Turkey and the Region: Testing the Links between Power Asymmetry and Hydro-Hegemony

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Hydro-Hegemony Theory


- **Hegemonic Stability Theory** (neo-realist approach, Kindleberger, 1973): power of the hegemon
  - Most powerful riparian imposes water policies
  - No conflict if not in hegemon’s interest (Lowi, 1993; Waterbury, 1994).
Hegemonic Stability Theory

- Regimes are most effective when a hegemon emerges
- Hegemon can enforce rules & norms unilaterally, avoiding collective goods problem
Definition of the “Hegemon”

- State that temporarily gains a *preponderance of power* in the international and/or regional system

- It can unilaterally dominate the rules and procedures that guide political and economic relations
Hegemonic Stability Theory

- **Prediction**: strong hegemonic powers increase international stability and peace

- **E.g**: Britain in 19th c. (regime for the oceans), US after WW2 initiated and maintained global economic and security framework
Some Questions About Hegemonic Stability Theory

- Other states try to influence rules through their participation to int. institutions
- What if the hegemon’s interests do not coincide with other countries’ interests?
- Issues of infringement on State sovereignty
Defining power: Dahl, 1957

Debating about Power:

«Is power a property or a relationship? Is it potential or actual, a capacity or the exercise of a capacity? By whom or what, is it possessed or exercised (…). Over whom or upon what is it exercised? What kinds of outcomes does it produce: does it modify interests, options, preferences, policies or behaviour? Is it a zero-sum concept?» (Lukes, 1991)

Time as a source of power (Rubinstein, 1982 & 1985)
Two Faces of Power

**STRUCTURAL POWER**: possession & mobilization of capabilities (eco, pol., upstream/downstream position, size of territory, population...) – *neo-realists*

- *The ability to set the agenda & the rules of the games*
- *The ability to control results (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962, 1970)*
- *The ability to mobilize resources, create options and constrain actions (Guzzini, 1993)*

**BARGAINING POWER**: power as a relation

- *Impact on one’s and other’s options and alternatives: weaker not so weak*
- *Cost of no-agreement and value of time*
Negotiation & Power Asymmetries

Negotiating the Euphrates and Tigris Waters: Securitisation in Asymmetry of Power (Daoudy, 2005)

STRATEGIES
- More Issues, Actors
- New Sources of Power
  - Land/Water
  - Coalitions (Syria, Iraq vs. Israel/Turkey)

PREDOMINANTLY DISTRIBUTIVE:
- 1960-1993: Turkey, Sy, Iraq
- 2002: Turkey, Syria

POSITIONS
- International Water Law

AGREEMENTS
- 1987, 1990
- COLLATERAL
  - 1998 (T/S - Kurds)

STRUCTURE
- Power Asymmetry:
  - Resources
  - Geography
  - Costs of no Agreement

RESULTS
- Tension
  - Cooperation/Conflict

PROCESS
- Time
- Influence
- Tension between cooperation and conflict
NEGOTIATION

- Turkey: absolute sovereignty
- Syria: equitable utilization
- Iraq: prior use, historic rights

Bilateral Agreements:
- Syria/Turkey (1987): min. 500 m³/s.
- Syria/Iraq (1989): 58 % - 42 %
Despite its geographic, political and economic predominance, why has upstream Turkey (*the hegemon*) agreed to a minimum allocation of 500 m$^3$/second to downstream Syria (1987)?
TURKEY & THE REGION: ASYMMETRY OF POWER

- Structural power:
  - Resources & capacity to mobilize
  - Capacity to turn the tap (GAP)
  - Capacity to influence structure of interaction
  - More patient: low cost of no agreement

- « Structural dilemma »:
  - Securitization of water issues
  - Impacting on the hegemon’s security: narrowing the power gap
ISSUE-LINKAGES IN EUPHRATES & TIGRIS BASINS

↑ BARGAINING POWER: power strategies and counter-strategies (linking water with security issues)

- Syria: Kurds; IL; financement of GAP; rapprochement with Iraq
- Turkey: coalition opportunities (Israel); Orontes waters (Turkish Hatay/Syrian Sandjak of Alexandretta)
POWER ASYMMETRY AND HYDRO-HEGEMONY

- Research findings: more efficient outcomes if asymmetry of power (power strategies)
  - limits to Hydro-Hegemony

- Only bilateral agreements – limits to downstream power

- Shift in power relations: Turkey and Syria
  - End of Kurdish point of contention (1998)
  - Multipurpose Cooperation:
    - Training & Expertise (Protocol of 2002)
    - Sharing of Benefits (new hegemon’s discourse)
  - Iraq War (2003): foreign policy realignment