campaign restrictions. However, though opposition parties were allowed, national elections were still supplementary, with less than a third of seats open for direct election. Opposition politicians’ still struggled to reach their audience, as the

\textsuperscript{17} This was known as the Gaoshou (___) or Formosa Incident, and the defendants received sentences of between twelve years and life.
electronic media remained KMT dominated. The KMT stayed reliant on its organizational battle and political propaganda to win elections. The newly formed Democratic Progressive Party (DPP [____]) lacked both the financial clout and organizational strengths to compete with the KMT’s organizational battle. Instead it had to rely on the limited media openings and direct action. The principle stages for opposition politicians to perform were street marches, parliaments, campaign rallies and the realm of stunt politics.

Firstly, there was a surge in marches and demonstrations in the late 1980s. This was a critical tool for the DPP in spreading its agenda. Social protests rose from 175 in 1983 to 734 in 1987. During the DPP’s first five years large demonstrations were held calling for full national elections, direct presidential elections, freedom of speech, and application to rejoin the United Nations. Although there were some isolated violent incidents, most DPP politicians were at pains to avoid violence in these events.

The second forum for opposition politicians was the political rallies that became exceedingly common and popular in this period. As political scientist Tien Hung-mao recalled, “it is not unusual to have over twenty thousand people attend, compared to several hundred that show up at rallies for KMT candidates.”[18] Opposition party politicians had to learn to satisfy the new and demanding audience by attacking the KMT and making radical and controversial political demands. They were also expected to make their passionate speeches in the formally suppressed Taiwanese language, rather than Mandarin.[19] This meant that numerous moderate dissidents such as Kang Ningxiang (____) or Mainlanders unable to speak Taiwanese fell from favour among opposition supporters.[20] KMT candidates also organized election rallies and banquets during this

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[19] During the Martial Law era the government placed strict limits on the radio and television use of Taiwanese, and at school children would be fined for speaking in Taiwanese.
[20] The term Mainlander refers to those Han Chinese that came to Taiwan between 1945 and 1950 and their descendants, this group constitutes approximately 14%. Native Taiwanese are those Han Chinese who already lived in Taiwan during the Japanese occupation and their descendents. They make up about 85% of the population. See John F Copper, Taiwan: Nation State or Province? (Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1996), 10-13.
period, however, these contrasted sharply with those run by the opposition party. As these tended to have little policy content and were more like variety shows, being hosted by TV stars, and featuring pop stars and scantily dressed singers.

A number of DPP politicians also used violence in the parliament to gain publicity and also protest against the slow pace of political reforms. Particularly famous was Zhu Gaozheng’s (___) attacks on the Legislative Yuan speaker and Huang Zhaohui (___) overturning tables at the President’s banquet in the March 1990 National Assembly. The KMT regularly used the DPP’s political theatre performances in its propaganda to discredit it as radical and violent. However, in the late 1980s the only way for DPP figures to get television exposure was by using violence, and such actions gained politicians cult status among the opposition’s hardcore supporters.

In this period politicians from all parties began to use stunt politics to attract voter attention. One especially noteworthy event was when DPP Legislative Yuan candidate Lu Xiu (___) promised his rally in November 1989 would feature the head of the World United Formosans for Independence Guo Peihong (___). Since Guo was a blacklisted political exile that had been smuggled into Taiwan and was on the run from the police, the rally attracted a huge crowd. After Guo had made his speech and gave a press conference, the police were ready to arrest him. However, in unison Guo and the whole audience put on identical black masks and the lights were turned out, allowing Guo to escape in the confusion. This stunt certainly paid dividends for Lu, who was the highest vote getter in Taibei County that year. Of course not all the stunts paid off electorally. A prime example was the Labour Party candidate, and striptease artist, Xu Xiaodan (___). Xu produced one of the most talked about newspaper ads of the 1989

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22 See KMT advertisement in United Daily News (___) November 21, 1994, 25. This ad attacks the DPP’s record of inciting violence, and showed a picture of a DPP campaign truck in a riot.

23 Guo was one among hundreds of Taiwanese on a blacklist that the government banned from returning to Taiwan because of their political activities abroad.

campaign, which showed a naked Xu breaking through a KMT flag and the slogan, “the breast resists the fist” (______). Moreover Xu was able to attract large (mostly male) crowds for her campaign performances. However, Xu failed to win election in 1989, 1992 and 1995.

The new style of political campaigning contributed to the high turnover of parliamentarians during this period, as politicians from both parties that lacked the newly required propaganda skills failed to win re-election and faded from the political scene. Although KMT candidates could still win election using the organization battle, they were less competitive, as many KMT candidates lacked the qualities for democratic campaigns. Not surprisingly the proportion of KMT Legislative Yuan candidates winning election fell from 96.66% in 1980 to only 63.26% in 1992. The DPP’s performances of the late 1980s were remarkably successful. Despite its media disadvantage it was able to set the political agenda and increase its vote share from 22.17% in 1986 to 28.26% in 1989. However, its radical methods meant it faced a bottleneck in growth by the early 1990s as full democratization made direct action and parliamentary violence hard to justify.

4. Political Communication after the Introduction of Full Democratic Elections and Cable TV.

The electoral stage changed considerably in the early 1990s as the pace of democratization and media liberalization increased. The scope of elected offices broadened rapidly, with the first full elections of the National Assembly in 1991, Legislative Yuan in 1992, the Provincial Governor, Taibei and Gaoxiong Mayor in 1994 and the President in 1996. Simultaneous media liberalization offered political parties

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28 Direct elections for Taibei and Gaoxiong Mayor had been held during Martial Law, but were cancelled after 1967 and 1979 respectively. Until 1990 the president had been elected by the National Assembly.
and candidates new opportunities for communicating with voters. First the ban on new newspapers was lifted in 1987, also the first newspaper election advertisements were permitted in 1989 and the first TV ads in 1991. However, the most significant change in the media has been the rise in the popularity of cable TV channels, with their round the clock news coverage, and political talk shows.

This section examines how the development of political communication in Taiwan since 1991, to see the degree that Taiwan has followed the modern model of campaigning. We are interested to see whether campaigns have become TV orientated, dominated by personalities rather than issues, and run by professional campaigners rather than politicians. Also have traditional campaigning methods been replaced by modern campaign technologies, or have they persisted in modified forms?

4.1 The Television Orientated Campaign

During the Martial Law period and also the democratic transition television played a secondary role in electioneering. With the three terrestrial channels owned or de facto controlled by the ruling party, television news served as party political broadcasts for the KMT. Even in the 1990s opposition politicians complained about the blatant bias of news coverage in favour of the KMT. For instance in the 1996 presidential election the percentage of coverage on the terrestrial channels’ evening news for KMT candidates was over 50%, compared to only 15% for the main opposition team. However, the effectiveness of the KMT’s television propaganda declined as voters became cynical about the biased news coverage and switched to more reliable and balanced news channels appearing on cable television.

The growth of cable television during the 1990s was very rapid. In 1990 only 16.1% of households subscribed to cable, however this had risen to 75.9% by 1996 and 84.3% in 2003. The number of cable channels has shot up since the mid 1990s, and this includes

which was largely made up of members elected on Mainland China in 1947.

29 Chiu and Chan Olmstad 496.

30 1990 figure Chiu and Chan. 1996 and 2003 figures are from www.dgt.gov.tw/Chinese/Data-statistics/11.3/annual-report-92/Cable-TV.shtml In reality these figures are also underestimates as many
over ten Taiwan based 24-hour news channels. This revolutionized election communication in Taiwan, offering politicians a new range of campaigning methods to reach the voters directly in their living rooms.

One such method was election advertising. Making good election TV ads has become a prerequisite of a successful campaign. Just as in the US, the Taiwanese newspapers analyze and compare the quality of the previous days slots and these are also often the subjects of everyday conversation.31

Table 1 shows three indices of how election advertising has developed since 1991. These are (1) the number of newspaper election advertisements placed in the main three newspapers in the 31 days prior to each election; (2) the broadcast time for television advertisements in each campaign; (3) the amount spent on television advertisements in each campaign. This table shows a number of significant trends. Firstly, the expenditure on newspaper advertisements has clearly risen since its legalization in 1989. Though the amount spent on newspaper ads has been overtaken by television spots, the number of newspaper ads has remained high since 1994. Secondly, the role played in campaigns by television advertising has shot up since the mid 1990s. In the first two elections allowing television advertising in 1991 and 1992, Taiwan followed a system similar to the UK’s party political broadcasts, whereby parties received free television time on the terrestrial channels in proportion to the number of nominated candidates. Individual candidates were not allowed to buy television advertising and the Central Election Commission censored the contents of advertisements. However, since the huge rise in cable television channels in the mid 1990s the parties and candidates have turned a blind eye to advertising regulations and Taiwan has shifted to a US style free market in buying advertising time on cable channels. The degree of change is clear from the comparison of the 245 minutes of free television campaign ads shown in 1991 with 56,043 minutes of purchased advertising time in 2000. The amount of election advertisements has meant that it is almost impossible to avoid exposure, as such ads even were regularly shown on

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31 For an example of newspaper coverage of election slots see China Times, December 6, 1991, 6. In the
documentary channels such as National Geographic and kids cartoon channels. Thirdly, both the newspaper and television columns show that after an advertising peak in 2000, there has been a decline in both the number and expenditure on election advertising. In interviews with Taiwanese politicians in 2001 there was a consensus that the television advertising was most effective in 1998 and 2000, but had become less effective since. Fourthly, the table shows how the former ruling party has increasingly tried to win elections by outspending its rivals in campaign advertising. In the early 1990s the KMT still felt that it could win elections with its combination of the organizational battle, biased television coverage, and traditional campaign methods. However, by the mid 1990s the party leaders perceived these methods as less effective, and so invested more in the “propaganda battle.” Therefore in Table 1 we can see that from 1994 the KMT had more newspaper ads, TV ads and higher TV ad expenditure than its rivals in almost every election. The KMT’s status as the richest political party in the world has enabled it to outspend its rivals, even since it became an opposition party.

An examination of election vote shares shown in Figure 1 reveal that there is not a direct correlation between advertising spending and election results. Although the KMT rapidly increased its propaganda expenditure and vastly outspent its rivals throughout the 1990s, its vote share progressively declined from a high of 71.2% in 1991 to only 23.1% in 2000. In fact in 2000 the KMT spent more on TV advertisements than the combined total of its two election rivals, but came a poor third in the race.

A trend in election advertising that cannot be shown in this table has been the rise in the production quality of Taiwan’s election slots. In 1991 and 1992 many ads resembled the long and serious party political broadcasts of the UK, and advertising expert Zheng Zi-long complained of the poor quality of opposition ads. By the mid 1990s these had been replaced by the 30-second slots common in the US, prompting advertising scholar Hong Ya-hui’s claim that the quality of Taiwanese election slots has overtaken

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33 Zheng 304.
those of the US. Moreover, though the opposition could not afford as many ads as the KMT, there is a consensus that the quality of their ads has exceeded those of the KMT. As a former KMT party propaganda chief complained, “The DPP has always been strong at propaganda.”

The DPP was initially slow to recognize the increased significance of television advertising. Some in the party also saw this as a factor in the party’s loss of the Taipei Mayoral election in 1998. That year the KMT’s Ma Yingjiu performed well in a series of candidate image ads, which showed him jogging, chatting to city residents, and making tough anti-corruption speeches. As a DPP campaign manager recalled, “In 1998 we didn’t adjust to media developments, we spent too much money on newspaper ads, but ignored two new trends, the TV ads and 24 hour news channels. We had less TV ads than them and ours were of poorer quality.”

By the 2000 presidential election the DPP had improved the quality of its television advertising. This election is viewed as being a battle of TV ads, as the DPP’s Yu Meimei commented, “The only year that the TV ads were really effective was in 2000.” The ads showed clearly the contrasting acting abilities of the three main candidates. The KMT spent more on TV ads than all the other four candidates put together, however, their candidate came third with only 23% of the vote. A critical factor was that Lian was clearly uncomfortable about putting on a show. In fact, a KMT ad even admitted Lian’s lack of showmanship with the slogan, “A Person that can talk can’t always get things done, A Person that can get things done can’t always talk.”

While Chen and Song were veteran election campaigners, this was Lian’s first campaign, as he had followed a career of unelected government positions, and it showed. Lian clearly suffered from a lack of charisma, and when he did try to use ads to show his strength, the message was just too far from his public image to be convincing. For instance, in 2001 the KMT ran a TV ad

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34 Hong Yahui, interview by author, Taipei, June 18, 2001.
37 The ad compared Lian’s modesty, hard work and numerous achievements while premier, with Chen’s big showmanship but lack of policy achievements while Taipei Mayor.
38 Although this was only Song’s second election campaign, he had been a key figure in election planning.
that was a blatant copy of a Nike football boots ad, with Lian (in place of David Beckham and Luis Figo) beating an assortment of monsters at football. In contrast, both the opposition candidates Song Chuyu and Chen Shuibian were far more comfortable at acting in TV ads. For instance, many voters were impressed with Song’s ad showing him trying to help flood victims and then contrasting this with Lian’s apparent indifference at the disaster zone. Once again, the candidates that gave the best political theatre did the best in this campaign, with the DPP’s Chen winning election with 39%, closely followed by the independent Song with 36%, while the KMT’s Lian gained the party’s record low vote share of 23%.

Another major consequence of the rise of cable TV has been the proliferation of politics talk shows. While in the UK there are only one or two shows such as “Question Time” per week, in Taiwan there are at least ten each night, in which politicians from the major political parties debate the issues of the day. These shows offer politicians free advertising. As DPP legislator Lai Jinlin (___) explained, “They can increase your exposure and make you better known. As when you’re out electioneering you can only meet a minority of constituents. If you can appear on TV, especially if it’s a channel with high viewing rates many people can see you.”

However, not all politicians are able to cope with the intensity of these shows, as the performance skills required are quite different from the traditional rally speech. There is particular pressure for urban-based politicians to regularly appear on these shows, for instance many of the politicians I interviewed appear on at least four shows a week. The fact that so many of these politics talk shows are able to survive in Taiwan’s cable TV market shows they must be profitable and the intensity of such shows contributes to the high levels of political knowledge among the Taiwanese electorate.

The popularization of cable TV has allowed televised candidate debates to become a regular feature of every campaign. The precedent was set in Taiwan’s first live televised candidate debate for the 1994 Taipei mayoral contest. The DPP’s Chen Shuibian was

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scathing in his criticism of the incumbent KMT mayor, but also attempted to show his own government competence. The NP’s Zhao Shaokang (___) gave by far the most theatrical performance, opening with the statement, “Taiwan is going to be destroyed! Destroyed in the Nazi Fascist hands of the DPP!” In a later exchange Zhao challenged Chen, “I shout ‘long live the Republic of China,’ do you dare to shout ‘long live the Republic of China, long live the Republic of China, long live the Republic of China!’” Pundits concluded that the winners of the debate had been the NP’s Zhao and the DPP’s Chen. While all agreed that the KMT’s Huang Dazhou had performed very poorly. This was not surprising considering that Huang had been a government appointed mayor and never stood for any elected offices before. In contrast, both Chen and Zhao had been star legislators since the late 1980s. The candidates’ debate performances were reflected in the actual election results, in which the DPP’s Chen won, while the NP’s Zhao came second.

The rise in 24-hour cable news has also had an impact on the speeches that political leaders give. While in the past no more than a few sound bites from a speech would be shown on the TV news, since the late 1990s the cable news channels have broadcast speeches live. This has meant that a different speech is needed for each rally, also the speech must be written to appeal to both the rally and TV audience. Within the DPP it is felt that initially the DPP’s star politician Chen Shuibian failed to adjust to this new stage, and this damaged his 1998 mayoral reelection campaign. As the DPP’s Zhang Yishan (___) explained, “Before Chen Shuibian tended to use mainly Taiwanese in his rally speeches, with much Taiwanese slang, he tried to incite the audience. However, this kind of speech came across very differently to a middle class audience, and this gave the other side much ammunition to attack Chen Shuibian.” Therefore following Chen’s 1998 defeat he has used both Mandarin and Taiwanese, stopped making unscripted speeches, and created a professional speech writing team.

4.2 Casting Citizens in the Role of Spectators in Campaigns?

The above descriptions of the increasing role television plays in Taiwanese election

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campaigns should not be taken as meaning that the electorate have become armchair voters or what Swanson and Mancini refer to as, “casting citizens in the role of spectators.” In fact since the late 1990s the complete reverse has happened, as citizen participation in election activities has actually increased.

By the mid 1990s the old style outdoor political rally had lost its novelty, and voters were no longer so attracted by serious political speeches. Politicians that still persisted with this method such as Zhu Gao-zheng and Lin Zhengjie failed to win elected in both 1998 and 2001. Instead these have been replaced by a new style of televised mass rally. One of the first political figures to adapt to the new media environment was the DPP’s Propaganda Chief from 1995-1997, Chen Wenqian (___). She tried to liven up the DPP’s election rallies to give the party a more modern image that could attract younger voters. Chen designed rallies that would look good on both TV news and also for the rally audience. The most famous of these were the “Spice Girls Campaigning Team (_____) rallies of 1997 that combined scantily dressed dancers with pop music, short political speeches and the chance for the audience to directly address questions to party leaders. Of course, Chen was criticized by some party elders as trivializing politics. However, the election results, particularly 1997 when the DPP vote share exceeded that of the KMT for the first time ensured that even after Chen left the DPP the party continued its more youth orientated rallies.

A new phenomenon of political communication since the late 1990s has been a battle of televised campaign rallies. In the 2000 presidential election there was a clear contest over which party could hold the largest and most passionate rallies. Although at times the KMT was able to muster larger crowds than the DPP or independent candidate Song Chuyu (___) in 2000, on close observation I found that many participants were forced to go by their work units or were being paid to attend. Song Chuyu’s rallies in 2000 showed how well he had adapted his election rally performances. Song is from the Mainlander ethnic community, but he has increased his nationwide appeal by learning Taiwanese. Though not a great orator, Song has the charisma to attract and entertain large

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41 252
crowds. Song Chuyu has responded to the rise in Taiwanese identity by projecting a more inclusive Taiwanese image in his performances. For instance, in his 2000 rallies Song appealed to all ethnic communities by mixing his Mandarin speeches with slogans in Hakka, Taiwanese and even Aboriginal languages.

Despite the rise in television campaigning, the significance of mass election rallies has actually increased since 2000. There has been a clear correlation between the increasing emphasis on mass rallies and reduction in spending on television advertisements. The 2004 presidential election was even more a battle of rallies than four years earlier. As mentioned earlier, the DPP’s key note political event was a hand in hand human chain linking the far north with the far south of Taiwan that was attended by at least one and a half million people. This event was designed to show Taiwanese unity in the face of the PRC missile threat. In contrast, the KMT held a series of simultaneous anti Chen rallies on March 13 under the slogan of “Change the President, Save Taiwan,” in which up to 3 million people participated. In short, despite the rise in TV campaigning, Taiwanese voters have not been relegated to the role of spectators.

4.3 The Use of Internet Campaigning
Since the mid-1990s Taiwan has shown a facet of what Pippa Norris calls the “Post-Modern Campaign,” this is the arrival of Internet campaigning. There has been a huge surge in the number of Internet users in Taiwan, from only 600,000 users in 1996, to 10.92 million in 2003. Taiwan’s parties have adapted rapidly to this new means of political communication, and by the late 1990s all political parties offered high quality, high tech and rich content websites. In addition, the vast majority of legislative, and elected local executive politicians also have set up their own websites. Of course, there is a huge variety in the quality of these individual politicians’ sites. Politicians from urban based constituencies tended to have the most extensive sites and employ full-time web managers, while rural based politicians interviewed often were unsure whether they had a website. In fact in 2001 advertising consultant Fu Hekang was still advising against his

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42 Surveys show that respondents self-identifying as Taiwanese rose from 16% 1989 to 37.9% in 2001.
43 Gary Rawnsley, Parliamentary Affairs
clients investing too heavily in campaign websites. Clearly, the value of the internet in election campaigning is still limited, as voters have to actively seek out this information themselves (unlike other media in which getting information is a relatively passive matter), thus voters who visit these websites tend to support the candidate already. This validates the “reinforcement theory” of election campaigning.

4.4 The Rise of Political Consultants

As predicted in the modern model of election campaigning there has been a professionalization of electioneering in Taiwan. Parties have sought the help of experts in both polling and advertising. However, these experts have only played an advisory role, while campaigns remain dominated by party politicians. As in many western democracies (excluding the US), Taiwan’s election consultants have tended to be incorporated within the political parties, rather than operating as independent political consultants.

In addition to making use of commercial and academic survey centers, Taiwan’s two leading parties have invested heavily in establishing their own high tech survey centers. Particularly within the DPP, the head of the survey department has become a powerful party position. The DPP has paid much more attention to public surveys in designing its election campaigns than the KMT. As the advertising expert Fu Hekang explained, “its (the DPP’s) election campaigns have always been based on the results of opinion surveys,” while in contrast the “KMT doesn’t seriously (use surveys) to analyze with which kind of voters and what kind of situation I am the weakest and how to tackle these weaknesses.”

In Taiwan opinion polls are also viewed as powerful campaign tools. On the eve of voting day candidates often cite polls in advertisements known as “Saving Ads” (____) to show that they are on the borderline between election and defeat, and need your sacred vote to ensure election. In a three horse race a common tactic is to cite polls to prove

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44 [www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20030703/20030703b2.html](http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20030703/20030703b2.html)
45 Interview by author.
46 Fu Hekang, interview by author, Taipei, November 1, 2001.
47 For example, see DPP Legislator Tang Jinquan’s ad in China Times, November 29, 2001, 19.
that a rival is already out of the race, and that their supporters should switch allegiance. For instance, in the 2000 presidential election the KMT used polls to convince voters to abandon independent candidate Song Chuyu, and unite behind the KMT’s candidate to defeat the DPP’s Chen Shuibian. However, polls are often misused in Taiwanese campaigns, with doctored polls or polls from unknown polling organizations often appearing in newspapers and party propaganda. An example of the way polls can be manipulated was the KMT’s practice in 2000 of placing advertisements in leading newspapers that were disguised to look like the newspapers’ survey analysis proving only the KMT candidate could save the island from war. As it is believed opinion polls are highly influential on voting behavior, Taiwan’s Election and Recall Law prohibits the release of opinion poll results in the last ten days of presidential campaigns.

Since the commencement of legal campaigning advertising in the early 1990s, Taiwan’s leading parties have sought the help of advertising companies to design their campaign propaganda. However, all major parties have remained suspicious of giving too much power to outsiders, and thus political consultants in Taiwan have never had the same influence on the design of election campaigns as those in the United States. The party organization also partly explains variation in the role that advertising experts have in campaigns. In the DPP the Propaganda Chief has the freedom to design the election campaign in conjunction with selected advertising experts. For instance, it is believed that in 2000 when DPP propaganda chief Luo Wenjia teamed up with advertising expert Fan Keqing they were able to create one of the best designed and effective election campaigns. In contrast, there is much more political interference from above in the more hierarchichal KMT, which affects the quality of the advertising product. As Hong Yahui explained regarding the KMT’s 2000 campaign, “(it) used a number of ad agencies and there many high level figures to please. When the ad companies were happy with something, the big shots insisted on several revisions. When the KMT was satisfied, the ad companies were not.”

The role and influence of political consultants in Taiwan should not be exaggerated. This was made clear when man responsible for the DPP’s

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48 See Liberty Times, March 7, 2000, 1.
49 At first glance I was also taken in by this ad. See Liberty Times, March 4, 2000, 7.
highly regarded 2000 presidential campaign Fan Keqing switched to working on the KMT’s 2001 parliamentary campaign. Despite a series of well-designed slots, the electorate responded by giving the KMT its worst ever parliamentary results.

4.5 Personalization instead of Issues
The modern model of election campaigns predicts a dominance of personalities and images at the expense of debate over substantive political issues. During Taiwan’s forty year Martial Law period no opposition parties were permitted and there were severe restrictions on freedom of speech, therefore elections were already candidate centered. Since Taiwan’s liberalization and democratic transition, though candidates remain a critical variable affecting voting behavior, its importance has declined relative to party identification and issue voting.

Our own content analysis of newspaper election advertisements between 1991 and 2000 showed that Taiwanese parties do give heavy attention to issues in their electoral propaganda. The trend in television advertisement does show a shift towards increasing stress on image rather than issues as the style of ads shifted from lengthy party political broadcasts to 30 second slots. However, the high issue content of newspaper advertisements, the regularity of political talk shows and televised election debates, and the intensive media coverage of campaign issues ensure that issues are still central to Taiwanese political communication.

4.6 The Decline of Old Campaigning Methods?
With the rapid rise of modern campaigning methods we would expect electioneering praticises that originated in the Martial Law era and democratic transition period to gradually fade away as they lose effectiveness. In this section we examine the degree that the propaganda battle has taken the place of (1) the organizational battle, (2) traditional campaign methods, (3) and direct action. We show that though certain methods have lost their effectiveness, others have been highly resilient and have remained influential in

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50 Hong Yahui, interview by author, Taipei, June 18, 2001.
51 Dafydd Fell, Issues and Studies paper
slightly modified forms.

4.6.1 Fading Away of the Organizational Battle?

During interviews with KMT politicians in 2001 there was a consensus that because of the declining effectiveness of its organizational battle, the party had been forced to pay more attention to the propaganda battle. Firstly, although it is difficult to prove empirically, most believe the effectiveness of vote buying has declined considerably. As former KMT Secretary General Xu Shuide complained, “Before vote buying worker. Scarves, or other things. Now hundreds of dollars, people don’t care.” However, it appears that vote buying still is common in rural regions and new forms of vote buying have appeared. For instance, gambling on election results is seen in Taiwan as a novel form of vote buying. This involves a candidate’s agent offering favorable odds on the preferred politician winning election, hoping that this will encourage the gambler to campaign hard to win the bet.

We see a similar pattern of change but not disappearance of traditional methods in vote allocation within districts. During the Martial Law era the KMT was able to dominate elections by assigning candidates responsibility zones to its candidates and forbidding campaigning in others zones. However, after democratization and a loosening of party discipline, candidates refused to stick to their assigned zones. The arrival of opposition parties brought a new party style of vote allocation in multi-member districts. If a party nominated four candidates in a single district, it placed newspaper advertisements asking its supporters to vote for candidates according to their birth month. This if their birthday was in January to March, they should vote for candidate A, and if they were born in April-June, they should vote for candidate B, etc. This organizational method has been increasingly used by the DPP since 1995 and has contributed to its improved vote distribution.

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A facet of the organizational battle that the KMT was highly reliant on during the Martial Law era was mobilizing numerous pro KMT groups, such as the trade unions, civil servants and the military. However, after democratization the KMT found its hold on these groups declined, as many of these voters became attracted by other parties issue positions or grew tired of having their votes taken for granted. For instance, on the election eve in March 2000 China Steel workers were pressured to attend the KMT rally in Gaoxiong in 2000, however, many just turned up briefly and then either went home or switched to the more lively DPP or independent candidate Song Chuyu’s rally.

One area of campaigning that has shown the least change has been candidate support organizations and the provision of constituency services. Even today, though a candidate may be initially elected due to having a good reputation, party identification or a special issue focus, when striving for reelection it is essential to create have a strong local support organization and to be seen to have given his constituents “service.” The term “service” refers to the provision of benefits such as free legal advice, or helping constituents in their dealings with officials. The decline of the NP was closely related to its failure to comprehend the importance of organization and service in Taiwan’s electoral politics. In 1995 after the NP’s fine election performance its magazine editor Yang Taishun (___) warned, “If the NP is unable to create grassroots organization and an image of party service, it is doubtful that the party will still be able to win votes with the appeal of highly educated candidates and anti-money politics.”\(^\text{55}\) In our interviews with NP politicians it was clear many looked down upon the provision of the services Taiwanese voters expect from politicians. As a NP party worker explained, “The NP is not based on service, but ideals. DPP candidates will help constituents when they get in trouble with the police and threaten the police. There is no way that the NP would do this.”\(^\text{56}\) Unfortunately for the NP, it failed to heed Yang’s advice, and this contributed to its failure to expand outside of the largest cities and its falling parliamentary election vote share from 12.95 percent in 1995 to 7.06 percent in 1998 and 2.61 percent in 2001.

\(^\text{54}\) For example see DPP ad in Liberty Times, December 1, 1995, 30.
\(^\text{55}\) China Times, December 3, 1995, 11.
4.6.2 Fading Away of Traditional Campaign Methods?

In addition to the new television orientated campaign methods, it remains essential for candidates at all levels of election not to neglect traditional electioneering practices. In fact many of these have become part of the televised campaign. Months prior to voting day the 24-hour news channels show the candidates in their street market handshake visits, attending religious ceremonies or sporting events. Another feature of traditional campaigning that has transferred well into the modern campaign has been filming the candidate motorcades, behind which firecrackers are set off to attract attention and scare away evil spirits. In fact in the 2004 election assassination attempt on President Chen Shuibian, it was because of the noise of the firecrackers that the Chen’s security and the TV camera crews were initially unaware of a gunshot.

Personal contact also remains highly significant in Taiwan’s elections. Therefore, in addition to shaking countless hands, candidates must still spend much time attending weddings and funeral. One PFP politician we interviewed in August 2001 explained how relieved he was that this was the Chinese ghost month (___) as this meant there were no weddings to attend. Such practices are frowned upon by many highly educated politicians, but remain popular among voters. As NP legislator Yu Muming (___) complained, “The further south you go, the more they demand. If your family has a funeral, they want you to attend. Like (DPP legislator) Zhu Xingyu (___), he’ll kneel and crawl in from the door (at a funeral). So he can get votes and every time he stands, he gets elected.” In the 2001 Legislative Yuan election the NP paid the price for not embracing such traditional campaign methods. In this election the NP’s high profile chairwoman Xie Qida stood for election in the southern city in an attempt to expand its seats outside of northern Taiwan. In 2001 we spent a day as an observer accompanying Xie Qida on the campaign trail. She was out of her depth in this constituency, unable to speak Taiwanese, and unfamiliar with the city. When we visited a temple, Xie clearly was unsure how to interact with the worshippers and felt uncomfortable in the midst of Taiwanese speakers. In that campaign, Xie spent more on newspaper advertisements than

57 During the ghost month of the Chinese lunar calendar people avoid activities such as weddings or
the combined total of the NP’s previous six campaigns. However, such modern campaign methods did not pay off, as the NP was not only wiped out in Gaoxiong but in the whole of Taiwan.\footnote{58}

Taiwanese elections remain colorful and festive occasions. Although the candidate election banners have become less common in Taipei, where city government regulations only allow flags at candidate campaign headquarters, as soon as you cross the boundary into Taipei County you face a sea of flags fighting for voters’ attention. Although many intellectual frown upon election banquets as a form of vote buying, these still persist in rural Taiwan. In urban Taiwan these have been replaced by fundraising meals. However, these differ from their counterparts in the US where the main objective is to attract the stars or rich business people. In Taiwan candidates compete to see who can attract the most people to their fundraising events. As former DPP legislator Huang Huangxiong (___) explained about his 1995 campaign, “He (a fellow DPP candidate) could only manage 480 tables. But I could get 1,000 tables, that is more than 10,000 people.”

4.6.3 Fading away of Direct Action?
During the late 1980s many Taiwanese viewed limited political violence as tolerable in the light of the unfair political system in which only a small minority of seats were open to direct election. The media bias meant that the use of street protests was often seen as the opposition’s best method to get its message across to voters. However, by the mid 1990s the democratic transition and media liberalization had basically been completed and all restrictions on freedom of speech removed. As a result the opposition DPP decided to shift its tactics from street protests to parliamentary opposition. Audience tastes had shifted, and violence appeared no longer justifiable. In fact, most opposition politicians had dropped direct action by this point. The price for DPP legislators such as Stella Chen (___), Huang Zhaohui (___) and Chen Sansi (___) that still used direct action was defeat in the December 1995 Legislative Yuan elections. In the words of the Far Eastern Economic Review’s Julian Baum, Stella Chen “had exhausted the moving house.

\footnote{58} The party fell from 11 seats in 1998 to only one in 2001, and this was from the small offshore island of
patience of voters with her violent tactics in parliament.” Although the numbers of street protests remained high throughout the 1990s, social movements attempted to keep their distance from political parties. Moreover, the opposition DPP was trying to show it was not an anti business party, thus it also became reluctant to take to the streets. For instance when in 1997 DPP candidate Liao Yonglai (___) headed a movement to call for a public referendum over a German chemical plant in Taizhong County, the DPP party head quarters came out against this plan.

After the change in ruling parties in May 2000 there appears to be a reversal of the trends of reduced street action. Firstly, the KMT has begun to organize large anti government marches to protest against the new government. In October 2001 the party organized simulatanous anti unemployment marches in the run up to the 2001 parliamentary elections. Similarly in 2004 the KMT has run a series of large scale marches contesting the fairness of the presidential election. Secondly, the use of street rallies appears to have actually reached a new climax in 2004, with the clear battle for which party can run the largest outdoor activities. Thirdly, the aftermath of the March 2004 election saw the most serious political violence since the late 1980s. PFP legislators led their supporters to attack the Central Election Commission offices and attempted to break down the gates of the Gaoxiong City law courts with a campaign truck. Clearly, this violence is part of PFP legislators’ attempts to make names for themselves in the December 2004 elections, however, time will tell whether Taiwanese voters will reward or punish this form of political communication.

5. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how Taiwan’s electoral practices have resisted Americanization, and instead are associated with the ‘modern model’ of election campaigning. However, even these new techniques have become reformulated to suit the Taiwanese electorate’s tastes. There has been much continuity in the effectiveness of

Jinmin (___).

60 See www.taipeitimes.com/News/2001/11/09/story0000111026
61 Rallies Turn Violent: Ma Takes Action
many traditional campaign methods and it is clear that politicians must get the right balance between old and new electioneering. Practices such as setting off firecrackers from the candidate motorcade or the street market handshaking have survived and now feature prominently on the TV election news coverage. The electoral defeats of those continuing to use violence and the NP reveal how voters punish those that failed to adjust their campaigning to audience tastes. We have shown that modern campaigning does not have become issueless and cast the voter in the role of spectator. In the Taiwan case, the intensive media campaign of televised debates and endless talk shows forces politicians to take clear issue stands. Moreover, content analysis of party propaganda has shown that parties and candidates have consistently stressed electoral issues. Also Taiwan’s parties have actually been encouraging increasingly participatory rather than armchair campaigning, as parties compete over who can run the largest rally that must be both TV and audience appealing.

Table 1 The Development of Newspaper and Television Election Advertising in Taiwan: 1989-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Newspaper Ads</th>
<th>Broadcast Time of TV Ad (minutes)</th>
<th>Spending on TV ads (in New Taiwan Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Data N/A</td>
<td>No TV ads</td>
<td>No TV ads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>KMT: 27 DPP: 43 NP: 3 Total: 73</td>
<td>No TV ads</td>
<td>No TV ads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>KMT: 116 DPP: 88 NP: 18 Total: 222</td>
<td>Data N/A</td>
<td>Total: 236,650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>KMT: 97</td>
<td>Data N/A</td>
<td>Total: 55,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KMT: 5,490.</td>
<td>DPP: 3,381</td>
<td>NP Supported: 2,614</td>
<td>Total: 20,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KMT: 54,900,830</td>
<td>DPP: 33,815,333</td>
<td>NP Supported: 26,142,500</td>
<td>Total: 204,828,663</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>78</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Data N/A</td>
<td>Data N/A</td>
<td>Data N/A</td>
<td>Data N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KMT: 15,580</td>
<td>DPP: 8,027</td>
<td>NP: 2,049</td>
<td>Total: 25,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KMT: 119,482,000</td>
<td>DPP: 62,734,000</td>
<td>NP: 14,578,000</td>
<td>Total: 196,794,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>412</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KMT: 28,212</td>
<td>DPP: 15,517</td>
<td>NP: 0</td>
<td>Total: 56,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KMT: 1,694,236,000</td>
<td>DPP: 747,539,000</td>
<td>PFP: 680,235,000</td>
<td>Total: 3,122,010,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
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<td>Data N/A</td>
<td>Data N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>263</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data N/A</td>
<td>Data N/A</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Number of newspaper ads refers to the frequency of ads appearing in the three main newspapers over the 31 days prior to each election. The source was my content analysis. Newspapers are China Times, Ziyoushibao (____) and Lianhebao (____).


Note 3: In 1996 NP supported refers to the presidential candidates Lin Yanggang and Hao Bocun, who were not official NP candidates but received NP endorsement.

Note 4: The independent team in 1996 were Chen Lu-an and Wang Qingfeng.