The Egyptian hydro-hegemony

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Summary

Is the Framework of HH theory applicable to the NRB?

- Conflict Intensity
- Power asymmetry

YES

How did Egypt attain, maintain and consolidated this situation?

- Attaining HH (1811-1952)
- Maintaining HH (1952-1989)
- Consolidating HH (the 1990s)

Conclusions

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The Nile river basin

- Length 6700 km
- 10 riparians (competition over water)
- 1 powerful state = Egypt (downstream)
- 1959 agreement divides the average 84 bcm/year Nile flow between Sudan and Egypt (inequitable sharing)
  - Egypt: 55.5 bcm/year
  - Sudan: 18.5 bcm/year
  - Evapotranspiration: 10 bcm/year
Conflict intensity in the NRB (1)

- There **is** a conflict, but a **cold** one (no armed conflict cases, only threats but no actions)
- **Before 1990**
  - Cold conflict (-2/-3)
- **After 1990**
  - Less cold conflict (0/1)
- **Whole period:**
  - events tend to be concentrated around 0.
  - Unstable peace situation
  - Recent (10-15 years) positive evolution?


Source: Cascao, 2004
### Power asymmetry in the NRB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Riparian Position</th>
<th>Three dimensions of power</th>
<th>Exploit. Potential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt’s HH</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia’s HH</td>
<td>Three dimensions of power</td>
<td>Exploit. Potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan’s HH</td>
<td>Riparian Position - midstream</td>
<td>Three dimensions of power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Three dimensions of power**
- Exploit
- Potential

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Historical review (1)

Pre- and colonial periods

- Pre-colonial period (1811-1882)
  - Structural power
  - Strategy: Resource Capture (RC)
  - Tactic - Military force (I) - coercive CPM
  - Conflict intensity (-5) - Violent conflict
  - Key events
    - Muhammad Ali’s systematic use of the Nile for Modernisation (1st half 19th century)
    - Khedive Ismail’s incursions in Ethiopia (1873-1879)
## Historical review (2)

### Pre- and colonial periods: Attaining HH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Countries involved</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Strat.</th>
<th>Type of Power</th>
<th>CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1906 | GB + France + Italy (for Egypt + Ethiopia) | Nile Tripartite agreement – Treaty of “Non-interference” principle | I – Coercion-pressure  
II – Incentives  
III – Treaty / securitisation  
IV – SD / K construction | C | S + B + I | 2 |
| 1925 | Italy + GB (for Sudan + Egypt) | Exchange of notes - Italy recognises the “prior hydraulic rights” of Egypt and Sudan. | II – Incentives  
III – Treaty / Securitisation  
IV – SD / K construction | C | S + B + I | 2 |
| 1929 | Egypt + GB (for Sudan) | Egypt (partially indpt) and Britain (on behalf of Sudan) - Nile Water Treaty | III – Treaty / Securitisation  
IV – SD / K construction | C | B + I | 2 |

« Egypt’s hydro-hegemony originates in British colonisation of most of the basin » (Williams, 2002: 1192)
Historical review (3)
Post-colonial and cold war periods: Maintaining HH

Table: the 1959 agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Countries involved</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Type of Power</th>
<th>CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1959 | Egypt + Sudan      | Agreement on “Full control and utilization of the annual Nile flow” | I - Covert actions - Pressure  
II - Incentives  
III – Treaty - Securitisation  
IV - Knowledge construction- Sanctioned discourse | RC + C + I | S +B + I | 6   |
Historical review (4)
Post-colonial and cold war periods: Maintaining HH

Table: the 1959 agreement: tactics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance Producing Mechanism (CPM)</th>
<th>Tactic used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRUCTURAL POWER</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I – coercive CPM</td>
<td>Covert actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coercion/Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II – utilitarian CPM</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BARGAINING POWER</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III – normative CPM</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Securitisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDEOATIONAL POWER</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV – hegemonic CPM</td>
<td>Knowledge construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanctioning the discourse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Historical review (5)
**Post-colonial and cold war periods**

**Maintaining HH**

Table: Key events - Post-colonial and cold war periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Countries involved</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Type of Power</th>
<th>CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960 - 1964</td>
<td>Egypt + Ethiopia</td>
<td>Somalia – Ethiopia war</td>
<td>I – Covert operations</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>All riparians (Ethiopia observer)</td>
<td>Hydromet</td>
<td>I – Covert operations II – Incentives</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Ethiopia excluded</td>
<td>Undugu</td>
<td>I – Covert operations II – Incentives</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-1979</td>
<td>Egypt + Somalia</td>
<td>Somalia – Ethiopia war</td>
<td>I – Covert operations I – Coercion - pressure</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Historical review (6)
The 1990s - Consolidating HH

Table: Key events – the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Countries involved</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Tactic</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Type of Power</th>
<th>CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>All Nile riparians (Ethiopia observer)</td>
<td>Tecconile</td>
<td>I – Active stalling II – Incentives</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Toshka project</td>
<td>I – pressure III – Securitisation IV – K construction and SD</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>S + B + I</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>All Nile riparians</td>
<td>NBI</td>
<td>I – Active stalling II – Incentives</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Historical review (7)

Conclusion

• The evaluation of the conflict intensity showed amelioration in states water-relations.
• However, an in-depth analysis of these events spotted the light on the fact that these cooperative schemes are for Egypt a tactic to gain time in order to complete its gigantic resource capture projects.
• As a consequence, upstreamers may not see any change in the status quo for long.
Other coercive resources and Int’l context

• International support and financial mobilisation
  – Playing with powers
  – Blocking funds to other riparians
  – Human Capital
  – Weakness of International law
Conclusion

• The NRB is a pertinent case study
• Power is an efficient explanatory tool
• Egypt used of all strategies and tactics to attain, maintain and consolidate is HH.
  – **Attainment**: Process launched by Muhammad Ali through Resource capture strategies, and completed by colonial GB through more reflexive strategies
  – **Maintenance**: Independent Egypt quickly ensure its powerful position via the 1959 agreement
  – **Consolidation?** The 1990s, via gigantic resource capture projects and the containment (nearly integration) of the other states?
Conclusion: Egypt and the Nile basin’s position in the FHH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of Hydro-Hegemony</th>
<th>Main Water Control Strategy (Figure 3)</th>
<th>Form of Interaction over Water (Figure 2)</th>
<th>Likely distribution of water or benefits</th>
<th>Form of Conflict (Figure 1)</th>
<th>Water Event Intensity Scale (Yoffe 2001)</th>
<th>River basin example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>positive-sum</td>
<td>integration</td>
<td>shared control (stability)</td>
<td>EQUITABLE</td>
<td>no conflict</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Egypt - Nile basin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative-sum</td>
<td>resource capture, containment</td>
<td>consolidated control (contained instability)</td>
<td>INEQUITABLE</td>
<td>cold conflict</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative-sum</td>
<td>resource capture, containment</td>
<td>unconsolidated control (instability)</td>
<td>(NON-EQUILIBRIUM)</td>
<td>violent conflict</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>